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Document 62015CN0028

Case C-28/15: Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 23 January 2015 — Koninklijke KPN NV and Others v Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM)

OJ C 138, 27.4.2015, p. 28–29 (BG, ES, CS, DA, DE, ET, EL, EN, FR, HR, IT, LV, LT, HU, MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SL, FI, SV)

27.4.2015   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 138/28

Request for a preliminary ruling from the College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Netherlands) lodged on 23 January 2015 — Koninklijke KPN NV and Others v Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM)

(Case C-28/15)

(2015/C 138/40)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Koninklijke KPN NV, KPN BV, T-Mobile Netherlands BV, Tele2 Nederland BV, Ziggo BV, Vodafone Libertel BV, UPC Nederland BV and UPC Business BV

Defendant: Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM)

Questions referred

1.

Must Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, (1) read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 13 of the Access Directive, (2) be interpreted as meaning that, in principle, in a dispute concerning the lawfulness of a cost-oriented scale of charges imposed by the national regulatory authority (NRA) in the wholesale call termination market, a national court is permitted to make a ruling which does not accord with the European Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU (2009/396/EC), (3) in which pure BULRIC is recommended as the appropriate price regulation measure for call termination markets, if, in that national court’s view, this is required on the basis of the facts in the case brought before it and/or on the basis of considerations of national or supranational law?

2.

If the answer to Question 1 is affirmative: to what extent is the national court permitted, in assessing a cost-oriented price regulation measure:

a.

in the light of Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive, to evaluate the NRA’s argument that the development of the internal market is promoted by reference to the degree to which the functioning of the internal market is in fact influenced?

b.

to assess, in the light of the policy objectives and regulatory principles laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive and Article 13 of the Access Directive, whether the price regulation measure:

(i)

is proportionate;

(ii)

is appropriate;

(iii)

has been applied proportionately and is justified?

c.

to require the NRA to demonstrate adequately that:

(i)

the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(2) of the Framework Directive, that the NRAs should promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and electronic communications services is genuinely being attained and that users are genuinely deriving maximum benefit in terms of choice, price and quality;

(ii)

the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive, that NRAs should contribute to the development of the internal market is genuinely being attained; and

(iii)

the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(4) of the Framework Directive, that the interests of the citizens should be promoted is genuinely being attained?

d.

in the light of Article 16(3) of the Framework Directive, and of Article 8(2) and (4) of the Access Directive, when assessing whether the price regulation measure is appropriate, to take into account the fact that the measure has been imposed on the market on which the regulated undertakings possess significant market power but, in the form chosen (pure BULRIC), has the effect of promoting one of the objectives of the Framework Directive, namely the interests of end users, on another market which has not been earmarked for regulation?

(1)  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 33).

(2)  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 7).

(3)  OJ 2009 L 124, p. 67.

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