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[pic] | COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES |
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[pic] | IL-KUMMISSJONI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ |
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Brussels, 12.10.2006
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Brussel 12.10.2006
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COM(2006) 571 final
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KUMM(2006) 571 finali
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COMMISSION COMMUNICATION
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KOMUNIKAZZJONI TAL-KUMMISSJONI
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The demographic future of Europe – from challenge to opportunity
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Il-ġejjieni demografiku ta’ l-Ewropa, il-bidla ta’ sfida f’opportunità
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Werrej
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1. The ageing population in Europe: trends and outlook 3
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1. Ix-xjuħija demografika fl-Ewropa: tendenzi u perspettivi 3
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2. Impact of the ageing population 5
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2. L-impatt tax-xjuħija tal-popolazzjoni 5
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2.1. Impact on the labour market, productivity and economic growth 5
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2.1. L-impatt fuq is-suq tax-xogħol, il-produttività u t-tkabbir ekonomiku 5
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2.2. Impact on social security and public finances 6
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2.2. L-impatt fuq il-ħarsien soċjali u l-finanzi pubbliċi 6
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3. A constructive response to the demographic challenge 7
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3. Tweġiba kostruttiva għall-isfida demografika 7
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3.1. Promoting demographic renewal in Europe 7
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3.1. Ewropa li tiffavorixxi t-tiġdid demografiku 7
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3.2. Promoting employment in Europe: more jobs and longer working lives of better quality 8
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3.2. Ewropa li tagħti valur lix-xogħol aktar impjiegi u ħajja attiva itwal u ta’ kwalità 8
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3.3. A more productive and competitive Europe 10
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3.3. Ewropa aktar produttiva u li għandha aktar suċċess 10
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3.4. Receiving and integrating immigrants in Europe 11
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3.4. Ewropa organizzata biex tirċievi u tintegra lill-immigranti 11
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3.5. Sustainable public finances in Europe: guaranteeing adequate social security and equity between the generations 12
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3.5. Ewropa għall-finanzi pubbliċi vijabbli; garanzija ta’ ħarsien soċjali xieraq u ta’ l-ekwità bejn il-ġenerazzjonijiet 12
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4. Conclusion: from challenge to opportunity 12
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4. Konklużjoni: Il-bidla ta’ sfida f’opportunità 13
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APPENDIX: Main European Demographic Trends and Data 15
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5. APPENDIX: Main European Demographic Trends and Data 15
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Projections – EU-25 15
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Projections – EU25 15
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Projections by country 16
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Projections by country 16
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Employment rate of older workers 17
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Employment rate of older workers 17
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Fertility and female employment rates 18
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Fertility and female employment rates 18
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Net migration rate vs. natural population growth 19
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Net migration rate vs. natural population growth 19
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1. THE AGEING POPULATION IN EUROPE: TRENDS AND OUTLOOK
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1.IX-XJUħIJA DEMOGRAFIKA FL-EWROPA: TENDENZI U PERSPETTIVI
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Demographic ageing, i.e. the increase in the proportion of older people, is above all the result of significant economic, social and medical progress giving Europeans the opportunity to live a long life in comfort and security that is without precedent in our history. However, as was stressed by the Heads of State and Government at their Hampton Court informal Summit in October 2005, it is also one of the main challenges that the European Union will have to face in the years to come.
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Ix-xjuħija tal-popolazzjoni, jiġifieri iż-żieda tal-persuni anzjani hi qabel kollox ir-riżultat tal-progress ekonomiku, soċjali u mediċinali konsiderevoli li joffri lill-Ewropej l-opportunità li jgħixu aktar f’kumdità u f’sigurtà għall-ewwel darba fl-istorja tagħhom. Iżda, kif diġà nsaħaq mill-kapijiet ta’ l-Istat u l-gvernijiet fis-Samit f’Hampton Court f’Ottubru 2005, hi wkoll waħda mill-isfidi l-aktar importanti li l-Unjoni Ewropea għandha tħabbat wiċċha magħhom tul is-snin li ġejjin.
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This Communication responds to the concern raised at this Summit, which is also widely felt by Europe’s citizens. It is a follow-up to the Commission’s communication to the European Council entitled “European values in the Globalised World” and the Commission’s Green Paper on “Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations”[1]. It examines the possibilities for Europeans to confront the demographic challenge by drawing on the renewed Lisbon strategy for Growth and Jobs and the Sustainable Development Strategy. More specifically, it underlines how the European Union can support its Member States as part of a long-term strategy, the implementation of which essentially depends on their willingness and competences. In so doing, it sets out the main factors, evaluates the various complex impacts and identifies the main courses of action at national, regional and local levels, as well as at European level. It concludes that we can take up the challenge of the ageing population if we create conditions in support of people who wish to realise their desire to have children and take full advantage of the opportunities offered by longer and more productive lives in better health.
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Din il-komunikazzjoni tirrispondi għat-tħassib espress tul dan is-Samit u li jħossu bosta miċ-ċittadini. Tikkostitwixxi segwitu għall-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni fil-Kunsill Ewropew imsejjaħ “Il-valuri Ewropej fl-epoka tal-globalizzazzjoni” u għall- Green Paper tal-Kummissjoni intitolata “Quddiem il-bidliet demografiċi – solidarjetà ġdida bejn il-ġenerazzjonijiet”[1]. Hi teżamina kif l-Ewropej jistgħu jġibu ruħhom quddiem sfida demografika billi jissejsu fuq l-istrateġija ta’ Liżbona mġedda għat-tkabbir u l-impjiegi u l-istrateġija ta’ l-iżvilupp sostenibbli. Speċifikament tenfasizza kif l-Unjoni tista’ ssostni lill-Istati Membri tagħha fi strateġija fuq medda ta’ żmien twila li l-implimentazzjoni tagħha sseħħ fil-parti l-kbira permezz tar-rieda u l-ħiliet tagħhom. Biex tagħmel dan, hija ddawwal il-fatti ewlenin, tivvaluta l-impatti kumplessi, u tidentifika l-mogħdiet ewlenin għall-azzjoni kemm nazzjonali, reġjonali u lokali kif ukoll Ewropea. Hija tikkonkludi li x-xjuħija tal-popolazzjoni hi sfida li nistgħu negħlbu jekk noħolqu kondizzjonijiet favorevoli ta’ appoġġ addattat għal dawk li jridu jkollhom it-tfal u jekk nieħdu vantaġġ mill-opportunitajiet offruti minn ħajjiet itwal, aktar produttivi u f’saħħa aħjar.
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The ageing of the European Union’s population is the result of four interactive demographic trends. However, their magnitude and rhythm may vary substantially from one country to another and from one region to another, ruling out a uniform response. In summary:
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Ix-xjuħija tal-popolazzjoni ta’ l-UE hi r-riżultat ta’ tliet tendenzi demografiċi li jaġixxu b’mod interattiv. Madankollu, il-kobor u r-ritmu tagħhom jista’ jvarja bil-kbir minn pajjiż għall-iehor. Dan iwassal għat-twarrib ta’ kull tweġiba uniformi. Fi ftit kliem:
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- The average number of children per woman (the current fertility rate) is low, at 1.5 children for EU-25, well below the replacement rate of 2.1 required to stabilise the population size in the absence of immigration. A limited increase of 1.6 is projected for EU-25 by 2030[2].
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- In-numru medju ta’ tfal għal kull mara (ir-rata ta’ twelid marbuta mal-qagħda ekonomika preżenti hija baxxa b’livell ta’ 1.5 trabi għall-UE25, ħafna inqas mir-rata ta’ bidla ta’ 2.1 meħtieġa sabiex jiġi stabbilit id-daqs tal-popolazzjoni f’nuqqas ta’ immigrazzjoni. Żieda limitata għal 1.6 hi maħsuba għall-UE25 sa l-2030[2].
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- The decline in fertility in recent decades followed the post-war baby boom which is today causing the bulge in the size of the population aged 45 to 65 years. The gradual progress of the baby-boomers towards retirement age will lead to a substantial increase in the proportion of old people, who will need to be supported financially by a reduced working-age population. This phenomenon will disappear, but not for several decades.
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- In-nuqqas tal-fertilità fl-għexieren ta’ snin riċenti seħħ wara l- baby-boom ta’ wara l-gwerra li llum wassal għal żieda tal-popolazzjoni ta’ bejn il-45 u l-65 sena. Il-passaġġ progressiv tal- baby-boomers għall-età tal-pensjoni se jwassal għal żieda sostanzjani tal-persuni anzjani li għandhom jiġu sostnuti finanzjarjament minn popolazzjoni mnaqqsa ta’ nies bl-età li jaħdmu. Dan il-fenomenu hu mistenni jispiċċa, iżda mhux qabel jgħaddu bosta għexieren ta’ snin.
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- After increasing by eight years since 1960, life expectancy at birth could continue to rise by at least a further five years by 2050. The projected increase would have its greatest impact on the older generations, so that Europeans reaching the age of 65 in 2050 can expect to live on average between four and five years longer than those reaching 65 today. This will lead to a spectacular increase in the number of people surviving to the ages of 80 and 90, leading to many of them spending several decades in retirement and reaching an age frequently characterised by infirmity and disability, although the proportion of people in poor health in this age bracket could fall.
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- Wara żieda ta’ 8 snin mill-1960 ’l hawn, il-medja ta’ l-għomor tal-ħajja fit-twelid tista’ tissokta tiżdied b’5 snin oħra sa l-2050, jew saħansitra aktar. L-akbar parti mbassra li tgawdi hija dik tan-nies bl-akbar etajiet. B’hekk, l-Ewropej li jilħqu l-età ta’ 65 sena fl-2050 ikunu assigurata li jgħixu mill-inqas bejn erba’ u ħames snin aktar min-nies li jagħlqu l-65 sena llum. Dan se jwassal għal żieda spettakolari tan-numru ta’ persuni li jgħixu sa l-età ta’ 80 u 90 sena, li jwassal għall-fatt li bosta minnhom jgħaddu bosta għexieren ta’ snin fuq il-pensjoni u jilħqu etajiet fejn il-fraġilità u l-inkapaċità jkunu spissi, anke jekk il-proporzjon tal-persuni f’saħħa ħazina f’din il-klassi ta’ età jista’ jonqos..
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- Europe is already the recipient of major inflows of net migration from third countries. In 2004, the EU registered 1.8 million immigrants, i.e. an influx greater than that of the United States relative to the total population. The EU is set to remain a popular destination for migrants over the coming decades. Eurostat’s conservative projection is that around 40 million people will emigrate to the European Union between now and 2050. As many of them are of working age, migrants tend to bring down the average age of the population. However, the longer-term repercussions remain uncertain, as they depend on the more or less restrictive nature of family reunification policies and birth patterns of migrants. Despite the current flows, immigration can only partially compensate for the effects of low fertility and extended life expectancy on the age distribution of the European population.
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- L-Ewropa tilqa’ diġà flussi importanti ta’ migrazzjoni netta, li ġejjin minn pajjiżi terzi. Fl-2004, l-UE rreġistrat 1.8 miljun immigrant jiġifieri fluss ogħla minn dak fl-Istati Uniti fi proporzjoni għall-popolazzjoni totali. L-UE se tibqa’ bi żgur destinazzjoni sinifikanti għal migranti fl-għexieren ta’ snin li jmiss. F’qagħda ta’ bażi prudenti, l-Eurostat ibassar li madwar 40 miljun persuna se temigra lejn l-Unjoni Ewropea sa l-2050. Peress li bosta jkunu f’età li jistgħu jaħdmu, il-migranti għandhom tendenza li jrendu l-popolazzjoni aktar żagħżugħa. Ir-riperkussjonijiet fil-medda ta’ żmien twila jibqgħu madankollu inċerti, peress li jiddependu min-natura ftit jew wisq limitata tal-politiki ta’ l-għaqda mill-ġdid tal-familja u ta’ l-imġiba ta’ twelid tal-migranti. Minkejja l-livelli tal-flussi bħalissa, l-immigrazzjoni tista’ biss tpatti parzjalment għall-effetti tal-fertilità baxxa u ż-żieda fil-medja ta’ l-għomor tal-ħajja fuq it-tqassim skond l-età tal-popolazzjoni Ewropea.
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As a result of these trends, the total population of EU-25 will fall slightly, but will become much older. In economic terms, the main change will involve the size of the working-age population (15-64 years), which will decrease by 48 million between now and 2050. The dependency ratio (the number of people aged 65 years and above relative to those aged from 15 to 64) is set to double and reach 51% by 2050, which means that the EU will change from having four to only two persons of working age for each citizen aged 65 and above.
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Minħabba dawn it-tendenzi, il-popolazzjoni totali fl-UE25 se tonqos kemm kemm, iżda ser issir ħafna ixjeħ. Fuq livell ekonomiku, il-bidla ewlenija tikkonċerna l-popolazzjoni li tinsab f’età li taħdem (bejn il-15 u l-64 sena), li tonqos bi 48 miljun sa l-2050. Ir-rata ta’ dipendenza (l-għadd ta’ persuni ta’ 65 sena u aktar, meta mqabbla ma’ dawk ta’ 15 sa 64 sena) għandha tirdoppja biex tilħaq il-51% sa l-2050. Dan ifisser li l-UE se tgħaddi minn erbgħa għal biss tnejn min-nies li għandhom l-età biex jaħdmu għal kull cittadin ta’ 65 sena u aktar.
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The regional and social implications of population ageing are also worth noting. Regions with declining populations consisting mainly of senior citizens will face difficulties in supplying essential public goods and services, such as health care, housing, urban planning, transport and tourism services, so that their environmental balance will also reflect the impact of an ageing population. Demographic change is also accompanied by profound social changes affecting the composition of families, particularly evident in the growing number of elderly persons living alone. The increase in the number of very old dependent persons also raises new problems of an economic, social or even ethical nature.
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L-implikazzjonijiet reġjonali u soċjali tax-xjuħija tal-popolazzjoni jiġbdu l-attenzjoni wkoll. Ir-reġjuni b’popolazzjonijiet li qegħdin jonqsu u li huma magħmula prinċipalment minn anzjani, għandhom iħabbtu wiċċhom ma’ diffikultajiet għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam ma’ l-għoti ta’ beni u servizzi pubbliċi essenzjali bħas-saħħa, l-alloġġ, l-ippjanar tad-djar fil-belt, is-servizzi ta’ trasport u ta’ turiżmu sabiex il-bilanċi ambjentali, jirriflettu wkoll l-effetti tax-xjuħija. Il-bidla demografika twassal ukoll għal bidliet soċjali profondi li jaffettwaw il-kompożizzjoni tal-familja, li jwassal ukoll għal numru akbar ta’ anzjani li jgħixu waħedhom. Iż-żieda fin-numru ta’ persuni tat-tielet età u dipendenti jqajjem ukoll problemi ġodda tat-tip ekonomiku, soċjali, saħansitra etiku.
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The ageing population of the EU needs to be examined against the background of the global expansion of the world’s population. Following a worldwide population increase from 2 billion in 1950 to 6.5 billion today, the United Nations' key projection is that this growth will continue, albeit at a slower pace, to reach a population of 9.1 billion by 2050. Around 95% of the overall growth of the population will occur in the developing countries, and the population of the 50 least developed countries is set to double. The fastest growth will take place in Africa. As a result, the proportion of the worldwide population accounted for by the 25 Member States will decrease.
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Ix-xjuħija fl-UE għandha tkun eżaminata fil-kuntest ta’ l-espansjoni globali tal-popolazzjoni fid-dinja. Wara żieda tal-popolazzjoni dinjija minn 2 biljun persuna fl-1950 għal 6.5 biljuni llum, it-tbassir ta’ l-NU jipprevedi li dan it-tkabbir se jissokta, iżda b’ritmu aktar bil-mod, biex tilħaq 9.1 biljuni sa l-2050. Madwar 95% taż-żieda globali tal-popolazzjoni ser iseħħ fil-pajjiżi li qegħdin jiżviluppaw u l-popolazzjoni tal-50 pajjiż l-inqas żviluppat se tirdoppja. L-akbar żieda ser iseħħ fl-Afrika. Għaldaqstant, il-parti tal-25 Stat Membru ta’ l-UE fil-popolazzjoni dinjija se tonqos.
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However, Europe will not be ageing alone. Significant increases in the dependency ratios will appear between now and 2050 in emerging economies such as China and India. If developing countries can exploit the demographic dividend and integrate young working-age people into the labour market, global production will increase and provide profitable investment opportunities for Europeans saving for their retirement. Conversely, the combination of a high birth rate and slow development could lead to instability in these countries and increase pressure to emigrate.
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Iżda l-Ewropa ma tixjiħx waħedha. Żidiet sinifikanti tar-rati ta’ dipendenza ser iseħħu sa l-2050 fl-ekonomiji li qegħdin ifeġġu bħaċ-Ċina u l-Indja. Jekk il-pajjiżi li qegħdin jiżviluppaw jisfruttaw id-dividend demografiku u jintegraw liż-żgħażagħ attivi fis-suq tax-xogħol, il-produzzjoni globali se tiżdied u se toffri opportunitajiet ta’ investiment siewja għall-Ewropej li qegħdin iġemmgħu għall-pensjoni. Min-naħa l-oħra, il-kumbinazzjoni tar-rata ta’ twelid għolja ma’ l-iżvilupp batut tista’ twassal għal instabbiltà f’dawn il-pajjiżi u żżid il-pressjonijiet għall-emigrazzjoni.
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Global migration flows have and will continue to have major repercussions for the countries of destination and departure. For the EU, the impact of immigrants on population ageing will depend on how well they integrate into the formal economy, bearing in mind that the employment rate for immigrants is still lower than that of non-immigrants in many Member States. Immigration may temporarily help to reduce the financial impact of an ageing population when legally employed immigrants pay contributions into public pension schemes. However, economically active immigrants will also, over time, accumulate their own pension rights. Their longer-term contribution to a sustainable balance in public finances will therefore depend on the existence of well-designed pension schemes. For the countries of origin, emigration to the EU can be beneficial, specifically through the reduction of pressure on the labour market, transfers of funds and the contribution of migrants returning to their countries with new skills and capital. However, the emigration of a large section of the young educated population is likely, for certain countries and sectors, to give rise to a “brain drain” with its negative impact on the economy and the country's prospects for social development. Against this backdrop, we must not ignore the possibilities offered by temporary migration and the voluntary return of migrants to their countries of origin.
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Il-flussi globali tal-migrazzjoni għandhom u ser ikollhom riperkussjonijiet importanti għall-pajjiżi ta’ destinazzjoni u għal dawk ta’ tluq. Għall-UE, l-impatt ta’ l-immigranti fuq ix-xjuħija jiddependi fuq l-integrazzjoni tagħhom fl-ekonomija formali, fid-dawl li r-rata ta’ impjiegi ta’ l-immigranti tibqa’ dejjem inqas minn ta’ dawk li mhumiex immigranti f’bosta Stati Membri. L-immigrazzjoni tista’ tgħin biex tnaqqas temporanjament l-impatt finanzjarju tax-xjuħija meta l-immigranti legali impjegati jħallsu l-kontribuzzjonijiet fl-iskemi pubbliċi tal-pensjonijiet. Madankollu, l-immigranti attivi se jakkumulaw biż-żmien id-drittijiet tagħhom għall-pensjoni. Il-kontribuzzjoni tagħhom fil-medda ta’ żmien twila b’bilanċ sostenibbli tal-finanzi pubbliċi se tiddependi għalhekk mill-preżenza ta’ sistemi ta’ pensjoni maħluqa sew. Għall-pajjiżi ta’ oriġini, l-emigrazzjoni lejn l-UE tista’ tkun ta’ benefiċċju, permezz b’mod partikolari tat-tnaqqis tal-pressjonijiet fuq is-suq tax-xogħol, tat-trasferimenti ta’ fondi u permezz tas-sostenn tal-migranti li jiġu lura f’pajjiżhom b’għarfien espert u b’kapital. Madankollu, l-emigrazzjoni ta’ proporzjoni kbira ta’ żgħażagħ mgħallma hi suxxettibbli, għal ċerti pajjiżi u setturi li toħloq “telf ta’ l-aħjar imħuħ” b’effetti negattivi fuq l-ekonomija u l-perspettivi ta’ żvilupp soċjali ta’ pajjiżhom. F’dan il-kuntest, il-possibbiltajiet offruti mill-migrazzjonijiet temporanji u l-migranti li jmorru lura lejn il-pajjiż ta’ oriġini volontarjament, m’għandhomx jiġu injorati.
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2. IMPACT OF THE AGEING POPULATION
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L-impatt tax-xjuħija tal-popolazzjoni
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2.1. Impact on the labour market, productivity and economic growth
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L-impatt fuq is-suq tax-xogħol, il-produttività u t-tkabbir ekonomiku
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Over the next decade, the working-age population will begin to decline when a large number of the “baby-boomers” retire. However, with the support of specially-adapted employment policies, this phenomenon is likely to be temporarily offset during the next decade by increasing rates of employment. Recent projections[3] show that although the working-age population will begin to fall from 2010 onwards, the total number of persons in work in EU-25 will continue to increase until around 2017. More than two thirds of this increase will be the result of a higher number of women in work, older women being gradually replaced by better-educated younger women with greater involvement in working life. The remainder is accounted for by the substantial increase anticipated in the employment rate for older workers (aged from 55 to 64 years). The expected positive developments tend to create a “window of opportunity” permitting the implementation of reforms before the effects of population ageing make themselves fully felt. However, higher employment rates can only offer temporary respite, and the full burden of the demographic changes would subsequently be felt. Even if the objective of 70% in the overall rate of employment as set out in the Lisbon strategy is reached, the total number of persons in work is set to decrease by 30 million between the end of the decade and 2050.
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Fl-għexieren ta’ snin li ġejjin, il-popolazzjoni fl-età tax-xogħol se tibda tonqos filwaqt li numru kbir ta’ baby-boomers jibdew jieħdu l-pensjoni. Madankollu, bl-appoġġ tal-politiki ta’ impjiegi addattati, dan il-fenomenu hu suxxettibbli li jitpatta temporanjament tul l-għaxar snin li jmiss bir-rata ta’ impjiegi li qiegħda tiżdied. Tbassir riċenti [3] juri li, għalkemm il-popolazzjoni f;l-età tax-xogħol se tibda tonqos mill-2010, l-għadd totali ta’ persuni li għandhom xogħol fl-UE25 se jissokta jikber sa l-2017. Aktar minn żewġ terzi ta’ dawn il-benefiċċji se jwasslu għal rata ta’ impjiegi tan-nisa ogħla, in-nisa anzjani se jitteħdilhom posthom b’mod progressiv min-nisa żgħażagħ aktar mgħallma u aktar involuti fil-ħajja attiva. Il-bqija jirriżulta minħabba żieda qawwija mbassra tar-rata ta’ impjiegi ta’ ħaddiema bejn il-55 u l-64 sena. L-iżviluppi pożittivi mistennija għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam ma’ l-impjiegi għandhom tendenza joħolqu “tieqa ta’ opportunitajiet” li tippermetti implimentazzjoni ta’ riformi qabel ma l-effetti tax-xjuħija jseħħu bis-sħiħ. Rati ta’ impjiegi ogħla ma jistgħux, madankollu, joffru waqfa proviżorja, u minħabba f’hekk, bidla demografika se tinħass fit-toqol kollu tagħha. Anke jekk l-objettiv tar-rata globali ta’ impjiegi ta’ 70% fl-istrateġija ta’ Liżbona jintlaħaq, in-numru totali ta’ persuni li għandhom xogħol għandu jitnaqqas b’30 miljun persuna bejn l-aħħar ta’ dawn l-għaxar snin u l-bidu ta’ l-2050.
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Economic growth rates are set to decline with the ageing of the population, mainly owing to the reduction in the working-age population. The projections show that, if current trends and policies remain unaltered, the average annual growth rate in GDP for EU-25 will fall systematically from 2.4% over the period 2004-2010 to only 1.2% between 2030 and 2050. Over time, Europe will increasingly have to rely on its productivity gains as a major source of economic growth. Older workers will constitute an increasing proportion of global labour and economic production resources. However, many countries still employ only a relatively small number of older workers owing to excessive recourse to early retirement, insufficient financial incentives to work offered by tax and social security systems, and poor management of age-related issues in the workplace. This is in particular reflected by insufficient access to training, or even discrimination against older workers.
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Ir-rata tat-tkabbir ekonomiku suppost għandu jonqos flimkien max-xjuħija tal-popolazzjoni, prinċipalment minħabba t-tnaqqis tal-popolazzjoni fl-età tax-xogħol. It-tbassir juri li r-rata medja ta’ tkabbir annwali tal-PGD ta’ l-UE25 se tonqos mekkanikament minn 2.4% matul il-perjodu 2004-2010 għal biss 1.2% bejn l-2030 u l-2050. Biż-żmien, l-Ewropa se jkollha tistrieħ aktar u aktar fuq il-benefiċċji tal-produttività bħala l-għajn ewlieni ta’ tkabbir ekonomiku. Il-ħaddiema anzjani se jikkostitwixxu parti akbar tar-riżorsi globali ta’ xogħol ta’ l-idejn u tal-produzzjoni ekonomika. Madankollu, f’bosta pajjiżi, il-ħaddiema anzjani huma relattivament ftit impjegati minħabba użu eċċessiv ta’ benefiċċji ta’ qabel il-pensjoni, inċentivi finanzjarji għax-xogħol mogħtija mis-sistema fiskali u soċjali li mhumiex biżżejjed, u minħabba tmexxija ta’ l-etajiet ma tantx mixtieqa fuq il-post tax-xogħol, immarkati b’mod partikolari minħabba aċċess mhux biżżejjed għat-taħriġ, u saħansitra diskriminazzjonijiet lejn il-ħaddiema anzjani.
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An older labour force and longer working lives need not imply less productive labour. The available data do not suggest that older workers are necessarily less productive and less innovative. The decline in physical and mental capacity occurs only at an older age, is very gradual, is subject to wide variations depending on the individuals concerned, and can be reduced by preventive health policies. Moreover, it may be offset by greater experience, changes to work organisation and more effective use of information and communication technologies (ICT). In addition, the future cohorts of older workers will also benefit from higher levels of training, reducing the risk of a slower spread of new technologies that could be associated with ageing.
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Ħidma ta’ l-idejn aktar anzjana u ħajjiet attiviti itwal m’għandhomx jimplikaw ħidma ta’ l-idejn inqas produttiva. L-elementi disponibbli ma jissuġġerux li ħaddiema aktar anzjani huma bilfors inqas produttivi u inqas innovattivi. In-nuqqas ta’ ħiliet fiżiċi u mentali jseħħu f’etajiet ixjeħ, dan hu progressiv ħafna u suġġett għal varjazzjonijiet kbar skond l-individwu u jista’ jkun limitat minn politiki preventivi għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam mas-saħħa. Barra minn hekk, jista’ jitpatta minn esperjenza akbar, permezz ta’ addattamenti ta’ l-organizzazzjoni tax-xogħol u permezz ta’ użu aktar effiċjenti tat-teknoloġiji ta’ l-informatika u tal-komunikazzjoni (ICT). Barra minn hekk, il-gruppi ta’ ħaddiema anzjani fil-ġejjieni se jibbenefikaw minn livell ta’ taħriġ ogħla li ser inaqqas ir-riskju ta’ diffużjoni aktar bil-mod tat-teknoloġiji l-ġodda li jistgħu jiġu assoċjati max-xjuħija..
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In addition, we cannot take it as read that the reduction in the number of young people will facilitate their access to the labour market. Factors like education and suitable skills will still be essential in securing stable employment. In the context of an ageing society it is therefore of vital importance to provide quality training for young people, thereby meeting the needs of the labour market and of a knowledge-based society, and to develop lifelong learning to ensure that individuals maintain their human capital.
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Barra minn hekk, ma nistgħux nagħmluha fatta li t-tnaqqis tan-numru ta’ żgħażagħ ser iħaffef l-aċċess tagħhom fis-suq tax-xogħol. Edukazzjoni u kwalifiki addattati jibqgħu essenzjali biex jiżguraw impjieg stabbli. Fil-kuntest ta’ soċjetà li qiegħda tixjieħ, l-għoti ta’ taħriġ ta’ kwalità għaż-żgħażagħ, li jwieġeb għall-bżonnijiet ta’ soċjetà msejsa fuq l-għarfien, l-iżvilupp ta’ taħriġ kontinwu, sabiex l-individwi jżommu l-kapital uman għandu importanza partikolari.
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2.2. Impact on social security and public finances
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L-impatt fuq il-ħarsien soċjali u l-finanzi pubbliċi
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On the basis of current policies, ageing will lead to ever greater pressures on public spending, although the situation varies widely from one country to another. For EU-25, it is projected that age-related public spending will rise by 3-4 GDP points between 2004 and 2050, representing an increase of 10% in public spending[4]. These upward pressures will be felt from 2010 onwards and will become particularly pronounced between 2020 and 2040. They will relate to pensions, health and services for the elderly.
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Fuq il-bażi tal-politiki attwali, ix-xjuħija se twassal għal pressjonijiet sinifikanti għaż-żieda fuq l-ispejjeż pubbliċi, għalkemm hemm diversità kbira bejn il-pajjiżi. Għall-UE25, hemm tbassir ta’ żieda fl-ispejjeż pubbliċi marbuta ma’ l-età ta’ 3 sa 4 punti tal-PGD bejn l-2004 u l-2050. Dan jirrappreżenta żieda ta’ 10% ta’ l-ispejjeż pubbliċi[4]. Dawn il-pressjonijiet ogħla se jinħassu mill-2010 u se jsiru partikolarment qawwija bejn l-2020 u l-2040. Huma se jikkonċernaw il-pensjonijiet, is-saħħa u s-servizzi għall-persuni anzjani.
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Overall public finances risk becoming unsustainable in many countries, thereby compromising the future equilibrium of pension and social security systems in general. Allowing public spending linked to ageing to create budget deficits would lead to an intolerable spiral of debt. Such consequences would undermine the potential for economic growth and compromise the functioning of the single currency, thereby requiring pensions and health benefits to be seriously called into question, with considerable negative impact on the future wellbeing of pensioners and taxpayers.
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Il-finanzi pubbliċi globali jiinsabu fir-riskju li ma jkunux jistgħu jitħallsu f’bosta pajjiżi, u minħabba f’hekk, jikkompromettu l-bilanċ fil-ġejjieni tas-sistemi tal-pensjonijiet u tal-ħarsien soċjali b’mod ġenerali. Jekk l-ispejjeż pubbliċi marbuta max-xjuħija jiżdiedu, id-defiċit baġitarju jwassal għal spirali ta’ dejn insupportabbli. Dawn ir-riżultati se jnaqqsu l-potenzjal tat-tkabbir ekonomiku, li se jikkomprometti t-tħaddim tal-munita waħdanija u se jeżiġu minħabba f’hekk, bidla dramatika fil-pensjonijiet u l-benefiċċji tas-saħħa, b’konsegwenzi sfavorevoli kbar għall-benessri tal-ġejjieni tal-pensjonanti u ta’ dawk li jħallsu t-taxxi.
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Delaying reforms until public spending on pensions and health has risen would be missing an opportunity to ensure that every generation, including the baby-boomers, contribute to the necessary process of adjustment.
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Il-posponiment tar-riformi għal aktar tard, filwaqt li jiżdiedu l-ispejjeż pubbliċi marbuta mal-pensjonijiet u s-saħħa, se jirrapreżenta okkażjoni mitlufa biex jiġi żgurat li l-ġenerazzjonijiet kollha, kif ukoll il- baby-boomers , jikkontribwixxu għall-proċess ta’ aġġustament meħtieġ.
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However, the EU governments have, in general, not remained inactive and recent reforms, especially in the fields of public pensions, health, employment and education systems, have begun to pay off, as evidenced in particular by the employment rate for older workers, which has been rising rapidly since 2000. These reforms have also aimed to transfer responsibilities from governments and companies to individuals; citizens will thus have to play a much more active role as regards both the amounts they save for retirement and choosing when to retire.
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Madankollu, il-gvernijiet fi ħdan l-UE ma baqgħux inattivi u r-riformi riċenti fis-setturi b’mod partikolari tas-sistemi pubbliċi tal-pensjoni, tas-saħħa, tas-suq tax-xogħol u ta’ l-edukazzjoni bdew juru l-frott tagħhom, kif jixhdu b’mod partikolari r-rati ta’ impjiegi tal-ħaddiema anzjani dejjem ogħla mill-2000. Dawn ir-riformi huma maħsuba wkoll li jittrasferixxu responsabbiltajiet tal-gvernijiet u l-impriżi lejn l-individwi: iċ-ċittadini se jitħeġġu jkollhom rwol aktar attiv fir-rigward kemm ta’ l-ammonti mġemma’ għall-pensjoni tagħhom kif ukoll ta’ l-għażla taż-żmien tal-pensjoni tagħhom.
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Ageing will also bring about sharp rises in public spending on health and long-term care, even if much will depend on the future improvement in the state of health of the elderly. Such an improvement will require, in particular, better adapted healthcare services and a preventive approach to chronic diseases which could be helped by the use of new technologies. If the gains to be made in terms of life expectancy were generally acquired in good health and without disability, the projected increase in public spending on health and dependency care due to ageing would be reduced by half[5].
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Ix-xjuħija ssarraf ukoll f’żidiet kbar ta’ l-ispejjeż pubbliċi tas-saħħa u tal-kuri fit-tul, anke jekk f’dan is-settur, dan se jiddependi l-aktar mit-titjib fil-ġejjieni ta’ l-istat tas-saħħa tal-persuni anzjani. Dan it-titjib se jeħtieġ b’mod partikolari addattament aħjar tas-servizzi tas-saħħa u approċċ preventiv għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam mal-mard kroniku li jista’ jiffavorixxi l-użu tat-teknoloġiji l-ġodda. Jekk il-benefiċċji tal-ġejjieni għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam ma’ l-għomor tal-ħajja fil-biċċa l-kbira miksub f’saħħa tajba u mingħajr inkapaċitajiet, iż-żieda prevista għall-ispejjeż pubbliċi tas-saħħa u tal-kuri ta’ dipendenza minħabba x-xjuħija tisfa mnaqqsa bin-nofs[5].
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3. A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE
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Tweġiba kostruttiva għall-isfida demografika
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In view of the complexity of the challenges of ageing, an overall strategy appears essential. Both at EU and at national level it will be necessary to review existing policies to determine whether they need to be adjusted to take account of the changing demography of the EU.
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Quddiem il-kumplessità ta’ l-isfidi tax-xjuħija, strateġija globali tidher meħtieġa. Kemm fuq livell ta’ l-UE kif ukoll fuq livell nazzjonali, se jinħtieġ li l-politiki eżistenti jiġu vvalutati biex jiġu ddeterminati l-aġġustamenti eventwali, suxxetibbli li jqisu l-bidliet demografiċi ta’ l-UE.
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Five core policy directions are outlined below:
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Ħames tendenzi politiċi ewlenin huma ppreżentati hawn isfel.
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3.1. Promoting demographic renewal in Europe
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Ewropa li tiffavorixxi t-tiġdid demografiku
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The EU Member States can prevent demographic decline or react to the falling birth rate, which for some of them is reaching a worrying level. These reactions are both necessary and realistic: necessary because surveys show that in all EU countries couples would like to have more children; realistic because international comparisons underline the effectiveness of family and other policies consistently implemented by some countries over several decades to create conditions supportive of those who wish to have children[6].
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L-Istati Membri ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea jistgħu jħabbru n-nuqqas demografiku jew jirreaġixxu għat-tnaqqis tat-twelid li jilħaq, għal ftit minnhom, stadju inkwetanti. Dawn ir-reazzjonijiet huma kemm meħtieġa kif ukoll realistiċi. Meħtieġa , peress li l-istħarriġiet juru li fil-pajjiżi kollha ta’ l-Unjoni, il-koppji jixtiequ jkollhom aktar tfal. Realistiċi , peress li tqabbil internazzjonali jenfasizza l-effiċjenza tal-politiki mmexxija minn ċerti Stati b’konsistenza minn bosta għexieren ta’ snin ’l hawn biex joħolqu kundizzjonijiet favorevoli għal dawk li jridu t-tfal.[6]
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There are many different such policies but they generally have three aspects in common, aiming to (i) reduce the inequality of opportunities offered to citizens with and without children, (ii) offer universal access to assistance services for parents, in particular for education and care for young children, and (iii) manage working hours to offer both men and women better opportunities for lifelong learning and for balancing their private and working lives.
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Dawn il-politiki huma bosta u varjati iżda ġeneralment għandhom tliet dimensjonijiet komuni bl-għan li i) inaqqsu l-inugwaljanzi ta’ l-opportunitajiet offruti liċ-ċittadini bit-tfal jew mingħajrhom, ii) joffru aċċess universali għas-servizzi ta’ għajnuna għall-ġenituri, b’mod partikolari għall-edukazzjoni u t-trobbija tat-tfal iż-żgħar, iii) jorganizzaw il-ħin tax-xogħol biex joffru kemm għall-irġiel kif ukoll għan-nisa possibbiltajiet ta’ taħriġ kontinwu u konciljazzjoni bejn il-ħajja privata u l-ħajja professjonali.
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Furthermore, the most recent analyses of the fall in the birth rate emphasise the substantial impact of the rise in the age at which women have their first child, reflecting the growing reluctance of couples to have children. These analyses attach growing importance to reducing uncertainties accompanying the entry of young adults into the labour market and, more generally, to the improvement of their living conditions. In addition, effective gender equality policies make it easier for parents to consider when to have children. We must therefore tackle the problems of access to accommodation, facilitate access to affordable and quality childcare and generally improve the work-life balance through flexible forms of work, making use of new technologies. We must also tackle child poverty, the extent of which remains worrying and also reflects the relative deterioration of the situation of families with children.
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Barra minn hekk, l-analiżi l-aktar riċenti tat-tnaqqis tat-twelid tenfasizza l-effetti notevoli taż-żieda ta’ l-età tan-nisa waqt l-ewwel twelid li hu mera ta’ l-eżitazzjoni dejjem aktar tal-kopji biex ikollhom it-tfal. Dawn l-analiżi jwasslu biex jagħtu importanza dejjem ikbar lit-tnaqqis tad-dubji li jimxu id f’id mad-daħla taż-żgħażagħ adulti fuq is-suq tax-xogħol, u b’mod aktar ġenerali mat-titjib tal-kondizzjonijiet tal-ħajja tagħhom. Jeħtieġ għalhekk li niġġieldu kontra d-diffikultajiet għall-aċċess għall-alloġġ, li jitħaffef l-użu ta’ servizzi ta’ kura tat-tfal bi prezz raġjonevoli u ta’ kwalità, u b’mod aktar ġenerali li titjieb il-konċiljazzjoni bejn iż-żmien tal-ħajja ta’ kuljum permezz tal-forom tax-xogħol flessibbli li jagħmlu użu mill-possibbiltajiet teknoloġiċi l-ġodda. Jeħtieġ ukoll li niġġieldu kontra l-faqar tat-tfal, fenomenu li l-kobor tiegħu jibqa’ inkwetanti u jirrifletti wkoll id-deterjorazzjoni relattiva tal-qagħda tal-familji bit-tfal.
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Solidarity between generations could be jeopardised if the burden of ageing had to be carried by the younger population, decreasing in number and economic strength. Remedying this situation is one of the priorities of the new pact between the generations.
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Is-solidarjetà bejn il-ġenerazzjonijiet tista’ tiġi pperikolata jekk il-piż tax-xjuħija ikollu jiġi sostnut mill-popolazzjoni ta’ età żgħira, u li b’hekk tonqos fin-numru u fis-saħħa ekonomika. Soluzzjoni għaliha hi tassew prijorità tal-patt il-ġdid bejn il-ġenerazzjonijiet.
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At the Barcelona European Council in 2002, Member States made a clear commitment to step up provision of childcare: by 2010 this should be available to at least 90% of children between 3 and 6 years old, and at least 33% of children under 3 years of age. It is now time for these national childcare facilities to be put in place.
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Fil-Kunsill Ewropew ta’ Barċellona fl-2002, l-Istati Membri ħadu impenn ċar biex iżidu l-għoti ta’ servizzi biex jieħdu ħsieb it-tfal li, sa l-2010, għandu jkun disponibbli għal mill-inqas 90 % tat-tfal bejn it-3 u s-6 snin u 33% tat-tfal iżgħar minn 3 snin. Wasal iż-żmien li jitwaqqfu dawn is-servizzi biex jieħdu ħsieb it-tfal.
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The Commission:
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Il-Kummissjoni
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- will consult the social partners on the measures (e.g. on parental leave, or more flexible work arrangements) to be taken to improve the balance between the working, private and family lives of men and women, in order to take greater account of the needs of families[7];
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se tikkonsulta l-imsieħba soċjali dwar il-miżuri li għandhom jittieħdu biex titjieb il-konċiljazzjoni bejn il-ħajja professjonali, il-ħajja privata, u l-ħajja tal-familja ta’ l-irġiel u tan-nisa sabiex jikkunsidraw aħjar il-bżonnijiet tal-familji [7].
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- will hold in October 2006 the first European Demographic Forum which will give rise to a Commission analysis report. In addition, the Commission will set up a group of government experts to accompany the work of the Forum.
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se torganizza minn Ottubru 2006 l-ewwel Forum demografiku Ewropew li jwassal għal rapport ta’ analiżi tas-servizzi tal-Kummissjoni. Il-ħidmiet tal-Forum se jiġu akkompanjati minn grupp ta’ esperti governattivi msejħa li jinħalqu fi ħdan il-Kummissjoni.
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3.2. Promoting employment in Europe: more jobs and longer working lives of better quality
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Ewropa li tagħti valur lix-xogħol aktar impjiegi u ħajja attiva itwal u ta’ kwalità
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Increasing the rate of employment is a vital component of the Lisbon Strategy. Some success has already been achieved. The relevant reforms of employment, education and training policy will thus have to be expanded and pursued beyond 2010. Increased efforts will be needed to reduce the segmentation of the labour markets, pursue the increase in the number of women in work[8], and increase the efficiency and equity of education systems in order to enhance skills and foster the integration of new entrants who suffer from this segregation. This, in particular, will be the aim underlying the implementation of “flexicurity” guidelines which should facilitate the transition between different stages in the life cycle by means of increased flexibility of the labour markets, lifelong learning and active labour market and social security policies. The involvement of a large number of stakeholders with different levels of responsibility - workers and companies – by means of social dialogue and corporate social responsibility will be required.
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Iż-żieda tar-rata ta’ parteċipazzjoni fl-impjiegi hi sfida ewlenija ta’ l-Istrateġija ta’ Liżbona, diġà mżewqa minn ċertu suċċess. Ir-riformi korrispondenti tal-politiki ta’ l-impjiegi, ta’ l-edukazzjoni u tat-taħriġ għandhom għalhekk jitkabbru u jiġu segwiti wara l-2010. Jinħtieġ sforz akbar biex jitnaqqas it-tqassim f’partijiet tas-swieq tax-xogħol, sabiex tissokta ż-żieda tar-rata ta’ attività feminili[8], sabiex titjieb l-effiċjenza u l-ekwità tas-sistemi ta’ edukazzjoni, sabiex jitkabbru l-ħiliet u sabiex titħeġġeġ l-integrazzjoni tal-ġodda li jsofru minn din il-kompartimentalizzazzjoni. Huwa b’mod partikolari l-għan ta’ l-implimentazzjoni tal-linji ta’ gwida dwar il-“flessigurtà” li għandu jħaffef it-tranżizzjoni bejn il-fażijiet differenti taċ-ċiklu tal-ħajja b’flessibbiltà akbar tas-swieq tax-xogħol, il-miżuri ta’ taħriġ kontinwu, il-politiki attivi tas-swieq tax-xogħol u tal-ħarsien soċjali. Se jinħtieġ l-involviment ta’ numru kbir ta’ parteċipanti, fuq livelli differenti ta’ responsabbiltà, ħaddiema u impriżi, permezz tad-djalogu soċjali u tar-responsabbiltà soċjali ta’ l-impriżi.
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Demographic ageing, however, calls for strategic importance to be given to increasing the rate of participation of men and women aged over 55. This will require far-reaching reforms to remove incentives for early exit from the labour market and to encourage the employment of senior citizens. It must also be ensured that it is effectively possible to work for longer and that public employment policies as a whole create more job opportunities for older workers.
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Ix-xjuħija demografika tistieden madankollu li tingħata importanza strateġika għaż-żieda tar-rati ta’ sehem tan-nisa u l-irġiel ta’ aktar minn 55 sena. Dan se jeħtieġ riformi kbar sabiex ineħħu l-inċentivi għat-tluq bikri mis-suq tax-xogħol u jħeġġu l-impjieg ta’ l-anzjani. Jeħtieġ ukoll li jitħares li jkun tassew possibbli li taħdem għal aktar żmien u li l-politiki pubbliċi kollha jkabbru l-possibbiltajiet ta’ impjieg tal-ħaddiema anzjani.
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“Active ageing” constitutes in itself a comprehensive and sustainable approach which must employ a range of tools beyond retirement reforms. In order to be able to seriously consider working longer, people must not be faced with discriminatory prejudices, they must have been prepared to update and make the most of the skills they have gained with experience and have access to more flexible retirement schemes, and they must not only be in good physical and mental health but also have good prospects of remaining so for a long time to come. The EU has legislative instruments to ensure that the ban on age discrimination is enforced, and the 2007 European Year of Equal Opportunities for All will be an opportunity to evaluate its implementation by the Member States, which are responsible for developing training and stepping up lifelong preventive health policies. Easier access to lifelong learning must reach everyone and, in particular, those with lower skills and in less favourable employment conditions. While these areas are not new, demographic ageing now makes them a priority investment in the future which the European Union supports, principally through its "Education and Training 2010" programme.
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Ix-“xjuħija attiva” tikkostitwixxi fiha nnifisha approċċ globali u sostenibbli, li għandha tuża medda ta’ għodda lil hinn mis-sempliċi riformi tal-pensjonijiet. Sabiex jiġi kkontemplat b’mod pożittiv li taħdem aktar, jeħtieġ li ma jkunx hemm preġudizzji diskriminattivi, tkun imħejji taġġorna u tivvalorizza l-ħiliet miksuba biż-żmien, tinsab mhux biss f’saħħa fiżika u mentali tajba, iżda wkoll tittama li tgħix aktar f’dan l-istat. L-Unjoni għandha għodod leġiżlattivi sabiex titħares in-nuqqas ta’ diskriminazzjoni skond l-età u s-Sena Ewropea għall-opportunitajiet indaqs fl-2007 se tkun l-okkażjoni li tiġi vvalutata l-applikazzjoni mill-Istati Membri. Huma huma li jridu jiżviluppaw it-taħriġ u jsaħħu l-politiki ta’ ħarsien għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam mas-saħħa kontinwa. B’mod partikolari, kull wieħed għandu jkollu aċċess aktar faċli għat-taħriġ kontinwu, speċjalment il-ħaddiema l-anqas kwalifikati jew dawk li għandhom il-kondizzjonijiet ta’ impjieg l-inqas favorevoli. Dawn l-oqsma mhumiex ġodda. Ix-xjuħija demografika tagħtihom mil-lum ’il quddiem natura ta’ investiment prijoritarju għall-ġejjieni li l-Unjoni Ewropea tappoġġja b’mod partikolari bil-programm “Edukazzjoni u Taħriġ 2010". .
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Increasing the active population will be achieved partly by improving public health. First of all, we need to rationalise the structure of our health systems' provision of care, which often no longer meets current needs. The Commission's recent initiative to establish a Community framework to improve cross-border mobility for patients and free movement of health services will allow economies of scale to be achieved and is part of this programme. Secondly, effective preventive measures to tackle obesity, smoking, alcoholism and mental illnesses should also have a broad impact on Europeans' state of health and, therefore, on productivity at work and future healthcare costs. Thirdly, the increased use of new technologies, such as telemedicine and personalised healthcare systems, available to senior citizens, their families and healthcare staff, could help to control healthcare expenditure and improve the wellbeing of citizens. Finally, the types of illnesses will certainly change with an ageing population, inevitably raising new questions about the types of care required in the future.
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Iż-żieda tal-popolazzjoni attiva se seħħ, parzjalment permezz ta’ titjib tas-saħħa pubblika. L-ewwelnett, jeħtieġ li tiġi razzjonalizzata l-istruttura ta’ l-għoti ta’ kuri tas-sistemi tas-saħħa tagħna li ma jikkorrispondux iżjed, sikwit, mal-bżonnijiet il-ġodda. L-inizjattiva riċenti tal-Kummissjoni biex tistabbilixxi qafas Komunitarji sabiex titjieb il-mobilità transkonfinali tal-pazjenti u tal-forniment ħieles tal-kuri tas-saħħa għandha tippermetti li jitwettqu ekonomiji fil-kobor u li jagħmlu parti minn din il-perspettiva. Barra minn hekk, miżuri effiċjenti ta’ ħarsien għall-ġlieda kontra l-obeżità, it-tipjip, alkoħoliżmu u l-mard mentali għandu jkollhom ukoll impatt kbir fuq il-kondizzjonijiet ta’ saħħa ta’ l-Ewropej, u jibbażaw, fuq il-produttività fix-xogħol u l-ispejjeż fil-ġejjieni tas-saħħa. Fit-tieletnett, l-użu akbar tat-teknoloġiji l-ġodda, bħat-tele-mediċina u s-sistemi ta’ saħħa personalizzati, aċċessibbli għall-anzjani, għall-familji tagħhom u għall-persunal tal-kuri, jista’ jiffavorixxi l-kontroll ta’ l-ispejjeż tas-saħħa u l-benessri taċ-ċittadini. Fl-aħħar, it-tipi ta’ mard wisq probabbli se jevolvu b’popolazzjoni li qiegħda tixjieħ. Dan ma jonqosx li jqajjem mistoqsijiet ġodda rigward it-tip ta’ kuri meħtieġa fil-ġejjieni.
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Continuing to work after the age of 60 should no longer be, as it is today, the prerogative of high income earners and the highly qualified. This should lead to a reduction in the disparity in life expectancies, which today constitutes one of the most salient forms of social inequality, depending on income and level of education. Preventive measures to foster lifestyles and environmental conditions conducive to good health, within and outside the workplace, must henceforth lead to increased cooperation between the stakeholders in public health, education, the media and work organisation. This should influence at an early stage life expectancy in good health , which differs markedly from overall life expectancy and varies considerably between Member States.
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Jekk il-fatt li taħdem wara li taqbeż is-sittin, ma jibqax bħal-lum il-prerogattiva ta’ min għandu pagi għoljin u diplomi ta’ livell għoli, jeħtieġ li jitnaqqsu d-differenzi ta’ l-għomor tal-ħajja li jikkostitwixxu llum l-inugwaljanzi soċjali l-aktar importanti skond il-pagi u l-livell ta’ edukazzjoni. L-azzjonijiet preventivi jippermettu li jiġu promossi l-istili ta’ ħajja u l-kondizzjonijiet ambjentali ta’ saħħa tajba, fi u barra l-ambjent tax-xogħol, għandhom minn issa ’l quddiem iwasslu għal kooperazzjoni akbar bejn il-parteċipanti tas-saħħa pubblika, ta’ l-edukazzjoni, tal-mezzi tax-xandir u ta’ l-organizzazzjoni tax-xogħol, sabiex jinfluwenzaw, minn qabel, l-għomor tal-ħajja f’ saħħa tajba, li hi tassew differenti mill-għomor tal-ħajja globali u tvarja konsiderevoment skond l-Istati Membri.
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The participation of people aged over 65, including those who are officially retired, in the economic and social fabric must be promoted as an opportunity and not presented as a constraint. This increased participation in social activity on a voluntary basis will be achieved by means which have largely yet to be created.
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Is-sehem tal-persuni ta’ aktar minn 65 sena, kif ukoll dawk formalment fil-pensjoni, għall-ambjent ekonomiku u soċjali għandu jkun favorizzat, bħala opportunità offruta u mhux piż. Dan is-sehem kbir għall-attività soċjali fuq bażi volontarja se jsir skond it-termini u l-kondizzjonijiet li għad iridu jinħalqu.
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Member States are invited to take the necessary measures to respect their commitments, taken at the Stockholm European Council in 2001, to raise employment rates for workers over 55 to over 50%. At the launch of a new cycle of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment in 2008, the Commission will examine the results obtained in each Member State as regards the employment rate for men and women aged over 55 and the age of withdrawal from the labour force. It will report on specific examples of best practices from the Member States in promoting active ageing.
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L-Istati Membri huma mistiedna jieħdu l-miżuri meħtieġa, fil-qafas ta’ l-impenji tagħhom meħuda fil-Kunsill Ewropew ta’ Stokkolma fl-2001, biex iżidu r-rati ta’ impjiegi tal-ħaddiema ta’ aktar minn 55 sena għal ’il fuq minn 50%Fl-okkażjoni tat-tnedija taċ-ċiklu l-ġdid ta’ l-istrateġija ta’ Liżbona għat-tkabbir u l-impjiegi fl-2008, il-Kummissjoni se teżamina r-riżultati miksuba f’kull Stat għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam mar-rata ta’ impjiegi ta’ l-irġiel u tan-nisa ta’ aktar minn 55 sena u ta’ l-età li jieqfu mix-xogħol u se tagħmel rapport ta’ eżempji konkreti ta’ l-aħjar prassi ta’ l-Istati Membri fil-promozzjoni tax-xjuħija attiva.
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The European Union has agreed to step up support to Member States to reach this goal with an agreement on a reinforced European Social Fund and Lifelong Learning programme for 2007-2013[9].
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L-Unjoni Ewropea aċċettat li żżid is-sostenn tagħha lill-Istati Membri biex jilħqu dan l-għan, permezz ta’ tisħiħ tal-Fond Soċjali Ewropew u programmi ta’ taħriġ kontinwu għall-perjodu 2007-2013[9]
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The Commission will consult the stakeholders on initiatives aimed at establishing a Community framework to improve cross-border supply of health services and mobility for patients[10].
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Il-Kummissjoni se tikkonsulta lill-parteċipanti kkonċernati rigward l-inizjattivi li għandhom jittieħdu sabiex jiġi stabbilit qafas Komunitarju li jippermetti t-titjib ta’ l-offerta ta’ bejn il-fruntieri tas-servizzi tas-saħħa u l-mobbiltà tal-pazjenti[10].
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Member States are invited to implement fully the Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation[11]. In 2007, the Commission will review the state of implementation of this directive with regard to age discrimination.
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L-Istati Membri huma mistiedna li japplikaw bis-sħiħ id-Direttiva li tikkonċerna l-ugwaljanza tat-trattament fl-impjieg u x-xogħol[11]. Fl-2007, il-Kummissjoni se tivvaluta l-implimentazzjoni ta’ din id-Direttiva għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam mad-diskriminazzjoni msejsa fuq l-età.
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3.3. A more productive and dynamic Europe
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Ewropa aktar produttiva u li għandha aktar suċċess
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A third response to the demographic challenge is to improve the productivity of Europeans at work. More generally, the Lisbon Strategy, which has been refocused since 2005, brings together in a coherent manner all the structural reforms, including microeconomic ones, which are likely to optimise European performance. The European Union contributes to this directly by deepening the internal market, implementing competition rules, prioritising the quality of regulation (specifically with regard to small and medium-sized enterprises) and through social cohesion policy. In this way, the Lisbon Strategy establishes the conditions required for optimising skills and the quality and productivity of work at all ages.
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It-tielet risposta għall-isfida demografika tinsab fit-titjib tal-produttività ta’ l-Ewropej fix-xogħol. Hawnhekk ukoll, l-Istrateġija ta’ Liżbona għat-tkabbir u l-impjiegi tagħti d-direzzjoni t-tajba, bil-prinċipju li tagħti valur, f’kwalunkwe età, lill-kwalità u lill-produttività tax-xogħol. L-Unjoni Ewropea tikkontribwixxi għal dan direttament permezz tat-tisħiħ tas-suq intern, ta’ l-implimentazzjoni tar-regoli ta’ kompetizzjoni, tal-prijorità mogħtija lill-kwalità tar-regoli, b’mod partikolari għall-SMEs, kif ukoll permezz tal-politika ta’ koeżjoni soċjali. B’hekk l-Istrateġija ta’ Liżbona tistabbilixxi l-kondizzjonijiet meħtieġa biex tippermetti li tagħti valur għall-kompetenza, kwalità u produttività tax-xogħol għal kull età.
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The ageing population can even represent a good opportunity to enhance the competitiveness of the European economy. European companies should be able to take advantage of better conditions to grasp the opportunities offered by demographic change in terms of creating new markets for goods and services which respond to the needs of an older clientele[12]. A first step in this direction would undoubtedly be to encourage companies and other economic actors to incorporate the ageing phenomenon into their innovation strategies. This concerns a number of areas such as information and communication technologies, financial services, transport, energy and tourism infrastructures and local services, in particular long-term care. In all these areas the European Union can supplement or to strengthen planning efforts of the Member States.
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Ix-xjuħija tal-popolazzjoni tista’ tikkostitwixxi wkoll opportunità kbira biex tiżdied il-kompetittività ta’ l-ekonomija Ewropea. Jeħtieġ li l-parteċipanti ekonomiċi Ewropej jiġu offruti l-aħjar kondizzjonijiet biex jaħtfu l-opportunitajiet ippreżentati permezz tal-bidliet demografiċi għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam mal-ħolqien tas-swieq ġodda għall-beni u servizzi li jissodisfaw il-bżonnijiet ta’ klijenti ixjeħ.[12] L-ewwel pass f’din id-direzzjoni se jkun ċertament li l-parteċipanti ekonomiċi jitħeġġu jinkludu l-fenomenu tax-xjuħija fl-istrateġiji ta’ innovazzjoni tagħhom. Dan jikkonċerna numru ta’ oqsma bħat-teknoloġiji ta’ l-informatika u tal-komunikazzjoni, is-servizzi finanzjarji, l-infrastrutturi tat-trasport, ta’ l-enerġija u dawk turistiċi u s-servizzi lokali, b’mod partikolari s-servizzi tal-kuri fit-tul. F’dawn is-setturi kollha, l-Unjoni Ewropea tista’ tikkompleta jew iżżid l-isforzi ta’ antiċipazzjoni ta’ l-Istati Membri.
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By the end of 2008, the Commission will adopt a Communication on how best to take into account the needs of an ageing population in areas such as town and country planning, the environment or access to new technologies. It will pay special attention to the conditions and potential role for the Structural Funds for developing care provision adapted to the needs of dependent people and their families.
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Il-Kummissjoni se tadotta sa l-aħħar ta’ l-2008, komunikazzjoni li tipproponi mogħdijiet biex tqis aħjar il-bżonnijiet ta’ populazzjoni li qiegħda tixjieħ fl-oqsma bħall-bidla tat-territorju, l-ambjent jew l-aċċess għat-teknoloġiji ġodda. Hi se tagħti attenzjoni privileġġjata lill-kondizzjonijiet ta’ l-iżvilupp ta’ għoti ta’ kuri addattati għall-bżonnijiet tal-persuni dipendenti u tal-familja tagħhom u lir-rwol tal-fondi strutturali għal dan l-effett.
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3.4. Receiving and integrating immigrants in Europe
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Ewropa organizzata biex tirċievi u tintegra lill-immigranti
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It must be acknowledged that over the next 15 to 20 years significant net immigration into Europe will continue. This will at first meet the needs of the European labour market, which will need to attract a qualified labour force from outside. The need for external unskilled labour will also remain very high. Nor can we overlook the attractiveness of Europe owing to its relative prosperity, its political stability, the desire of recently arrived immigrants to be reunited with their families and the dynamic growth in the populations of relatively poor neighbouring regions. These different factors should be better reconciled by organising legal immigration and, correspondingly, the integration of immigrants, while at the same time respecting the needs of the country of origin.
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Għandna nkunu ċari: tul il-15 sa 20 sena li jmiss, l-Ewropa se tissokta tirċievi immigrazzjoni netta importanti. Dan għall-bidu jaqdi l-bżonnijiet tas-suq tax-xogħol Ewropew li għandu jiġbed ħidma ta’ l-idejn esterna kwalifikata. Il-bżonnijiet esterni f’ħidma ta’ l-idejn mhux kwalifikata jibqgħu wkoll importanti ħafna. L-attrazzjoni tat-territorju Ewropew ma tistax tiġi injorata, minħabba l-prosperità relattiva tiegħu, l-istabbilità politika, għat-talbiet ta’ unjoni mill-ġdid tal-familja min-naħa ta’ l-immigranti li waslu m’ilux u għad-dinamiżmu tat-tkabbir tal-popolazzjoni ta’ reġjuni relattivament foqra fl-inħawi tagħna. Dawn il-fatturi differenti għandhom jiġu kkonċiljati aħjar billi tiġi organizzata l-immigrazzjoni legali u korrelattivament l-integrazzjoni ta’ persuni li ġew mill-immigrazzjoni, filwaqt li jitħarsu l-bżonnijiet tal-pajjiżi ta’ oriġini.
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Current national policies on immigration from third countries are not uniform. In some countries, legal flows are limited and illegal immigration remains more or less contained; in others, the large-scale regularisations of recent years have allowed the circumstances of hundreds of thousands of immigrants who were living and working on an irregular basis to be legalised. These differences reflect, beyond the disparities in the labour market, the growing difficulties of immigrants with regard to economic and social integration in countries that have a long tradition of immigration. These differences are not sustainable in the long term within a European Union characterised by the free movement of workers and an increasingly unified internal labour market. It is also the European Union, with its international weight, its commercial role and its international cooperation relations with the Mediterranean, African and Latino-American regions, which can engage in partnerships indispensable to the management of migration flows, a prerequisite for the success of immigration policies. It also falls to the European Union, which is founded on non-discrimination and the respecting of differences, to inform public opinion and combat prejudice, to identify the real obstacles to be overcome and also to point out the riches of diversity[13].
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Il-politiki nazzjonali ta’ l-immigrazzjoni minn pajjiżi terzi mhumiex omoġeni. F’ċerti pajjiżi, il-flussi legali huma limitati u l-immigrazzjoni illegali tibqa’ ftit jew wisq imrażżna; f’pajjiżi oħra, ir-regolarizzazzjoni enormi ta’ dawn l-aħħar snin ippermettew li jiġu legalizzati eluf ta’ immigranti li jgħixu hemm u jaħdmu b’mod regolari. Dawn id-differenzi jirriflettu, lil hinn mid-differenzi fuq is-suq tax-xogħol, id-diffikultajiet dejjem akbar ta’ l-integrazzjoni ekonomika u soċjali ta’ l-immigranti fil-pajjiżi ta’ immigrazzjoni qadima. Fil-medda ta’ żmien twila, dawn id-differenzi mhumiex sostenibbli, f’Unjoni li fi ħdanha tipprattika l-moviment ħieles tal-ħaddiema u li s-suq intern tax-xogħol tagħha kull ma jmur jingħaqad iżjed. Hija wkoll l-Unjoni, li permezz tal-piż internazzjonali tagħha, ir-rwol kummerċjali tagħha u r-relazzjoni tagħha ta’ kooperazzjoni globali ma’ l-entitajiet il-kbar Mediterranji, Afrikani u Latino-amerikani jistgħu jimpjegaw l-imsieħba indispensabbli għat-tmexxija tal-flussi ta’ immigrazzzjoni, kundizzjoni tas-suċċess tal-politiki ta’ immigrazzjoni. L-Unjoni, imsejsa fuq in-nuqqas ta’ diskriminazzjoni u l-ħarsien tad-differenzi, għandha tiddjaloga ma’ l-opinjonijiet pubbliċi biex tiġġieled kontra l-preġudizzji, tindika l-ostakoli ġenwini li għandhom jingħelbu, tfakkar ukoll l-għana fid-diversità [13].
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This is why the EU today is working with the Member States to develop elements of a common policy on legal immigration[14], focussing particularly on immigration for work purposes in order to satisfy requirements in certain sectors of the labour market. This policy should be supplemented by tighter policies on integrating third-country nationals[15], allocating greater financial resources, and by striking up partnerships with emigration countries.
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Huwa għalhekk li, llum, l-Unjoni hi impenjata ma’ l-Istati Membri fl-iżvilupp ta’ elementi ta’ politika komuni ta’ immigrazzjoni legali[14], maħsuba b’mod partikolari għall-immigrazzjoni għall-fini ta’ l-impjieg biex jissodisfaw il-bżonnijiet f’ċerti setturi tas-suq tax-xogħol. Din il-politika għandha tiġi kkompletata permezz ta’ tisħiħ tal-politiki ta’ integrazzjoni taċ-ċittadini ta’ pajjiżi terzi[15] permezz ta’ mezzi finanzjarji akbar, u permezz tal-bidu qalil tas-sħubiji mal-pajjiżi ta’ emigrazzjoni.
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At the same time, with respect to the internal mobility of Community citizens, the transition towards full freedom of movement for workers within an enlarged EU of 27 Member States will continue up to 2014. This internal mobility helps offset imbalances in labour markets in Europe and should be taken into consideration in planning immigration policies.
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Fl-istess ħin, fuq il-pjan ta’ mobbiltà interna taċ-ċittadini Komunitarji, titkompla t-tranżizzjoni lejn il-moviment liberu sħiħ tal-ħaddiema fi ħdan l-Unjoni ta’ 27, sa l-2014. Din il-mobbiltà interna tikkontribwixxi għat-tneħħija ta’ l-iżbilanċi tas-swieq tax-xogħol fl-Ewropa u għandha titqies fid-dawl tal-politiki ta’ immigrazzjoni.
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The Hague programme of 2004 led to a "Policy Plan on legal migration" and inspired the establishment of the European Integration Fund. Such measures can support further action at all levels to help the integration of legal migrants.
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Il-Programm ta’ The Hague ta’ l-2004 wassal għal “Pjan ta’ azzjoni politika dwar il-migrazzjoni legali” u ispira l-waqfien ta’ Fond Ewropew għall-Integrazzjoni. Dawn l-istrumenti jistgħu jsostnu azzjonijiet oħrajn fuq il-livelli kollha biex jiffavorixxu l-integrazzjoni tal-migranti legali.
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The Commission will continue its initiatives to stimulate the integration of migrants, specifically by holding discussions with Member States on obstacles to integration, to find out more about migrants’ profiles, perceptions and policies implemented. Over the course of 2009, the Commission will consider the need to propose new measures relating to economic immigration, taking account of the needs of the labour market, and taking stock of the progress achieved on internal mobility.
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Il-Kummissjoni se tkompli tħejji l-inizjattivi tagħha biex tiffavorixxi l-integrazzjoni tal-migranti, u b’mod partikolari r-riflessjonijiet impenjati ma’ l-Istati Membri dwar ix-xkiel fl-integrazzjoni tagħhom, għarfien aħjar tal-karatteristiċi tagħhom, il-perċezzjonijiet tagħhom, u l-politiki ta’ implimentazzjoni. Tul is-sena 2009, il-Kummissjoni se tivvaluta l-opportunità li tipproponi miżuri ġodda li għandhom x’jaqsmu ma’ l-immigrazzjoni ekonomika, b’kunsiderazzjoni tal-bżonnijiet tas-suq ta’ l-impjiegi, u tagħmel sommarju tal-qagħda tal-progress miksub għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam mal-mobbiltà interna.
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3.5. Sustainable public finances in Europe: guaranteeing adequate social security and equity between the generations
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Ewropa għall-finanzi pubbliċi vijabbli; garanzija ta’ ħarsien soċjali xieraq u ta’ l-ekwità bejn il-ġenerazzjonijiet
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In most Member States, public finances are not sustainable under current policies. Sustained efforts towards budgetary consolidation are nevertheless required. Increasing the participation rate in employment is an effective tool that governments have at their disposal for increasing their revenue and contending with expenditure linked to ageing, without increasing the rates of taxation.
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F’bosta Stati Membri, il-finanzi pubbliċi mhumiex sostenibbli bil-politiki attwali. Jinħtieġ sforz sostenibbli ta’ konsolidazzjoni baġitarja. Iż-żieda tar-rata ta’ parteċipazzjoni għall-impjiegi tikkostitwixxi mezz effiċjenti li għandhom il-gvernijiet biex iżidu d-dħul tagħhom u jħabbtu wiċċhom ma’ l-ispejjez marbuta max-xjuħija mingħajr ma jżidu t-taxxa. Madankollu jinħtieġ sforz sostenibbli ta’ konsolidazzjoni baġitarja, b’bilanċ xieraq skond l-Istat Membru bejn it-tnaqqis ta’ l-ispejjeż u ż-żieda tat-taxxi. Jeħtieġ li jiġi evitat il-fatt li jitnaqqsu l-ispejjeż pubbliċi tal-ġejjieni, bħall-infrastrutturi, l-edukazzjoni u r-riċerka, indispensabbli f’livell għoli ta’ produttività u għalhekk għal futur ekonomiku dejjem ikbar.
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The recent retirement reforms in several countries will allow the financial imbalance in the pension systems to be significantly reduced. Nonetheless, some countries may require additional reforms, aimed in particular at avoiding early withdrawals from the labour market, raising the age of definitive retirement, offering older people financial incentives to stay in the labour market and allowing individuals to increase their retirement income with a supplementary pension, while ensuring a better balance between individuals' contributions and benefits.
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Ir-riformi riċenti tal-pensjonijiet f’bosta pajjizi se jippermettu li jitnaqqas sensibbilment l-iżbilanċ finanzjarju tas-sistemi tal-pensjonijiet. Madankollu, riformi supplimentari jistgħu jkunu ta’ ħtieġa f’ċerti pajjiżi, li jimmiraw b’mod partikolari li jevitaw it-tluq bikri mis-suq tax-xogħol, iżidu l-età ta’ waqfien definittiv mix-xogħol, joffru lill-anzjani inċentivi finanzjarji biex jibqgħu fis-suq tax-xogħol, u jippermettu lill-individwi li jikkompletaw id-dħul tagħhom tal-pensjoni b’pensjonijiet komplimentari, filwaq li jiżguraw bilanċ aħjar bejn il-benefiċċji u l-kontribuzzjonijiet ta’ individwu.
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New challenges are emerging, linked to the development of private savings and funded systems. They are linked, for example, to the cover of these systems, to the level of contributions and to the increasing role of pension funds, which in turn raises questions about transparency and quality of supervision. In this context, it is of key importance to develop efficiently functioning financial markets and to create stable and secure conditions for individuals to save and invest. Governments should also favour the emergence of a sufficient variety of financial instruments. Building up private savings and capital should also be promoted so that individuals can have more autonomy in determining the level of income they wish to have at their disposal during their retirement. There is also a need for communication and education in financial matters to help individuals adapt to new circumstances.
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Qegħdin jitfaċċaw sfidi ġodda marbuta ma’ l-iżvilupp tat-tfaddil privat u tas-sistemi ffinanzjati. Dawn huma marbuta, pereżempju, mal-kopertura ta' dawn is-sistemi, mal-livell tal-kontribuzzjonijiet u mar- rwol dejjem akbar tal-fondi tal-pensjoni, li jqajmu min-naħa tagħhom mistoqsijiet ta' trasparenza u ta’ kwalità ta’ superviżjoni. F’dan il-kuntest huwa ta’ importanza kruċjali, li jiġu promossi s-swieq finanzjarji effikaċji kif ukoll il-kondizzjonijiet ta’ stabbiltà u ta’ sigurtà li jippermettu lill-individwi li jfaddlu u jinvestu. Il-gvernijiet għandhom jiffavorixxu l-ħolqien ta’ medda biżżejjed u varjata ta’ strumenti finanzjarji. Il-ġabra tat-tfaddil u tal-kapital privat għandha tkun iffavorita wkoll sabiex il-persuni jkunu jistgħu jiffissaw, b'aktar awtonomija, il-livell ta' dħul li jixtiequ li jkollhom tul iż-żmien ta’ pensjoni tagħhom.Se jinħtieġ sforz ta’ komunikazzjoni u ta’ edukazzjoni finanzjarja biex jgħinu lill-individwi jaddattaw rwieħhom għaċ-ċirkostanzi l-ġodda.
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Together with this communication, the Commission is adopting a report analysing the long-term sustainability of public finances, based on population projections up to 2050 and on the financial strategies presented by the Member States in their 2005 Convergence and Stability Programmes.
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Fiż-żmien ta’ din il-komunikazzjoni, il-Kummissjoni tadotta rapport li janalizza l-vijabbiltà fit-tul tal-finanzi pubbliċi, imsejjes fuq it-tbassir demografiku sa l-2050 u fuq l-istrateġiji finanzjarji mressqa mill-Istati Membri fil-Programmi tagħhom ta’ Konverġenza u ta’ Stabbiltà 2005.
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4. CONCLUSION: FROM CHALLENGE TO OPPORTUNITY
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KONKLUżJONI: IL-BIDLA TA’ SFIDA F’OPPORTUNITÀ
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The ageing of European populations is the inevitable consequence of developments that are fundamentally positive: increased life expectancy, often in good health, and easier choice over whether and when to have children, in particular by increasingly educated women who enjoy easier access to the labour market. However, these far-reaching demographic and socioeconomic changes compel us to reform existing institutions, for reasons of both economic efficiency and social equity.
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IX-XJUħIJA TAL-POPOLAZZJONIJIET EWROPEJ HI L-KONSEGWENZA INEVITABBLI TA’ L-IżVILUPPI FONDAMENTALMENT POżITTIVI TAGħHOM : iż-żieda fl-għomor tal-ħajja, sikwit f’saħħa tajba, għażla aktar faċli fuq il-fatt ikollokx it-tfal u meta , meħuda minn nisa aktar u aktar mgħallma u li għandhom aċċess faċli għas-suq tax-xogħol. Madankollu, dawn it-tibdiliet demografiċi u soċjo-ekonomiċi profondi jobbligaw riforma ta’ l-istituzzjonijiet attwali kemm għal raġunijiet ta’ effiċjenza ekonomika kif ukoll ta’ ekwità soċjali.
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Our current policies are not viable in the long term, in that they do not address the expected decrease in the active population and the prospect of slippage in public finances. The source of the problem is not higher life expectancy as such, rather it is the inability of current policies to adapt to the new demographic order and the reluctance of businesses and citizens to change their expectations and attitudes, particularly in the context of labour market modernisation. In short, the Member States are facing a problem of retirement rather than a problem of ageing.
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Il-politiki attwali tagħna mhumiex vijabbli għal medda ta’ żmien twila, sakemm huma ma jippermettux li tiffaċċja t-tnaqqis mistenni ta’ għadd ta’ persuni attivi u l-perspettivi ta’ żieda mhux mistennija tal-finanzi pubbliċi. Il-qalba tal-problema mhix iż-żieda fit-tul tal-ħajja. Tinsab pjuttost fl-inkapaċità tal-politiki attwali li jaddattaw ruħhom għal tagħrif demografiku ġdid u minħabba li l-impriżi u ċ-ċittadini joqogħdu lura milli jimmodifikaw l-istenniji u l-imġiba tagħhom, b’mod partikolari fuq is-suq tax-xogħol. Fi ftit kliem, l-Ewropa tħabbat wiċċha aktar ma’ problema ta’ pensjoni milli problema tax-xjuħija.
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Of course, it falls above all to the Member States to formulate specific responses to the demographic challenge. Recent experience in this regard is encouraging, as the first retirement reforms have begun to bear fruit. The challenge is not insurmountable if we make good use of our brief window of opportunity of about ten years.
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Ovvjament, huma l-Istati Membri li għandhom isibu t-tweġibiet konkreti għall-isfida demografika. L-esperjenza riċenti f’dan ir-rigward tqawwilna qalbna peress li l-ewwel riformi li kellhom x’jaqsmu mal-pensjoni bdew jagħtu l-frott. L-isfida mhix impossibbli jekk nagħmlu użu tajjeb tal-perjodu qasir ta’ opportunità ta’ madwar għaxar snin li għandna f’idejna.
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These reforms are also part of a European framework, already applied opportunely and tenaciously through the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, the Stability and Growth Pact, the Sustainable Development Strategy, cohesion policy, and the open method of coordination in the area of social protection and inclusion.
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Dawn ir-riformi jagħmlu parti wkoll mill-qafas Ewropew diġà applikat f’waqtu u b’tenaċità, permezz ta’ l-Istrateġija ta’ Liżbona, il-Patt ta’ l-Istabbiltà u t-Tkabbir, l-Istrateġija għall-Iżvilupp Sostenibbli u l-Metodu miftuħ ta’ koordinazzjoni għal dak li għandu x’jaqsam mal-ħarsien u l-inklużjoni soċjali.
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It is not now a question of introducing a new process of European coordination. We need to commit to continuing and deepening these efforts, while at the same time ensuring that adequate account is taken of the multiple and complex facets of the demographic challenge as a whole and in each of our policies, at both national and Community level.
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Issa, din mhix kwistjoni ta’ implimentazzjoni ta’ proċess ġdid ta’ koordinazzjoni Ewropea. Għandna nimpenjaw ruħna biex insegwu u nqawwu l-isforzi tagħhna, filwaqt li nassiguraw kunsiderazzjoni tajba tad-dimensjonijiet multipli u kumplessi tal-kwistjoni demografika globali u kull waħda mill-politiki tagħhna, fuq livell nazzjonali u fuq livell Komunitarju.
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In this respect, this communication develops a reference framework at Community level for Member States' policies. The framework has set out five areas that respond to a common perspective of restored confidence:
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Din il-komunikazzjoni tiżviluppa f’dan ir-rigward qafas ta’ referenza fuq livell Komunitarju għal dawn il-politiki mill-Istati Membri. Il-qafas jispeċifika ħames setturi li jwieġbu għal perspettiva komuni, dik tal-kunfidenza misjuba:
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- Promoting demographic renewal in Europe
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- Ewropa li tiffavorixxi t-tiġdid demografiku
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- Promoting employment in Europe: more jobs and longer working lives of better quality
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- Ewropa li tagħti valur lix-xogħol: aktar impjiegi u ħajja attiva itwal u ta’ kwalità
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- A more productive and dynamic Europe
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- Ewropa aktar produttivà u effiċjenti
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- Receiving and integrating migrants in Europe
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- Ewropa organizzata li tirċievi u tintegra l-migranti
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- Sustainable public finances in Europe: guaranteeing adequate social security and equity between the generations.
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- Ewropa b’finanzi pubbliċi vijabbli: li tagħti garanzija ta’ ħarsien soċjali xieraq u ta’ ekwità bejn il-ġenerazzjonijiet
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Community and national policies need to be attuned to the demographic challenge described in this Communication. European policies, including the Commission's, need to be reviewed so that the demographic challenge is mainstreamed into tomorrow's policy choices. The Commission recommends that the sectoral Councils and the sectoral Committees in the European Parliament consider the impact of demographic change in the policy areas for which they are responsible.
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Il-politiki Komunitarji u nazzjonali għandhom ikunu addattati għall-isfida demografika deskritta f’din il-komunikazzjoni. Il-politiki Ewropej, kif ukoll dawk tal-Kummissjoni, jeħtieġu jiġu vvalutati mill-ġdid sabiex l-isfida demografika tkun integrata fl-għażliet politiċi tal-ġejjieni. Il-Kummissjoni tirrakkomanda li l-Kunsilli settorjali u l-Kumitati settorjali fil-Parlament Ewropew jivvalutaw l-impatt tal-bidla demografika fil-qasam tal-politiki li huma responsabbli għalihom.
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Confidence in the long-term future is to be built from today on the basis of men and women participating in working life, and on productivity and performance. This same confidence will also help Europeans to enjoy fruitful relationships with current and future migrants, based on mutual respect.
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Kunfidenza fil-ġejjieni fit-tul li għandha tinbena llum fuq is-sehem fl-attività ta’ l-irġiel u tan-nisa, tal-produttività u tar-rendiment. Din l-istess kunfidenza li se tikkontribwixxi wkoll sabiex l-Ewropej ikunu jistgħu jsawru, mal-migranti, bħalissa u tal-ġejjieni, relazzjoni mżewqa msejsa fuq ir-rispett reċiproku.
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Confronting the demographic challenge will be a long-term task for all of us. Progress in the implementation of these initiatives will be the subject of the European Demographic Forum to be held every two years, for the first time in October 2006. The results of the initiatives announced in this communication between now and 2009 and the lessons of the Forum will form the subject of a chapter in the Annual Progress Report (Lisbon Process), which the Commission will devote every two years to the Union's state of preparedness for increasing life expectancy.
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L-iffaċċjar ta’ l-isfida demografika hi ħidma twila għalina lkoll. Il-progress fl-implimentazzjoni ta’ dawn l-azzjonijiet hu suġġett għall-forum demografiku Ewropew biannwali li ser iseħħ għall-ewwel darba f’Ottubru 2006. L-effeti ta’ l-inizjattivi mħabbra minn din il-komunikazzjoni sa l-2009 kif ukoll it-tagħlim tal-Forum, kull sentejn, se jimlew kapitlu tar-Rapport annwali ta’ Progress (Proċess ta’ Liżbona) iddedikat lill-istat ta’ tħejjija ta’ l-Unjoni għaż-żieda tat-tul tal-ħajja.
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APPENDIX: MAIN EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND DATA
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APPENDIX: MAIN EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND DATA
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Projections – EU-25
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Projections – EU25
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Projections for EU's population trend 2005-2050 |
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Projections for EU's population trend 2005-2050 |
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in thousands | 2005-2050 | 2005-2010 | 2010-2030 | 2030-2050 |
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in thousands | 2005-2050 | 2005-2010 | 2010-2030 | 2030-2050 |
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Total population | -8659 | 5563 | 5312 | -19534 |
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Total population | -8659 | 5563 | 5312 | -19534 |
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Percentage change | -1.9% | 1.2% | 1.1% | 4.2% |
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Percentage change | -1,9% | 1,2% | 1,1% | 4,2% |
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Children (0-14) | -13811 | -2304 | -6080 | -5427 |
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Children (0-14) | -13811 | -2304 | -6080 | -5427 |
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Percentage change | -18.6% | -3.1% | -8.5% | -8.2% |
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Percentage change | -18,6% | -3,1% | -8,5% | -8,2% |
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Young people (15-24) | -14035 | -2383 | -6663 | -4990 |
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Young people (15-24) | -14035 | -2383 | -6663 | -4990 |
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Percentage change | -24.3% | -4.1% | -12.0% | -10.2% |
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Percentage change | -24,3% | -4,1% | -12,0% | -10,2% |
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Young adults (25-39) | -24867 | -3896 | -14883 | -6088 |
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Young adults (25-39) | -24867 | -3896 | -14883 | -6088 |
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Percentage change | -25.0% | -3.9% | -15.6% | -7.5% |
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Percentage change | -25,0% | -3,9% | -15,6% | -7,5% |
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Adults (40-54) | -18666 | 4116 | -10029 | -12754 |
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Adults (40-54) | -18666 | 4116 | -10029 | -12754 |
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Percentage change | -19.0% | 4.1% | -9.8% | -13.8% |
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Percentage change | -19,0% | 4,1% | -9,8% | -13,8% |
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Older workers (55-64) | 4721 | 4973 | 8717 | -8969 |
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Older workers (55-64) | 4721 | 4973 | 8717 | -8969 |
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Percentage change | 9.1% | 9.5% | 15.3% | -13.6% |
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Percentage change | 9,1% | 9,5% | 15,3% | -13,6% |
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Elderly people (65-79) | 25688 | 1947 | 22281 | 1460 |
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Elderly people (65-79) | 25688 | 1947 | 22281 | 1460 |
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Percentage change | 44.5% | 3.4% | 37.3% | 1.8% |
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Percentage change | 44,5% | 3,4% | 37,3% | 1,8% |
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Frail elderly (80+) | 32311 | 3109 | 11969 | 17233 |
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Frail elderly (80+) | 32311 | 3109 | 11969 | 17233 |
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Percentage change | 171.6% | 16.5% | 54.0% | 50.8% |
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Percentage change | 171,6% | 16,5% | 54,0% | 50,8% |
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Source : EUROSTAT, 2004 |
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Source : EUROSTAT, 2004 |
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Projections by country
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Projections by country
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Population1 | Fertility2 | Life expectancy3 | Natural Increase4 | Net Migration5 | Old Age Dependency6 |
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Population1 | Fertility2 | Life expectancy3 | Natural Increase4 | Net Migration5 | Old Age Dependency6 |
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Men | Women |
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Men | Women |
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Life expectancy at birth
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Life expectancy at birth
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[pic]
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[pic]
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[pic]
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[pic]
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Source: Eurostat 2004 Demographic Projections (Baseline scenario)
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Source: Eurostat 2004 Demographic Projections (Baseline scenario)
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Employment rate of older workers
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Employment rate of older workers
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Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey
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Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey
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Fertility and female employment rates
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Fertility and female employment rates
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[pic]
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[pic]
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Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey and National data
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Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey and National data
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Net migration rate vs. natural population growth
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Net migration rate vs. natural population growth
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[pic]
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[pic]
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Source: Eurostat. Figures exclude intra-EU flows and comprise regularisations of previously undeclared migrants
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Source: Eurostat. Figures exclude intra-EU flows and comprise regularisations of previously undeclared migrants
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[1] COM(2005) 525, 3.11.2005 and COM(2005) 94, 16.3.2005, respectively.
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[1] COM (2005)525 tat-3.11.2005 u COM(2005)94 tas-16.3.2005, rispettivament.
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[2] Some demographers have expressed the hypothesis that a very low fertility rate could become irreversible, cf. “The low fertility trap hypothesis: forces that may lead to further postponement and fewer births in Europe” by Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa, Vienna Institute of Demography research paper No 4 2005.
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[2] Ċerti demografi esprimew l-ipoteżi li rata baxxa ħafna ta’ fertilità tista’ ma tinqalibx. Irreferi għal “L-ipoteżi tan-nasba tal-fertilità baxxa: forzi li jistgħu jwasslu għal aktar posponiment u anqas twelid fl-Ewropa” minn Lutz, Skirbekk u Testa, karta ta’ riċerka Nru 4 2005 ta’ l-Istitut tad-Demografija ta’ Vjenna.
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[3] Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2006), “The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member States on pensions, health care, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-50)” in European Economy Reports and Studies , No 1.
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[3] Il-Kumitat tal-Politika Ekonomika u l-Kummissjoni Ewropea (2006), “L-impatt tax-xjuħija fuq l-infiq pubbliku: tbassir għall-Istati Membri ta’ l-UE25 dwar il-pensjonijiet, il-kura tas-saħħa, l-edukazzjoni u t-trasferimenti tal-qgħad (2004-50)” fir- Rapporti u Studji ta’ l-Ekonomija Ewropea , Nru 1.
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[4] Communication from the Commission - The long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU - COM(2006) 574, 12.10.2006.
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[4] Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni – Vijabbiltà fit-tul tal-finanzi pubbliċi fl-UE (COM(2006) 574 tat-12.10.2006).
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[5] Communication from the Commission - The long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU - COM(2006) 574, 12.10.2006.
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[5] Ara l-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni - Vijabbiltà fit-tul tal-finanzi pubbliċi fl-UE (COM(2006) 574 tat-12.10.2006).
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[6] Cf. for example “The Demographic Future of Europe – Facts, Figures, Policies: Results of the Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS)” published by the German Federal Institute for Population Research and the Robert Bosch Foundation; Eurobarometer No 253 produced in 2006, for which an analysis of the results is to be published shortly.
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[6] Irreferi pereżempju għal “Il-ġejjieni Demografiku ta’ l-Ewropa – Fatti, Ċifri, Politiki: Riżultati ta’ l-Istudju ta’ Approvazzjoni tal-Politika tal-Popolazzjoni (PPAS) ippubblikat mill-Istitut Federali Ġermaniz tar-riċerki demografiċi u l-Fondazzjoni Robert Bosch: l-Eurobarometer Nru 253 imwettaq fl-2006 li l-analiżi tar-riżultati tiegħu se jiġu ppubblikati dalwaqt.
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[7] Communication from the Commission - First-stage consultation of European social partners on the reconciliation of professional, private and family life - SEC(2006) 1245, 12.10.2006.
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[7] Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni għall-Ewwel pass tal-Konsultazzjoni ta’ l-imsieħba soċjali dwar il-Konċiljazzjoni bejn il-ħajja professjonali u l-ħajja tal-familja (SEC(2006) 1245 tat-12.10.2006).
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[8] Communication from the Commission - A Roadmap for equality between women and men 2006-2010 - COM(2006) 92, 1.3.2006.
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[8] Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni - Pjan tar-rotta għall-ugwaljanza bejn in-nisa u l-irġiel 2006-2010 (COM(2006)92 ta' l-1.3.2006).
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[9] Regulation (EC) No 1081/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the European Social Fund, and proposal for a Decision establishing an integrated action programme in the field of lifelong learning - COM(2004) 474, 14.7.2004.
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[9] Regolament (KE) 1081/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-5 ta’ Lulju 2006 dwar il-Fondi Soċjali Ewropej u proposti ta’ deċiżjoni li jistabbilixxu programm ta’ azzjoni integrat fil-qasam ta’ l-edukazzjoni u tat-taħriġ kontinwu (COM (2004)474 ta’ l-14.7.2006).
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[10] See Communictaion from the Commission - Consultation regarding Community action on health services - SEC(2006) 1195, 26.9.2006.
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[10] Ara l-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni – Konsultazzjoni rigward azzjoni Komunitarja fil-qasam tas-servizzi ta’ saħħa (SEC(2006) ////1195 tas-26.9.2006).
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[11] Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
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[11] Direttiva 2000/78/KE tas-27 ta’ Novembru 2000 li tistabbilixxi qafas ġenerali għall-ugwaljanza fit-trattament fl-impjieg u fix-xogħol.
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[12] Communication from the Commission - Putting knowledge into practice: A broad-based innovation strategy for the EU - COM(2006) 502, 13.9.2006.
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[12] Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni “ L-użu ta’ l-għarfien: strateġija ta’ innovazzjoni mkabbra għall-UE ” COM, (2006) 502 tat-13.9.2006).
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[13] See the results of Eurobarometer No 64, published in December 2005, and No 65, published in June 2006, on public opinion and migrations.
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[13] Ara r-riżultati ta’ l-Eurobarometer 64, ippubblikat f’Diċembru 2005, u 65, ippubblikat f’Ġunju 2006 dwar l-opinjoni pubblika u l-migrazzjonijiet.
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[14] Communication from the Commission - Policy Plan on Legal Migration - COM(2005) 669, 21.12.2005.
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[14] Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni “Programm ta’ azzjoni rigward l-immigrazzjoni legali” COM(2005)669 tal-21.12.2005).
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[15] Communication from the Commission - A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals in the European Union - COM(2005) 389, 1.9.2005.
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[15] Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni “ Programm komuni għall-integrazzjoni – Qafas li jikkonċerna l-integrazzjoni taċ-ċittadini tal-pajjiżi terzi fl-Unjoni Ewropea ”, ta’ Settembru 2005 (COM(2005) 389 ta’ l-1.9.2005).
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