Grounds
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1. This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 34 TFEU.
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1. It-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari tirrigwarda l-interpretazzjoni tal‑Artikolu 34 TFUE.
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2. The reference has been made in the course of proceedings between Asociación Nacional de Expendedores de Tabaco y Timbre (ANETT) and Administración del Estado concerning national legislation which prohibits licensed tobacco and stamp outlets (‘tobacco retailers’) from importing tobacco products from other Member States.
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2. Din it-talba tressqet fil-kuntest ta’ kawża bejn l-Asociación Nacional de Expendedores de Tabaco y Timbre (ANETT) u l-Administración del Estado dwar dispożizzjonijiet nazzjonali li jipprojbixxu proprjetarji ta’ ħwienet tat-tabakk u tal-bolol milli jimpurtaw prodotti tat-tabakk (iktar ’il quddiem il-“bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk”) milli jimpurtaw prodotti tat-tabakk li joriġinaw fi Stati Membri oħra.
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The national legal framework
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Il-kuntest ġuridiku nazzjonali
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3. As set out in Article 1(1) and (2) of Law No 13/1998 organising the Tobacco Market and Taxation Regulations (Ley 13/1998 de Ordenación del Mercado de Tabacos y Normativa Tributaria), of 4 May 1988 (BOE No 107 of 5 May 1998, p. 14871) as amended (‘Law No 13/1998’):
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3. Skont l-Artikolu 1(1) u (2) tal-Liġi 13/1998 li torganizza s-suq tat-tabakk u l-leġiżlazzjoni fiskali (Ley 13/1998 de Ordenación del Mercado de Tabacos y Normativa Tributaria), tal-4 ta’ Mejju 1998 (BOE nº 107, tal-5 ta’ Mejju 1998, p. 14871), kif emendata (iktar ’il quddiem il-“Liġi 13/1998”):
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‘1. The market in tobacco is liberalised, subject to the limitations set out in the present Law, and consequently, the monopoly over the manufacture, importation and wholesale of non-community manufactured tobacco products … are abolished on the territory of the peninsula, the Balearic Islands, Ceuta and Melilla.
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“1. Is-suq tat-tabakk huwa lliberalizzat, suġġett għal-limitazzjonijiet iffissati f’din il-liġi u, għalhekk, il-monopolju tal-manifattura, tal-importazzjoni u tal-kummerċjalizzazzjoni bl-ingrossa ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk immanifatturati barra l-Komunitajiet [...] huma mħassra fit-territorju tal-peniżola, il-Gżejjer Baleariċi, Ceuta u Melilla.
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2. Any natural or legal person having the legal capacity to carry on a trade may engage in the activities referred to in paragraph 1, in the manner and according to the conditions provided in Articles 2 and 3 of the present Law. However, persons involved in one of the situations listed below, or who become so involved, may not engage in the abovementioned activities:
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2. Kull persuna fiżika jew ġuridika li għandha kapaċità legali biex teżerċita kummerċ tista’ twettaq l-attivitajiet speċifikati fil-paragrafu 1, bil-mod u taħt il-kundizzjonijiet stabbiliti fl-Artikoli 2 u 3 ta’ din il-liġi. Madankollu, persuni li huma involuti f’waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet elenkati hawn taħt, jew li jiġu involuti, ma jistgħux iwettqu l-imsemmija attivitajiet:
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...
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[...]
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c) being a [tobacco retailer], having a point of sale subject to a surcharge or being the owner of one of the tobacco outlets under the special regime...’
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c) tkun [bejjiegħ bl-imnut tat-tabakk], li jkollu awtorizzazzjoni għal ħanut suġġett għal taxxa addizzjonali jew tkun proprjetarju ta’ wieħed mill-ħwienet tat-tabakk taħt sistema speċjali [...]”
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4. Article 2(3) of the Law states:
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4. L-Artikolu 2(3) tal-imsemmija liġi jipprovdi li:
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‘Manufacturers and, where appropriate, importers shall ensure that their [manufactured tobacco products] are available throughout the national territory referred to in Article 1(1), where there is demand for those products.’
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“Meta jkun hemm id-domanda għall-[prodotti tat-tabakk immanifatturati], il-manifatturi, u skont il-każ, l-importaturi għandhom jiżguraw li jkunu disponibbli fit-territorju nazzjonali kollu kemm hu li għalih jirreferi l-Artikolu 1(1).”
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5. Article 3(1) of the same Law provides::
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5. L-Artikolu 3(1) ta’ din l-istess liġi tipprevedi li:
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‘There shall be no restrictions on the importing and wholesale distribution of manufactured tobacco products, irrespective of their origin, save for the requirement to submit an undertaking of compliance [with the applicable rules] to the Tobacco Market Commission … ‘
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“Ma hemm l-ebda restrizzjoni fuq l-importazzjoni u fuq id-distribuzzjoni bl-ingrossa ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk immanifatturati, irrispettivament mill-oriġini tagħhom, bil-kundizzjoni madanakollu li tiġi ppreżentata lill‑Kummissjoni tas-suq tat-tabakk, dikjarazzjoni ta’ impenn għall‑osservanza tar-[regoli applikabbli] [...]”
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6. Article 4 of Law No 13/1998 states:
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6. L-Artikolu 4 tal-Liġi jipprovdi li:
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‘1. The retail trade of manufactured tobacco products in Spain, with the exception of the Canary Islands, shall remain a monopoly owned by the State, operated through the network of tobacco and stamp outlets.
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“1. Il-kummerċ bl-imnut ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk immanifatturati fi Spanja, bl-eċċezzjoni tal-Gżejjer Kanarji, jibqa’ taħt il-monopolju tal-Istat, li jeżerċitah permezz tan-netwerk tal-ħwienet tat-tabakk u tal-bolol.
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2. The retail selling prices of the various types, brands and forms of tobacco product intended for sale in Spain, with the exception of the Canary Islands, shall be determined by manufacturers or, where applicable, their representatives or agents in the European Union …
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2. Il-prezz ta’ bejgħ bl-imnut ta’ tipi differenti, trade marks u forom ta’ tabakk intiżi sabiex jinbiegħu fi Spanja, minbarra fil-Gżejjer Kanarji, huma ffissati mill-manifatturi jew, skont il-każ, mir-rappreżentanti jew l-aġenti tagħhom fl-Unjoni Ewropea [...]
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3. [Tobacco retailers], who must necessarily be natural persons, having the nationality of any of the States of the European Union, are classified as licensees of the State. … [They] shall not be licence holders of any other outlet or point of sale subject to surcharge, or have any professional or working relationship with any importers, manufacturers or wholesalers on the tobacco market, unless that relationship ends prior to the definitive grant of the outlet licence.
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3. Il-[bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk], li għandhom neċessarjament ikunu persuni fiżiċi, li huma ċittadini ta’ wieħed mill-pajjiżi tal-Unjoni Ewropea, huma l-konċessjonarji tal-Istat. Huma ma jistgħux ikunu proprjetarji ta’ ħanut jew punt ta’ bejgħ suġġett għal taxxa addizzjonali oħrajn, u lanqas ikollhom relazzjoni professjonali jew relazzjoni ta’ xogħol ma’ wieħed mill-importaturi, manifatturi jew grossisti tas-suq tat-tabakk, sakemm din ir-relazzjoni ma tintemmx qabel l-għoti definittiv tal-liċenzja ta’ ħanut tat-tabakk.
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4. An outlet licence shall be granted after a call for tenders ...
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4. Il-konċessjoni tal-ħanut tat-tabakk għandha tingħata wara sejħa għall-offerti [...]
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The licence shall be granted for a period of twenty-five years. ...
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Il-konċessjoni tingħata għal perijodu ta’ ħamsa u għoxrin sena. [...]
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...
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[...]
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7. The [tobacco retailer’s] profit margin on the sale of manufactured tobacco products, which must be acquired from an authorised wholesaler, is fixed at 8.5% of the retail sale price, regardless of the product’s price, type, or origin, or the wholesaler who supplied it Nevertheless, for the sale of cigars, the [tobacco retailer] shall, in any event, receive a profit margin of 9%.
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7. Il-marġini tal-bejjiegħa bl-imnut fuq il-bejgħ ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk immanifatturati, li huma obbligati li jixtru minn grossisti awtorizzati, huwa stabbilit għal 8.5 % tal-prezz tal-bejgħ bl-imnut, irrispettivament mill-prezz jew tip ta’ prodott, l-oriġini tiegħu jew il-grossista li jipprovdihom. Madankollu, għall-bejgħ ta’ sigarri, il-bejjiegħ bl-imnut għandu jirċievi fi kwalunkwe każ marġni ta’ 9 %.
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...’
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[...]”
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7. Article 1(1) of Royal Decree No 1199/1999 of 9 July 1999 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Law No 13/1998 (BOE No 166 of 13 July 1999, p. 26330; ‘Royal Decree 1199/1999) states:
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7. L-Artikolu 1(1) tad-Digriet Irjali 1199/1999, tad-9 ta’ Lulju 1999, dwar l‑implementazzjoni tal-Liġi 13/1998 (BOE Nru 166, tat-13 ta’ Lulju 1999, p. 26330, iktar ’il quddiem id-“Digriet Irjali 1199/1999”) jipprovdi li:
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‘In accordance with Article 1 of Law [13/1998], any natural or legal person having the legal capacity to carry on a trade may engage in the activities of manufacture, importation and wholesale of manufactured tobacco products, regardless of their origin, under the conditions set out in the present regulation.’
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“Skont l-Artikolu 1 tal-Liġi [13/1998], kull persuna fiżika jew ġuridika li għandha l-kapaċità legali biex teżerċita kummerċ tista’ twettaq l-attivitajiet ta’ manifattura, ta’ importazzjoni u ta’ kummerċjalizzazzjoni bl-ingrossa ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk immanifatturati, irrispettivament mill-oriġini tagħhom, skont il-kundizzjonijiet stipulati f’dan ir-regolament.”
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8. Article 2(1) of the royal decree provides:
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8. L-Artikolu 2(1) ta’ dan id-digriet irjali jipprovdi li:
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‘Persons involved in one of the situations listed below may not engage in the activities referred to in Article 1(1):
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“Il-persuni li huma involuti f’waħda mis-sitwazzjonijiet elenkati hawn taħt ma jistgħux jeżerċitaw l-attivitajiet imsemmija fl-Artikolu 1(1):
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...
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[...]
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c) being a [tobacco retailer], having an outlet subject to a surcharge or being the owner of one of the tobacco outlets under the special regime ...’
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ċ) tkun [bejjiegħ bl-imnut tat-tabakk], li jkollu awtorizzazzjoni għal ħanut suġġett għal taxxa addizzjonali jew tkun proprjetarju ta’ wieħed mill-ħwienet tat-tabakk taħt sistema speċjali [...]”
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9. Royal Decree No 1199/1999 was amended by Royal Decree No 1/2007 of 12 January 2007 (BOE No 18 of 20 January 2007, p.2845; ‘Royal Decree No 1/2007’).
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9. Id-Digriet Irjali 1199/1999 ġie emendat bid-Digriet Irjali 1/2007, tat-12 ta’ Jannar 2007 (BOE Nru 18, tal-20 ta’ Jannar 2007, p. 2845, iktar ’il quddiem id-“Digriet Irjali 1/2007”).
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The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling
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Il-kawża prinċipali u d-domanda preliminari
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10. By an action brought before the Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court), ANETT requested that several provisions of Royal Decree No 1/2007 be annulled, on the ground that they modified Royal Decree No 1199/1999 without resolving an alleged contradiction between European Union law and the rules governing the tobacco market and the monopoly over tobacco distribution in Spain.
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10. Permezz tar-rikors ippreżentat quddiem it-Tribunal Supremo, l-ANETT titlob lil dan tal-aħħar, sabiex jannulla diversi dispożizzjonijiet tad-Digriet Irjali 1/2007, minħabba l-fatt li huwa jemenda d-Digriet Irjali 1199/1999 mingħajr ma jsolvi allegata kontradizzjoni bejn id-dritt tal-Unjoni u r-regoli li jirregolaw is-suq tat-tabakk u l‑monopolju tad-distribuzzjoni tiegħu fi Spanja.
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11. ANETT claimed, inter alia, that the prohibition of tobacco retailers from importing tobacco was contrary to the principles of the free movement of goods, as provided by Article 34 TFEU, since this prohibition constituted a quantitative restriction or a measure having equivalent effect.
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11. L-ANETT issostni b’mod partikolari li l-projbizzjoni imposta fuq il-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk milli jeżerċitaw l-attività ta’ importazzjoni ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk tmur kontra l-prinċipji tal‑moviment liberu tal-merkanzija, kif iggarantiti mill-Artikolu 34 TFUE, peress li din il-projbizzjoni hija restrizzjoni kwantitattiva jew miżura li għandha effett ekwivalenti.
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12. In those circumstances, the Tribunal Supremo decided to stay proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
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12. F’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi, it-Tribunal Supremo ddeċieda li jissospendi l-proċeduri quddiemu u li jagħmel id-domanda preliminari li ġejja lill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja:
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‘Should Article 34 [TFEU] be interpreted as meaning that Spanish national law prohibiting tobacco [retailers] from importing manufactured tobacco products from other Member States constitutes a quantitative restriction on imports or a measure having equivalent effect as prohibited by the [FEU] Treaty?’
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“L-Artikolu 34 [TFUE] għandu jiġi interpretat fis-sens li l-projbizzjoni li d-dritt nazzjonali Spanjol jimponi fuq il-[bejjiegħa bl-imnut] tat-tabakk milli jiżviluppaw attività ta’ importazzjoni ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk immanifatturati fi Stati Membri oħra, tikkostitwixxi restrizzjoni kwantitattiva fuq l-importazzjoni jew miżura li għandha effett ekwivalenti, ipprojbiti mit-Trattat [FUE]?”
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The admissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling
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Fuq l-ammissibbiltà tat-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari
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13. At the hearing, the Spanish Government challenged the admissibility of the reference for a preliminary ruling, maintaining that the Court’s response served no purpose in relation to the outcome of the main proceedings since those proceedings concern the validity of Royal Decree 1/2007.
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13. Waqt is-seduta, il-Gvern Spanjol ikkontesta l-ammissibbiltà tat-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari, billi sostna li r-risposta tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ma għandha ebda utilità għall-eżitu tal-kawża prinċipali peress li din il-kawża tirrigwarda l-legalità tad-Digriet Irjali 1/2007.
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14. That decree modified certain provisions of Royal Decree 1199/1999 without governing or even mentioning the prohibition of tobacco retailers from importing tobacco products. This prohibition arises from Article 4 of Law No 13/1998 and Article 2 of Royal Decree No 1199/1999, which are not affected by Royal Decree 1/2007. It follows that, in the main proceedings, the referring court may not annul any provision connected to the aforementioned prohibition.
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14. Fil-fatt, dan id-digriet emenda ċerti dispożizzjonijiet tad-Digriet Irjali 1199/1999 mingħajr ma rregola jew wkoll mingħajr ma semma’ l‑projbizzjoni imposta fuq il-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk milli jeżerċitaw l-attività ta’ importazzjoni ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk. Din il-projbizzjoni tirriżulta mill-Artikolu 4 tal-Liġi 13/1998 u mill-Artikolu 2 tad-Digriet Irjali 1199/1999, li ma humiex affettwati mid-Digriet Irjali 1/2007. Minn dan isegwi li, fil-kawża prinċipali, il-qorti tar-rinviju ma tistax tannulla ebda dispożizzjoni li jkollha konnessjoni mal-imsemmija projbizzjoni.
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15. Moreover, ANETT has already brought an action against Royal Decree No 1199/1999 which lays downs this same prohibition, without challenging that prohibition, and this action has been rejected by the Tribunal Supremo. In light of the principles of legal certainty and res judicata , the national court cannot thereby revaluate the prohibition in question in the main proceedings.
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15. Barra minn hekk, l-ANETT diġà ppreżentat rikors kontra d-Digriet Irjali 1199/1999 li jipprovdi din l-istess projbizzjoni, mingħajr ma tikkontesta din tal-aħħar, u dan ir‑rikors ġie miċħud mit-Tribunal Supremo. Fir-rigward tal-prinċipji ta’ ċertezza legali u tal-awtorità ta’ res judicata , il-qorti nazzjonali ma tistax għaldaqstant terġa’ tevalwa l‑projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali.
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16. In this respect, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context which that court is responsible for defining and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of European Union law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05, van der Weerd and Others [2007] ECR I-4233, paragraph 22, and Case C-158/08 Pometon [2009] ECR I‑4695, paragraph 13).
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16. F’dan ir-rigward, għandu jitfakkar li d-domandi dwar l‑interpretazzjoni tad-dritt tal-Unjoni magħmula mill-qorti nazzjonali fil-kuntest leġiżlattiv u fattwali li hija tiddefinixxi taħt ir-responsabbiltà tagħha, u li ma huwiex id-dmir tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja li tivverifika l-eżattezza tiegħu, igawdu minn preżunzjoni ta’ rilevanza. Iċ-ċaħda mill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ta’ domanda magħmula minn qorti nazzjonali ma hijiex possibbli ħlief meta jkun jidher b’mod manifest li l-interpretazzjoni tad-dritt tal-Unjoni mitluba ma għandha ebda konnessjoni mal-fatti jew mas-suġġett tal-kawża prinċipali, meta l-problema tkun ta’ natura ipotetika jew inkella meta l-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ma jkollhiex għad-dispożizzjoni tagħha l-punti ta’ fatt u ta’ liġi neċessarji sabiex tirrispondi b’mod utli għad-domandi li jkunu sarulha (ara, b’mod partikolari, s-sentenzi tas-7 ta’ Ġunju 2007, van der Weerd et , C‑222/05 sa C‑225/05, Ġabra p. I‑4233, punt 22, kif ukoll tal-4 ta’ Ġunju 2009, Pometon, C‑158/08, Ġabra p. I‑4695, punt 13).
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17. In the main proceedings, it is admittedly not certain that an incompatibility of the prohibition in question with EU law will affect the validity of Royal Decree 1/2007, since that decree does not govern the prohibition and since an action against Royal Decree 1199/1999 which lays down this prohibition has already been rejected by the Tribunal Supremo.
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17. Fil-kawża prinċipali, huwa, ċertament, mhux ċar li l-eventwali inkompatibbilità tal-projbizzjoni kkonċernata mad-dritt tal-Unjoni taffettwa l-legalità tad-Digriet Irjali 1/2007, peress li dan id-digriet ma jirregolax din il-projbizzjoni u li rikors kontra d-Digriet Irjali 1199/1999 li jipprovdi l-imsemmija projbizzjoni diġà ġie miċħud mit-Tribunal Supremo.
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18. However, when the decision to refer is considered in its entirety, it cannot be completely excluded that the response of the Court may serve a purpose in relation to the outcome of the main proceedings. In those circumstances, the abovementioned elements do not suffice, in themselves, to reverse the presumption of relevance evoked in paragraph 16 of the present judgment.
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18. Madankollu, fid-dawl ta’ qari flimkien tad-deċiżjoni tar-rinviju, ma jistax jiġi eskluż b’mod definittiv li r-risposta tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja għandha utilità għall-eżitu tal-kawża prinċipali. F’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi, l-elementi msemmijin iktar ’il fuq ma humiex biżżejjed, fihom infushom, biex tiġi kkonfutata l-preżunzjoni ta’ rilevanza msemmija fil-punt 16 ta’ din is-sentenza.
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19. Consequently, the reference for a preliminary ruling must be held to be admissible.
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19. Għaldaqstant, għandu jiġi kkunsidrat li t-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari hija ammissibbli.
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The question referred for a preliminary ruling
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Fuq id-domanda preliminari
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20. By its question, the national court essentially asks whether Article 34 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which imposes prohibitions on tobacco retailers from importing tobacco products from other Member States.
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20. Permezz tad-domanda tagħha, il-qorti tar-rinviju tistaqsi, essenzjalment, jekk l-Artikolu 34 TFUE għandux jiġi interpretat fis-sens li jipprekludu leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali bħal dik inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali, li tipprojbixxi lill-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk milli jeżerċitaw l-attività ta’ importazzjoni ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk minn Stati Membri oħra.
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Applicable Legislation
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Fuq id-dispożizzjonijiet applikabbli
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21. The European Commission, in its written observations, and the Spanish Government, at the hearing, claimed that, contrary to what the referring court stated in its reference for a preliminary ruling, the national legislation must be assessed in the light of Article 37 TFEU and not of Article 34 TFEU. The legislation in question concerns the operation of a monopoly of a commercial character within the meaning of Article 37 TFEU and gives rise to restrictions on trade which are inherent in the existence of such a monopoly.
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21. Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea, fl-osservazzjonijiet bil-miktub tagħha, u l-Gvern Spanjol, waqt is-seduta, sostnew li, kuntrarjament għal dak li l-qorti tar-rinviju indikat fid-domanda preliminari tagħha, il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali għandha tiġi evalwata fid-dawl tal-Artikolu 37 TFUE u mhux fir-rigward l-Artikolu 34 TFUE. Fil-fatt, din il-leġiżlazzjoni tikkonċerna l-funzjonament ta’ monopolju kummerċjali, fis-sens tal-Artikolu 37 TFUE, u tista’ twassal għal effetti restrittivi fuq il-kummerċ inerenti fl-eżistenza ta’ tali monopolju.
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22. In this respect, according to the case-law of the Court, the rules relating to the existence and the operation of a monopoly must be examined in the light of the provisions of Article 37 TFEU, which are specifically applicable to the exercise, by a domestic commercial monopoly, of its exclusive rights (see, inter alia, Case C-189/95 Franzén [1997] ECR I-5909, paragraph 35, and Case C-170/04 Rosengren and Others [2007] ECR I-4071, paragraph 17).
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22. F’dan ir-rigward, skont il-ġurisprudenza tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja, hemm lok li jiġu eżaminati r-regoli li jirrigwardaw l-eżistenza u l-funzjonament ta’ monopolju fid-dawl tad-dispożizzjonijiet tal-Artikolu 37 TFUE, applikabbli b’mod speċifiku għall-eżerċizzju, minn monopolju nazzjonali ta’ natura kummerċjali, għad-drittijiet ta’ esklużività tiegħu (ara, b’mod partikolari, is-sentenzi tat-23 ta’ Ottubru 1997, Franzén, C‑189/95, Ġabra p. I‑5909, punt 35, kif ukoll tal-5 ta’ Ġunju 2007, Rosengren et , C‑170/04. Ġabra p. I‑4071, punt 17).
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23. However, the effect on trade within the Union of the other provisions of the domestic legislation, which are separable from the operation of the monopoly although they have a bearing upon it, must be examined in the light of Article 34 TFEU (see, inter alia, Franzén , paragraph 36, and Rosengren and Others , paragraph 18).
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23. Min-naħa l-oħra, l-effett, fuq il-kummerċ fi ħdan l-Unjoni, ta’ dispożizzjonijiet oħra tal-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali, li huma separabbli mill-funzjonament tal-monopolju anki jekk għandhom effett fuq dan tal-aħħar, għandu jiġi eżaminat fid-dawl tal-Artikolu 34 TFUE (ara b’mod, partikolari, is-sentenzi ċċitati iktar ’il fuq Franzén, punt 36, kif ukoll Rosengren et , punt 18).
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24. In those circumstances, it is necessary to check whether the prohibition at issue in the main proceedings amounts to a rule relating to the existence or the operation of the monopoly.
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24. F’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi, għandu jiġi vverifikat jekk il-miżura ta’ projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali tikkostitwixxix regola dwar l-eżistenza jew il-funzjonament tal-monopolju.
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25. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that, firstly, the specific purpose of the monopoly in question is to reserve the exclusive right of sale of tobacco products at retail level to authorised retailers, which does not imply that they should be prohibited from importing such products.
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25. F’dan ir-rigward, hemm lok li jitfakkar, minn naħa, li l-funzjoni speċifika assenjata lill-monopolju kkonċernat hija li tirriżerva lill-konċessjonarji l-esklużività tal-bejgħ bl-imnut tal-prodotti tat-tabakk, mingħajr ma jiġi implikat li dawn tal-aħħar ser ikunu pprojbiti milli jimportaw tali prodotti.
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26. Hence, by preventing tobacco retailers from importing those products on to the Spanish territory, the prohibition at issue in the main proceedings affects the free movement of goods within the European Union, and does not govern the exercise of the exclusive right relating to the monopoly in question.
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26. Għalhekk, billi tipprojbixxi l-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk milli jimportaw l-imsemmija prodotti fit-territorju Spanjol, il-miżura ta’ projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali taffettwa l-moviment liberu tal-merkanzija fl-Unjoni mingħajr madankollu ma tirregola l-eżerċizzju tad-dritt ta’ esklużività li jikkonċerna l-monopolju inkwistjoni.
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27. Consequently, this prohibition does not concern the exercise of the specific purpose of the monopoly in question and thus cannot be considered as relating to the very existence of the monopoly (see, by analogy, Rosengren and Others , paragraph 22).
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27. Għaldaqstant, din il-miżura ma tirrigwardax l-eżerċizzju tal-funzjoni speċifika tal-monopolju inkwistjoni u ma tistax għaldaqstant titqies li tirrigwarda l-eżistenza stess ta’ dan tal-aħħar (ara, b’analoġija, is-sentenza Rosengren et iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 22).
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28. Secondly, it must be noted that the prohibition imposed on retailers’ importing tobacco products has the effect of forcing those tobacco retailers to procure their supplies from authorised wholesalers. On that basis, the prohibition in question is capable of having an impact on the operation of the monopoly.
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28. Min-naħa l-oħra, għandu jiġi rrilevat li l-projbizzjoni fuq il-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk milli jimportaw prodotti tat-tabakk għandha l-effett li tidderiġi l-provvista ta’ dawn il-bejjiegħa bl-imnut mingħand grossisti awtorizzati. Bħala tali, il-miżura ta’ projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali tista’ taffettwa l-funzjonament ta’ dan il-monopolju.
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29. However, and even if, in contrast to the legislation at issue in the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment in Rosengren and Others , the prohibition at issue in the main proceedings does not affect private individuals but rather the licensees under the monopoly in question, namely the tobacco retailers, such a prohibition is separable from the operation of the monopoly as it relates not to the selling arrangements for retail sale of tobacco products on the Spanish territory but to the upstream market in those products. It does not aim to organise the monopoly’s system of product selection. Likewise, the prohibition does not target either the sale network of the monopoly in question or the marketing or advertising of the products distributed by the monopoly (see, by analogy, Rosengren and Others, paragraph 24).
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29. Madankollu, u anki jekk, kuntrarjament għal-leġiżlazzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża li tat lok għas-sentenza Rosengren et , iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, il-miżura inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali ma taffettwax lill-individwi, iżda lill-konċessjonarji tal-monopolju kkonċernat, jiġifieri l-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk, tali miżura hija distakkata mill-funzjonament tal-monopolju peress li ma tirreferix għall-metodi tal-bejgħ bl-imnut tal-prodotti tat-tabakk fit-territorju Spanjol, iżda għas-suq upstream ta’ dawn il-prodotti. Fil-fatt, ma hijiex intiża biex torganizza s-sistema ta’ għażla ta’ prodotti mill-monopolju. Bl-istess mod, l-imsemmija miżura la tiffoka fuq in-netwerk ta’ bejgħ tal-monopolju kkonċernat u lanqas fuq il-kummerċjalizzazzjoni jew ir-reklamar ta’ prodotti distribwiti mill-imsemmi monopolju (ara, b’analoġija, is-sentenza Rosengren et , punt 24).
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30. In those circumstances, the prohibition cannot be regarded as a rule relating to the existence or the operation of the monopoly. Accordingly, Article 37 TFEU is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether such a prohibition is compatible with EU law, in particular with the provisions of the Treaty relating to free movement of goods.
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30. F’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi, il-miżura ta’ projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali ma tistax titqies bħala regola dwar l-eżistenza jew il-funzjonament tal-monopolju. Sabiex tiġi vverifikata l-kompatibilità ta’ tali miżura mad-dritt tal-Unjoni, b’mod partikolari mad-dispożizzjonijiet tat-Trattat dwar il-moviment liberu tal-merkanzija, l-Artikolu 37 TFUE huwa għalhekk irrilevanti.
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31. Consequently, national legislation prohibiting tobacco retailers from importing tobacco products, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, must be assessed in the light of Article 34 TFEU.
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31. Konsegwentement, il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali li tipprojbixxi lill-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk milli jimportaw prodotti tat-tabakk, bħal dawk inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali, għandha tiġi evalwata fid-dawl tal-Artikolu 34 TFUE.
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The existence of a restriction on the free movement of goods
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Fuq l-eżistenza ta’ restrizzjoni għall-moviment liberu tal-merkanzija
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32. According to settled case-law, all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, trade within the European Union are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU (see, inter alia, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5, and Case C‑110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑519, paragraph 33).
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32. Skont ġurisprudenza stabbilita, kull leġiżlazzjoni kummerċjali tal-Istati Membri li tista’ tostakola, direttament jew indirettament, attwalment jew potenzjalment, il-kummerċ fi ħdan l-Unjoni għandha tiġi kkunsidrata bħala miżura li għandha effett ekwivalenti għal restrizzjonijiet kwantitattivi fis-sens tal-Artikolu 34 TFUE (ara, b’mod partikolari, is-sentenzi tal-11 ta’ Lulju 1974, Dassonville, 8/74, Ġabra p. 837, punt 5, u tal-10 ta’ Frar 2009, Il-Kummissjoni vs L-Italja, C‑110/05 Ġabra p. I‑519, punt 33).
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33. It is also apparent from settled case-law that Article 34 TFEU reflects the obligation to comply with the principles of non-discrimination and of mutual recognition of products lawfully manufactured and marketed in other Member States, as well as the principle of ensuring free access of EU products to national markets (see Commission v Italy , paragraph 34, and Case C-108/09 Ker-Optika [2010] ECR I-0000, paragraph 48).
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33. Minn ġurisprudenza daqstant ieħor stabbilita jirriżulta li l-Artikolu 28 KE jirrifletti l-obbligu li jiġu osservati l-prinċipji ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni u ta’ rikonoxximent reċiproku tal-prodotti mmanifatturati u kkummerċjalizzati legalment fi Stati Membri oħra, kif ukoll l-obbligu li jiġi żgurat aċċess liberu tal-prodotti tal-Unjoni għas-swieq nazzjonali (ara, f’dan is-sens, is-sentenzi Il-Kummissjoni vs L-Italja, iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 34, u tat-2 ta’ Diċembru 2010, Ker-Optika, C‑108/09, li għadha ma ġietx ippubblikata fil-Ġabra, punt 48).
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34. Accordingly, measures adopted by a Member State the object or effect of which is to treat goods coming from other Member States less favourably are to be regarded as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions, as are rules that lay down requirements to be met by such goods, even if such rules apply to all products alike (see Commission v Italy , paragraphs 35 and 37 and Ker-Optika , paragraph 49).
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34. Għaldaqstant, għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati bħala miżuri li għandhom effett ekwivalenti għal restrizzjonijiet kwantitattivi, il-miżuri adottati minn Stat Membru li l-għan jew l-effett tagħhom huwa li jittrattaw b’mod inqas favorevoli l-merkanzija li toriġina minn Stati Membri oħra, kif ukoll regoli dwar il-kundizzjonijiet li din il-merkanzija għandha tissodisfa, anki jekk dawn ir regoli japplikaw mingħajr diskriminazzjoni għall-prodotti kollha (ara s-sentenzi ċċitati iktar ’il fuq, Il-Kummissjoni vs L-Italja, punti 35 u 37, kif ukoll Ker-Optika, punt 49).
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35. Any other measure which hinders access of products originating in other Member States to the market of a Member State is also covered by that concept ( Commission v Italy , paragraph 37, and Ker-Optika , paragraph 50).
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35. Kull miżura oħra li tostakola l-aċċess ta’ prodotti li joriġinaw minn Stati Membri oħra għas-suq ta’ Stat Membru taqa’ wkoll taħt dan il-kunċett (sentenzi ċċitati iktar ’il fuq, Il-Kummissjoni vs L-Italja, punt 37, kif ukoll Ker-Optika, punt 50).
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36. In the main proceedings, nothing indicates that the national legislation at issue has the object or effect of treating tobacco coming from other Member States less favourably. Nor does it concern the requirements that those products must meet.
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36. Fil-kawża prinċipali, ma hemm ebda indikazzjoni li l-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali inkwistjoni għandha l-għan jew l-effett li tagħti trattament inqas favorevoli lill-prodotti tat-tabakk li joriġinaw minn Stati Membri oħra. Lanqas tikkonċerna l-kundizzjonijiet li dawn il-prodotti għandhom jissodisfaw.
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37. However, it is still necessary to examine whether this legislation hinders the access of tobacco products coming from other Member States to the Spanish market.
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37. Madankollu, xorta huwa neċessarju li jiġi eżaminat jekk din il-leġiżlazzjoni tostakolax l-aċċess ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk li joriġinaw minn Stati Membri oħra għas-suq Spanjol.
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38. In this respect, it should be noted that, by prohibiting tobacco retailers from directly importing such products from other Member States, the legislation in question forces them to procure their supplies from authorised wholesalers. Such a procurement method is likely to present various disadvantages which the retailers would not encounter if they carried out the importation themselves.
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38. F’dan ir-rigward, għandu jiġi rrilevat li, billi tipprojbixxi lill-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk milli jimportaw direttament tali prodotti minn Stati Membri oħra, l‑imsemmija leġiżlazzjoni tobbligahom li jordnaw provvisti mingħand grossisti awtorizzati. Madankollu, tali mod ta’ provvista jista’ jippreżenta diversi żvantaġġi li dawn il‑bejjiegħa bl-imnut ma kinux jiltaqgħu magħhom kieku kienu jagħmlu l‑importazzjoni huma stess.
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39. In particular, the retailers in question can only sell a tobacco product coming from another Member State if such a product is included in the range of products offered by the authorised wholesalers in Spain and if those wholesalers have the product in stock. Hence, where the range of products offered by those wholesalers does not include a specific product, the tobacco retailers have no direct, flexible and quick means of meeting the demands of their own customers who are interested in this product.
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39. B’mod partikolari, il-bejjiegħa bl-imnut inkwistjoni jistgħu jikkummerċjalizzaw prodott tat-tabakk li joriġina minn Stat Membru ieħor biss jekk dan il-prodott huwa disponibbli fil-gamma ta’ prodotti tal-grossisti awtorizzati fi Spanja u jekk dawn ikollhom fl-istokk. Għalhekk, meta l-gamma tal-prodotti ta’ dawn il-grossisti ma tinkludix prodott speċifiku, il-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk ma jkollhom ebda possibbiltà diretta, flessibbli u rapida biex jissodisfaw it-talba tal-klijenti tagħhom stess li jkunu interessati f’dan il-prodott.
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40. This finding is not called into question by the importers’ obligation to guarantee the availability of tobacco products throughout the national territory, where demand for these products exists, as the national legislation provides. The importers may choose to avoid importing certain products where demand is judged to be insufficient, or to delay the importation of such products. On the other hand, any tobacco retailer would undoubtedly be able to react, in the place of the importers, more flexibly and quickly to the demands of its customers with whom it is in direct and frequent contact.
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40. Din il-konstatazzjoni mhix qed tiġi kkontestata mill-obbligu impost fuq l-importaturi biex jiggarantixxu d-disponibbiltà ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk fit-territorju nazzjonali kollu, meta d-domanda għal dawn il-prodotti teżisti, kif previst fil-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali. Fil-fatt, dawn l-importaturi jistgħu jagħżlu li ma jimportawx ċerti prodotti mitluba minn numru ta’ persuni kkonċernati meqjus żgħir wisq jew li jagħmlu dan b’dewmien. Madankollu, kull bejjiegħ bl-imnut tat-tabakk ikun mingħajr dubju f’pożizzjoni li jirreaġixxi, minflok dawn l-importaturi, b’mod iktar flessibbli u iktar malajr għat-talbiet tal-klijenti li huma f’kuntatt dirett u frekwenti miegħu.
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41. Moreover, the tobacco retailers are prevented from procuring supplies in other Member States, even if the manufacturers and wholesalers located there could offer more advantageous procurement conditions, particularly in border areas, either because of their geographic proximity or because of the specific delivery methods they offer.
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41. Barra minn hekk, il-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk huma ostakolati milli jordnaw provvisti fi Stati Membri oħra għalkemm il-manifatturi jew il-grossisti li jkunu stabbiliti hemmhekk jistgħu joffru, b’mod partikolari fir-reġjuni transkonfinali, kundizzjonijiet ta’ provvista iktar vantaġġużi, kemm minħabba l-prossimità ġeografika tagħhom, jew minħabba l-metodi ta’ kunsinna speċifiċi li huma jipproponu.
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42. All of these elements are capable of having a negative effect on the choice of products that the tobacco retailers include in their range of products and, ultimately, on the access of various products coming from other Member States to the Spanish market.
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42. Dawn l-elementi kollha jistgħu jkollhom effett negattiv fuq l-għażla ta’ prodotti li l-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk jinkludu fil-gamma tal-prodotti tagħhom u, fl-aħħar nett, fuq l-aċċess ta’ prodotti differenti minn Stati Membri oħra għas-suq Spanjol.
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43. In those circumstances, it must be held that the prohibition at issue hinders the access of these products to the market.
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43. Għaldaqstant, għandu jiġi kkonstatat li l-miżura ta’ projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali tostakola l-aċċess ta’ dawn il-prodotti għas-suq.
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44. It follows that the legislation at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU.
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44. Minn dan isegwi li l leġiżlazzjoni inkwistjoni tikkostitwixxi miżura li għandha effett ekwivalenti għal restrizzjonijiet kwantitattivi fis-sens tal-Artikolu 34 TFUE.
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Justification for the restriction on the free movement of goods
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Fuq il-ġustifikazzjoni tar-restrizzjoni fuq il-moviment liberu tal-merkanzija
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45. According to settled case-law, an obstacle to the free movement of goods may be justified on one of the public interest grounds set out in Article 36 TFEU or in order to meet overriding requirements. In either case, the national provision must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see, inter alia, Commission v Italy , paragraph 59, and Ker-Optika , paragraph 57).
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45. Skont ġurisprudenza stabbilita, ostakolu għall-moviment liberu tal-merkanzija jista’ jiġi ġġustifikat minħabba raġunijiet ta’ interess ġenerali msemmija fl‑Artikolu 36 TFUE jew minn rekwiżiti imperattivi. Fiż‑żewġ każijiet, il-miżura nazzjonali għandha tkun adatta sabiex tiggarantixxi li jintlaħaq l-għan mixtieq u ma għandhiex tmur lil hinn minn dak li huwa meħtieġ sabiex jintlaħaq (ara, b’mod partikolari, is-sentenzi ċċitati iktar ’il fuq, Il-Kummissjoni vs L-Italja, punt 59, u Ker-Optika, punt 57).
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Observations submitted to the Court
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Osservazzjonijiet ippreżentati lill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja
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46. The Spanish and Italian Governments claim, first, that the prohibition at issue in the main proceedings may be justified by the necessity of guaranteeing fiscal and customs control of tobacco products and ensuring their control of health-related aspects.
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46. Il-Gvern Spanjol u dak Taljani jsostnu, l-ewwel nett, li l-miżura ta’ projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali tista’ tiġi ġġustifikata min-neċessità li jiġi ggarantit kontroll fiskali u doganali ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk u biex jiġi żgurat kontroll sanitarju tagħhom.
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47. Second, those governments claim that the abovementioned prohibition is necessary to achieve the objective of protecting consumers. If tobacco retailers were authorised to import tobacco products, they might be tempted to favour certain products over others, to the detriment of the neutrality of the tobacco market.
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47. It-tieni nett, dawn il-gvernijiet isostnu li l-imsemmija miżura hija meħtieġa biex jinkiseb l-għan ta’ protezzjoni tal-konsumatur. Fil-fatt, jekk il-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk kienu awtorizzati li jimportaw il-prodotti tat-tabakk, huma setgħu jitħajjru li jiffavorixxu ċerti prodotti pjuttost milli oħrajn, għad-detriment tan-newtralità tas-suq tat-tabakk.
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48. Third, the Spanish Government considers that the prohibition at issue in the main proceedings is justified by the fact that allowing tobacco retailers to import these products would amount to giving them an excessive competitive advantage.
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48. It-tielet nett, il-Gvern Spanjol iqis li l-miżura ta’ projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil‑kawża prinċipali hija ġġustifikata mill-fatt li tingħata lill-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk il-possibbiltà li jimportaw dawn il-prodotti jirriżulta li jagħtihom vantaġġ kompetittiv eċċessiv.
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49. Fourth, the Spanish Government is of the opinion that, in any event, a restriction on the free movement of goods should be removed only if doing so would present an advantage for consumers such as, in particular, a decline in prices. However, given that tobacco is a monopolised product, sold at fixed prices, the removal of the prohibition of importation by tobacco retailers could not have any benefit for consumers; the only possible beneficiary being the retailers themselves.
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49. Ir-raba’ nett, il-Gvern Spanjol iqis li, fi kwalunkwe każ, huwa meħtieġ li titneħħa restrizzjoni għall-moviment liberu tal-merkanzija biss jekk din it-tneħħija toħloq vantaġġ għall-konsumaturi, jiġifieri, b’mod partikolari, tnaqqis fil-prezzijiet. Madanakollu, minħabba li t-tabakk huwa prodott monopolizzat mibjugħ bi prezzijiet fissi, it-tneħħija tal-projbizzjoni ta’ importazzjoni għall-bejjiegħa bl‑imnut tat-tabakk ma tipproduċi l-ebda benefiċċju lill-konsumaturi, huma biss il‑bejjiegħa bl-imnut infushom li jistgħu jibbenefikaw minnha.
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The Court’s Reply
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Ir-risposta tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja
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50. With regard, first of all, to the argument of the Spanish and Italian Governments, based on the necessity of ensuring fiscal, customs, and health control of tobacco products, it should be noted that it is for the national authorities, where they adopt a measure derogating from a principle enshrined by European Union Law, to show in each individual case that that measure is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective relied upon and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it. The reasons invoked by a Member State by way of justification must thus be accompanied by an analysis of the appropriateness and proportionality of the measure adopted by that State and by specific evidence substantiating its arguments (see Case C-8/02 Leichtle [2004] ECR I-2641, paragraph 45, and Case C-73/08 Bressol and Others [2010] ECR I-2735, paragraph 71).
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50. F’dak li jirrigwarda, l-ewwel nett, l-argument tal-Gvern Spanjol u dak Taljan ibbażat fuq in-neċessità li jiġi żgurat kontroll fiskali, doganali u sanitarju tal‑prodotti tat-tabakk, għandu jitfakkar li huma l-awtoritajiet nazzjonali, meta jadottaw miżura li tidderoga minn prinċipju stabbilit bid-dritt tal-Unjoni, li għandhom jipprovaw, f’kull każ partikolari, li din il-miżura tiggarantixxi t-twettiq tal-għan invokat u ma tmurx lil hinn minn dak li huwa neċessarju sabiex dan jinkiseb. Ir‑raġunijiet ġustifikattivi li jistgħu jiġu invokati minn Stat Membru għandhom għaldaqstant jinkludu analiżi ta’ kemm il-miżura adottata minn dan l-Istat hija adattata u proporzjonali, kif ukoll elementi preċiżi li jippermettu li tissostanzja l-argumenti tagħha (ara s-sentenzi tat-18 ta’ Marzu 2004, Leichtle, C‑8/02, Ġabra p. I‑2641, punt 45, kif ukoll tat-13 ta’ April 2010, Bressol et vs Chaverot et , C‑73/08, Ġabra p. I‑2735, punt 71).
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51. However, the Spanish and Italian Governments do not substantiate their argument with any evidence which satisfies the requirements referred to in the previous paragraph. In particular, they have not explained in what respect offering tobacco retailers the possibility of importing tobacco products themselves would constitute an obstacle to the application of fiscal, customs, and health control measures to those products.
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51. Madanakollu, il-Gvern Spanjol u dak Taljan ma jsostnux l-argument tagħhom b’ebda element li jissodisfa l-kundizzjonijiet speċifikati fil-punt preċedenti. B’mod partikolari, huma ma spjegawx kif l-opportunità li ġiet offruta lill-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk biex jimportaw huma stess il-prodotti tat-tabakk stess toħloq ostaklu għall-applikazzjoni tal-miżuri ta’ kontroll fiskali, doganali u sanitarji ta’ dawn il-prodotti.
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52. Moreover, the argument based on the protection of consumers must be rejected. Even if the requirement to ensure a uniform range of products constituted an legitimate public interest objective which merited being pursued by legislation, rather than the law of the market, compliance with such a requirement could, in any event, be achieved by less restrictive measures, such as the imposition of an obligation on tobacco retailers to stock a predefined minimum range of products.
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52. Barra minn hekk, l-argument ibbaża fuq il-protezzjoni tal-konsumatur għandu jiġi miċħud. Fil-fatt, anki jekk jiġi preżunt li r-rekwiżit li tiġi żgurata gamma ġeneralment uniformi ta’ prodotti jikkostitwixxi għan leġittimu ta’ interess ġenerali li għandu jiġi segwit permezz ta’ regoli legali, minflok il-liġi tas-suq, l-osservanza ta’ dan ir-rekwiżit tista’ tinkiseb, fi kwalunkwe każ, permezz ta’ miżuri inqas restrittivi, bħall-impożizzjoni ta’ obbligu għall-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk li jkollhom fl-istokk gamma ta’ prodotti tal-inqas definiti minn qabel.
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53. Next, the Spanish Government cannot claim that the restriction in question may be justified on the ground that the possibility of importing tobacco products would create an excessive competitive advantage for tobacco retailers. Such a consideration is of a purely economic dimension. However, according to settled case-law, grounds of a purely economic nature cannot constitute overriding reasons in the public interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty (see Case C-254/98 TK-Heimdienst [2000] ECR I-151, paragraph 33, and Case C-109/04 Kranemann [2005] ECR I-2421, paragraph 34).
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53. Minn dan isegwi li l-Gvern Spanjol ma jistax isostni li r-restrizzjoni kkonċernata tista’ tiġi ġġustifikata minħabba li l-possibbiltà li jimportaw prodotti tat-tabakk toħloq vantaġġ kompetittiv eċċessiv għall-bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk. Fil-fatt, tali kunsiderazzjoni hija biss ta’ dimensjoni ekonomika Madankollu, skont ġurisprudenza stabbilita, motivi ta’ natura purament ekonomika ma jistgħux jikkostitwixxu raġunijiet imperattivi ta’ interess ġenerali tali li jiġġustifikaw ir-restrizzjoni għal-libertà fundamentali ggarantita mit-Trattat (ara s-sentenzi tat-13 ta’ Jannar 2000, TK-Heimdienst, C‑254/98, Ġabra p. I‑151, punt 33, u tas-17 ta’ Marzu 2005, Kranemann, C‑109/04, Ġabra p. I‑2421, punt 34).
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54. Finally, the Spanish Government’s argument that the removal of a restriction on the free movement of goods is only justified if it leads to an advantage for consumers must be rejected. It suffices to point out that, in the present case, the removal of the prohibition at issue in the main proceedings is capable of benefiting consumers by allowing tobacco retailers to expand the range of products available.
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54. Fl-aħħar nett, l-argument tal-Gvern Spanjol, li jipprovdi li t-tneħħija ta’ restrizzjoni għall-moviment liberu tal-merkanzija tkun iġġustifikata biss jekk din tista’ jwassal għal vantaġġ għall-konsumaturi, għandu jiġi miċħud. F’dan ir-rigward, huwa suffiċjenti li jiġi rrilevat li, f’dan il-każ, it-tneħħija tal-projbizzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali tista’ tkun vantaġġuża għal bejjiegħa bl-imnut tat-tabakk billi tippermettilhom li jestendu l-gamma ta’ prodotti għad-dispożizzjoni tagħhom.
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55. In light of all the foregoing, it must be held that the restriction arising from the legislation at issue in the main proceedings cannot be justified by the achievement of the objectives invoked.
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55. Fid-dawl ta’ dak li ntqal preċedentement, għandu jiġi kkonstatat li r-restrizzjoni li tirriżulta mil-leġiżlazzjoni inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali ma tistax tiġi ġġustifikata permezz tal-kisba tal-għanijiet invokati.
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56. Consequently, the answer to the question referred is that Article 34 TFEU must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which prohibits tobacco retailers from importing tobacco products from other Member States.
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56. Konsegwentement, ir-risposta għad-domanda magħmula għandha tkun li l-Artikolu 34 TFUE għandu jiġi interpretat fis-sens li jipprekludi leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali, bħal dik inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċiplai, li tipprojbixxi lill-bejjiegħa bl-imnut milli jeżerċitaw attività ta’ importazzjoni ta’ prodotti tat-tabakk minn Stati Membri oħrajn.
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Costs
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Fuq l-ispejjeż
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57. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
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57. Peress li l-proċedura għandha, fir-rigward tal-partijiet fil-kawża prinċipali, in‑natura ta’ kwistjoni mqajma quddiem il-qorti tar-rinviju, hija din il-qorti li tiddeċiedi fuq l-ispejjeż. L-ispejjeż sostnuti għas-sottomissjoni tal-osservazzjonijiet lill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja, barra dawk tal-imsemmija partijiet, ma jistgħux jiġu rrimborsati.
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