1. 

The Court of Justice is being asked for the first time (unless I am mistaken) whether Directive 2013/32/EU ( 2 ) is compatible with national legislation which allows for a finding of inadmissibility, or the dismissal, without preparatory inquiries of an action brought by an asylum seeker against the refusal of his application for international protection.

2. 

The referring court states that the application of the person who has requested asylum in this case is ‘manifestly unfounded’ and that ‘the administrative authority’s refusal’ of his application is ‘therefore insurmountable’. Although, in that case, national legislation would authorise it to find inadmissible, or to dismiss, the application without preparatory inquiries, the question arises whether that solution is in accordance with Directive 2013/32. Specifically, the referring court wishes to ascertain whether such a rejection of the action would deprive the applicant of the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by Article 46(3) of the directive.

3.

The aim of Directive 2013/32, according to Article 1 thereof, is ‘to establish common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection pursuant to Directive 2011/95/EU’. ( 3 )

4.

In recitals 18, 20 and 60 of the directive it is stated:

5.

Article 2(c) of the directive states that:

‘“applicant” means a third-country national or stateless person who has made an application for international protection in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken.’

6.

Included in Chapter II (‘Basic principles and guarantees’), Article 12 provides:

‘1.   With respect to the procedures provided for in Chapter III, Member States shall ensure that all applicants enjoy the following guarantees:

…

2.   With respect to the procedures provided for in Chapter [IV], Member States shall ensure that all applicants enjoy guarantees equivalent to the ones referred to in paragraph 1(b) to (e).’

7.

Article 14 (‘Personal interview’) of the directive provides, in paragraph 1:

‘Before a decision is taken by the determining authority, the applicant shall be given the opportunity of a personal interview on his or her application for international protection …’

8.

Under Article 17 (‘Report and recording of personal interviews’) of the directive:

‘1.   Member States shall ensure that either a thorough and factual report containing all substantive elements or a transcript is made of every personal interview.

2.   Member States may provide for audio or audiovisual recording of the personal interview. Where such a recording is made, Member States shall ensure that the recording or a transcript thereof is available in connection with the applicant’s file.

3.   Member States shall ensure that the applicant has the opportunity to make comments and/or provide clarification orally and/or in writing with regard to any mistranslations or misconceptions appearing in the report or in the transcript, at the end of the personal interview or within a specified time limit before the determining authority takes a decision. To that end, Member States shall ensure that the applicant is fully informed of the content of the report or of the substantive elements of the transcript, with the assistance of an interpreter if necessary. Member States shall then request the applicant to confirm that the content of the report or the transcript correctly reflects the interview.

…

5.   Applicants and their legal advisers or other counsellors … shall have access to the report or the transcript and, where applicable, the recording, before the determining authority takes a decision.

…’

9.

Under the title ‘Examination procedure’, Article 31, with which Chapter III (‘Procedures at first instance’) opens, provides:

‘1.   Member States shall process applications for international protection in an examination procedure in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II.

2.   Member States shall ensure that the examination procedure is concluded as soon as possible, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination.

3.   Member States shall ensure that the examination procedure is concluded within six months of the lodging of the application.

…

Member States may extend the time limit of six months set out in this paragraph for a period not exceeding a further nine months, where:

…

8.   Member States may provide that an examination procedure in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II be accelerated and/or conducted at the border or in transit zones in accordance with Article 43 if:

9.   Member States shall lay down time limits for the adoption of the decision in the procedure at first instance pursuant to paragraph 8. Those time limits shall be reasonable.

…’

10.

Under Article 32(2) of the directive:

‘In cases of unfounded applications in which any of the circumstances listed in Article 31(8) apply, Member States may also consider an application to be manifestly unfounded, where it is defined as such in the national legislation.’

11.

Chapter V (‘Appeals procedures’) of the directive contains a single article (Article 46), entitled ‘The right to an effective remedy’, according to which:

‘1.   Member States shall ensure that applicants have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following:

2   Member States shall ensure that persons recognised by the determining authority as eligible for subsidiary protection have the right to an effective remedy pursuant to paragraph 1 against a decision considering an application unfounded in relation to refugee status.

…

3.   In order to comply with paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive 2011/95/EU, at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance.

4.   Member States shall provide for reasonable time limits and other necessary rules for the applicant to exercise his or her right to an effective remedy pursuant to paragraph 1. The time limits shall not render such exercise impossible or excessively difficult.

Member States may also provide for an ex officio review of decisions taken pursuant to Article 43.

…’

12.

According to the order for reference, Italian law has introduced, in relation to international protection, an administrative stage during which, after interviewing the applicant, a panel of experts examines the application — and a judicial stage, when an applicant whose application has not been granted may challenge the administrative body’s decision to refuse it.

13.

Article 19 of Legislative Decree No 150 of 2011, ( 4 ) as amended by Legislative Decree No 142 of 2015, ( 5 ) provides:

‘1.   Proceedings concerning appeals brought against the decisions to which Article 35 of Legislative Decree No 25 of 28 January 2008 refers, are governed by the accelerated procedure, unless otherwise provided by this article.

…

3.   To be admissible, the appeal shall be brought within thirty days of notification of the decision or sixty days if the applicant is resident abroad; …

4.   Appeals have suspensive effect, except when brought:

…

…

6.   The registrar shall notify the person concerned and the Ministry of the Interior … and also the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the appeal and also of the order fixing the hearing.

…

8.   The panel which has adopted the contested decision may lodge all the records and documents it considers necessary for the purpose of the investigation and the court may, including of its own motion, take the investigative steps necessary to rule in the case.

9.   Within six months of submission of the application, the court shall decide, on the basis of the evidence available at the time of the decision, to issue an order rejecting the application or granting the applicant refugee status or subsidiary protection status.

…’

14.

On 20 March 2015, Mr Sacko reached Italy, from Mali, and lodged an application for asylum. On 10 March 2016, he was interviewed by the Commissione Territoriale per il riconoscimento della protezione internazionale (Regional Commission for the grant of international protection; ‘the Commissione territoriale’).

15.

On 5 April 2016, the Commissione Territoriale informed Mr Sacko that it was not going to grant his request for international protection and, consequently, was refusing to accord him refugee status or to consider him eligible for subsidiary protection. The reason it gave for its decision was that the application was based on strictly economic reasons and that he did not have any well-founded fear of persecution.

16.

On 3 May 2016, Mr Sacko appealed against the decision of the Commissione Territoriale before the referring court. He reiterated the reasons for his initial application and referred, in abstract terms, to the situation in Mali, but without in any way linking it to his personal circumstances.

17.

The national court considers that the application is manifestly unfounded. It takes the view, in its own words, that ‘it has become clear (and indeed indisputable at the end of the examination) that Sacko applied for international protection as a result of his own situation of extreme poverty. The mere fact of being in a state of poverty does not, however, even confer entitlement to the measures provided for by domestic law, namely what is known as humanitarian protection … In the final analysis, this court considers that it may reject the application without measures of inquiry, that is without arranging for a fresh hearing of the applicant’.

18.

The referring court maintains that, if the applicant has already been interviewed at the administrative stage, his application for judicial review may be rejected or granted without the need for a further hearing. This interpretation of legality has been ratified by the Suprema Corte di Cassazione (Supreme Court), supported by the updated version of Article 19 of Legislative Decree No 150 of 2011.

19.

According to the order for reference, Article 19(9) of Legislative Decree No 150 of 2011 designs an alternative ‘new decision-taking model’, namely the option of ‘a decision without preparatory inquiries’ based on the ‘evidence available at the time the decision is taken’. This means that, as an alternative to the procedure set out in Article 19(6), the court may directly uphold or dismiss the application, in particular where it considers that the solution at which evidence in the existing case file points would be no different even if a further interview were conducted with the applicant.

20.

However, the referring court harbours doubts as to the compatibility with EU law of the national legislation which allows it to dismiss the action or find it inadmissible without a prior hearing, which is why it has made a reference for a preliminary ruling.

21.

The wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling, registered in the Registry of the Court of Justice on 22 June 2016, is as follows:

‘Must Directive 2013/32/EU (in particular Articles 12, 14, 31 and 46) be interpreted as permitting a procedure, such as the Italian procedure (under Article 19(9) of Legislative Decree No 150 of 2011), whereby a judicial authority seised by an asylum-seeker — whose application has been rejected by the administrative authority responsible for considering applications for asylum after it has conducted a full examination, including an interview — may, in cases where the application for judicial review is manifestly unfounded and the administrative authority’s rejection of the application is thus incontrovertible, dismiss the application for judicial review without preparatory inquiries and without being required to afford the applicant a further opportunity to be heard?’

22.

Written observations have been submitted by Mr Sacko and the Italian Government, and also by the Belgian, Czech, French, Hungarian and Polish Governments and the Commission. It has not been considered necessary to hold an oral hearing.

23.

For Mr Sacko, Article 19(9) of Legislative Decree No 150 of 2011 does not allow an application for review to be rejected without preparatory inquiries and without a hearing, but only requires, for the benefit of the applicant, that his challenge is examined and decided quickly, but without undermining the guarantees inherent in an effective remedy. In his view, the right guaranteed by Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 does not authorise, in the interest of a speedy procedure, abandoning the substantive examination or dispensing with the hearing of the applicant in order to assess the circumstances of his case.

24.

The Member States which have appeared in the proceedings agree that, just as it is essential to give the applicant a hearing at the administrative stage, it may be possible, in certain limited circumstances, to eliminate it during the judicial stage.

25.

However, this agreement between the Member States is not unqualified.

26.

Accordingly, the Italian Government argues that Article 19 of Legislative Decree No 150 of 2011 establishes a procedure which, although it does not expressly envisage a hearing, constitutes an effective remedy and does not preclude the court from deciding, giving reasons for its decision, to hear the applicant, if it considers it necessary.

27.

For the Italian Government, neither Directive 2013/32 nor the general principles of the European Union concerning a fair hearing impose the general and indiscriminate obligation to grant a hearing at the judicial stage. This, furthermore, must be concluded within a reasonable time.

28.

According to the Belgian Government, irrespective of whether or not the application or the appeal are manifestly unfounded, Directive 2013/32 does not require a hearing at the judicial stage. Given the safeguards provided by the directive itself to ensure the transcription of the interview conducted at the administrative stage, the European legislature has considered (logically) that it was unnecessary to require a further hearing at the judicial stage in order to ensure a rigorous examination of the pleas of fact and law relied on by the applicant.

29.

The Czech Government takes the view that the right to be heard is exercised at the administrative stage of the procedure, without it being inferred from Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 or from Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) that the right to effective judicial protection requires, in each case, a second interview, especially when the application for judicial review is manifestly unfounded. To believe otherwise would only serve to prolong the procedure artificially.

30.

The French Government considers that it is clear, both from the general scheme of Directive 2013/32 and from its preparatory works, that it is not mandatory to hear the person concerned at the judicial stage, and the Member States are left the option of introducing it in the exercise of their procedural autonomy. Furthermore, it adds, it would be inappropriate to invoke the principle of equivalence, given that there was no comparable national remedy. As for the principle of effectiveness, the safeguards in Article 46(3) of the directive are to be respected in every case; also in the situation of dismissal without a prior hearing, a procedure which would not be a prerequisite for respecting those safeguards.

31.

The Hungarian Government cites the case-law of the Court of Justice relating to Directive 2008/115/EC. ( 6 ) It argues that a hearing at the judicial stage is not mandatory and may be dispensed with in situations such as that of the main proceedings. In any event, the Italian legislation is compatible with that of the Union if it does not preclude the possibility of the court hearing the applicant, if it considers it necessary.

32.

The Polish Government maintains that the option of conducting a hearing at the judicial stage is left open to the Member States, which are required to respect the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, and also the right to effective judicial protection. These are principles which this Government believes would not be infringed, in principle, by any dismissal of the application for review without a prior hearing, provided that the applicant has been heard at the administrative stage. All this, furthermore, is in the interests of the objective of speed pursued by Directive 2013/32.

33.

For the Commission, no EU rule lays down the circumstances in which the right to be heard in proceedings must be guaranteed. It is for the national legal order to establish them, ensuring respect for the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. It argues that, in order to determine whether it is mandatory to hold a hearing at the judicial stage, it is necessary to take into account the characteristics of asylum proceedings as a whole and the circumstances likely to justify dispensing with that hearing.

34.

The Commission maintains that, according to the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHB’), the right to be heard is a general principle which may only be omitted in exceptional circumstances. The fact that the administrative authority may have refused the application as manifestly unfounded does not constitute one of those circumstances. Nor does the slow progress of the procedure or the additional financial costs of holding a hearing.

35.

Ultimately, the hearing must constitute, according to the Commission, the rule, although not an absolute rule. Exceptionally, when only economic reasons are invoked as a basis for the application for asylum, the facts are simple and uncontested and the proper guarantees have been respected at the administrative stage, the exception to that rule meets the objective of speed stated in recital 20 of Directive 2013/32.

36.

The question raised by the Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan, Italy) is, on first reading, quite specific: it is sought to determine whether national legislation permitting applications for judicial review brought against the administrative refusal of claims for international protection to be dismissed or found inadmissible without preparatory inquiries is compatible with Directive 2013/32.

37.

As the reasons for referring it are developed, however, the question becomes more complex. It appears that the doubts do not appear to refer in general to the ‘right to a hearing’ or, if preferred, to the ‘right to be heard’, but to a specific type or variant of that right, which consists in the ‘right to be interviewed’ or ‘to be heard in person’. ( 7 )

38.

The referring court’s question focuses on the possible need to hear the asylum seeker again, in person, in the judicial proceedings with which he seeks to challenge the administrative refusal to grant his application.

39.

As I shall try to explain below, the ‘right to be heard in person’, as a species of the genus ‘right to a hearing’, has its place in the administrative stage of the asylum procedure. At the judicial stage, however, the applicant has the right to set out (and, to that extent, to be heard) before the court the arguments in support of his claim, a right which cannot be equated to the right to be heard in person.

40.

The referring court and the governments which have submitted written observations have absolutely no doubt that a personal interview of the applicant is mandatory at the administrative stage.

41.

Indeed, Article 14(1) of Directive 2013/32 is categorical when it states that, at that administrative stage, ‘the applicant shall be given the opportunity of a personal interview on his or her application for international protection’. ( 8 ) This was done with Mr Sacko, who was interviewed by the Commissione Territoriale.

42.

However, Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, the subject matter of which is judicial review proceedings against the refusal of the application, does not provide for such an interview. That provision guarantees the ‘right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal’ (paragraphs 1 and 2 which ‘provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law’ (paragraph 3). It also requires reasonable time limits which shall not render such exercises impossible or excessively difficult (paragraph 4) and that the remedy shall have, in principle, a suspensory effect (paragraph 5). But at no point does it say that those judicial proceedings must include a personal interview of the applicant.

43.

Furthermore, Article 46(4) of Directive 2013/32 not only leaves it to the Members States to set ‘reasonable time limits’ for challenging the decisions to which paragraph 1 refers, but also authorises them to introduce the ‘other necessary rules for the applicant’ to be able to exercise the right to an effective remedy against those decisions.

44.

In this context, the configuration of the judicial review proceedings against administrative refusals of applications for asylum comes within the framework of the procedural autonomy of the Member States. ( 9 ) Their freedom to introduce the procedural rules they consider appropriate is not, however, absolute, because it is subject to a categorical obligation as to the result to be achieved: the national proceedings must guarantee, in each case, a remedy capable of effectively ensuring the right to judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.

45.

Directive 2013/32, as is stated in recital 60 thereof, ‘respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by the Charter’, and seeks to ensure, in particular, ‘full respect for human dignity and to promote the application’, inter alia, of Article 47 of the Charter, and has to be ‘implemented accordingly’. ( 10 )

46.

The Court of Justice has affirmed that ‘the right to be heard forms an integral part of the rights of the defence’ ( 11 ) and that this ‘guarantees every person the opportunity to make known his views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his interests adversely’. ( 12 )

47.

This doctrine has been proclaimed in the sphere of relations between individuals and the public authorities and, very especially, in administrative proceedings for granting international protection. ( 13 ) Its transposition to the sphere of judicial procedure is one of the components of the right to effective judicial protection, an example of which is the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 46 of Directive 2013/32.

48.

In order for the right to appeal before the courts to be considered effective, ‘the national court must be able to review the merits of the reasons which led the competent administrative authority to hold the application for international protection to be unfounded or made in bad faith, there being no irrebuttable presumption as to the legality of those reasons’. ( 14 )

49.

On that basis, a person’s right to be heard at the administrative stage of the proceedings includes the ability to address the public authority in defence of his own rights and interests, before that public authority adopts a decision on the application for international protection. ( 15 ) Once the decision has been taken, the right to an effective judicial remedy comes into play, if the determining authority reject the applicant’s claim.

50.

This is precisely the situation with which we are concerned: it is a question of charting the course to be followed by the procedure which gives access to the court which will establish, finally, whether the administrative refusal of international protection was in accordance with the law.

51.

In that context, the effectiveness of the appeal provided for in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 will be ensured when the applicant (normally, through his legal adviser or other counsellors) is able to set out before the judicial authority the reasons why the contested decision is unlawful and if the judge is able to assess whether that decision is well founded.

52.

The first condition is, then, that the applicant for international protection (where appropriate, the person giving him legal assistance or advice or representing him in the proceedings) shall be able to exercise his defence with all the procedural safeguards inherent in a fair hearing. If this is so, the applicant will have been heard by the court, since he has been allowed to express — not necessarily orally, since the procedural rules may, validly, provide for only written procedures — the arguments which he considers necessary in defence of his claim.

53.

The right to be heard by the judicial authority does not, however, include a presumed ‘right to be interviewed’ during the judicial proceedings. It includes, I reiterate, the right to explain before the court the reasons on which it bases its claim against the administrative decision, which is challenged as adversely affecting the rights and interests of the person concerned, but not the right to be interviewed in person by the court reviewing the administrative action.

54.

However, this statement must immediately be qualified. It must not be assumed to preclude the adoption of certain procedural investigative measures, ( 16 ) both at the request of a party and of its own motion, which the court may decide on when it considers it necessary for the better administration of justice. These include interviewing the applicant during the judicial proceedings.

55.

That interview may, of course, be appropriate for fulfilling the mandate of Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, that is, so that, in accordance with paragraph 3 of that provision, ‘a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law’ is carried out.

56.

If Article 46 of Directive 2013/32, unlike Article 14 of that directive in relation to the administrative stage, does not expressly refer to the personal interview in the judicial proceedings, the national law which transposes the directive is not required to introduce that procedure into its procedural rules.

57.

Article 46 is to be interpreted, furthermore, in the context of the mechanism for examining applications for international protection governed by Directive 2013/32, that is, taking into account the close link between the application for judicial review and the administrative stage which precedes it and in which it has been mandatory to give a hearing to a person who lodges an asylum application.

58.

If the administrative stage has been conducted correctly, there will be a reliable record of the interview of the applicant, ( 17 ) who will have been able to add his own comments, and provide clarification or make corrections to the report. ( 18 ) As this report, or the transcript of the interview, must be incorporated into the file which is made available to the court, its contents must constitute an important factor in the assessment made by the person who has to conduct the ‘full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law’ to which Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 refers. The directive, which is respectful of the procedural autonomy of the Member States, has not sought to limit, beyond as has been stated, the proceedings of the courts, to whose prudent assessment it entrusts the delicate task of ultimately deciding whether the negative administrative decision is in accordance with the law.

59.

In short, whether the applicant is interviewed by the judicial authority must depend on whether this is necessary in the context of the ‘full examination’ which the court is required to conduct, in the interests of effective judicial protection of the rights and interests of the asylum seeker. Directive 2013/32 has not wished to make it mandatory, but nor has it precluded the possibility that a decision to interview him may be taken, if the court which has to settle the matter considers it essential for giving judgment.

60.

The above is applicable to all judicial proceedings for reviewing compliance with the law of administrative decisions refusing applications for international protection. However, there are some borderline cases in which the inadmissibility of an application for review is so obvious and manifest that the ‘full examination’ of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 is completed merely by considering either the pleadings submitted to the court (that is, during the proceedings), or the objective information contained in the administrative file.

61.

In these cases of manifest inadmissibility of the application for review, or evident insufficient substantiation, of the applicant’s claim, the requirement for a (second) personal interview, in addition to that at the pre-judicial stage, is both inappropriate and disproportionate.

62.

Indeed, there may be cases in which the judicial action is wholly unfeasible ( 19 ) and in which it would make no sense nor be of any use to conduct an interview. I cannot see why applications for judicial review concerning this issue would be excluded from a possible decision of inadmissibility, where they are manifestly unfounded or lack the minimum procedural conditions. And in such circumstances, ( 20 ) I repeat, it is legitimate for the court’s decision to be adopted without the need for further investigative measures during the proceedings.

63.

However, apart from those situations, where the possible unfeasibility of an action hinges on more questionable assessments of the substance of the claim, the inadmissibility (or dismissal) of the claim must inevitably be preceded by the ‘examination’ of its substance which, to be ‘full’, within the meaning of Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 must have sufficient evidence. Inter alia, if it were necessary, the personal interview of the applicant might be appropriate for establishing the decision-making criterion of the judicial authority.

64.

Classification of an action as inadmissible or unfounded must always be the result of an assessment made on the basis of an analysis of the factual and legal circumstances of the contesting claim. That result will necessarily depend on the nature of the cause of the unfeasibility of the action. And in the assessment of that cause or causes, the appropriate evidence may sometimes be found directly in the application itself and in the previous administrative case file, whereas, at other times, it will have to be obtained by means of preliminary (evidential) inquiries.

65.

As Directive 2013/32 requires an interview to be held at the administrative stage of processing of the application for international protection, I consider that it need only be repeated in judicial proceedings if the (first) interview turns out to be insufficiently informative for the court which is hearing the judicial action and has doubts as to the outcome of the action.

66.

In my view, in the circumstances to which I have just referred, the interview of the applicant, which the court decides to conduct at its own discretion, is a formality which cannot be dispensed with for the reason of speed to which recital 20 of Directive 2013/32 refers.

67.

Nor do justifications of an economic nature (such as those indicated by the referring court) ( 21 ) prevent, in those same situations, the holding of the interview during the proceedings. Although recital 20 of Directive 2013/32 allows Member States to accelerate the examination procedure, it does not authorise the elimination of procedures which are essential in order to guarantee the applicant’s right to effective judicial protection. In fact, that same recital refers to the possibility of fixing ‘shorter … time limits for certain procedural steps’, respecting in each case the need to carry out a full examination of the application and safeguarding the fundamental principles and guarantees established in the directive.

68.

Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 is therefore to be interpreted as meaning that, although it does not require an interview to be conducted, it does not permit the national legislature to prevent the judicial body from deciding to conduct one, when it considers it necessary in order to carry out a full examination of the factual and legal circumstances of the asylum application, after considering the information gathered during the interview held at the administrative stage to be insufficient. The procedural rules of the Member States should give the court the opportunity to hear the applicant in person, in that case, if it considers it necessary.

69.

Turning to the matter which is the subject of the reference for a preliminary ruling, the national court has no doubt — quite the contrary — concerning the manifestly unfounded nature of the action brought by Mr Sacko, whose application is clearly not based on reasons justifying the grant of international protection. If that is so, the way is open to dismiss it or find it inadmissible without preparatory inquiries, without interviewing the applicant (now the appellant) again. Logically, that decision will be valid in so far as it is the result of a full examination of all the circumstances of the case which must include the ‘appropriate and effective expression of the point of view’ of Mr Sacko, set out in the personal interview held at the administrative stage of the procedure.

70.

A reading of the national legislation (Article 19(9) of Legislative Decree No 150 of 2011), as set out by the referring court, shows that it does not preclude an interview at the judicial stage of the procedure, from the moment that rule authorises the court to adopt the investigative measures it considers necessary. There is no reason, therefore, to consider that it does not comply with the appeals system laid down by Directive 2013/32.

71.

However, it is not for the Court Justice to choose one or other interpretation of the relevant Italian legislation. Specifically, it cannot intervene in the controversy, which may be inferred from the order for the reference, which has arisen in relation to the approach taken in that regard by the Suprema Corte di Cassazioni (Supreme Court) and by the referring court, especially since, as the Italian Government suggests, ( 22 ) it cannot be ruled out that there is an alternative interpretation which is compatible with the one which I propose for Directive 2013/32. In any event, it is for the national court to resolve that matter.

72.

In the light of the foregoing, I suggest that the Court of Justice reply to the Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan, Italy) as follows:

Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, in particular Articles 12, 14, 31 and 46 thereof are to be interpreted as allowing the competent judicial authority to decide without preparatory enquiries, without the need for a personal interview of the applicant, appeals brought against the rejection of applications for international protection where: