12.10.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 342/1

1.

welcomes the great success of European research policy as implemented through the successive framework programmes up to Horizon 2020 (H2020), the largest integrated research programme in the world, based on scientific excellence and the acceleration of innovation;

2.

notes that H2020 is the main support tool for developing research and innovation in Europe within the overarching Europe 2020 strategy and for implementing the European Research Area (ERA);

3.

reaffirms the relevance of the Europe 2020 strategy, which proposes a consolidated ‘knowledge triangle’ approach (research — education — innovation), with the change in the learning approach and the goal of raising the level of training for all remaining essential, and promoting university-business cooperation; also recommends seeking greater coordination and complementarity with the Erasmus+ and Interreg programmes, including Interreg Europe, which is devoted to interregional cooperation; emphasises that the implementation of the ERA must be pursued and requires that a number of goals be met, of which scientific excellence is a vital and indispensable, but not exclusive, strand;

4.

underlines the continued relevance of the ERA objectives and the benefit of still seeking to achieve them, particularly in respect of transnational cooperation, knowledge mobility, a single labour market for researchers and innovators, gender equality, and access to information and science;

5.

suggests, in order to develop support for the project to build a knowledge society in Europe, that European talent be identified and researchers’ careers monitored; European pathways for researchers should be established, enabling them to access programmes to support their research career in periods of transition; the involvement of researchers in the business environment should be promoted;

6.

refuses to limit the budget debate solely to the framework programme: depending on the valuation method, the share of cohesion policy devoted to research and innovation varies between EUR 43 and EUR 110 billion, not including the major contributions from other sectoral policies and the Juncker Plan;

7.

calls for a return to innovation and research as one of the top priorities in the debate on the future of Europe and the priorities set out in the Rome Declaration (1), for the horizontal governance of research, innovation and training issues within the EU to be strengthened, and for the EU’s overall fiscal effort in the area of R&I to be stepped up across each of these policies, within the current and the next MFF. In this overall context, and in line with the European Parliament’s draft report (2) and the report of the independent High Level Group on maximising the impact of EU Research and Innovation Programmes (Lamy Report) (3), the budget for the framework programme should be considerably increased to at least maintain the growth momentum of the current framework programme (4). In any event, the necessary promotion of R&I must not undermine the importance of cohesion policy, which remains the EU’s key financing tool for achieving economic and social cohesion and convergence between its cities and regions. The full potential of cohesion and R & D policy measures will need to be harnessed and combined in order to boost regional development;

8.

calls for a new collective ambition that focuses not only on scientific excellence in Europe but also on scientific excellence and the innovation capacity of Europe as a whole, by tapping into the full potential of all its cities and regions, helping to strengthen their capacities and promoting open and collaborative innovation;

9.

believes such an ambition is particularly necessary in the context of a globalisation process whose effects are not yet contained, above all at local and regional level, and where research and innovation can offer resilience, high added value and long-term competitiveness;

10.

aims to promote a holistic approach to European, national and regional funding without which this ambition and the debate on the EU budget would be meaningless; points out the importance of the target of spending 3 % of GDP on public and private R&I that was set for all Member States by the Europe 2020 strategy, which has been stagnating at 2,03 % since 2015 and undermined, among other things, by the decrease in appropriations in many Member States; to that end, considers it essential to continue strengthening R&I systems, taking account of the circumstances in each country and region, by improving the coordination of policies at European level and promoting the necessary reforms at national and regional level, including through the European Semester and the smart specialisation strategies;

11.

considers it necessary to clarify the debate on synergies and proposes five operational principles that could be shared between the EU, the Member States, the regions and cities:

12.

points out that the European added value of the framework programme is primarily based on its collective and collaborative dimension and on its contribution to creating a network of researchers and innovation ecosystems. This dimension should continue to take precedence over support for individual projects;

13.

is concerned about the decline in the average success rate of the calls for proposals, which is lower than for the previous framework programme and seriously impedes its dissemination in cities and regions. The competition necessary in a drive for excellence should not lead to exclusion and excessive concentration;

14.

believes it is vital to maintain the openness of the framework programme in order to ensure its availability right across Europe and its regions, as well as to its citizens; calls for greater innovation in the framework programme’s tools in order to combine excellence, inclusion and participation;

15.

notes the importance of maintaining a balance between basic research and research closer to the market, but also between free research and research as a response to questions raised by society and economic operators, in order to target both incremental innovation as well as disruptive innovation, as both are capable of creating new business opportunities and jobs;

16.

notes the primacy currently afforded to projects with high technology readiness levels (TRL), which prioritises incremental innovation by encouraging researchers to focus on mature ideas that can be brought to the market within a short time span; at the same time, argues that support for projects at lower TRLs is also important for bringing more innovation to the market; stresses the importance of disruptive innovations that are based on lower TRLs and enable new products and services to be released on the market quickly. In any event, helping SMEs access the market and creating sustainable jobs should be key priorities of innovation policy. This should be the role of a European Innovation Council;

17.

calls for better account to be taken of all forms of excellence and innovation, and points out that non-technological innovation and social innovation create a need for new knowledge that can configure new areas of excellence;

18.

calls for full recognition of social innovation, which means novel ideas (products, services and models) that make it possible to meet societal needs in the broad sense of the term;

19.

emphasises that research and innovation is not targeted exclusively at companies but also concerns public policies, health, culture and community life, as well as the social economy and new economic models, which contribute to the creation of new partnerships, new activities and new social relationships. Therefore, the exploitation of innovation output should focus not only on the concept of a product with an economic value on the market but also on the concept of a service with a social value for citizens;

20.

highlights that the term excellence is used to refer to very different realities; suggests distinguishing between the following challenges which the framework programme must help address:

21.

when assessing the impact of projects, both in the ex-ante phase in the case of proposals and the ex-post phase in the case of approved projects, suggests taking the following into consideration:

22.

suggests, in order to help promote excellence in all its forms, that cities and regions be given a greater role in the future framework programme:

23.

calls for the introduction of two new societal challenges to develop excellent scientific output on major challenges for the future of European societies:

24.

calls for interdisciplinarity, the human and social sciences, and risk-taking to be given more emphasis in the context of societal challenges, in order to catalyse new ideas and solutions, particularly through the introduction of undefined calls for projects;

25.

encourages the adoption of a new, complementary approach based on missions, in order to carry out exploratory work and large-scale projects, as well as on cross-cutting focuses, using the model of smart cities, environmental questions, or maritime and marine research questions; to this end, reiterates the Committee’s call for a target to be set, in the next framework programme, for 10 % of projects to have a significant impact on marine and maritime research (5);

26.

is surprised that many opportunities existing under the current rules are not sufficiently tapped and suggests several areas for improvement:

27.

calls on the Commission to present those elements of its assessment that justify the high level of funding for large enterprises under Horizon 2020 given that their R & D expenditure has increased only slightly, and consequently to propose changes for the next framework programme;

28.

insists on the need to fund research activities with grants; deplores the trend towards replacing grants with loans but acknowledges that projects with high levels of technological maturity that are close to market activities should be able to avail of such loans, among other tools;

29.

considers that the development of financial instruments to support the objectives of the framework programme is justified only if they can be used, in partnership with financial institutions, to hedge against high risks where there is market failure, based for example on the InnovFin model; regrets the current limited use of the Juncker Plan to protect against this type of risk;

30.

draws attention to the need to improve the financing of innovation projects for SMEs, with the focus on Industry 4.0 programmes as a better way of structuring the EU industrial fabric, while also creating domestic demand for technology that promotes European development;

31.

notes that scientific excellence is embedded in innovation hubs and ecosystems. The majority of entities benefiting from Horizon 2020 (universities, research bodies, SMEs, civil society organisations) are solidly rooted in their cities and regions, whose assets contribute to the quality of science. This fact must be fully reflected in the framework programme;

32.

points out that the territorial dimension must be taken into account as a matter of course when any policy is being framed, because smart specialisation strategies (RIS3) provide resources for science stakeholders and businesses, and create value for cities and regions, as well as for citizens;

33.

points out that RIS3s have been adopted and developed by regions as a way of structuring investment in research and innovation to further economic growth, in tandem with other regions, and that coordinating regional and European investment on structural projects in relation to smart specialisation increases the impact of the framework programme and avoids financing projects that are not relevant to local circumstances;

34.

emphasises that the framework programme must help to strengthen R&I capacity in cities and regions so that they are helped to climb the ‘stairway to excellence’, e.g. in smart specialisation, and to promote the ability of all regions to take part in H2020 by contributing high-quality projects;

35.

notes the importance of cities as innovation hubs that play a key role in producing excellence; also notes that if science is too concentrated in innovation hubs, this may undermine the search for spillover effects on the economy and society, and points to the need to develop pockets of excellence away from the main centres; points to the crucial role played by regional policy in this area;

36.

advocates a new partnership for R&I excellence in Europe — between the EU, the Member States, cities and regions — based on enhanced multilevel governance, compliance with the subsidiarity principle, a shared open innovation culture and development of grassroots initiatives in a bottom-up approach;

37.

would like the framework programme to do more to strengthen regional innovation hubs and ecosystems, with more support for technology transfer networks, and for a new ‘territorial connections’ action to be set up to recognise and fund regional excellence networks through the framework programme, along the lines of the Vanguard Initiative;

38.

calls for pioneering regions to form European consortia with a view to creating ground-breaking innovations throughout Europe. Identifying opportunities for collaboration, mapping parts of the value chain, and identifying key stakeholders and capabilities through smart specialisation are key steps in the process of creating EU added value;

39.

is disappointed that halfway through its term, Horizon 2020 is undermined by low participation among the EU-13 countries  (6) , and points to the differences in participation at regional and local level. It is important to make the framework programme — and not just cohesion policy — work across all the Union’s cities and regions so as to support the best pioneers of excellence and ensure their access to European collaborative efforts;

40.

would like the Spreading Excellence and Widening Participation in Horizon 2020 programme to be continued and broadened accordingly, and calls for a special approach in the case of regions in countries that are not eligible for the programme whose R&I is very underdeveloped, which means most of the outermost regions, without losing sight of excellence as a fundamental criterion; highlights the low share of H2020 resources mobilised for this programme (1 %), notes the absence of any significant change in access to the framework programme, and is surprised that the countries that are the major beneficiaries of H2020 are also the main beneficiaries of the Spreading Excellence programme; believes that this undermines the legitimacy of the framework programme, and calls for new initiatives;

41.

recommends an integrated approach to the ‘stairway to excellence’, based on a coordination plan for each country and region so that action is taken on the necessary reforms, building centres of excellence that are open to all, combating the brain drain and participating fully in European research networks. This coordination plan would be co-financed through regional, national and European funding, including Horizon 2020 resources and the European Structural and Investment Funds;

42.

to this end, suggests that access to EU cooperation be stepped up:

43.

underlines that in accordance with EU values cooperation within networks should come before competition within the framework programme, and draws attention to the importance of such networks as sources of projects and of excellence;

44.

in this connection, highlights the relevance of the Regions of Knowledge programme included in the 7th Framework Programme, which allowed for meaningful interaction with regional policy by helping to initiate long-term cooperation between local knowledge triangle players, involve the private sector (including SMEs) in framework programme projects, support transnational cooperation between innovative ecosystems and integrate local and regional players into the ERA;

45.

calls for an ambitious policy to develop cooperation networks:

46.

points to the considerable potential for supporting these initiatives under Horizon 2020, and has concerns about their meagre resources and limited use; calls for coordination and support actions (CSAs) to be more intensively used, while encouraging better recognition of innovative initiatives implemented by cities and regions through the framework programme; also calls for support for interregional cooperation around the RIS3 to be strengthened, as part of both H2020 and cohesion policy;

47.

notes that involvement of cities and regions in implementing Horizon 2020 has increased since the programme was launched, with more and more partner regions for the joint programming tools such as ERA-NET schemes, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Cofund actions, and public-private research and innovation partnerships such as the Clean Sky initiative;

48.

is in favour of developing these co-constructed projects, and urges that the implementing rules be simplified and harmonised and that, for example, it be made easier for regions to take part in Joint Programming Initiatives (Article 185 TFEU), subject to the Member States’ agreement;

49.

calls for further simplification of the handling of aid; continuation and extension of the centralisation of subsidies and aid via a single information portal; programme information, procedures and the participant portal’s aid management platform should be in all official EU languages, in order to facilitate participants’ access;

50.

supports the mechanisms for granting an EU ‘top up’ to the framework programme in order to support local excellence initiatives that mobilise substantial and diversified funding;

51.

believes that experience with the smart specialisation strategies and their implementation offers very useful feedback for steering H2020 and the future framework programme, and for framing the work programmes setting out the areas eligible for financing; calls on the authorities involved in this work to do more to include the local level in this process, in order to improve consistency with grassroots challenges;

52.

considers it crucial that the various challenges of the Horizon 2020 programme take into account the socioeconomic impact on regions, starting with the design, planning and identification of areas for programme funding, so that their choice contributes effectively to improving the quality of life in all European regions;

53.

suggests that all the provisions of the framework programme be reassessed in the light of the subsidiarity and complementarity principles so as to strengthen coordination between the various stakeholders in terms not just of co-financing but also of a reassignment of roles, focusing the activities of the framework programme on areas offering European added value;

54.

recommends transforming the ‘seal of excellence’ granted to the best unsuccessful applications under the SME instrument, so that this becomes a real partnership facility piloted jointly by the EU and the regions to coordinate their activities as effectively as possible before and after the submission of applications. This principle applies to the other measures covered by the seal of excellence, such as the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions and European Research Council grants, and any other projects that help create synergies;

55.

highlights the role of local authorities as test beds and early adopters via public procurement; calls for relaxation of the regulatory framework for these activities and simplification of the system for supporting innovative public procurement, which is currently underutilised and whose rules are not well enough understood by contracting authorities;

56.

reiterates the importance of a 360o approach to innovation that is both incremental and disruptive, technological and non-technological, design- and user-led innovation, social innovation, and open and collaborative innovation; points out that locally established hubs and ecosystems are the main factors in innovation, transfer and value creation activities; calls on the Commission when setting up the European Innovation Council (EIC) to take into account the role played by local authorities in these matters and to involve them in future EIC tasks;

57.

proposes introducing in the next framework programme a new structure for the SME instrument, whose programming and implementation conditions would involve local authorities upstream and downstream in order to gear it better to smart specialisation and local financing and to mitigate the discouragement effect associated with its very low success rate;

58.

opposes any suggestion of transferring part of cohesion policy funding to measures under the framework programme in order to finance more projects automatically or to support these ‘excellent rejects’; wishes to defend the autonomy of regional authorities and to promote the proposed approach based on co-construction and the strengthening of complementarity and cooperation;

59.

emphasises the need to consider spillover effects, and issues of dissemination and ownership of project results, from the moment projects are set up. The current impact of projects is limited in these respects, and EU and local programmes should therefore be developed specifically for these activities. Cities and regions should be more involved in using and disseminating the results of projects under the framework programme;

60.

also supports the development of instruments designed to support the path of a proof of concept to the market, e.g. the Fast Track to Innovation pilot, or the organisation of new industrial sectors through the INNOSUP initiative and its cluster-facilitated projects for new industrial value chains, and would like these to be expanded;

61.

a mix of support tools for clusters dedicated to groups of enterprises rather than to individual ones should be developed to enable cross-sector approaches and collaborative EU partnerships. Furthermore, the role that clusters can play as bridges between actors within regions and outside, as channels for business support to SMEs, should be reflected in EU policies;

62.

calls on the Commission to assess the impact of the reforms introduced in 2013 to promote synergies between H2020 and the ESI Funds;

63.

feels that there is not enough focus in the second pillar on emerging industries, and is concerned that inadequate support is being given to the networks of excellence of innovation hubs and ecosystems geared to industries of the future, such as the Vanguard Initiative. The persistent difficulty of financing industrial pilot projects and large-scale demonstrators is worrying, and the European Commission is urged to boost funding and consider new actions in this area without delay;

64.

suggests creating a programme to support demonstration infrastructure in order to promote the networking of testing sites, demonstrators and pilot projects, based on the model for networking research infrastructure;

65.

notes that, with the concept of progress currently being challenged and debated, the relationship between science and society must be at the heart of the debate on the future of European R&I, whether this concerns the areas of research focus, the conditions for carrying out projects, or the choices made regarding the development of new social and technical applications of science;

66.

thus advocates promoting trust in both science and progress, while developing a sustainable development approach; will therefore defend the precautionary principle, which is a principle of prudence whereby action is taken in full awareness of risk;

67.

highlights the major challenge that open science currently represents, through open access to research findings and publications, the availability of information to the general public that is both reliable and from different sources, and the debate with the public and stakeholders;

68.

considers that between open science and objective-driven science there should be a space for dialogue between scientific and economic players, as well as civil society, to discuss and formulate new scientific questions together, while at the same time respecting each other’s independence;

69.

stresses the urgent need to commend science, technology and all related professions, including those in industry, to young people and their families, with particular emphasis on encouraging women to embark on scientific and technological careers;

70.

laments the lack of resources earmarked for the Science with and for society programme, its fragmentary nature and consequently limited impact, and calls for priority to be given to actions with European added value and with real cooperation between stakeholders, Member States, cities and regions;

71.

defends the principle of open science but wishes to preserve the specific nature of the framework programme, including in the context of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU; hopes that this withdrawal does not lead to a decrease in funding for the framework programme, while understanding that the issue will be dealt with as part of the comprehensive negotiations with the United Kingdom;

72.

calls for a strengthening of international cooperation under the framework programme, including with associate partners and emerging countries, but also as part of neighbourhood policy or sea-basin strategies such as the one for the Mediterranean.

12.10.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 342/10

1.

welcomes the European Commission’s approach of involving the European Committee of the Regions in the foresight exercise for the CAP after 2020; observes that agriculture, food and rural areas are facing major challenges which make carrying out a reform of the CAP necessary;

2.

stresses that the CAP has played and must continue to play a fundamental role in European integration; the objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union remain valid as part of the review process which we are facing;

3.

notes that the agricultural sector is the second biggest industrial employment sector in the EU employing 22 million farmers and 44 million people in the rest of the agri-food chain and providing more than 500 million Europeans with the highest quality food supply at affordable prices. The impact that agriculture has on jobs is even greater if we include the production, repair and marketing of agricultural machinery and the production and marketing of farm inputs;

4.

argues that the CAP should be turned into an agricultural policy that is fair, sustainable, high-quality and based on solidarity for the benefit of farmers, regions, consumers and members of the public; considers that only a strong and common European agricultural and food policy can guarantee food security at European level and ensure that rural areas are dynamic;

5.

notes that arable and livestock farmers are the key players in and the main recipients of the CAP. Without their support it is not possible to implement the measures by which we seek to achieve the desired outcomes. The CAP must take into account their role and their commitment, and in particular the need for agricultural and livestock farms to be economically sustainable in order to ensure decent living conditions, while also maintaining a vibrant rural environment with an adequate level of employment;

6.

believes that the future design of the CAP should take European consumers into consideration. Informing the public of the benefits of the CAP, ensuring food security and guaranteeing environmental protection are challenges that European consumers should face together;

7.

believes that, with a view to making farming attractive and ensuring safe and high quality European agriculture, regulated markets could ensure better pay for farmers by employing public and private management tools and measures which stabilise agricultural prices and prevent unfair trade practices; also believes that the position of farmers needs to be strengthened vis-à-vis other stakeholders in the sector;

8.

recognises that the economic, social, environmental, regional and international legitimacy of the CAP is key to its survival. The European agricultural sector has some key qualities that form the basis of its competitiveness: innovativeness, robust logistics and infrastructure, considerable diversity, the significant natural, cultural and historical assets of agricultural areas, the large number of family-run farms, and a highly developed culture of entrepreneurship, as well as products that conform to strict environmental and health rules. All of these qualities offer potential that we need to make more use of, via a targeted CAP, in order to further strengthen agriculture and rural areas;

9.

believes that the CAP urgently needs reform so as to be more in tune with public expectations and to legitimise its budget, which is much sought after in a context of static budgetary resources;

10.

is convinced that the success of the CAP is founded on unity, and that there must be no shift away from this towards renationalisation in the future, while also hoping that the regions will be strengthened in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity. In retaining its character as a common policy, the CAP must be flexible in order to take account of the different circumstances in agriculture, particularly those of the Mediterranean and outermost regions;

11.

draws the European Commission’s attention to the growing interest among consumers in locally produced, high-quality and fair priced food that meets animal protection standards and has a high environmental and social value, as well as creating jobs and added value; this is also evident from the increase in demand;

12.

believes that the traceability of modes of food production, which is a safety guarantee for consumers and producers, must be enhanced and sustained;

13.

notes farming’s lack of economic appeal as a career in many areas of production and subsectors, which exacerbates the problem of an age pyramid that is very unconducive to generational renewal (1); the fact that few young people are taking up farming represents a threat to the continuation of European family-based agriculture and the vitality of rural areas; believes that measures should be introduced to support the entry of young farmers into the sector;

14.

notes that the CAP, despite having a significant budget, is associated with a considerable decrease in agricultural employment (the number of farms in the EU fell by 20 % between 2007 and 2013); notes that the CAP budget has fallen in percentage terms over the last 30 years, from 75 % to 40 % of the EU’s budget;

15.

stresses that agricultural production should be promoted by the CAP, as provided for by the Treaty, by giving farmers the means to generate their income essentially from the market, at a reasonable and justified cost for European citizens and consumers; points out that numerous studies have demonstrated that the CAP has contributed to the concentration of agricultural production in certain regions at the expense of others, undermining the EU’s territorial cohesion goals;

16.

believes that the CAP must reflect the various agricultural and climate-related circumstances in Europe, especially those of less-favoured areas, such as grassland hilltops, mountain regions, the Mediterranean, north polar regions and outermost regions. The CAP must take account of their functions in safeguarding the land and protecting the soil, and in providing support for maintaining rural communities and their cultural values as well as their role in maintaining an active social system in these regions;

17.

recalls that, despite warnings by the European Court of Auditors, the distribution of public support among farms and Member States remains very unequal; notes that the allocation of direct payments on the basis of surface area has resulted in farmland and direct payments becoming heavily concentrated; the latter should take greater account of the range of farming models, levels of income, added value produced and jobs provided and should ensure that farming is maintained in all regions;

18.

notes that a great many farmers have a very low income that is below the poverty threshold, and that this contradicts the Treaty of Rome’s aim of ensuring ‘a fair standard of living for the agricultural community’ (Article 39) and that it is necessary to make farming incomes more secure (prices, direct aid);

19.

considers that CAP subsidies should only be provided to producers who are actually engaged in agricultural activity, and not to inactive farms that only generate a negligible agricultural income;

20.

notes that, too often, farmers are forced to sell their products at prices that are below their production costs, leading to a spiralling reduction in costs and prices;

21.

supports the conclusions of the EC Agricultural Markets Task Force of November 2016 and calls on the European Commission to propose a legislative proposal to fight unfair trade practices;

22.

notes that the export of EU genetic resources, and animal breeds in particular, is contributing to the genetic erosion of important indigenous breeds, particularly in third countries, and contradicts UN Sustainable Development Goal 15 on preserving biodiversity, in particular genetic resources with food security implications;

23.

believes that, as demonstrated by the CoR study on the Market Responsibility Programme in the dairy sector, market regulation is for many sectors more effective and less costly than the retroactive triggering of crisis measures and would therefore enable the CAP budget to be put to better use;

24.

considers that income insurance schemes could benefit insurance providers rather than farmers and prove expensive for taxpayers in the event that prices fell sharply, without addressing price volatility. A study should be carried out and an assessment made of the insurance regime introduced in the United States; the specific case of outermost regions, which are subject to particular market conditions, should be examined;

25.

considers that there is a need for a clear and stable legislative framework which guarantees arable and livestock farmers the legal certainty they need to be able to make economic decisions in the medium and long term;

26.

stresses that the EU, which is now the world’s largest importer and exporter of food, has increased its dependence on third countries and developed a trade policy that contradicts its aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions;

27.

notes that an increasing proportion of those agricultural products that were previously produced in Europe are now imported from countries with low labour costs, which puts EU food products at a substantial competitive disadvantage in terms of price;

28.

notes also the positive aspects of EU exports for the economy, in terms of agricultural and food products with high added value, which create income and employment in the European agriculture and agri-food sector;

29.

notes that cooperatives and producer organisations and the integration of producers in certain forms may play a key role in the agri-food sectors, allowing the farmers to concentrate supply, reduce costs, provide a number of services and strengthen their position in the food chain;

30.

notes that EU exports of surpluses (milk powder, chicken, tomato purée, etc.) at prices below the cost of production in Europe and in Africa reduce the productive capacity of African countries and encourage rural populations to emigrate, contrary to the EU’s commitment to take account of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) adopted by the United Nations in 2015 in its ‘policy coherence for development’; also observes that the European Union is the biggest importer of foodstuffs from developing countries, creating jobs in the agri-food sector in these countries; notes however that European imports (fruit, vegetables, lamb, etc.) at prices below the cost of production in Europe reduce productive capacity in the EU and may entail food security risks;

31.

notes that agricultural prices in Europe are increasingly linked to the price of the lowest bidder on the world market and that European farmers are therefore subjected to greater competition, despite the fact that they must comply with more stringent environmental and health standards;

32.

stresses that the added value of agricultural production has been largely extracted upstream and downstream, with the position of agricultural producers vis-à-vis agro-industry and distribution being in many cases too weak; improved coordination along the chain between the agricultural sector, the agri-food industry and the commercial sector must lead to improved distribution of profit margins;

33.

notes that rural areas are falling behind urban areas and that this gap is all the more worrying as it is still growing, partly because the development of big cities and capitals is picking up pace (2);

34.

regrets the accelerated loss of biodiversity on farmland and in the wild, which threatens the resilience of our agricultural systems and natural areas;

35.

is concerned that erosion and soil degradation due to unsustainable farming practices put the fertility of the soil at risk, and that the increasing encroachment of urban areas onto farmland takes up the space that is needed to maintain food security in Europe;

36.

takes note of the agricultural pollution of certain water tables and rivers, as well as the occasional overuse of these waters for irrigation purposes;

37.

stresses that global warming is already having a significant agricultural impact, which makes it all the more urgent to redirect production methods;

38.

highlights the need to invest in digital innovation which can have a positive impact on issues such as sustainability, food safety, resource efficiency, waste reduction and short supply chains, etc.; at the same time, points out that the economic and social effects of such developments with regard to family farming must be carefully studied; and is concerned about the potential use of big data by private companies, which may result in farms being placed under technical and financial supervision;

39.

notes that the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union is likely to lead to a reduction in resources for the CAP as well as a loss of EU markets in the UK; calls on the United Kingdom and the EU to maintain close trade cooperation in the sphere of agriculture and food;

40.

points out that the share of the EU budget devoted to agriculture — despite being only 0,7 % of European GDP in 2014 — is just enough to build a genuine common European policy that is of strategic importance for food security, but that, where rural development and the second pillar are concerned, the resources are not enough in some spheres, and the CAP’s new objectives should therefore be taken into account in the future budget;

41.

rejects the idea of co-financing for the first pillar of the CAP, which would undermine the position of the CAP as the sole integrated EU policy, effectively renationalising it, and would put at a disadvantage farmers in the poorest EU countries who are the most dependent on EU funding;

42.

notes that the cost to public health of certain diets that cause obesity, diabetes, etc., and certain agricultural practices (overuse of antibiotics in some livestock farms, cocktails of pesticides, etc.) is much higher than the CAP budget; points out that closer coordination of agricultural and food policy is needed;

43.

recommends raising awareness about and encouraging the consumption of foods which are part of a healthy diet, such as the Mediterranean diet, through specific programmes that support wine, fruits and vegetables, and apiculture, while also improving the quality and added value of these products;

44.

bears in mind the specific features of the outermost regions; given that transposing the European farming model to these regions would not work, Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) expressly allows the Council to adopt specific provisions for adapting EU legislation, including the CAP, to the outermost regions’ circumstances. Here, the post-2020 CAP should retain the differentiated treatment for the outermost regions, by means of necessary adjustments to the EAFRD, POSEI, state aid and other instruments that may be introduced;

45.

proposes that the future European agriculture policy after 2020 should be structured around the following objectives, which are widely shared:

46.

notes that the complexity of the CAP makes it difficult, or even risky, for individual entrepreneurs and farmers to apply for subsidies. and that simplification is necessary to ensure the continued acceptance and attractiveness of the CAP. The process should be simplified and accelerated, including by streamlining paperwork, for low-value transactions in particular;

47.

hopes that the CAP budget will be kept at a sufficiently high level, consistent with the principles set out in the EU treaties and with its status as the only integrated EU policy, to meet the needs of European agriculture and of rural areas and communities and to respond to the demands made by society;

48.

notes that many of the challenges mentioned above concerning climate, energy, food production and biodiversity can be tackled by the agricultural sector. However, it will be necessary to provide financial support for technical initiatives and innovative solutions, both entrepreneurial and cooperative, in order to speed up the transition;

49.

draws attention to the need, regarding direct and area payments, to concentrate resources particularly on small and family-run farms, while for large farms affected by the capping of aid the priority should be financial solutions;

50.

calls on the European Commission to carry out a detailed assessment of the results of the current CAP when it comes to applying the objectives assigned to it in the EU Treaties in terms of agricultural income and market stabilisation;

51.

recommends tackling the volatility of agricultural prices, providing market-driven income opportunities for farmers and making food chains fairer (3);

52.

calls, on the basis of Article 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, for the treatment accorded to agriculture in the outermost regions under the POSEI scheme to be maintained, in accordance with the view expressed by the European Commission in its report to the European Parliament and the Council of 15 December 2016 (COM(2016) 797);

53.

calls for increased support for vineyards, olive groves and livestock farming on steep slopes or mountains, disadvantaged, low-yield areas and outermost regions, and for types of agricultural management that help to improve the biodiversity of mountain meadows and pastures;

54.

calls on the EU to use its influence as the world’s largest food importer and exporter to change the international agricultural trade rules introduced in 1994 (WTO) so as to encourage greater fairness and solidarity in trade relations; notes that volatility is a challenge for European agriculture and urges the European Commission to consider measures to mitigate risks arising from increased exposure to the world market;

55.

thinks that an approach in which agricultural revenue is based more on the market than on subsidies can bolster the economic recognition of the job of farming, making it more attractive; to this end advises the EU to regulate its agricultural markets so as to prevent surpluses and shortfalls and stabilise agricultural prices at satisfactory levels;

56.

proposes that an annual precautionary savings fund be introduced, to be carried over to the following year if it is not spent in its entirety (4);

57.

calls on the Commission to guarantee fair conditions in bilateral trade agreements and partnerships entered into with third countries; to this end, views the duty to stop exporting agricultural and food products at prices below the average production costs in Europe as a result of public aid as being connected to the right to protect the EU from cheap imports that frustrate its production capacity or do not meet European production standards;

58.

underlines the importance of short regional and local chains, both because they are more environmentally sustainable as they generate less pollution from transport, and because they promote farming that showcases local quality, tradition and economic and cultural heritage;

59.

calls on the EU to revamp the agriculture sections of bilateral ‘free’ trade agreements and economic ‘partnerships’ with third countries. These agreements should have adequate resources and priority should be given to labour-intensive family farms, with a focus above all on local and regional markets and short supply chains; also calls on the EU to properly reflect the interests of its agriculture sector in trade agreements, in order to minimise the threats for European production, by identifying a strategic list of products which may be vulnerable to excessive pressure; requests that such products which may be sensitive to liberalisation are given appropriate special and differential treatment in trade agreements;

60.

suggests that a review should take place of EU competition law so as to allow all stakeholders in a given sector, including consumers and public authorities, to decide on a fair distribution of the added value and profit margins along the value chain and to allow farmers to move towards a fairer position in the food chain and to strengthen their position on the market;

61.

calls for a review of EU law on awarding public contracts in the mass catering sector, incorporating a locality clause for food supply; also calls for a greater exchange of good practices between local and regional authorities, with a view to promoting local food supply, a local market for organic farming products, and small-scale processing that provides rural jobs;

62.

calls for research funded by the EU budget and the EIB on agricultural and rural cooperation to be geared in particular towards the following aims:

63.

calls for a switch from a direct payments per hectare approach to one based on direct payments per hectare capped and modulated per agricultural worker — understood as an active farmer — in order to:

64.

calls, as part of greening, for environmental measures and aid for environment- and climate-friendly practices to be gradually reinforced by means of:

65.

recommends that any award of direct payments to an undertaking that has not respected the social standards in place in its Member State should be reduced, in order to protect the rights of agricultural workers;

66.

calls for a strengthening of the second CAP pillar and an increase in rural development budgets; also calls for a greater degree of subsidiarity enabling Member States to transfer funds from the first to the second pillar;

67.

draws attention to the great contribution made to achieving CAP goals at local and regional level by Community-led Local Development (CLLD) and the LEADER method and therefore recommends that up to 20 % of funds earmarked for the implementation of the second pillar be spent on this under national and regional programmes implementing the CAP;

68.

reiterates that the Member States and regions should be given more power to regulate farmland and set restrictions to that end, particularly to tackle Europe’s land-grabbing and concentration phenomenon, which is limiting young farmers’ options with regard to setting up a farming business (5);

69.

calls for a sufficient share of funds to be set aside for the development of rural areas, by boosting the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), to ensure the harmonious and integrated development of these areas, including the provision of local infrastructure; supporting SMEs, village renewal and wider economic diversification;

70.

recommends that the EU pay special attention to the outermost regions, where the farming sector is fundamental for job and wealth creation as well as for boosting the development of the agri-food industry, research and innovation, steps to safeguard and promote high quality areas of land subject to spatial planning, and efforts to combat climate change;

71.

proposes that the second-pillar funds should be primarily aimed at:

72.

proposes shifting from a ‘service desk’ approach to a ‘contract’ approach between specific types of farms, sectors and areas; starting with a few objectives (quality, productivity, sustainability), proposes supporting innovation projects designed to this end and capable of producing a significant impact on jobs;

73.

proposes strengthening EU financial support for rural development, which has decreased significantly in comparison with the previous programming period, while maintaining sufficient funds available under the first pillar;

74.

proposes substantial, robust support for sustainable investment in maintaining family farms, with regard in particular to production, distribution and diversification;

75.

recommends adopting a rural strategy enabling all EU policies to make a greater contribution to innovation and cooperation in, and the development of rural areas in line with territorial cohesion goals (6);

76.

proposes making it easier to pool the various funds aimed at non-agricultural rural development so as to support:

77.

also advocates making use of the broader potential of agricultural and forest areas — particularly peri-urban areas — for economic, ecological, climate, energy and recreational purposes, such as local food and energy production and rural tourism. This means that the CAP needs to target not only farmers. The LEADER initiatives provide opportunities for rural and peri-urban players to collaborate and innovate, and this must continue;

78.

calls for a thorough assessment of the Structural Funds supporting the development of rural areas and promoting comprehensive policies to boost these areas by improving connectivity in terms of both transport and digital broadband, balanced with environmental protection, by means of the ‘rural proofing’ mechanism recommended in the Cork 2.0 Declaration (7);

79.

stresses that balanced territorial development must provide adequate support for rural and peri-urban areas in the hinterland, as well as disadvantaged areas (e.g. mountainous, border areas or other areas with natural or demographic challenges), in order to secure the necessary investments in growth, jobs, social inclusion and environmental sustainability;

80.

calls for the improvement of rural-urban links, whereby smaller towns and rural municipalities are fully involved, so that EU policies do not encourage a competitive relationship between urban, coastal and rural dimensions;

81.

welcomes the European Commission’s Smart Villages initiative, and the European Parliament’s part in the success of the process, and proposes that this concept be extended to Smart Rural Areas; also asks to be able to play as big a role as possible in discussions on establishing a local and regional framework for action in connection with this initiative;

82.

insists on the need to continue to harmonise the Structural Fund operating rules by means of the common strategic framework so as to facilitate the design and management of rural development programmes and promote integrated and place-based approaches (8);

83.

suggests developing the lead fund approach in order to standardise the management of projects financed from more than one fund;

84.

suggests that a discussion be held on reconciling the various non-agricultural regional development funds.

12.10.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 342/20

1.

Welcomes the European Commission’s commitment to making an active and constructive contribution to reaching the strategic objectives set out in the 2030 Agenda, paving the way for tackling a number of key and integrated global challenges;

2.

notes that the planning document, adopted as a communication by the Commission on 22 November 2016, proposes a very ambitious and wide-ranging strategy which focuses on sustainable development;

3.

acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to link the Agenda with the Europe 2020 Strategy and thereby with the European Structural and Investment Funds; given the complexity and the multitude of different reference frameworks, underlines the need for policy coherence, mainstreaming and a consistent governance framework;

4.

highlights that in order to achieve results it is essential to involve all levels of government in the decision-making process, particularly local and regional authorities (LRAs);

5.

notes that, as the policies of the European Union (EU) must comply with the principle of subsidiarity, the sustainability objectives are directly related to the responsibilities, competences and functions of subnational levels of government;

6.

insists that local and regional authorities — regions, provinces, counties, districts, metropolitan cities, small cities and municipalities — are fully-fledged policy-makers, tasked with identifying the most appropriate levels and methods of government for linking the overarching EU and UN objectives with those of local communities;

7.

stresses that out of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals, two require local governments to perform key tasks, namely SDGs 10 and 11. The former aims to reduce inequalities between territories, while the latter relates to carrying out essential functions in the areas of urban planning, transport, social welfare and sustainable lifestyles;

8.

points out in this context that the Communication does not examine the need to measure progress on attaining the SDGs, either at UN, European and national level or at subnational level; calls therefore on the European Commission to bear this dimension in mind when developing further the indicators used to measure progress and to involve local expertise and existing networks;

9.

highlights the additional priorities stemming from the integrated performance of functions with a cross-cutting impact on other strategic objectives, such as the Urban Agenda, social inclusion, EU climate and energy policy, emissions reductions, disaster risk reduction, environmental policy, the circular economy, mobility, smart specialisation and smart cities (smart lands), the subject of the Bratislava summit and the Covenant of Mayors on climate and energy;

10.

proposes capitalising on the mid-term review of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) in order to ensure overlap between the 2030 Agenda and Europe 2020, by reviewing the key guidelines and gearing them to the new SDGs from the outset;

11.

welcomes the efforts made in the working document accompanying the Communication on Key European action supporting the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SWD (2016) 390 final) to align the Europe 2020 Strategy with the objectives of the 2030 Agenda, building on the connections between the three pillars, the seven flagship initiatives, the five objectives linked to the Europe 2020 priorities and those linked to the eleven thematic Cohesion Fund objectives;

12.

stresses that in any event, if they are to be achieved, the objectives set out by the Commission in its communication on a sustainable European future will all have to be deployed locally. In this regard, recommends embedding the Agenda 2030 objectives at local level, as this is the only way of making a real and lasting impact on people’s lives;

13.

agrees with the fact that the complexity of different levels of government calls for guidance and monitoring, bringing the benefits of policy evaluation and institutional innovation (measuring the effects) to the decision-making process;

14.

takes the view that some of the linkages between the Juncker Commission’s priorities and the SDGs are in areas of significance for LRAs. This is especially the case with the employment priority, in that it covers the same competences as those referred to in SDG 4 (training and education), an area where local and regional bodies exercise considerable powers, especially where the costs of transition to a sustainable Europe are concerned;

15.

hopes that the Commission’s Investment Plan also covers tangible and intangible assets within the remit of local and regional bodies (social protection, IT, mobility, energy and telecommunications networks, waste disposal, integrated water management, etc.), many of which dovetail with various SDGs (including Nos 8, 9, 12 and 13);

16.

points out that Commission priority No 3, A resilient Energy Union with a forward-looking climate change policy, also interfaces with a range of SGDs in an area of interest to LRAs. The same applies to SDGs 5, 7 and 13, where LRAs are both beneficiaries and protagonists in policies designed to combat climate change, as well as those designed to ensure a sustainable, universally accessible energy supply and to protect social rights, which rely on services provided at local level if they are to be guaranteed;

17.

notes that priority No 7, which aims to create an area of justice and protection of fundamental rights based on mutual trust, includes policies on gender equality, in which LRAs can play a significant role, fully commensurate with SDG 5 as well as the need to win back people’s trust in the European institutions;

18.

reiterates that disaster resilience is one of the key aspects of sustainable development and calls on the institutions of the European Union to ensure that this principle is one of the central pillars of future sustainable development measures in Europe (1);

19.

notes that priority No 8 seeks to tackle migration on an unprecedented and global scale, bringing it fully into line with SDGs 1 and 10 and involving many cross-cutting LRA competences, which are very often under immense pressure to manage migratory flows of an exceptional nature;

20.

observes that, in contrast to Cohesion Policy, it may not always be possible to place the action taken to achieve the SDGs in a framework of integrated policies. It is therefore vital to set priorities that correspond to the most pressing needs, adopting a dynamic approach in the interests of attaining all the objectives in the long-term. It is thus essential to take account of the CoR’s proposal on the need to approve a code of conduct for the involvement of LRAs;

21.

points out that the objectives, require a balance to be struck between current needs and those of future generations, as well as between the needs of the different levels of government. The latter is essential for reducing burdensome transition costs to be shouldered by LRAs. If costs are not sustainable this may pose a threat to the public acceptance and effective implementation of the measures in question, in particular threatening the ability of more marginalised (internal) areas to contribute to global sustainability and more generally to the durability of the SDGs;

22.

notes the time mismatch between European (2020) measures referred to in the communication and the 2030 Agenda, while hoping that additional economic and financial instruments will be made available and that the objectives will be redefined throughout the entire duration of the reference timeframe, in line with those of the Agenda;

23.

regrets that the communication does not include an assessment of potential risks in the implementation phase of the 17 SDGs. This could be of great assistance in equipping LRAs with appropriate tools to deal with any problems that crop up in the course of implementing policies related to the goals. Ensuring that all indicators are geared to the local level is crucial for ongoing monitoring of trends in inequality — including through the use of indicators other than GDP, such as qualitative indicators capable of measuring the fairness of development and social progress in the regions;

24.

highlights that if a subset of local and regional level objectives is to be achieved, it will have to be properly funded. The necessary resources could be made available by means of specific transfers from the national level, but also by conferring greater budgetary powers on local bodies;

25.

believes that there is a need to promote platforms and initiatives that allow LRAs to share good practices and make use of know-how already made available by established bodies, such as the UNDP Live Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, to prevent the Agenda from being used as an opportunity to recentralise policies. To this end, the CoR looks forward to the launch of the multistakeholder platform announced by the Commission in order to facilitate the roll-out of the universal elements contained in the Agenda at local and regional level, and, above all, to promote the exchange of good practice and the sharing of progress made by the most dynamic European regions; expects to be associated to this platform in the appropriate manner in its institutional role as the assembly representing local and regional authorities;

26.

recognises that improving living conditions in the EU will depend, in addition to our ability to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion, on well-being and security in the neighbouring countries. In this respect, in line with the new approach set out in the Commission’s communication on a new European Consensus, strongly urges stepping up support for decentralised cooperation with and development of third countries, by promoting the use of LRA platforms for information and discussion on development: the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) and the Conference of Regional and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP), the biennial Assises of decentralised cooperation and the atlas of decentralised cooperation, which provide partner countries with the opportunity to meet, talk and exchange good practice;

27.

endorses the Commission’s position on the Urban Agenda for the EU adopted with the Pact of Amsterdam in 2016,which will be implemented in cooperation with LRAs in order to cover all aspects of sustainable development and contribute to the implementation of the global New Urban Agenda;

28.

deems it necessary for strategies in support of sustainable urban development and horizontal and vertical cooperation, within a participatory governance system, to take account of the diversity of cities and of the importance of social innovation and future-oriented planning, by employing an integrated and coordinated approach, particularly when addressing key challenges with the aim of improving quality of life in cities;

29.

recommends analysing the 2030 Agenda to ensure that its objectives are consistent with the European development model, based as it is on local production systems (clusters), comprised mainly of SMEs. To this end, hopes that the development models also pay particular attention to the development of smaller urban centres, as an excessive concentration of local and regional development can end in the trap of underdevelopment, which, in turn, may result in marginalisation and population decline;

30.

values the fact that the communication highlights the various facets of sustainable development — social, environmental and economic — as pillars upon which the Commission’s policies must converge in order to provide solutions in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals and the 13 sectoral policies adopted under the 2014-2020 MFF. Believes, however, that in the face of new global challenges, local development must be given a boost by adding a local and regional dimension;

31.

emphasises that LRAs must be recognised as key players in policies, due to their proximity to citizens and their potential to contribute to rebuilding consensus on the European institutions and the European project. Multilevel Governance is the ideal approach for policies that aim to build a sustainable future and combine the 10 Commission priorities with the 11 thematic goals of the Cohesion Funds and the 17 SDG goals of the 2030 Agenda.

32.

reiterates that centrally-managed, top-down policies and programmes are not the best methods to address the complexities of sustainable development and to tackle poverty. Instead, LRAs should be given the responsibility and autonomy required to respond properly to major social issues;

33.

stresses the need to strengthen policies enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union with sustainable social policy planning that involves all tiers of governance. This is the only way to ensure access for all to basic services and permit a response to new demands posed by demographic change using local policies geared to facilitating active and healthy ageing;

34.

highlights that the Commission should work towards policies that aim to promote people’s health as a prerequisite for social inclusion, improving living conditions in urban and suburban areas, as well as guaranteeing access to public services, recreational activities and sport — including for disabled people — and promoting preventive healthcare for all, including older people, migrants and other demographic groups that are at risk of poverty and social exclusion; encourages Member States and local and regional authorities to do the same;

35.

considers the potential of the social economy to be in creating jobs and tackling unemployment among young people and women. It is therefore essential that the Agenda draw attention to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), the need to create empathy among young people and entrepreneurship. Moreover, the new strategy must — by adopting a cross-cutting approach — include the different facets of sustainability and the new prospects offered by creativity;

36.

considers it necessary to include culture in the 2030 Agenda, clearly underlining the role that it plays in relation to sustainable development and job creation by furthering the construction of shared European ideals to be disseminated worldwide: the aspirations and principles of democracy, social justice and solidarity. Culture contributes effectively to inclusive development strategies and has a considerable impact on SDGs and improving education systems by fighting social exclusion and poverty, removing the causes of inequality, facilitating equal opportunities and dismantling generational and demographic disparities;

37.

stresses that seemingly global issues, such as climate change, reduction of CO2 emissions, energy saving, renewable energy production, protection of biodiversity, reduction of resource exploitation, integrated transport and the circular economy, are actually conditioned by local policies and action. To this end, recommends that particular attention be paid to environmentally-friendly production;

38.

considers it necessary, given the wide range of sectors involved, to adopt an integrated and cooperative approach between multilevel governance and the environmental stakeholders concerned. In this respect, the concept of cohesion builds bridges between economic effectiveness, social cohesion, cultural development and environmental balance, putting sustainable development at the heart of policy-making;

39.

agrees that human activity and climate change are putting increasing pressure on marine ecosystems. As such, consideration should be given to the measures taken by the Commission to make the oceans safe and clean, to ensure that they are managed in a sustainable manner and to support the implementation of the Blue Growth Agenda, which aims to capture the potential of Europe’s oceans and seas to create jobs, economic value and sustainability. Furthermore, reiterates that innovation in the blue economy can help in ensuring an efficient and sustainable use of precious marine resources (2);

40.

calls for a commitment on the part of all the institutions to minimise food waste and to recover waste, thereby driving investment and employment in the wider context of the green economy. The EU must make a firm commitment to discarding the linear economic model in order to boost the circular economy, as highlighted previously by the CoR in its opinions Towards a circular economy: review of EU waste legislation, Legislative proposals amending the waste directives and An EU action plan for the Circular Economy;

41.

takes the view that development models, shaped by new competitive factors, including networks interconnecting an infinite quantity of data with an unlimited number of users, reflect a clear disconnect between the need for businesses to reduce the time to market and the time spent on consensus-building and bureaucratic formalities. LRAs are the appropriate level to bring policy decision-making up to the speed dictated by the markets;

42.

calls for real support for development models and, in particular, support for intangible networks that influence new local competitive factors and the transition to new production models by facilitating access to an infinite number of data;

43.

thinks it is high time to develop strategies that activate structural policies so that the core development pillars embrace the radical change in the production model, favouring sustainable production — including with incentives — until innovation makes the transition to the circular economy economically viable. It is clear that such policies not only help to overcome the onerous new challenges posed by globalisation, but also constitute a clear response to the trade-off between social demands that pit the environment against jobs;

44.

recognises that globalisation, driven above all by improved mobility of persons, products and data, is fuelling international competition not only between firms, but also between regions. Resolute action is therefore needed to address the factors determining regional competitiveness, such as social and institutional capital, infrastructure and innovation, in order to revitalise European economies;

45.

reiterates that LRAs have a crucial role to play in the relationship between public-private partnerships, as they are able to recognise the diversity of forms of development able to generate investments that make the most of the local resources inherent in each region;

46.

regrets that the concept of ‘territorial capital’, as defined by the OECD in 2001 and taken up by the Commission in 2005, is completely missing from the Commission communication. By way of a reminder, the concept refers to a set of local assets — natural, human, artificial, organisational, relational and cognitive — representing a region’s competitive potential;

47.

notes that the crisis and the effects of globalisation have had a profound impact on relations that guaranteed cohesion between the territories, creating rifts (between city and countryside, centres and peripheral areas) and altering the dynamics of societal development. With this in mind, we must bear the cost of transforming old territorial policy models, characterised by a functional approach which considered the area simply as a space, into a new institutional matrix granting the regions the role of collective player;

48.

The Pact of Amsterdam places the role of urban policies that aim to implement measures to boost social cohesion and economic development at the centre of growing interest, in the belief that cities can contribute positively to the process of innovation;

49.

highlights the fact that LRAs play a key role in protecting and developing urban environments, rural areas and the common heritage, and can make a contribution to what the 2030 Agenda describes as a ‘transformed world’ by being proactive and committed to:

50.

recalls that LRAs are able to develop forms of participatory democracy, in particular through the inclusion of women, young people, older people and minorities, as a basis for planning and implementing integrated strategies for economic development at local level;

51.

advocates a bottom-up approach, establishing an appropriate legal framework and allocating sufficient resources. A new system of this kind can only be successfully created through ever deeper decentralisation in the various EU Member States. National governments should:

52.

emphasises that national governments must involve the LRAs and cities, preferably through a bottom-up approach, in planning local activities to achieve the SDGs, taking into account strengths and weaknesses on the basis of the principles of ‘no-one left behind’ and efficient spending;

53.

believes that if global policies and agreements are to reap the full benefit of local commitment and experience, LRAs must be an integral part of the structured dialogue and governance, and not a mere stakeholder. Their work in organising and producing informed input must be acknowledged as being part and parcel of the decision-making process by, for example:

54.

asks the EU and national authorities to set aside resources to cover ex ante and ex post impact assessments of policies relating to sustainable development. This will call for improved coordination of all policies implemented, both by the EU and Member States and by the LRAs;

55.

calls on the Commission to use NRPs — which have already been formally included in the programming of the Cohesion Fund — in an even more strategic and operational manner, by making practical use of instruments that have already been adopted to support sustainable development. This would make it possible to highlight, within the European Semester framework, not only the reforms that are planned and promoted at national level to implement the SDGs, but also those relating to the local and regional dimension;

56.

recommends that European and international levels of government coordinate the complex system of world relations, by keeping regional outbreaks of tension in check and supporting the transformation and restructuring of institutional and productive assets inherited from the last century. Local bodies should be granted the necessary powers to be able to transform fragile geo-economic balances into development opportunities to revitalise the competitiveness of local production systems on the global market.

12.10.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 342/27

1.

recognises that this EU communication is an important element of broader EU policy reform. It has the added value of proposing concrete measures to complement the strategic guidelines of the council of 2014 in which European leaders agreed to offer a pathway for future policy development in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, including on immigration and asylum, in the coming years;

2.

considers that, in such a sensitive and strategic area, the EU Member States and the European Union institutions should continue to shape a strategy for the region in the context of the latter’s relations with the European Union and, as a consequence, a genuine migration policy, and assume political responsibility for its implementation in the interests of the peoples of Europe while taking into account the specific characteristics of the Member States and of the countries of origin, and the rights of migrants according to international and European conventions;

3.

recognises that migration and development policies are closely linked. International, national, regional and local cooperation is crucial for making a common European migration policy a reality, and for implementing the European Agenda for Migration;

4.

advocates the adoption of a holistic approach to the management of migration, allowing for more decentralised and efficient management of migration movements. This decentralised management will guarantee equal treatment and rights;

5.

stresses the utmost importance of reducing the number of deaths at sea in the attempt to cross to Europe and the need to continue and expand efforts to rescue people in distress; expresses its deep sorrow for the hundreds of lives already lost and commends all the countries and organisations involved in trying to prevent this human tragedy (1); reiterates that the development of additional safe and accessible legal pathways for migration to the EU, such as humanitarian visas, resettlements and increased family reunification, must be part of the efforts to create a comprehensive and humane migration policy;

6.

welcomes the additional measures that this Joint Communication has brought to strengthen initiatives along the Central Mediterranean migration route, including in and around Libya. In view of the high number of lives lost at sea and along the Central Mediterranean migration route, the question of managing flows and saving lives remains a top priority;

7.

believes that multilevel governance is a prerequisite to achieving optimum results. In this framework, it is crucial that the EU, national and sub-national authorities work in close cooperation with local and regional authorities in the countries of transit and with civil society, migrants’ associations and local communities in the host countries and are receptive to their input;

8.

underlines that the success of these actions requires close cooperation with the relevant partners in the countries along the Central Mediterranean route and concerted efforts by the EU institutions and Member States, as well as cooperation with international organisations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). Warns that some of the proposed actions can only be successfully implemented if the situation on the ground allows for it. These actions should be seen as complementary to the substantial number of initiatives already being implemented by the EU and its Member States, notably under the European agenda on migration and the Migration Partnership programme (2);

9.

wishes to express its appreciation of the efforts made by Italy, Malta, Greece, Cyprus, France, Spain and Portugal, which have already connected their Eurosur national coordination centres for border surveillance to the Seahorse Mediterranean Network;

10.

acknowledges that the Central Mediterranean route has become the dominant route for migrants and refugees attempting to reach Europe. Over 180 000 people were detected on the Central Mediterranean route in 2016, the vast majority of them reaching the continent via Italy. Almost 90 % of those on the route depart from Libya, where the unstable political and economic situation provides the opportunity for smugglers to expand their activities; stresses the urgent necessity to reduce the numbers of crossings and to stop dinghies and boats from leaving illegally to reach the EU. Underlines the importance of preventive actions at all level of governments;

11.

notes that smugglers and traffickers themselves contribute to the instability in Libya by their actions and human rights abuses, increasing the vulnerability of migrants. Finding a lasting solution to Libya’s governance and security challenges continues to be a key priority for the European Union, its Member States and international partners, as it is a prerequisite for sustainably managing the current situation;

12.

observes that the majority of migrants in Libya are third-country nationals, with the largest proportion originating from sub-Saharan African countries. An effective approach therefore also has to take into account actions to the south of Libya;

13.

underlines the added value of the measures announced in the communication: expanding training programmes for the Libyan Coast Guard, ensuring sustainable sources of funding to cover training needs in the future, taking firm action to step up the fight against smugglers and traffickers and providing incentives for the participation of Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt in the Seahorse Mediterranean Network to ensure sub-regional buy-in; underlines that in all these activities, the rebuilding of respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law to the benefit of migrants and local populations must be a key priority;

14.

reiterates the need for serious engagement with the Libyan authorities to ensure that conditions in centres for migrants are improved, paying particular attention to vulnerable persons and minors, ensuring close cooperation with, and effective monitoring of the standards by, the International Organisation for Migration and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

15.

welcomes stepping up work and engagement with Libyan municipalities to promote alternative livelihoods and support the resilience of local communities hosting migrants, as well as increasing technical cooperation so that Libyan municipalities can define development strategies for their areas and improve support services for the local population;

16.

underlines the need for a medium- and long-term cooperation strategy to provide support and back-up for Libya’s local and national authorities, enabling capacity building for managing their areas;

17.

encourages promoting border cooperation, dialogue and exchange of information between Libya and its southern neighbours, including using the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community to full potential;

18.

notes that in undertaking joint actions with Libya, the risk that other routes could develop in neighbouring countries needs to be minimised; welcomes therefore a comprehensive regional approach by increasing cooperation with Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, deepening dialogue and operational cooperation on migration with these countries. Further assistance to these countries to develop their own functioning asylum systems and support to those in need of international protection is needed;

19.

bearing in mind the different projects and programmes of the EU in the region, targeting interrelated matters, it is vital to coordinate these initiatives if they are to be efficient as part of steps to secure the above-mentioned goals;

20.

notes that so far, the common EU response to irregular migration has taken the form of state-centred security approaches that mainly focus on combatting smuggling practices through collaboration with state authorities;

21.

calls for greater attention to be devoted to the different local political economies involved in irregular migration. Actors involved include transport companies that facilitate the irregular movement of migrants, local populations that provide food and lodging to earn a living, local security forces that increase their income through bribery and road taxes, political elites that use the financial resources earned through the facilitation of irregular migration to buy political favours and influence, armed groups that feed off human smuggling and exploitation to strengthen their position, etc. Understanding these different actors and their relationship to local governance and stability/conflict dynamics, and ensuring they are involved in the discussion of strategies to stabilise and build a future for their country, is a necessary prerequisite for effective migration management;

22.

therefore welcomes the suggestion that existing socio-economic support for municipalities along the migratory route could be reinforced, involving them in the implementation of strategies for enabling the local population to have better living conditions and as a consequence, better prospects for the future of their area;

23.

stresses that properly designed migration policies could contribute to alternative livelihoods and higher quality institutions in the long term — thereby addressing some of the root causes of migration from within. To ensure such effective policy formation, current migration policies need to be reconciled with the fact that issues of governance and stability are at the root of trans-Saharan irregular migration;

24.

reiterates that irregular migratory routes cross many countries in the region where state authorities are weak or absent. Libya is an obvious case in point. Several reports have shown that proceeds from illicit smuggling and trafficking empower irregular armed forces that operate as de facto authorities on the ground, enabling them to act as spoilers in the larger conflict resolution processes. Even in those cases where formal state authorities do still exist, collaboration with such actors in the fight against irregular migration is an inherently political enterprise that may end up entrenching the interests of state-aligned smugglers and irregular armed forces. In the midst of fragmented sovereignty, neutral interlocutors do not exist.

25.

stresses that climate change and natural disasters can be factors leading to migration and displacement of people. Furthermore, calls for investment in building disaster risk resilience as a preventive action to tackle the root causes of migration;

26.

encourages continued efforts towards systematic engagement with the Libyan authorities, with a focus on border management, countering irregular migration and addressing the human rights and the needs of migrants in Libya, including developing, in cooperation with civil society, alternatives to detention of migrants which should only be used as a measure of last resort and only under conditions that meet international humanitarian and human rights standards. Training and logistical support on these issues should be an important element of capacity building programmes supported by the EU;

27.

suggests exploring with UNHCR the feasibility of taking practical steps to resettle migrants in need of international protection from Libya to EU Member States and other international partner countries;

28.

calls for reinforcement of the pilot initiative aiming at community stabilisation in areas affected by internal displacement and transit of migrants, including cooperation in the definition of strategies for their areas, aimed at ensuring human dignity in the country in which they live, inter alia by creating job opportunities for persons in need of protection, which would have the added benefit of facilitating their acceptance by host communities; and also cooperation in steps to improve public support services and facilities for local populations, amongst other things;

29.

advocates enhancing ongoing assisted voluntary returns from Libya to countries of origin, if the situation on the ground allows for it and in coordination with international partners, in particular the IOM;

30.

welcomes the recognition of local and regional authorities as important actors in solving and managing migration issues, saving lives and fighting crime;

31.

reiterates that cities are lead actors on the stage of global migration, and are also most directly affected by its negative consequences. Local governments have immediate responsibility for the living conditions, successes and challenges of immigrants. Local governments can succeed where many national governments are challenged and even fail (3);

32.

underlines the role of local authorities in countries of origin, transit and destination in migration policy, especially in relation to integration and social cohesion. Local authorities are clearly in the front line in addressing migration challenges, given their mandate, their presence ‘on the ground’ and their experience in handling the day-to-day realities of increasingly diverse societies. After all, migration is an area of shared competence that is managed at every level — EU, national, regional and local. At the same time it is important to take local and regional situations into account so as to ensure that reception of migrants is as good and sustainable as possible and that migrants therefore integrate successfully;

33.

believes that the EU should make the most of the potential and experience of the regions that make up its southern sea border — both in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic — as special links in developing mutually beneficial relations with third countries;

34.

underscores the need to strengthen local communities in particular in Libya, in line with the Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration (4) and supports therefore projects such as the Nicosia initiative; calls on the European External Action Service and the European Commission, in cooperation with the CoR and association of local or regional governments, to explore the possibilities for similar projects in other countries;

35.

recognises the added value of the Nicosia initiative as a capacity building project in support of Libyan municipalities carried out in partnership with European local and regional authorities and with the financial contribution of the European Commission. Points out that this initiative should be bolstered in such a way as to boost the effectiveness of its measures and generate better outcomes, nonetheless bearing in mind the need to be alert to the complex setting as regards the issue of legitimacy in Libya and to remain sensitive to any political implications;

36.

recognises that the capacity of local authorities along the Central Mediterranean route are not well developed. The challenge becomes more complex when attempting to respond to differing needs, especially in an economically fragile climate. Local authorities must have the tools to assess the most urgent needs of different migrant groups, particularly unaccompanied children and adolescents, and women;

37.

emphasises the need to pay greater attention to child protection. There has been a record number of refugee and migrant deaths in the Central Mediterranean over the past 3 months, including an estimated 190 children. We join the call of UNICEF on the EU and its Member States to commit to protecting refugee and migrant children, especially those who are unaccompanied, from exploitation, violence and child trafficking and strengthening child protection programmes in Libya;

38.

clarifies that EU support for local authority capacity development entails not only increasing the technical capabilities of local authorities, but also ensuring the efficient provision of basic needs and services. Empirical evidence suggests that decentralised management of social services and public goods provide optimal ‘value-for-money’ in development planning and delivery;

39.

advocates promoting decentralisation and local governance programmes, in line with national poverty reduction strategies;

40.

insists that coherence and interplay between national migration policies and local initiatives in providing services and protection to migrants and promoting their social inclusion, when they are entitled to international protection, is an area that merits further attention. As a minimum, local governments need the authority and resources to respond appropriately to the needs of migrants in the communities under their jurisdiction. Ideally, they should be able to operate in an overall policy environment that favours an inclusive approach when the right conditions are in place;

41.

notes that Libya has experienced political and social turmoil over the past 6 years as a direct result of the events of the Arab spring. The overall crisis in which Libya has found itself since 2014 has caused utter chaos and a steep deterioration in living conditions throughout the country. The near absence of the state and the very limited means at the disposal of the municipal councils make institutional weakness a considerable obstacle to stability and development. At the same time, the country has opted for reforms establishing a decentralised governance system approving Law 59 (on local governance) in 2012 which, despite the instability in the country, remains a reference point in all Libyan parties, no matter what their political affiliation;

42.

stresses that many young people from Libyan cities have become involved in the ‘migration business’, as it is a highly lucrative source of income. Young people who have participated in armed conflict and militia activities are particularly difficult to integrate. The traditional social organisations (tribes, families, schools and institutions) have difficulty in dealing with youths. Drugs and criminality are widespread. The absence of specific youth policies has made the situation worse for young people;

43.

emphasises the fact that municipalities not only in Libya but in the different countries along the Mediterranean route can play an important role. As institutional and legitimate actors responsible for local issues, they are called upon to make an important contribution to stabilisation. Local economic development, coordination with security actors and efficient policies for youth and migration are the pillars of such a role. But local governments need a great deal of assistance in order to be able to shoulder these responsibilities;

44.

advocates programmes to contribute to strengthening, empowering and rendering more effective local governance in Libya and other countries along the Central Mediterranean route by focusing on three dimensions of local governance: management, service delivery and participation. Efforts should also be made to increase local economic prospects, social life and political inclusion of highly educated young people in inland rural areas, cities and towns, in order to attenuate factors leading to radicalisation and migration;

45.

stresses that it is possible to create traction at local level for improved governance despite the de facto lack of capacity of local governments at this stage, and advocates for the vital necessity to support local governance as this will inevitably promote stabilisation and create the conditions for future reconstruction, a prerequisite for efficient and sustainable migration management in Libya;

46.

underlines the importance of women’s participation and youth engagement, something that should remain crucial in the various support activities, especially through the involvement of active civil society organisations (CSOs) and independent politicians;

47.

insists on the added value of targeted objectives in reducing the negative effects of the various forms of migration, displacement and unrest by increasing the economic attractiveness of rural areas and activities in support of municipalities in their new mandate, in keeping with decentralisation measures;

48.

acknowledges that the tragedy starts in the countries of origin, not in the sea. Thus encourages the EU to contribute to local economic development in the countries along the Central Mediterranean route by supporting municipalities in their role of local development actors and by enabling the participation of young people and women in local affairs and socio-economic activities;

49.

offers its further support in designing and implementing the EU’s migration policy, also drawing on the knowledge and expertise of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM).

12.10.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 342/32

1.

welcomes the Joint Communication on Ocean Governance, adopted on 10 November 2016 by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy;

2.

supports the proposed actions to ensure safe, secure, clean and sustainably managed oceans;

3.

agrees with the aim of ensuring that the EU is a strong global player that is able to set out an agenda for better ocean governance based on a cross-sectoral, rules-based international approach; the ultimate aim of this EU initiative will be to establish an international standard on the social, economic and environmental conditions applicable to activities linked to the sea, a level playing field that allows for the adequate sustainability of our oceans, and stronger competitiveness of the European players that operate in them;

4.

fully supports the recent Council Conclusions (1) that call for a more coherent approach between internal and external aspects of ocean governance, including synergies between EU, Member States and regional strategies;

5.

recalls, inter alia, its earlier opinions on the Commission communication ‘Towards an Integrated Maritime Policy’ (2), on maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal management (3), on developing the potential of Ocean Energy (4) and on better protecting the marine environment (5);

6.

stresses the leading role of the European Union in maritime governance that aims to provide Europe’s coasts and seas with the most comprehensive policy and regulatory system in the world — one which recognises the role of local and regional authorities, of coastal communities and of economic and social actors in ensuring that the economic, environmental, climatic and social factors are properly addressed in a comprehensive and multilevel governance fashion;

7.

considers, however, that ocean governance is affected by what is known as the ‘tragedy of the commons’. While there are a range of general worldwide or sea-based agreements, such as UNCLOS and specialised agreements particularly under the IMO, there is a considerable degree of fragmentation. In that context, the role of the EU is both to lead by example and to offer incentives so that non-EU partners replicate the high standards that exist within EU marine policy. Such incentives, including capacity building, could potentially be included in international agreements on trade and development programmes that the EU negotiates with third countries;

8.

notes that the EU and Member States have concurrent powers on international relations, inclusive of marine-related issues. This requires robust coordination between levels of government, and ensuring that EU and national positions in international forums have undergone territorial impact assessment so that the interests of the competent local and regional authorities are fully embedded in them;

9.

stresses that many issues related to ocean governance are inevitably local, due to resource extraction, economic benefit for coastal areas, fishing communities and ports, or their environmental impact on Europe’s coasts and seas. Environmental and climate policy and economic decisions concerning oceans elsewhere in the world affect EU local and regional authorities. This requires significant investment in maritime spatial planning and supporting governance at the local/regional level;

10.

stresses that marine policy is directly linked with inshore economic, environmental or spatial planning policy. How local and regional authorities manage inshore policies will have a direct offshore effect. Often, on issues such as windfarms, offshore activity has been perceived as the easy solution for activities being resisted inshore;

11.

highlights that local and regional authorities have competences and positive experiences in managing a range of areas such as fisheries, shellfishing and aquaculture; subsidies (e.g. for inefficient fleets), economic and environmental policies (e.g. marine litter) and inspections (e.g. vehicle inspection) that have a positive or negative impact in other territories outside the EU. They are also often part of port authorities;

12.

recalls the recent research work undertaken by the CoR (6) and OECD (7) on the ocean and blue economy. Insists, in line with the ‘Better Regulation’ agenda, that it is necessary to conduct prior impact assessments, including territorial impacts, to define the possible threats from all sectors, possible mitigation measures and expected socio-economic consequences before introducing new legislation, authorising new extractive technologies or defining new Marine Protection Areas;

13.

recalls the new UN Sustainable Development Goals signed by all EU and UN Member States. Ocean governance concerns Sustainable Goal 14 on Life Below Water and Goal 13 on Climate Action, and also Goal 11 on Sustainable Cities and Communities. The Committee welcomes the Commission’s plan to translate these goals into various EU policies (8), as it could be a good basis for building a common understanding at international level that goes beyond sectoral solutions for sustainable ocean governance;

14.

believes, conversely, that the entry of ocean-sourced goods and commodities from third countries into the EU Single Market should be conditional to the fact that these countries progressively converge towards higher EU standards, such as for instance on banning of discards at sea;

15.

believes that the three priority areas, broken down into 14 actions, set out in the joint communication form a relevant basis on which to undertake further action at EU and international level on ocean governance. While the communication primarily relates to the international component of maritime policy, there is a local and regional angle, in terms both of competence and of direct territorial impact and the degree of specialisation and dependence on the ocean;

16.

notes, concerning Action 1 on filling the gaps in the international ocean governance framework in order to improve the legal framework and provide a level playing field, that there is already an extensive legal framework at international level covering marine limits, navigation, archipelagic status and transit regimes, exclusive economic zones, continental shelf jurisdiction, deep seabed mining, the exploitation regime, protection of the marine environment, scientific research, and settlement of disputes; recalls in that respect that existing administrative boundaries and the cultural and traditional specificities of European local and regional communities should be taken into account for the purposes of shaping ocean governance policy;

17.

believes that EU policies are already robust on issues concerning fishing regulation, maritime spatial planning and macro-regional strategies. In some countries strategic land-use planning is an important policy tool for local land and water spatial planning. Local authorities are already responsible for planning in relation to coastal areas and territorial waters. Strategic land-use planning should not be compromised by the governance or legal framework proposed by the European Commission. The main challenge both at EU level and, particularly, worldwide is lack of control and robust implementation. Leading by example, the EU is therefore in a position to introduce reciprocity requirements and offer incentives when negotiating new international rules with third parties and organisations. This global initiative for enforcement of those rules is needed in order to ensure a level playing field for all countries, regions and economic operators;

18.

agrees, with regard to Action 2, that promoting regional fisheries management and cooperation in key ocean areas to fill regional governance gaps will improve the position of EU fisheries and help others to reach the high standards that are in force within the EU;

19.

is concerned that the Commission guidance on seabed mining would act as a deterrent to focus on the EU resource efficiency plans, the more so as the technology for exploitation of natural resources is untested and has the potential to damage the natural environment. Calls for coordination with Member States’ negotiations at the International Seabed Authority;

20.

recommends in that respect that the EU should campaign and provide incentives for other countries and organisations to introduce the European system of yellow and red cards as a model for tackling illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing on a global scale, including blacklisting and export bans resulting from non-compliance. The Committee calls for current plans for an electronic tool for managing catch certificates to be speeded up. Such measures would boost the industry in those regions that apply the provisions strictly;

21.

believes that Action 3 on improving coordination and cooperation between international organisations and launching Ocean Partnerships for ocean management will benefit regional maritime hubs through better international exposure;

22.

considers that local and regional centres of competitiveness and excellence, particularly in areas with a strong maritime dimension, including the outermost regions, can play a crucial role and need to be financially supported in developing international research teams and technology transfer platforms in support of the EU’s work in Ocean Governance;

23.

is opposed to the idea of creating new international rules and organisations from scratch. The Committee agrees with the Commission that it is more sensible to improve the current governance and enforcement system by focusing on inefficiencies and enhancing international coordination. In that respect, it is important to ensure, before launching new measures within a specific framework (e.g. oil exploration), that the knock-on effect in other policy areas and sectors (e.g. fishing) is properly understood;

24.

recommends, with regard to the management of biological biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, that the EU improve coordination with EMSA (9) and the EFCA as well as closely involving European regions in coordination actions and consultation with adjacent European regions;

25.

believes that ocean governance is part of the EU’s multilevel governance and thus requires the pooling of national and EU resources for capacity building, inspection, enforcement, deterrence and prosecution of all entities violating the existing legal frameworks. This requires the involvement of the competent local and regional authorities with respect to Action 4 on capacity building, as this will directly benefit coastal and maritime regions in many technical and administrative aspects;

26.

stresses that Action 5 on ensuring the safety and security of seas and oceans is crucial for seafarers, businesses and port operators, and a key element in the fight against forced labour and trafficking in human beings. The EU should continue to be the lead jurisdiction in this area, with the most comprehensive legal framework for safety and security at sea and in ports, and to use its considerable international leverage to encourage reciprocal arrangements in other parts of the world;

27.

believes that the cooperation between national authorities and Frontex, EMSA and EFCA must result in joint maritime surveillance capability with the EU providing, where applicable, state of the art vessels and technology to effectively enforce surveillance;

28.

believes, with regard to Action 6, that it is imperative to implement the COP21 Paris UN Climate Agreement in order to mitigate the harmful impact of climate change on oceans, coastlines and ecosystems, and to address future costs of global warming and rising oceans. Global climate goals require local adaptation measures, as most climate impacts are local impacts. Therefore, as recently stated by the CoR (10), local and regional authorities have a crucial role to play in the preparation and implementation of national, EU and international adaptation frameworks dealing with the consequences of climate change in the world’s oceans. Specific capacity and financial support needs to be provided to that end to all regions, including the outermost regions given their strategic locations in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and in the Caribbean Sea. Moreover, in order to comply with the Paris Agreement, it is essential not only to incorporate climate change adaptation measures into maritime management, but also to leave a substantial amount of the existing fossil fuels underground. To this end, considers that in the interests of consistency, Action 6 should be strengthened through the inclusion of measures to prevent new oil exploration in sensitive areas in European seas;

29.

stresses that Action 7 on fighting illegal fishing and strengthening the sustainable management of ocean food resources globally directly benefits the EU’s fishing industry. This entails strengthening the existing regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) and ensuring their full operability, and requires the European Commission to have a better mandate to negotiate and support RFMOs;

30.

agrees, in line with Action 8, that fishing subsidies that harm the environment both in the EU and in third countries should be phased out. Appropriate incentives and palliative measures need to be defined to ensure the viability of communities that are heavily dependent on fisheries both in the EU and elsewhere;

31.

believes that Action 9 on fighting marine litter and the ‘sea of plastic’ is one of the most relevant initiatives in this proposal. This directly benefits tourism and fisheries. If people continue to dump plastic in the natural environment at the current pace, the sea will contain more plastic than fish by 2050. The existing powers of local and regional authorities with regard to waste management and prevention can make a crucial contribution. Local authorities play an important role in terms of their capacity to recover energy from the incineration of recovered plastic. Some 28 % of waste in the EU currently goes into landfill. A robust EU environmental framework for prevention, including a possible EU ban on microplastics, needs proper enforcement at local and regional level, and continuing investment in cleaner technologies including the development of tailor-made local and regional marine litter prevention policies. This should include further progress towards a common regime not only for port reception facilities but also for fees for ship-generated waste and cargo residues, so as to discourage ships from discharge them before docking at ports. While Europe’s regions and local authorities are among the largest emitters of marine litter and plastic they are also affected by litter coming from outside the EU, meaning that international cooperation is essential;

32.

welcomes the European Commission’s initiative to fight ocean pollution and marine litter in particular, but notes that this is a first step in achieving cleaner oceans and that the EU and Member States can lead the way by introducing a joint plan for the eventual removal of harmful substances at sea such as munitions, chemicals and nuclear materials. The Committee therefore underlines in this regard the importance of pilot projects which can develop and showcase European capabilities, technology and commitment to peace. Such projects can be a source both of technology exports and of know-how that can be leveraged with third countries and organisations as an incentive for the introduction of similar policies elsewhere;

33.

believes that such a joint plan on ocean pollution can also bring tangible benefits for maritime regions and communities, not only directly in terms of know-how, expertise and increased civil protection capabilities in search, rescue and recovery but also more widely in the form of a resulting increase in income from tourism and fisheries, wider economic development, and a cleaner environment and health benefits, not only for Europe’s coastal areas but also for adjacent regions and the entire ocean ecosystem;

34.

notes that Action 10 on promoting maritime spatial planning (MSP) at global level, including possible IOC-UNESCO international guidelines on MSP, is consistent with earlier CoR opinions highlighting the EU’s advanced policies on MSP and the contribution of local and regional authorities. This is also an opportunity for EU companies to provide related services and products worldwide;

35.

agrees in that respect with Action 11, which aims to achieve the global target of conserving 10 % of marine and coastal areas and promote the effective management and enforcement of marine protected areas (MPAs) to effectively create ‘ocean parks’ . Current studies of similar projects in Australia show benefits for tourism and fisheries in neighbouring regions that can be replicated elsewhere, including parts of European shores. In this connection, the Committee highlights the importance of involving and empowering local stakeholders when identifying and managing MPAs. Indeed, under-resourced MPAs or limited availability of scientific data can be a significant barrier to sustainable economic development, e.g. marine energy, ports and harbours;

36.

believes, concerning Action 12, that a coherent EU strategy on ocean observation, national fisheries data and marine accounting will boost data services and observation. In that respect existing EU and international platforms for ocean and seabed mapping such as EMODnet or the ‘Copernicus’ programme of ocean observation need to be integrated and made interoperable. Initiatives such as IPBES (a global platform and intergovernmental body open to all UN Member States that aims to strengthen the link between science, politics and local knowledge in decision-making related to biodiversity and ecosystem services) should be encouraged, including the development of new tools such as a Nordic IPBES, the EU’s MAES (Mapping and Assessment of Ecosystems and their Services) and ESMERALDA (Enhancing Ecosystem Services Mapping for Policy and Decision Making);

37.

considers that the combination of different existing and future databases builds an interdisciplinary body of marine knowledge and data that cuts across multiple fields, such as environmental protection, fisheries and aquaculture, disaster relief, first response and rescue services, border control and migration monitoring, and transport. The Committee sees no need to add more databases; rather existing databases can be coordinated so as to be useful for the Member States;

38.

stresses that having compatible, redundant and overlapping databases and collection of marine knowledge and ocean mapping requires more synergies not only between the various EU and competent national institutions but also with other Member States and international organisations, as common data must be the starting points for developing common, trans-oceanic responses;

39.

insists that marine knowledge must not be just an endeavour for the public sector; the private sector, fishing and sea cargo companies, marine engineering, telecommunications, biotechnology and marine oil and gas exploration companies can play a crucial role in collecting and sharing the environmental data that they gather during their own activities at sea. The EU and other international bodies must provide incentives and facilitate this so that it does not add an unnecessary burden;

40.

reiterates its call on the European Commission to promote best practices for the use of public-private partnerships in the blue economy (11). Such promotion should take into account the potential offered by small and medium-sized businesses and limited administrative capacity of some of the relevant national authorities;

41.

highlights the asymmetric territorial impacts of many of the challenges facing our oceans, which mean that multipolicy marine data needs to be made available for local and regional authorities in a way that is easy to access and use;

42.

calls, in line with earlier CoR opinions on Blue Growth (12), for more investment in ‘blue’ science and innovation (Action 13) and underlines in this regard the importance of professional education and skills for seafarers, developed in close cooperation with marine industries;

43.

supports the development of international ocean research, innovation and science partnerships, which should be designed to boost regions that are investing in marine research and innovation (Action 14). In this connection European policies and programmes such as Horizon 2020, as well as the EMFF, LIFE, the CEF and the ERDF, can be put to good use to develop ocean research and innovation partnerships, including with third countries;

44.

recognises the important role the Blue Growth strategy can play in this area, and calls for strategic initiatives to be promoted at local and regional level, and for best practices and successful projects to be disseminated and implemented in other regions, with special focus on applied research and innovation in the area of maritime and coastal activities;

45.

believes that ocean governance affects local and regional authorities in a very asymmetric way, presenting challenges that very often they are not equipped to meet. At the same time changes in regulatory frameworks, fishing or natural resources exploitation in other parts of the world can have a direct economic or social effect in European coastal communities and those areas that are significantly dependent on ocean-related activities;

46.

considers, however, that Europe’s local and regional authorities have a proactive role to play in introducing sustainable policies to prevent overfishing and marine pollution, contributing to EU multilevel governance and campaigning for the EU and Member States, which have jurisdiction over 10 % of the world’s oceans, to lead by example in international ocean-related negotiations;

47.

requests, in line with the existing Inter-Institutional Agreement and the ‘Better Regulation’ package, that a Structured Dialogue on Ocean Governance be regularly co-organised by the Commission, Council, Parliament and CoR to jointly develop new marine-related policy initiatives with active input from representatives from the affected coastal and marine regions and communities of the EU, in particular island, isolated and outermost regions, or their directly mandated representatives, potentially encompassing the existing Stakeholder Forums of the various sea-related EU macro-regional strategies and representatives from the RFMOs.

12.10.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 342/38

1.

More than one third of EU citizens live and work in Europe’s border regions. Those borders have a direct and indirect impact on their lives. Cross-border cooperation (CBC) has proved to be the most effective tool for overcoming the barrier effect and the dividing role of borders, integrating border areas and increasing the quality of life for border regions’ citizens.

2.

European Territorial Cooperation plays an important role in removing border obstacles and fostering CBC. In the period 2014-2020, more than EUR 10 billion will be invested in cooperation between regions, of which around EUR 6,6 billion will go to cross-border regions.

3.

The Interreg A projects have achieved many tangible outcomes for many European citizens in very diverse territories all over the EU. An important and successful tool in CBC programmes (1) are people-to-people and small-scale projects, designed to foster the convergence of bordering regions and initiating grassroots contact among people.

4.

People-to-people (P2P) and small-scale projects can be defined by their size, duration and content. Small-scale projects are usually smaller in size than regular big projects (e.g. maximum size of EUR 100 000 (2)). They can also have a limited duration and their main focus is to finance initiatives in many different areas of CBC with a local impact, in order to support the main thematic objectives of EU programmes (including trust-building, creating favourable framework conditions and a bottom-up approach and initiating new partnerships). People-to-people projects are small-scale projects focusing primarily on promoting contacts and interaction between people on different sides of the border. These usually have a smaller budget and also a limited duration. The activities of the project happen in smaller geographic areas (commonly at Euroregional level) and their approaches are commonly place-based.

5.

People-to-people (P2P) projects and small-scale projects are carried out in a wide range of fields such as culture (e.g. learning the neighbouring language), sport, tourism, education and vocational training, economy, science, environmental protection and ecology, healthcare, transport and small infrastructure (cross-border gaps), administrative cooperation, promotional activities, etc.

6.

P2P and small-scale projects are accessible to a wide range of beneficiaries: municipalities, NGOs (numerous types of associations, platforms, networks, foundations, churches, etc.), educational institutions (schools, vocational training centres and universities), research and business-support institutions, among others.

7.

These projects have been supported by several generations of CBC programmes. In the current period, P2P and small-scale projects in 19 CBC programmes (approximately in one third of them) are mainly being supported through a Small Project Fund (SPF) or similar instrument (sometimes called micro-projects, disposition fund, or framework project to support small projects/initiatives). These SPFs usually take the form of an ‘umbrella project’ under which several smaller sub-projects are implemented.

8.

In general, the funding has been rather low — from 1,5 % up to 20 % of the allocation of the programmes (lower in the old EU, while in the new Member States and along the ‘old’ external borders the demand has been much higher).

9.

Independent studies dealing with CBC and all Interreg evaluations (3) to date confirm that in Interreg A programmes the best qualitative results are not achieved primarily through flagship projects, but, rather, success is determined by the variety of different genuinely cross-border projects addressing region-specific needs while directly involving citizens, local authorities and civil society organisations. Quite often the management of these Interreg A programmes (sub-programmes) is decentralised. From the beginning of Interreg (1990), the programmes with the best evaluation results have often been those managed in a decentralised way, many of them including support to P2P projects and small-scale projects.

10.

Despite their positive impact, these projects face some major difficulties. They are not anchored in the regulations, and bigger projects are often preferred by managing authorities as being more cost-effective (the higher administration cost of P2P projects) and having a measurable impact. It is also difficult to link the soft effects of such projects to indicators related to the EU2020 strategy focusing on jobs and growth (lack of methodology and suitable evaluation indicators).

11.

The main objective of this opinion is to provide an evidence-based list of the benefits and added value of such projects and their decentralised implementation through Euroregions and similar structures such as EGTCs; to provide recommendations for their further simplification; and, ultimately, to put forward specific proposals for future CBC programmes, thus contributing to the debate on the future of cohesion policy post-2020.

12.

considers that P2P and small-scale projects in general have a great European added value and contribute considerably to the overall objective of CBC programmes by means of overcoming border obstacles and integrating border areas and their citizens. The following specific benefits of such projects should be underlined:

13.

sees nevertheless advantages for increased partnerships where the size of the eligible territory is bigger, however is aware of the possible negative impact: it is harder for the programmes to reflect the specific needs of different parts of a large territory. There is a tendency to support larger projects and this support becomes less accessible for local/regional players;

14.

suggests that decentralised management of such programmes, for example through promotion of sub-programmes and also enabling the financing of small-scale and P2P projects, is the best solution to this trend that would keep the programmes closer to the citizens;

15.

points out the advantages of Small Project Funds (or similar instruments funding P2P and small-scale projects) being managed in a decentralised way:

16.

is aware that this approach may result in comparably higher administration costs. It should be stressed that, in addition to the usual project administration, many other activities take place (e.g. raising awareness, advice for preparation, implementation and accounting). Without this decentralised care and bottom-up approach such projects are difficult to realise;

17.

notes that the advantages of decentralised implementation of P2P and small-scale projects are best achieved through the involvement of Euroregions and similar cross-border structures (4). They could also have the legal form of an EGTC, which are very suitable for such a role;

18.

recommends that, in order to ensure successful implementation, these structures should have considerable experience in CBC at local and regional level. They should be:

19.

emphasises that in order to preserve the added value of P2P and small-scale projects and their decentralised management, these projects and procedures must be very simple;

20.

points out that the position of the CoR was expressed in its opinion on Simplification of ESIF from the perspective of local and regional authorities  (7). Recommendations regarding CBC such as removal of ETC from the area of application of State aid rules, or a more flexible approach in applying the thematic objectives of EU2020, are even more relevant for P2P and small-scale projects;

21.

states that simpler procedures have to be proportionate to the sums concerned, both for the management of these projects (administration, financial management, control mechanisms, etc.), and for the target groups (reduction of administrative burdens, target-oriented advance information, application of once-only principle (8)). These simpler procedures must be applied in all phases of the project cycle;

22.

recommends that during control, monitoring and audit, it is necessary to focus more on the content and the results and not merely on the processes;

23.

appeals to all shared management levels to enable and to use suitable simplified cost options as the main approach regarding P2P and small-scale projects. Despite the necessary control of public funding, the CoR calls for the use of the once-only principle, lump sums, flat rates and simplified statements of costs (e.g. standardised unit costs) to be promoted as regards accounting for these projects;

24.

believes that in the light of the current situation in the EU (growing nationalism, UK withdrawal from the EU, migration crisis, economic and monetary difficulties) there is clearly an increasingly strong need to communicate the specific benefits and added value of EU action. Cross-border cooperation and especially the P2P and small-scale projects are among the most tangible examples of such specific benefits and added value in the everyday life of citizens. Here EU funds have clear positive effects in the real life, prospects and perceptions of EU citizens;

25.

suggests that efforts should be made by all players to increase the visibility of the results and benefits of such projects — not so much in the border regions where they are obvious but at the national (Member States) and European levels (EU institutions) that make decisions about cohesion policy. This opinion, together with a brochure containing specific project examples, aims to contribute to these efforts. Communication of these results may also be facilitated by European Cooperation Day;

26.

recognises the need to implement a specific methodology to evaluate Small Project Funds (and similar instruments) supporting P2P and small-scale projects. Given the ‘soft’ nature of P2P projects, it is clear that standard outcome indicators are not suitable for such evaluation (e.g. for measuring the level of trust or overcoming prejudices). Here it is suggested that just the fact that cross-border cooperation between citizens and institutions of border regions takes place is a positive result in itself (similar to the growing number of students studying abroad thanks to the Erasmus programme). The number of participating citizens and cooperating partners should be sufficient. Small-scale projects shall contribute to the indicators of the given investment priority but also with these projects that are not purely P2P, the aspect of cooperating partners and number of persons actively involved in the CBC should be considered, as it builds the capacity of such partners to further develop such cooperation in the future. It extends the scope of EU-driven operations with a place-based approach and focused on the citizens, who become committed players to build up more Europe on the ground. Very often, the professional and intercultural skills acquired by members of the cross-border project teams are more valuable than the result of the project as such (small-scale investment);

27.

recommends that people-to-people projects and small-scale projects be anchored in the regulations governing EU support for cross-border cooperation as a legitimate instrument in CBC programmes and calls on the Commission to make the necessary provisions in the proposal for the next generation of regulations;

28.

also recommends that people-to-people and small-scale projects be encouraged by the Commission to be part of the CBC programmes, especially where there is the demand for such projects at local and regional level. Sufficient allocations should be secured to satisfy this bottom-up demand. Special attention should be paid to the borders that will be affected by UK withdrawal from the EU (9) where solutions for continuing cooperation with UK local and regional authorities and other partners should be found;

29.

points out that the full benefits of such projects can be achieved through decentralised management either through Small Project Funds, or any similar instrument or directly by steering committees on the ground. It is essential that each border region is free to use its existing instruments and procedures that have proved effective for many years, ensuring the continuity of such funding with the overall objective to keep the programmes closer to the citizens;

30.

recommends that Euroregions or similar structures and EGTCs should be the framework to guarantee the decentralised implementation of P2P and small-scale projects, ensuring their continuity and taking into account the already existing roles of such structures (e.g. ‘umbrella project’ recipients) that have proved useful. In border areas where these structures are not present, their creation should be encouraged or other suitable solutions should be found respecting as much as possible the principles stated above;

31.

emphasises that in order to preserve the added value and benefits of people-to-people and small-scale projects, they and their management must be kept as simple as possible. More emphasis should be placed on content than on procedures, and simplified cost options should be preferred;

32.

points out that P2P often bring together partners in public or semi-public services, they alleviate the effect of differences in regulation and financing between organisations in different Member States. However, beyond temporary project funding, successful P2P projects should be able to be continued by structural funding. More effort should be made in the next programming period to feed experiences at the border to national legislators. Member States should be engaged in a border-compact to reduce border effects resulting from national regulation and financing;

33.

calls on the Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament to take these specific recommendations into account and include all necessary rules to implement them when preparing legislative proposals for the next generation of CBC programmes, setting up these programmes and during their successful implementation. This will ensure that the benefits of European integration are felt strongly among the citizens of Europe’s border regions.

12.10.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 342/43

1.

welcomes the European Commission’s communication on ‘Europe’s next leaders: the start-up and scale-up initiative’ as a development and extension of the Small Business Act; at the same time calls on the Commission to update the Small Business Act and to maintain its homogeneity;

2.

agrees with the concerns expressed in the communication that the continuing excessive fragmentation of the single market (including the digital single market) might constrain the growth potential of start-ups and scale-ups;

3.

restates its full support for measures aimed at developing innovative entrepreneurship and dismantling the obstacles to its development;

4.

points out that start-up and scale-up businesses tend to accommodate flexible forms of employment, including teleworking, flexible working hours, temporary agency work and employee leasing, contract work and work- and job-sharing. When presented as a genuine option for the employee, such forms of employment can have a positive impact of achieving a work/life balance and help to address long-term unemployment;

5.

emphasises that cooperation between European, national, regional and local public authorities is of great importance to creating conditions enabling start-ups to scale up;

6.

calls on the Commission to take steps to encourage Member States to ensure that all levels of education (both business and non-business) take greater account of subjects such as creativity, entrepreneurship, economics and finance;

7.

stresses the role played by regions’ and cities’ achievements in the innovation-driven development of the world economy due to the fact that they are able to adapt in a flexible way to evolving market, technological and cultural circumstances;

8.

points out that support for innovative operators with particularly fast growth rates has an effect on other market operators. Together with the current trend of efforts to promote the circular economy, the social economy and the sharing economy (1), support measures and legal facilitation will produce synergies, thus contributing to the development of societies as a whole;

9.

emphasises that measures to more closely link sectoral strategies, intertwining research, business and public authorities at all levels, will be crucial to ensuring that the objectives achieved have a common denominator;

10.

emphasises that the heterogeneity and instability of EU Member States’ laws are one of the key problems constraining the expansion of European start-ups (2);

11.

encourages the Commission to attempt to clearly define start-ups and scale-ups, and to further streamline legal solutions for SMEs;

12.

agrees with the current analytical line developed in the Horizon 2020 programme (concerning the possibility of making use of expert recommendations) and in the work of the European Observatory for Clusters and Industrial Change;

13.

proposes revising the set of tools and measures after three measurement cycles so as not only to collect illustrative data on start-ups and scale-ups, but also to develop research on qualitative aspects, which will make it easier to identify problems;

14.

welcomes the fact that, in keeping with the European Commission’s policy priorities under the Single Market Strategy, COSME programme measures are largely geared to supporting start-ups and scale-ups;

15.

expresses concern about the slow pace of efforts to rectify the fragmentation of tax systems, in particular value-added tax (VAT) systems, in the 28 EU Member States. This fragmentation constrains SMEs’ — and especially start-ups’ — development and cross-border trade;

16.

suggests that the Commission make additional funds available to help start-ups develop and implement strategies for protecting intellectual property rights;

17.

recognises the problem of ineffective and excessively long business insolvency proceedings in EU Member States that deprive many honest but over-indebted entrepreneurs of a second chance;

18.

welcomes the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, of 22 November 2016 (COM(2016) 723) — which aims to reduce the key barriers to the free flow of capital stemming from differences in Member States’ restructuring and insolvency frameworks; expresses the concern, however, that the proposal is limited to financial aspects, with employed workers treated as creditors of a company on the same footing as banks or other investors, and that the recovery of a company is presented purely as a financial reorganisation of stakeholders;

19.

finds the Commission’s argument for the added value of implementing the proposed legislative solutions at EU level convincing and therefore considers the proposal for a directive consistent with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;

20.

expresses concern that the current inability to harmonise Member States’ legal systems relating to insolvency proceedings means that this legislative instrument will not make a meaningful contribution to increasing the number of start-ups remaining on the market for longer than two to three years;

21.

recalls the adoption on 20 May 2015 by the European Parliament and the Council of Regulation (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings in the various Member States and supports the approach whereby insolvency proceedings are no longer to be seen merely in terms of liquidation, but as a tool for ensuring that the resources of the company — including its employees’ right to work — are preserved and, as far as possible, ensuring the company’s survival. Also welcomes the establishment, by June 2019, of a digital system of interconnected insolvency registers to be set up in each Member State, and which it will be possible to access free of charge through the European e-Justice Portal. Nonetheless draws attention to the fact that additional support is needed to increase the specialisation of judges and the professionalism of practitioners involved in such procedures;

22.

welcomes the European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 April 2017 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Money Market Funds (COM(2013)0615) and the proposed establishment of a new category of money market fund (MMF), the low-volatility net asset value (LVNAV) MMF specifically designed for small companies in the real economy;

23.

calls on public authorities at national, regional and local level to initiate or become actively involved in:

24.

considers that there is a need to facilitate SME start-ups in the single market, in particular by setting appropriate thresholds for exempting them from national reorganisation and re-registration requirements;

25.

encourages the Commission to work towards laying the groundwork for a start-up visa and a catalogue of conditions enabling safe and beneficial use to be made of qualified intellectual and financial capital from third countries that is able to contribute to the development of the EU economy;

26.

welcomes the Commission’s efforts to improve access to public procurement for start-ups and scale-ups and stresses the need to closely monitor the transposition and implementation of Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement at Member State level in order to ensure that the Member States make full use of existing provisions for improving SMEs’ access to public procurement;

27.

welcomes the idea of establishing innovation brokers, responsible for putting together networks of buyers interested in innovative public procurement, linking them with innovative companies and helping such companies access venture capital;

28.

commends the proposed alterations to the Horizon 2020 programme to support a bottom-up, cross-sectoral approach and radical innovation characterised by a high degree of social significance and high growth potential;

29.

welcomes the further strengthening of the Enterprise Europe Network (EEN) by expanding its range of services to include specialised advice on scaling up, information about national and European rules, financing opportunities, partnerships, and how to access cross-border public procurement;

30.

emphasises the importance of the EEN regional offices forging strong cooperative links with local business incubators, accelerators and science and technology parks, because these institutions are in daily and close contact with start-ups and are thus well aware of their real problems and needs;

31.

emphasises that the intensification announced by the Commission of efforts to create connections between clusters and local and regional entrepreneurial ecosystems — in particular with regard to matchmaking between investors and large companies and networking of local decision-makers — should be extended to include connecting start-ups with research hubs, as potential providers of technological and non-technological innovative solutions;

32.

calls on the Commission to introduce support measures with the aim of launching innovative business incubators to help and support entrepreneurs during the initial stages of their business, improving their business management skills, enabling alternative financing options, reaching agreements with ‘driver’ enterprises (‘elevator pitch’), supporting international expansion, etc.;

33.

draws attention to the widening technological gap between metropolitan regions and less-developed and peripheral regions. In this regard, suggests that the Commission take measures to support the networking of leading regions with regions that have economies based on agriculture;

34.

although much still remains to be done, welcomes the progress that has been made in terms of entrepreneurship in less-developed regions, and suggests that the Commission continue supporting the current initiatives to promote business development in these regions and that it consider implementing new ones, such as a separate instrument dedicated to networking projects;

35.

underlines that additional measures to strengthen and network actors working to promote entrepreneurship in traditional economic sectors, including the craft sector and the cultural and creative industries, rural and peripheral regions, and peri-urban areas would be highly desirable;

36.

welcomes the Commission’s idea of creating a European platform to connect start-ups with potential partners (alongside existing public and private platforms). This instrument would strengthen the development of networks of entrepreneurial ecosystems and clusters in Europe;

37.

welcomes the planned direction for the Commission’s work in this field (the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition, the Blueprint for Sectoral Cooperation on Skills and the big data tool);

38.

supports the initiative to extend the Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs programme to incubators and entrepreneurs in international markets;

39.

expresses concern that the communication — which tackles an unusually broad topic — is too superficial when it comes to planned activities and only selectively goes into future actions (e.g. information about the programme of the digital innovation hubs is absent, and a proposal to set up a European Innovation Council is merely alluded to without specifying the way in which it will work);

40.

calls on the Commission to put forward more detailed information on the competences that this council is to have, as well as its legislative mandate;

41.

notes that ensuring that business and its environment, research circles and public authorities are given proper representation in the European Innovation Council is a key factor determining the quality of its work;

42.

encourages the European Commission to analyse the possibility of supporting local and regional authorities in setting up teams composed of experienced representatives of business, who would help develop entrepreneurship and start-up and scale-up businesses in the area administered by the local or regional authority;

43.

underlines the important role that local and regional authorities, academia and entrepreneurs themselves (the ‘triple helix’) have played and will continue to play in spreading an entrepreneurial spirit, constructing a culture of science and innovation in Europe’s regions, and building strong regional entrepreneurial ecosystems;

44.

calls on the Commission to involve local and regional authorities in the planned analysis of the peer review of the Member States’ principles and practices in relation to start-ups and scale-ups. Local and regional authorities are in the closest proximity to local entrepreneurs and it is worth taking advantage of their significant expertise about local business environments;

45.

considers that, with the digital single market, competition will take on a new dimension and every region will have to compete with other European entities that benefit from the same legal bases. This, therefore, is an opportunity for start-ups that have not had particularly good opportunities to date to internationalise and access new cross-border markets;

46.

points out that start-ups’ and scale-ups’ recourse to innovative and non-standard solutions means that the effects of implementing them can only be predicted to a limited extent. This also makes it more difficult to access funds from regular programmes;

47.

recommends that the Commission should loosen the financing system so that it can be more flexible towards innovative ideas, and that it should encourage bodies that distribute European funds to be more attentive to the selection of experts;

48.

welcomes the Commission’s idea of creating a European venture capital fund of funds, which might reduce the market fragmentation of venture capital funds in the EU;

49.

proposes launching analyses of the possibility of bringing in local venture capital in local and regional authorities;

50.

calls on the Commission to promote differentiation between the various sources of funding; venture capital funds, private equity and business angels are still underdeveloped in Europe;

51.

commends the proposal to increase the budget for COSME and, with the proviso that no funds are diverted away from the Connecting Europe Facility or the Horizon 2020 programme, in principle also the proposal to increase the budget for EFSI, which allows for additional financing for SMEs in the start-up and scale-up phases. In particular, it would be useful to promote integration and partnerships between SMEs and start-ups;

52.

welcomes the direction of the Commission’s measures that aim to create additional incentives for venture capital financing, e.g. by making it possible for private funds or local and regional authorities’ funds to benefit from public guarantee when raising debt financing, as this can contribute to increasing equity and debt investments in start-ups and scale-ups;

53.

calls for a non-financial support programme for start-ups and scale-ups to be developed at EU level, which will enable new markets to be explored, contributing to an increase in the number of jobs and the further development of innovation within the EU;

54.

considers it necessary to enhance a structured European investment ecosystem by means of economic and fiscal support measures that attract and encourage private investment in innovative companies, so that they can develop and grow in optimal economic and financial conditions and achieve a high degree of competitiveness. To this end, it is particularly important to strengthen alternative financing instruments (risk capital, equity loans, guarantees, etc.). A genuine simplification of how financial instruments co-financed by the Structural Funds are implemented is therefore needed;

55.

draws attention to the intensive development of crowdfunding platforms as an alternative source of financing for innovative solutions created by start-ups;

56.

calls on the Commission to analyse the opportunities and risks of crowdfunding for European society, in particular those that directly impact investors who might not have the same access to information and might be less prepared for this kind of transaction compared to professional investors;

57.

points out that a well-designed regulatory framework governing how crowdfunding platforms operate across the entire EU will enable the potential of this source to be fully harnessed. Standards ensuring that investors’ interests are protected should be an integral part of this framework;

58.

supports the strengthening of Startup Europe and the expansion of its scope beyond the ICT sector and web start-ups. In this regard, the Committee would recommend further simplification in order to provide increasingly smooth and effective guidance to start-ups that want to access the numerous possibilities offered by European programmes;

59.

calls on the European Commission to adopt a strategy — based on existing areas of particular interest such as the silver economy, social entrepreneurship, and the triple helix model — relating to innovative and socially-focused business initiatives that enhance quality of life, so that the system of incentives supports bottom-up activities and social creativity;

60.

draws attention to the scope for cooperation between start-ups and scale-ups, on the one hand, and large businesses, on the other. It is important to apply good practice from EU regions, where cooperation leads to synergies between businesses of different sizes and from different sectors;

61.

welcomes the Commission’s assurance that it will launch a Social Innovation Challenge Platform;

62.

points out that linking such a platform with the public procurement system could produce added value, potentially affecting social enterprises’ growth rate. However, the system would need to be made more flexible so that problems can be solved creatively — i.e. in an optimal way, from the point of view of the final beneficiaries — and not predictably, in terms of structural indicators.

12.10.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 342/51

1.

underlines that SMEs, as Europe’s main engines for creating growth and jobs, require a simple, clear, consistent and legally stable regulatory environment as well as an economic environment based on a sufficient level of public and private investment capacities;

2.

points out the disproportionate impact of red tape on SMEs, with relative compliance costs in areas such as taxation or reporting obligations higher for SMEs compared with larger companies;

3.

therefore forcefully emphasises the need to make the European regulatory environment more SME-friendly by tackling barriers to business creation and growth at all levels;

4.

recognises the progress achieved through the Small Business Act for Europe (SBA) of 2008 (1), the SBA review of 2011 (2), and the Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan of 2013 (3);

5.

reiterates its support for the Commission’s goal to ease VAT registration and reporting obligations as part of the Single Market Strategy, expressed in its Opinion on Upgrading the Single Market (4); regrets, however, that local and regional representatives were not formally consulted to ensure that their concerns — e.g. regarding needs of SMEs in cross-border regions — are fully taken into account;

6.

underlines the persistent need for a coherent, visible and updated European SME policy, oriented towards results and implementation, building upon and strengthening previous initiatives, and mainstreaming the ‘Think Small First’ principle across all government levels and policies;

7.

therefore reiterates its call for a revised and strengthened SBA and for a stronger role for regions and cities in implementing SBA principles; restates its own commitment to promote SBA implementation through its European Entrepreneurial Region (EER) scheme;

8.

notes that the SME envoys network acts as main interface between the European Commission and national policy-makers; calls upon the Commission to formally and systematically include regional and local SME envoys in this network;

9.

recognises that the EU has a fundamentally business-friendly regulatory environment; stresses, however, that differences persist as to the time, cost, and number of procedures required to set up a company; calls upon Member States to commit themselves to aligning their respective rules with the best performers, while respecting the subsidiarity principle and after checking suitability; points out that good practices such as, among others, Iniciativa Lisboa, which allows a company to be started in 36 minutes, can serve as inspiration in this respect;

10.

points to the role of clusters in helping small businesses scale up through market testing and analysis, innovation generation, and qualification, and recommends focussed support for these activities through programmes such as COSME;

11.

underlines the results of the ECON seminar ‘Smart Regulation — Smart Growth’ in Seggauberg, Styria, and the subsequent citizens’ dialogue, which point to the need for achieving concrete results through new and innovative approaches;

12.

stresses the importance of mainstreaming the ‘Think Small First’ principle across EU policies and the entire decision-making process; calls for weighting impact assessment criteria more strongly in favour of SMEs and considering the territorial impact of rules more systematically;

13.

underlines that overlapping and contradictory rules in different EU policies — regional policy, state aid, public procurement, environmental protection, tension between cluster support and competition and compliance rules — disproportionally affect SMEs;

14.

is concerned about bottlenecks due to incoherent requirements and conflicting definitions across EU sectoral policies, such as separate sets of rules linked to procurement, regional and competition policy (5), or diverging definitions of innovation in regional and competition policy (6);

15.

is convinced that the burden of reporting requirements on SMEs cannot be addressed by simplifying a single piece of legislation; therefore urges the Commission and Member States to adopt a holistic approach, based on a comprehensive assessment of all reporting requirements faced by SMEs;

16.

suggests exploring options to lighten the load on SMEs through actions such as creating a threshold below which companies have to provide less information, limiting the number of mandatory questionnaires, and avoiding the creation of new questionnaires by incorporating, for example, statistical information into existing ones;

17.

welcomes the fact that in the new generation of EU free trade agreements specific chapters are to be dedicated to SMEs with a view to facilitating their access to the other market, including by increasing legal certainty, reducing or removing non-tariff barriers, extending the awarding of contracts on the basis of the best tender, and strengthening protection of intellectual and industrial property rights; draws attention to its opinion on TTIP of 12 February 2015;

18.

welcomes efforts to reduce burden on SMEs in the framework of the Better Regulation Agenda, the REFIT programme, and the Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (IIA);

19.

reiterates its concern, expressed in its Opinion on the REFIT Programme (7), that elected representatives of local and regional authorities, as well as the CoR as their institutional representation, are not included in the IIA despite the mandate and weight conferred on them by the Lisbon Treaty;

20.

welcomes mainstreaming better regulation principles across the policy cycle and extending Impact Assessments (IAs) to the Parliament and Council; regrets that the IIA does not include a commitment by the Council and the Parliament to systematically carry out IAs;

21.

stresses that the introduction of amendments or additional rules at later stages of the legislative process or during transposition of EU directives by Member States should go hand in hand with a commitment to conduct IAs, in order to prevent gold-plating and ensure that the REFIT element of a given rule is not watered down;

22.

recognises the importance of stakeholder consultations in preparing legislative proposals; notes, however, that once consultations have taken place, contributors may be left wondering to what extent their concerns have been taken on board; suggests associating local and regional representatives to IA Boards, to allow them to provide additional scrutiny of Commission proposals;

23.

stresses that the institutional role of the CoR within the REFIT Platform should not be confused with other stakeholders; therefore considers that representatives of the CoR commissions should be able to support the CoR representative to the Platform by taking part in Platform meetings concerning dossiers related to their remits;

24.

commits itself to mainstreaming better regulation principles across its own work by drawing upon the expertise of relevant thematic commissions when issuing an opinion on a dossier affecting SMEs;

25.

notes that the work of the REFIT Platform focuses primarily on specific issues within EU legislation that can be improved without fundamentally changing an entire piece of legislation; considers that this narrow focus should be complemented by a more ambitious approach, aiming for structural improvements to the EU regulatory framework in the medium term;

26.

considers that specific priorities in Smart Regulation for SMEs can be identified in SME access to public procurement, and in VAT and taxation rules; also sees a clear need for action in SME access to the Single Market, access to finance, SME support from European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), and striking a better balance between SME needs and labour, consumer and environmental protection;

27.

welcomes the simplification of European procurement law introduced through the new procurement directives and the European Single Procurement document (8); calls upon Member States to ensure full implementation and correct application of the simplified European public procurement law system;

28.

points out the significant role played by regional and local authorities in SME access to public procurement and thus considers reducing obstacles to SME procurement as particularly important for regions and cities;