Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Uredba (EU) št. 1174/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta

of 16 November 2011

z dne 16. novembra 2011

on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area

o izvršilnih ukrepih za odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v euroobmočju

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

EVROPSKI PARLAMENT IN SVET EVROPSKE UNIJE STA –

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 136, in combination with Article 121(6) thereof,

ob upoštevanju Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije in zlasti člena 136 v povezavi s členom 121(6) Pogodbe,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

ob upoštevanju predloga Evropske komisije,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

po posredovanju osnutka zakonodajnega akta nacionalnim parlamentom,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank [1],

ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropske centralne banke [1],

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee [2],

ob upoštevanju mnenja Evropskega ekonomsko-socialnega odbora [2],

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure [3],

v skladu z rednim zakonodajnim postopkom [3],

Whereas:

ob upoštevanju naslednjega:

(1) The improved economic governance framework should rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus upon developing and strengthening the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, a European Semester for strengthened coordination of economic and budgetary policies, an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits (the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, and enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board.

(1) Izboljšan okvir ekonomskega upravljanja bi moral temeljiti na več medsebojno povezanih in usklajenih politikah za trajnostno rast in delovna mesta, zlasti na strategiji Unije za rast in delovna mesta, s posebnim poudarkom na razvoju in krepitvi notranjega trga, spodbujanju mednarodne trgovine in konkurenčnosti, evropskem semestru za okrepljeno usklajevanje ekonomskih in proračunskih politik, učinkovitem okviru za preprečevanje in zmanjšanje čezmernega javnofinančnega primanjkljaja (Pakt za stabilnost in rast), trdnem okviru za preprečevanje in odpravljanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij, minimalnih zahtevah za nacionalne proračunske okvire in okrepljeni ureditvi finančnih trgov in nadzoru nad njimi, vključno z makrobonitetnim nadzorom Evropskega odbora za sistemska tveganja.

(2) Reliable statistical data is the basis for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. In order to guarantee sound and independent statistics, Member States should ensure the professional independence of national statistical authorities, consistent with the European statistics code of practice as laid down in Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics [4]. In addition, the availability of sound fiscal data is also relevant for the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances. This requirement should be guaranteed by the rules provided in this regard by Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area [5], in particular its Article 8.

(2) Zanesljivi statistični podatki so osnova za nadzor nad makroekonomskimi neravnotežji. Da bi zagotovili zanesljivo in neodvisno statistiko, bi morale države članice zagotoviti strokovno neodvisnost nacionalnih statističnih organov, skladno z Evropskim statističnim kodeksom ravnanja, kakor je določeno v Uredbi (ES) št. 233/2009 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 11. marca 2009 o evropski statistiki [4]. Poleg tega je razpoložljivost zanesljivih javnofinančnih podatkov tudi pomembna za nadzor nad makroekonomskimi neravnotežji. Ta pogoj bi bilo treba zagotoviti s pravili, določenimi v ta namen v Uredbi (EU) št. 1173/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. novembra 2011 o učinkovitem izvrševanju proračunskega nadzora v euroobmočju [5], zlasti v njenem členu 8.

(3) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union should be developed in the context of the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound and sustainable public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments.

(3) Usklajevanje ekonomskih politik držav članic v Uniji bi bilo treba oblikovati v okviru širših smernic ekonomskih politik in smernic zaposlovanja, kakor je določeno v Pogodbi o delovanju Evropske unije (PDEU), pri tem pa bi bilo treba upoštevati vodilna načela stabilnih cen, zdravih in vzdržnih javnih financ in monetarnih pogojev ter uravnotežene plačilne bilance.

(4) Experience gained and mistakes made during the first decade of the economic and monetary union show a need for improved economic governance in the Union, which should be built on stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust framework at the level of the Union for the surveillance of national economic policies.

(4) Pridobljene izkušnje in storjene napake v prvem desetletju ekonomske in monetarne unije kažejo potrebo po izboljšanju ekonomskega upravljanja v Uniji, ki bi moralo temeljiti na močnejšem nacionalnem lastništvu skupno dogovorjenih pravil in politik ter na trdnejšem okviru nadzora nad nacionalnimi ekonomskimi politikami na ravni Unije.

(5) Achieving and maintaining a dynamic internal market should be considered an element of the proper and smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union.

(5) Vzpostavitev in ohranjanje dinamičnega notranjega trga bi bilo treba obravnavati kot del pravilnega in nemotenega delovanja ekonomske in monetarne unije.

(6) In particular, surveillance of the economic policies of the Member States should be broadened beyond budgetary surveillance to include a more detailed and formal framework to prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances and to help the Member States affected to establish corrective plans before divergences become entrenched and before economic and financial developments take a durable turn in an excessively unfavourable direction. Such broadening of the surveillance of economic policies should take place in parallel with a deepening of fiscal surveillance.

(6) Zlasti bi bilo treba nadzor ekonomskih politik držav članic razširiti prek proračunskega nadzora, da bi vključeval bolj podroben in formalen okvir za preprečevanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij, prizadetim državam članicam pa bi pomagal, da izdelajo popravljalne načrte, preden se razlike utrdijo in preden se ekonomska in finančna gibanja trajno obrnejo v pretirano neugodno smer. Takšna širitev nadzora ekonomskih politik bi morala sovpadati s poglabljanjem fiskalnega nadzora.

(7) To help correct such excessive macroeconomic imbalances, it is necessary to lay down a detailed procedure in legislation.

(7) Za odpravljanje takih čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij je treba v zakonodaji podrobno določiti postopek.

(8) It is appropriate to supplement the multilateral surveillance procedure referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 121 TFEU with specific rules for the detection of macroeconomic imbalances as well as the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the Union. It is essential that the procedure be embedded in the annual multilateral surveillance cycle.

(8) Primerno je, da se postopek večstranskega nadzora iz odstavkov 3 in 4 člena 121 PDEU dopolni s posebnimi pravili za odkrivanje makroekonomskih neravnotežij, kakor tudi za preprečevanje in odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v Uniji. Bistveno je, da je postopek del letnega cikla večstranskega nadzora.

(9) Strengthening economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of the dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State which is the subject of a Council decision imposing an interest-bearing deposit or an annual fine in accordance with this Regulation. The Member State's participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.

(9) Krepitev ekonomskega upravljanja bi morala vključevati tesnejše in pravočasnejše vključevanje Evropskega parlamenta in nacionalnih parlamentov. Kljub temu, da so sogovorniki Evropskega parlamenta v okviru dialoga ustrezne institucije Unije in njihovi predstavniki, lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta ponudi državi članici, na katero je naslovljen sklep Sveta, ki naloži obrestni depozit ali letno globo v skladu s to uredbo, možnost sodelovanja pri izmenjavi mnenj. Udeležba države članice pri takšni izmenjavi mnenj je prostovoljna.

(10) The Commission should have a stronger role in the enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, on-site missions, recommendations and warnings.

(10) Komisija bi morala imeti v postopku okrepljenega nadzora močnejšo vlogo v zvezi z ocenami, specifičnimi za posamezno državo članico, spremljanjem, misijami na kraju samem, priporočili in opozorili.

(11) Enforcement of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances [6] should be strengthened by establishing interest-bearing deposits in case of non-compliance with the recommendation to take corrective action. Such deposits should be converted into an annual fine in the case of continued non-compliance with the recommendation to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances within the same imbalances procedure. Those enforcement measures should be applicable to Member States whose currency is the euro.

(11) Izvajanje Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 Evropskega parlamenta in Sveta z dne 16. novembra 2011 o preprečevanju in odpravljanju makroekonomskih neravnotežij [6] bi bilo treba okrepiti z uvedbo obrestnih depozitov v primeru neupoštevanja priporočila v zvezi s sprejemom popravljalnih ukrepov. Ti depoziti bi se morali spremeniti v letno globo v primeru ponavljajočega se neupoštevanja priporočila v zvezi z odpravljanjem čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v okviru istega postopka v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem. Ti izvršilni ukrepi bi se morali uporabiti za države članice, katerih valuta je euro.

(12) In the case of failure to comply with Council recommendations, the interest-bearing deposit or the fine should be imposed until the Council establishes that the Member State has taken corrective action to comply with its recommendations.

(12) V primeru neupoštevanja priporočil Sveta bi se moral naložiti obrestni depozit ali globa, dokler Svet ne ugotovi, da je država članica sprejela popravljalne ukrepe za izpolnitev njegovega priporočila.

(13) Moreover, repeated failure of the Member State to draw up a corrective action plan to address the Council recommendation should also be subject to an annual fine as a rule, until the Council establishes that the Member State has provided a corrective action plan that sufficiently addresses its recommendation.

(13) Poleg tega bi morala država članica, ki večkrat ne pripravi načrt popravljalnih ukrepov za upoštevanje priporočila Sveta, praviloma plačevati letno globo, dokler Svet ne ugotovi, da je država članica pripravila načrt popravljalnih ukrepov, s katerim ustrezno izpolnjuje njegovo priporočilo.

(14) To ensure equal treatment between Member States, the interest-bearing deposit and the fine should be identical for all Member States whose currency is the euro and equal to 0,1 % of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Member State concerned in the preceding year.

(14) Za zagotovitev enake obravnave držav članic bi morala biti obrestni depozit in globa enaka za vse države članice, katerih valuta je euro, in znašati 0,1 % bruto domačega proizvoda (BDP) zadevne države članice v predhodnem letu.

(15) The Commission should be able to recommend reducing the amount of a sanction or cancelling it on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances.

(15) Komisija bi morala imeti v primeru izjemnih ekonomskih okoliščin možnost priporočiti zmanjšanje višine sankcij ali jih preklicati.

(16) The procedure for applying sanctions to those Member States which fail to take effective measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances should be construed in such a way that the application of the sanctions to those Member States would be the rule and not the exception.

(16) Postopek za uporabo sankcij za tiste države članice, ki niso sprejele učinkovitih ukrepov za odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij, bi moral biti oblikovan tako, da bi bila uvedba sankcij za navedene države članice pravilo in ne izjema.

(17) Fines referred to in this Regulation should constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and should be assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial assistance, created by Member States whose currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.

(17) Globe iz te uredbe bi morale pomeniti druge prihodke iz člena 311 PDEU in bi se morali dodeliti mehanizmom za stabilnost za zagotavljanje finančne pomoči, ki jih vzpostavijo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, da bi zaščitile stabilnost celotnega euroobmočja.

(18) The power to adopt individual decisions for the application of the sanctions provided for in this Regulation should be conferred on the Council. As part of the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States conducted within the Council as provided for in Article 121(1) TFEU, those individual decisions are an integral follow-up to the measures adopted by the Council in accordance with Article 121 TFEU and Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011.

(18) Svetu bi bilo treba dodeliti pristojnosti za sprejemanje posameznih sklepov za uporabo sankcij, predvidenih s to uredbo. Ti posamezni sklepi so kot del usklajevanja ekonomskih politik držav članic v Svetu v skladu s členom 121(1) PDEU ključna dopolnitev ukrepov, ki jih Svet sprejme v skladu s členom 121 PDEU in Uredbo (EU) št. 1176/2011.

(19) Since this Regulation contains general rules for the effective enforcement of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, it should be adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure referred to in Article 121(6) TFEU.

(19) Ker ta uredba vsebuje splošna pravila za učinkovito izvajanje Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011, bi se morala sprejeti v skladu z rednim zakonodajnim postopkom iz člena 121(6) PDEU.

(20) Since the objective of this Regulation, namely the effective enforcement of the correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States because of the deep trade and financial interlinks between Member States and the spill-over effects of national economic policies on the Union and the euro area as a whole, and can therefore be better achieved at the level of the Union, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective,

(20) Ker cilja te uredbe, in sicer učinkovitega izvajanja odpravljanja čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v euroobmočju, države članice zaradi tesnih medsebojnih trgovinskih in finančnih povezav ter prelivanja učinkov nacionalnih ekonomskih politik na Unijo in celotno euroobmočje ne morejo zadovoljivo doseči in ker se ta cilj lažje doseže na ravni Unije, lahko Unija sprejme ukrepe v skladu z načelom subsidiarnosti iz člena 5 Pogodbe o Evropski uniji. V skladu z načelom sorazmernosti iz navedenega člena ta uredba ne presega tistega, kar je potrebno za doseganje navedenega cilja –

HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

SPREJELA NASLEDNJO UREDBO:

Article 1

Člen 1

Subject matter and scope

Vsebina in področje uporabe

1. This Regulation lays down a system of sanctions for the effective correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.

1. Ta uredba določa sistem sankcij za učinkovito odpravljanje čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnotežij v euroobmočju.

2. This Regulation shall apply to Member States whose currency is the euro.

2. Ta uredba se uporablja za države članice, katerih valuta je euro.

Article 2

Člen 2

Definitions

Opredelitve pojmov

For the purposes of this Regulation, the definitions set out in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 shall apply.

Za namene te uredbe se uporabljajo opredelitve pojmov iz člena 2 Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011.

In addition, the following definition shall apply:

Poleg tega se uporablja naslednja opredelitev:

"exceptional economic circumstances" means circumstances where an excess of a government deficit over the reference value is considered exceptional within the meaning of the second indent of point (a) of Article 126(2) TFEU and as specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [7].

"izjemne ekonomske okoliščine" pomeni razmere, v katerih se presežek javnofinančnega primanjkljaja nad referenčno vrednostjo šteje za izjemnega v smislu druge alinee točke (a) člena 126(2) PDEU in kakor je določeno v Uredbi Sveta (ES) št. 1467/97 z dne 7. julija 1997 o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem [7].

Article 3

Člen 3

Sanctions

Sankcije

1. An interest-bearing deposit shall be imposed by a Council decision, acting on a recommendation from the Commission, if a Council decision establishing non-compliance is adopted in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, where the Council concludes that the Member State concerned has not taken the corrective action recommended by the Council.

1. Svet na priporočilo Komisije s sklepom naloži obrestni depozit, če je v skladu s členom 10(4) Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 sprejet sklep Sveta o ugotovitvi neupoštevanja priporočil, v katerem Svet ugotovi, da zadevna država članica ni sprejela popravljalnih ukrepov, priporočenih s strani Sveta.

2. An annual fine shall be imposed by a Council decision, acting on a recommendation by the Commission, where:

2. Svet na priporočilo Komisije s sklepom naloži letno globo, če:

(a) two successive Council recommendations in the same imbalance procedure are adopted in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 and the Council considers that the Member State has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan; or

(a) sta bili v skladu s členom 8(3) Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 v istem postopku v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem sprejeti dve zaporedni priporočili ter Svet meni, da je država članica predložila nezadosten načrt popravljalnih ukrepov; ali

(b) two successive Council decisions in the same imbalance procedure are adopted establishing non-compliance in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011. In this case, the annual fine shall be imposed by means of converting the interest-bearing deposit into an annual fine.

(b) sta bila v skladu s členom 10(4) Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 v istem postopku v zvezi s čezmernim neravnotežjem sprejeta dva zaporedna sklepa Sveta o neupoštevanju priporočil. V tem primeru se letna globa naloži tako, da se obrestni depozit spremeni v letno globo.

3. The decisions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be deemed adopted by the Council unless it decides, by qualified majority, to reject the recommendation within 10 days of its adoption by the Commission. The Council may decide, by qualified majority, to amend the recommendation.

3. Šteje se, da je Svet sklepa iz odstavkov 1 in 2 sprejel, razen če se v desetih dneh od dneva, ko je Komisija sprejela priporočilo, s kvalificirano večino ne odloči za zavrnitev priporočila. Svet se lahko s kvalificirano večino odloči priporočilo spremeniti.

4. The Commission's recommendation for a Council decision shall be issued within 20 days of the conditions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 being met.

4. Priporočilo Komisije za sklep Sveta se izda v roku dvajsetih dni po izpolnitvi pogojev iz odstavkov 1 in 2.

5. The interest-bearing deposit or the annual fine recommended by the Commission shall be 0,1 % of the GDP in the preceding year of the Member State concerned.

5. Obrestni depozit ali letna globa, ki jo priporoči Komisija, znaša 0,1 % BDP zadevne države članice v predhodnem letu.

6. By derogation from paragraph 5, the Commission may, on grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by the Member State concerned addressed to the Commission within 10 days of the conditions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 being met, propose to reduce or cancel the interest-bearing deposit or the annual fine.

6. Komisija lahko z odstopanjem od odstavka 5 zaradi izjemnih ekonomskih okoliščin ali na podlagi utemeljene prošnje zadevne države članice, naslovljene na Komisijo v desetih dneh od izpolnitve pogojev iz odstavkov 1 in 2, predlaga zmanjšanje ali preklic obrestnega depozita ali letne globe.

7. If a Member State has constituted an interest-bearing deposit or has paid an annual fine for a given calendar year and the Council thereafter concludes, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 that the Member State has taken the recommended corrective action in the course of that year, the deposit paid for that year together with the accrued interest or the fine paid for that year shall be returned to the Member State pro rata temporis.

7. Če je država članica položila obrestni depozit ali plačala letno globo za določeno koledarsko leto in Svet pozneje v skladu s členom 10(1) Uredbe (EU) št. 1176/2011 ugotovi, da je država članica v zadevnem letu sprejela priporočene popravljalne ukrepe, se depozit skupaj z obrestmi ali globa, plačana za zadevno leto, vrneta državi članici sorazmerno glede na čas.

Article 4

Člen 4

Allocation of the fines

Dodelitev glob

Fines referred to in Article 3 of this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility. When the Member States whose currency is the euro create another stability mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, those fines shall be assigned to that mechanism.

Globe iz člena 3 te uredbe pomenijo druge prihodke iz člena 311 PDEU in se dodelijo evropskemu instrumentu za finančno stabilnost. Kadar države članice, katerih valuta je euro, vzpostavijo drug mehanizem za stabilnost za zagotavljanje finančne pomoči, da se zagotovi stabilnost celotnega euroobmočja, se globe dodelijo temu mehanizmu.

Article 5

Člen 5

Voting in the Council

Glasovanje v Svetu

1. For the measures referred to in Article 3, only members of the Council representing Member States whose currency is the euro shall vote, and the Council shall act without taking into account the vote of the member of the Council representing the Member State concerned.

1. V zvezi z ukrepi iz člena 3 glasujejo samo člani Sveta, ki predstavljajo države članice, katerih valuta je euro, ob tem se ne upošteva glas člana Sveta, ki predstavlja zadevno državo članico.

2. A qualified majority of the members of the Council referred to in paragraph 1 shall be defined in accordance with point (b) of Article 238(3) TFEU.

2. Kvalificirana večina članov Sveta iz odstavka 1 se določi v skladu s točko (b) člena 238(3) PDEU.

Article 6

Člen 6

Economic dialogue

Ekonomski dialog

In order to enhance the dialogue between the Union institutions, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to appear before the committee to discuss decisions taken pursuant to Article 3.

Za okrepitev dialoga med institucijami Unije, zlasti Evropskim parlamentom, Svetom in Komisijo, ter za zagotovitev večje preglednosti in odgovornosti lahko pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta povabi predsednika Sveta, Komisijo in po potrebi predsednika Evropskega sveta ali predsednika Euroskupine, da nastopijo pred odborom in razpravljajo o sklepih, sprejetih v skladu s členom 3.

The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by such decisions to participate in an exchange of views.

Pristojni odbor Evropskega parlamenta lahko državi članici, ki jo ti sklepi zadevajo, ponudi možnost sodelovanja pri izmenjavi mnenj.

Article 7

Člen 7

Review

Pregled

1. By 14 December 2014 and every 5 years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation.

1. Komisija do 14. december 2014 ter nato vsakih pet let objavi poročilo o uporabi te uredbe.

That report shall evaluate, inter alia:

V tem poročilu sta med drugim ocenjena tudi:

(a) the effectiveness of this Regulation;

(a) učinkovitost te uredbe,

(b) the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States in accordance with the TFEU.

(b) doseženi napredek pri zagotavljanju tesnejše uskladitve ekonomskih politik in trajnostne konvergence ekonomskih učinkov držav članic v skladu s PDEU.

2. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendments to this Regulation.

2. Po potrebi se poročilu priložijo predlogi za spremembo te uredbe.

3. The Commission shall send the report and any accompanying proposals to the European Parliament and to the Council.

3. Komisija poročilo in vse priložene predloge pošlje Evropskemu parlamentu in Svetu.

Article 8

Člen 8

Entry into force

Začetek veljavnosti

This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Ta uredba začne veljati dvajseti dan po objavi v Uradnem listu Evropske unije.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in the Member States in accordance with the Treaties.

Ta uredba je v celoti zavezujoča in se neposredno uporablja v državah članicah v skladu s Pogodbama.

Done at Strasbourg, 16 November 2011.

V Strasbourgu, 16. novembra 2011

For the European Parliament

Za Evropski parlament

The President

Predsednik

J. Buzek

J. Buzek

For the Council

Za Svet

The President

Predsednik

W. Szczuka

W. Szczuka

[1] OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.

[1] UL C 150, 20.5.2011, str. 1.

[2] OJ C 218, 23.7.2011, p. 53.

[2] UL C 218, 23.7.2011, str. 53.

[3] Position of the European Parliament of 28 September 2011 (not yet published in the Official Journal) and decision of the Council of 8 November 2011.

[3] Stališče Evropskega parlamenta z dne 28. septembra 2011 (še ni objavljeno v Uradnem listu) in odločitev Sveta z dne 8. novembra 2011.

[4] OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164.

[4] UL L 87, 31.3.2009, str. 164.

[5] See page 1 of this Official Journal.

[5] Glej stran 1 tega uradnega lista.

[6] See page 25 of this Official Journal.

[6] Glej stran 25 tega Uradnega lista.

[7] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

[7] UL L 209, 2.8.1997, str. 6.

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