14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/1

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in the merger section of the Competition website of the Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). This website provides various facilities to help locate individual merger decisions, including company, case number, date and sectoral indexes,

—

in electronic form on the EUR-Lex website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=en) under document number 32017M8315. EUR-Lex is the online access to European law.

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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/2

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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/3

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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/4

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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/5

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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/6

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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/7

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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/8

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EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/9

1.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that it is legally possible to re-adopt a new decision in this case following the (partial) annulment of the 2010 Decision by the Court.

2.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that Articles 5(j) to 5(l) of the 2010 Decision are repealed and re-adopted.

3.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the draft decision applies to British Airways plc in so far as the judgment of the General Court in Case T-48/11 of 16 December 2015 annulled the 2010 Decision.

4.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the anticompetitive behaviour covered by the draft decision constitutes an agreement and/or concerted practice between undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Swiss Agreement.

5.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment of the undertakings’ behaviour and geographic scope of the agreement and/or concerted practice contained in the draft decision.

6.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the undertakings concerned by the draft decision participated in a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Swiss Agreement.

7.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the object of the agreement and/or concerted practice was to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 101 of the TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Swiss Agreement.

8.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that the agreement and/or concerted practice were capable of appreciably affecting trade between the Member States of the EU.

9.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s assessment as regards the duration of the infringement.

10.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission’s draft decision as regards the addressees.

11.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission that a fine should be imposed on the addressees of the draft decision.

12.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the application of the 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.

13.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the basic amounts of the fines.

14.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the determination of the duration for the purpose of calculating the fines.

15.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the application of the specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this case.

16.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the determination of the fine for the two undertakings whose adjusted basic amount exceeds 10 % of their total turnover.

17.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission as regards the treatment of the leniency applications and the reduction of the fines based on the 2006 Leniency Notice.

18.

The Advisory Committee agrees with the Commission on the final amounts of the fines.

19.

The Advisory Committee recommends the publication of its Opinion in the Official Journal of the European Union.

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/10

1.

On 9 November 2010, in Case COMP/39258 Airfreight, the Commission adopted Decision C(2010) 7694 final relating to proceedings pursuant to Article 101 of the TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air Transport (the ‘2010 Decision’) (2). All but one of the addressees of that cartel fining decision brought actions for its annulment (in full or in part).

2.

In 13 judgments dated 16 December 2015 (the ‘2015 Judgments’) (3) the General Court held that the 2010 Decision was vitiated by a defective statement of reasons (4). Depending on the forms of order sought before the General Court, that vice entailed the annulment in full or in part of the 2010 Decision in respect of the various parties that had challenged that decision (5).

3.

The 2015 Judgments identified a breach of the requirement of an adequate statement of reasons in accordance with Article 296(2) TFEU. They did not rule on any substantive pleas. The draft decision to which the present report relates is designed to replace the 2010 Decision to the extent that it has been annulled. It aims to correct the deficiencies identified in the 2015 Judgments and to account for developments in the structure of certain undertakings since 2010.

4.

On 20 May 2016, the Commission Directorate-General for Competition (‘DG Competition’) wrote to the applicants in the 13 challenges that led to the 2015 Judgments. The letters concerned (the ‘May 2016 Letters’) informed these parties of DG Competition’s intention to propose that the Commission adopt a fresh decision in Case AT.39258. This decision would be addressed to the legal entities covered by the 13 applications before the General Court in so far as the 2010 Decision was annulled vis-à-vis each applicant. It would find that each of the applicants before the General Court participated in a ‘single and continuous infringement’ in relation to all the transport routes referred to in the 2010 Decision. The proposed fresh decision would, according to those letters, ‘require some adaptation of the recitals and the operative part of the 2010 Decision’, but would not lead to new objections nor alter the substance of the objections set out in the statement of objections of 18 December 2007 (the ‘SO’). The letters conveyed DG Competition’s view that such a fresh decision would be permitted by relevant case law, since the annulment of the 2010 Decision was ‘on procedural grounds’ (6). They invited comments on DG Competition’s planned course of action.

5.

All addressees of the May 2016 Letters responded to them, with some providing the Hearing Officer with a copy of their responses addressed to DG Competition.

6.

Certain of these addressees criticised the May 2016 Letter that they received as being too imprecise. Without specific details of the ‘adaptation’ foreseen in those letters, they claimed to various degrees that their ability to make in-depth comments on the infringement that DG Competition was minded to identify in the proposed fresh decision was limited.

7.

Several addressees argued in essence that, contrary to the situations giving rise to the judgments cited in footnote 6 of the present report (the ‘PVC II line of case law’), the defects identified in the 2015 Judgments are not limited to pure formalities in the final stage of the adoption of a decision that are relatively straightforward to rectify.

8.

Some of the same addressees submitted, albeit not always pointing to a specific legal basis, that the Commission is thus legally precluded from taking a fresh decision in Case AT.39258. Others inferred rather that the Commission cannot proceed to adopt a fresh decision without firstly drawing up a new statement of objections and giving the parties concerned the opportunity to be heard anew, including by means of an oral hearing. Some of the latter addressees argued that there had been developments in relevant case law that call into question whether the requirements for a finding of their involvement in a single and continuous infringement are met.

9.

Certain addressees submitted also that any fresh decision was precluded from increasing their liability compared with the extent of the liability indicated in the 2010 Decision.

10.

None of the addressees of the May 2016 Letters addressed a request to me following the May 2016 Letters. It is nonetheless worth noting the following in relation to the submissions summarised above.

11.

The right to be heard concerns the Commission’s objections and the evidence on which it relies in relation to them. It does not however extend to the final position which the Commission intends to adopt in a competition law infringement decision (7). The May 2016 Letters cannot therefore properly be criticised on the ground that they did not set out in detail the precise adaptations that DG Competition envisaged for the purposes of a fresh decision in the present case. The May 2016 Letters sought views on the outline of DG Competition’s planned proposal of a fresh decision to remedy the defects identified by the 2015 Judgments. It would have been premature to set out in precise detail every modification that DG Competition considered necessary to remedy those defects. Moreover, the addressees of the May 2016 Letters were in fact put in a position to make comments on the matters set out in those letters.

12.

Breach of the requirement of an adequate statement of reasons in accordance with Article 296(2) TFEU is considered to be a breach of ‘essential procedural requirements’ for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU (8). Although the defects in the 2010 Decision identified in the 2015 Judgments were not the same as those at issue in the PVC II line of case law, it cannot be inferred that the illegality identified in the 2015 Judgments is one of substance rather than form. The PVC II line of case law is thus applicable to the situation pertaining in Case AT.39258 after the 2015 Judgments.

13.

Indeed, the 2015 Judgments did not rule on the issue of whether a cartel infringement was committed or review the legality of the assessment of this issue in the 2010 Decision (9). The principle of res judicata does not therefore arise (10). In addition, the various annulments effected by the 2015 Judgments cannot be regarded as an acquittal for the purposes of the principle of ne bis in idem as enshrined in particular in Article 50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It follows that the Commission is not precluded by either of these principles from resuming proceedings in respect of conduct which was the subject of the 2010 Decision (11). None of the submissions in response to the May 2016 Letters suggested that a fresh decision by the Commission in Case AT.39258 is precluded for other reasons.

14.

It is the SO and not the 2010 Decision that is relevant for the purposes of the exercise of the right to be heard in connection with the Commission’s objections in Case AT.39258. (12) The illegality identified in the 2015 Judgments occurred at the stage of the finalisation and adoption of the 2010 Decision. They did not of themselves affect the legality of the SO and the related hearing of the parties concerned (13). The Commission is accordingly entitled to take up the procedure in Case AT.39258 at the point when the illegality identified in the 2015 Judgments occurred (14).

15.

Without taking a view on the suggestion that the case law regarding the concept of a single and continuous infringement has evolved since the time of the SO or of the adoption of the 2010 Decision, it should be recalled that, according to EU courts, developments in the case law cannot in themselves render new hearings necessary, any more than if such developments occur in the course of administrative proceedings prior to a final decision (15). In any event, the content of some of the responses to the May 2016 Letters suggests that these letters did in practice put their addressees in a position to make legal arguments on the basis of relevant case law.

16.

If the Commission decides to replace the 2010 Decision to the extent that it has been annulled, it is required under Article 266 TFEU to eliminate the illegality identified in the 2015 Judgments. In doing so, the Commission is not precluded from adapting the text used in the 2010 Decision, even in a manner that, according to some addressees of the May 2016 Letters, would affect their liability compared with the operative part of the 2010 Decision, especially where this is done precisely to address the contradictions vitiating that decision. Unlike what some responses to the May 2016 Letters suggested, the mere possibility of differences between the 2010 Decision and a fresh decision in Case AT.39258 does not warrant a new statement of objections or the organisation of another oral hearing (16).

17.

Overall, the arguments raised in the responses to the May 2016 Letters have not identified procedural issues affecting the legality of the adoption of a fresh decision in Case AT.39258 as envisaged in the May 2016 Letters.

18.

In response to a May 2016 Letter, one addressee requested (as it had done before the 2010 Decision) access to all potentially exculpatory documents obtained by the Commission after the issuance of the SO in 2007. The request of 2016 sought in particular any potentially exculpatory information that the Commission might have received in the court proceedings leading to the 2015 Judgments and that the part of the file in Case M.3770 Lufthansa/Swiss that was relevant to a particular footnote in the 2010 Decision be added to the case file in Case AT.39258.

19.

DG Competition responded by letter dated 14 October 2016. That letter explained that an examination of the identified documents received by the Commission after the SO had not revealed any potentially exculpatory evidence to which that addressee did not already have access. As for the request that part of the file in Case M.3770 be added to the file in Case AT.39258, the letter noted that the relevant footnote referred solely to the public version of the Commission’s clearance decision in Case M.3770, and not to any documents from the file in that case.

20.

At a very late stage of the procedure for the adoption of a new decision, the same addressee sent a letter to me, calling into question the approach underlying DG Competition’s response of 14 October 2016. In my written response, I noted the lateness of that letter and explained why the criticisms raised could not be upheld.

21.

The fines imposed on individual addressees in the draft decision do not exceed the corresponding amounts set out in the 2010 Decision.

22.

Pursuant to Article 16 of Decision 2011/695/EU, I have examined whether the draft decision deals only with the objections in respect of which the parties have been afforded the opportunity of making known their views. My conclusion is that it does.

23.

In view of the above, and bearing in mind that, apart from the letter mentioned in paragraph 20 above, no requests or complaints were addressed to me, I consider that the effective exercise of the procedural rights has been respected in the procedure for the adoption of a new decision in Case AT.39258.

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/14

(1)

This Decision is addressed to 19 legal entities belonging to 10 undertakings for infringing Article 101 of the Treaty, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air transport (hereafter ‘the Swiss Agreement’) by coordinating their pricing behaviour in the provision of airfreight services. This Decision has been adopted following the resumption of the proceedings that led to Decision C(2010) 7694 final of 9 November 2010 (‘the 2010 Decision’), due to the annulment of the 2010 Decision by the General Court for a procedural error.

(2)

The case was opened on the basis of an immunity application on behalf of Deutsche Lufthansa AG and its controlled subsidiaries Lufthansa Cargo AG and Swiss on 7 December 2005.

(3)

The Commission obtained further evidence from the inspections that took place on 14 and 15 February 2006 at a number of premises of air freight providers throughout the EU.

(4)

Between 3 March 2006 and 27 June 2007 the Commission received eleven further applications under the 2002 Leniency Notice. The Commission also received an application from an undertaking which is not an addressee of this Decision due to lack of sufficient evidence.

(5)

The Statement of Objections was adopted on 18 December 2007, following which all undertakings involved were given the possibility to receive access to the file and defend themselves against the preliminary view of the Commission in writing and during an Oral Hearing that took place on 30 June – 4 July 2008.

(6)

On 9 November 2010, the Commission adopted the 2010 Decision.

(7)

On 16 December 2015, the General Court annulled the 2010 Decision within the limits of the form of order set out in the various applications, ruling that the 2010 Decision was vitiated by a defective statement of reasons.

(8)

This Decision takes into account the finding of the General Court as regards the defective statement of reasons in the 2010 Decision and is addressed to the parties to the extent that the 2010 Decision has been annulled for them. As the 2010 Decision has become final for Qantas Airways Limited, this Decision is not addressed to it.The Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions issued a favourable opinion on 6 March 2017.

(9)

This Decision relates to a single and continuous infringement of Article 101 of the Treaty, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Swiss Agreement, covering the EEA territory and Switzerland by which the addressees coordinated their pricing behaviour in the provision of airfreight services from, to, and within the EEA with respect to fuel surcharge (FSC), security surcharge (SSC) and the payment of commission on surcharges.

(10)

Pricing contacts between airlines providing airfreight services (‘carriers’) initially started in respect of the introduction of a FSC. Carriers then contacted each other regarding the application of the FSC mechanism, the introduction of new trigger points raising the level of FSC and regarding anticipated increases (or decreases) in FSC levels. These contacts started initially with a smaller group of carriers and spread to include all addressees of this Decision. They aimed to ensure that the airfreight carriers imposed a flat rate surcharge per kilo for all shipments and that increases (or decreases) were applied in full and in a coordinated way.

(11)

Cooperation spread to other areas without affecting the application of the FSC. Accordingly, carriers cooperated in the introduction and application of the SSC as well. Like the FSC, SSC was an element of the overall price.

(12)

Carriers extended their cooperation to refusing to pay commission to their customers (freight forwarders) on surcharges. By refusing to pay commission the carriers ensured that surcharges did not become subject to competition through the negotiation of discounts with customers.

(13)

The contacts were held in particular via bilateral phone calls. They also included bilateral and multilateral meetings and exchanges of emails. In some instances, meetings of the local Board of Airline Representatives associations were used to coordinate surcharges. Contacts occurred at both head office and local levels.

(14)

Although there is only one cartel, the conduct infringed three legal bases — Article 101 of the TFEU, Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and Article 8 of the Swiss Agreement (2). The Commission finds the infringement and imposes fines for different time periods with regard to different routes.

(15)

For airfreight services on routes within the EEA, the Commission is competent to find an infringement and impose fines for the whole period of 1999-2006.

(16)

Before 1 May 2004, Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector (3) granted the Commission implementing powers to apply Article 101 of the TFEU with respect to air transport between EU airports. Air transport between EU airports and airports in third countries was, however, excluded from the scope of that regulation. Under these circumstances, the Commission did not find an infringement or impose fines for conduct concerning air transport between EU airports and airports in third countries before 1 May 2004.

(17)

Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 became applicable for the implementation of the EEA Agreement by virtue of the Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 130/2004 (4) and the Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 40/2005 (5) which removed the exclusion of air transport between EEA airports and third countries from the scope of the provisions for the implementation of the EEA Agreement, in particular by amending Protocol 21. Decision No 130/2004 and Decision No 40/2005 entered into force on 19 May 2005 and from that date Council Regulation (EC) No 411/2004 (6) and Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 became applicable in the framework of the EEA Agreement. Under these circumstances the Commission did not find an infringement or impose fines for conduct concerning routes between EEA countries that are not Member States of the EU and third countries before 19 May 2005.

(18)

Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 became applicable for the application of the Swiss Agreement by virtue of Decision No 1/2007 of the Joint Community/Switzerland Air Transport Committee (7) which incorporated the regulation into the annex to the agreement with effect from 5 December 2007. Prior to such incorporation of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, the applicable implementing regulation was Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87, which had been incorporated into the annex of the agreement since its entry into force on 1 June 2002. Under these circumstances the Commission did not find an infringement or impose fines for conduct concerning routes between the EU and Switzerland before 1 June 2002. This Decision does not purport to find an infringement of Article 8 of the Swiss Agreement concerning airfreight services on routes between Switzerland and third countries.

(19)

As regards the duration of each addressee’s participation, the infringement covered the following periods:

(20)

The basic amount of the fine was determined as a proportion of the value of the sales of air freight services made by each undertaking in the relevant geographic area during 2005, the last full year prior to the end of the cartel, multiplied by the number of years of involvement of each undertaking in the infringement (variable amount), plus an additional amount, also calculated as a proportion of the value of sales, in order to deter undertakings from engaging in cartel conduct.

(21)

In order to calculate this basic amount, the Commission took into account the sales to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates, namely of airfreight services (i) between EEA airports, (ii) between airports in the EU and airports in third countries (8), (iii) between airports in the EEA (excluding EU airports) and airports in third countries and (iv) between airports in the EU and airports in Switzerland.

(22)

In respect of services provided between the EEA and third countries (points (ii) and (iii) above), whilst both inbound and outbound routes are relevant for calculating the value of sales it must be recognised for the purpose of determining the basic amount that part of the harm resulting from the cartel in respect of these EEA – third country routes (both inbound and outbound) is likely to fall outside the EEA (9). Therefore, an ad hoc reduction of 50 % to the basic amount of the fine with respect to these third country routes was applied in this Decision.

(23)

Taking into account in particular the nature of the infringement, which consisted of price-fixing agreements and practices, as well as the EEA-wide geographic scope of the cartel, both the variable amount and the additional amount were set at 16 %.

(24)

The Commission increased the fines for SAS by 50 % because this undertaking had already been fined once for prior cartel involvement (10).

(25)

This Decision concludes that the carriers were authorised or encouraged to concert on prices with their direct competitors on certain routes by the regulatory approach of certain third country jurisdictions as well as the provisions of certain bilateral Air Service Agreements. This regulatory environment constitutes a mitigating circumstance which justifies a 15 % reduction for all addressees of this Decision.

(26)

The Decision also concludes that three undertakings, namely Air Canada, Latam and SAS, participated in the infringement to a limited degree. This is due to the fact that these participants operated on the periphery of the cartel, entered into a limited number of contacts with other carriers and were involved in fewer aspects of the cartel A reduction of 10 % was applied to these three undertakings.

(27)

The fines on two undertakings would have exceeded the legal maximum of 10 % of their 2016 worldwide turnover, and were therefore reduced accordingly. Further, due to the procedural nature of the annulment of the 2010 Decision the Commission used its discretion to reduce the adjusted basic amount of the fine to 10 % of the worldwide turnover in 2009 when the worldwide turnover of an addressee in 2016 was higher than its worldwide turnover in 2009.

(28)

The Commission granted full immunity from the fine to Deutsche Lufthansa AG and its subsidiaries Lufthansa Cargo and SWISS and a reduction of the fine for cooperation under the 2002 Leniency Notice to Martinair (50 %), Japan Airlines (25 %), Air France and KLM (20 %), Cathay Pacific (20 %), Latam (20 %), Air Canada (15 %), Cargolux (15 %), SAS (15 %) and British Airways (10 %).

(29)

Finally, the Commission rejected a request for inability to pay the fine received under the Commission’s 2006 Guidelines on the setting of Fines. The undertaking concerned did not meet the conditions for a reduction.

(30)

The following fines were imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003:

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/20

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/21

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/22

1.

On June 6 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertaking Banco Santander, S.A. (‘Santander’, Spain) acquires within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation control of the whole of SAM Investment Holdings Limited (‘SAM’, UK), by way of purchase of shares..

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   Santander: Retail banking, treasury, and insurance services in Spain, the United Kingdom, other European countries, and the Americas.

—   SAM: a joint venture between Warburg Pincus, General Atlantic, and Santander active in the asset management in Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, Luxembourg and the Americas.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8519 — Santander/SAM, to the following address:

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/23

1.

On 6 June 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (‘CPPIB’, Canada) and Baring Private Equity Asia (‘BPEA’, Singapore) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation joint control of the whole of the undertaking Nord Anglia Education, Inc (‘Nord Anglia’, Hong Kong) by way of purchase of shares.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   CPPIB: professional investment management in real estate, public equities, private equities, infrastructure and fixed income instruments

—   BPEA: independent alternative asset management in real estate, private equities and growth capital

—   Nord Anglia: premium school operator active in China, Europe, the Middle East, the U.S. and Southeast Asia

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8515 — CPPIB/BPEA/Nord Anglia Education, to the following address:

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/24

1.

On 7 June 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Genui GmbH (‘GENUI’, Germany), Summit Partners L.P. (‘Summit’, USA) and Sycamore GmbH (‘Sycamore’, Germany) acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation joint control of the undertaking Market Logic Software AG (‘Market Logic Software’, Germany) by way of purchase of shares.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   for GENUI: an investment company that holds stakes in medium-sized companies in German-speaking countries,

—   for Summit: an international equity investment firm focused on investing in businesses in the sectors of technology, healthcare and life sciences, growth products and services to fund growth, recapitalisations and management buyouts,

—   for Sycamore: a private equity firm,

—   for Market Logic Software: a software company that develops and distributes marketing information systems.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8507 — GENUI/Summit/Sycamore/Market Logic Software, to the following address:

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/25

1.

On 1 June 2017, the Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (1) by which the undertakings Wärtsilä Technology Oy Ab, controlled by Wärtsilä Corporation (‘Wärtsilä’, Finland), and CSSC Electronics Technology Co., Ltd, controlled by China State Shipbuilding Corporation (‘CSSC’, China), acquire within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and 3(4) of the Merger Regulation joint control of the undertaking CSSC Wärtsilä Electrical & Automation (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. (‘JV’, China) by way of a purchase of shares in a newly created company constituting a joint venture.

2.

The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

—   for Wärtsilä: supply of complete lifecycle power solutions for the marine and energy markets,

—   for CSSC: shipbuilding and production of marine-related equipment, as well as non-marine related activities such as aerospace, construction, power generation and petrochemicals,

—   for JV: supply of marine electrical, automation and navigation systems in People’s Republic of China.

3.

On preliminary examination, the Commission finds that the notified transaction could fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation. However, the final decision on this point is reserved. Pursuant to the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (2) it should be noted that this case is a candidate for treatment under the procedure set out in this Notice.

4.

The Commission invites interested third parties to submit their possible observations on the proposed operation to the Commission.

Observations must reach the Commission not later than 10 days following the date of this publication. Observations can be sent to the Commission by fax (+32 22964301), by email to COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu or by post, under reference M.8439 — Wärtsilä/CSSC/JV, to the following address:

14.6.2017   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 188/26