Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011

Regolament tal-Kunsill (UE) Nru 1177/2011

of 8 November 2011

tat- 8 ta’ Novembru 2011

amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure

li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 1467/97 dwar li titħaffef u li tiġi ċċarata l-implimentazzjoni tal-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

IL-KUNSILL TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the second subparagraph of Article 126(14) thereof,

Wara li kkunsidra t-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea, u b’mod partikolari t-tieni subparagrafu tal-Artikolu 126(14) tiegħu,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Wara li kkunsidra l-proposta mill-Kummissjoni Ewropea,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Wara li l-abbozz tal-att leġislattiv intbagħat lill-Parlamenti nazzjonali,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament [1],

Wara li kkunsidra l-opinjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew [1],

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank [2],

Wara li kkunsidra l-opinjoni tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew [2],

Acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure,

Filwaqt li jaġixxi skont proċedura leġislattiva speċjali,

Whereas:

Billi:

(1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided for by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions, and a sustainable balance of payments.

(1) Il-koordinazzjoni tal-linji ta’ politika ekonomika tal-Istati Membri fl-Unjoni, kif stipulat mit-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea (TFUE), għandha twassal għal konformità mal-prinċipji ta’ gwida ta’ prezzijiet stabbli, finanzi pubbliċi u kondizzjonijiet monetarji sodi u bilanċ ta’ pagamenti sostenibbli.

(2) The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) initially consisted of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies [3], Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure [4] and the Resolution of the European Council of 17 June 1997 on the Stability and Growth Pact [5]. Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and (EC) No 1467/97 were amended by Regulations (EC) No 1055/2005 [6] and (EC) No 1056/2005 [7] respectively. In addition, the Council Report of 20 March 2005 on "Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact" [8] was adopted.

(2) Il-Patt ta’ Stabbiltà u Tkabbir (SGP) inizjalment kien jikkonsisti mir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1466/97 tas- 7 ta’ Lulju 1997 dwar it-tisħiħ tas-sorveljanza ta’ pożizzjonijiet ta’ budget u l-koordinazzjoni ta’ politika ekonomika [3], ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1467/97 tas- 7 ta’ Lulju 1997 dwar li titħaffef u tiġi ċċarata l-implimentazzjoni tal-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv [4] u r-Riżoluzzjoni tal-Kunsill Ewropew tas- 17 ta’ Ġunju 1997 dwar il-Patt ta’ Stabbiltà u Tkabbir [5]. Ir-Regolamenti (KE) Nru 1466/97 u (KE) Nru 1467/97 ġew emendati bir-Regolamenti (KE) Nru 1055/2005 [6] u (KE) Nru 1056/2005 [7] rispettivament. Barra minn hekk, ġie adottat ir-Rapport tal-Kunsill tal- 20 ta’ Marzu 2005 dwar "Titjib tal-implimentazzjoni tal-Patt ta’ Stabbiltà u Tkabbir" [8].

(3) The SGP is based on the objective of sound and sustainable government finances as a means of strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth underpinned by financial stability, thereby supporting the achievement of the Union’s objectives for sustainable growth and employment.

(3) L-SGP huwa bbażat fuq l-għan ta’ finanzi governattivi sodi u sostenibbli bħala mezz sabiex jissaħħu l-kundizzjonijiet għall-istabbiltà tal-prezzijiet u għal tkabbir sostenibbli b’saħħtu bbażat fuq stabbiltà finanzjarja, u b’hekk jappoġġa li jintlaħqu l-għanijiet tal-Unjoni għal tkabbir sostenibbli u impjiegi.

(4) Experience gained and mistakes made during the first decade of the economic and monetary union show a need for improved economic governance in the Union, which should be built on stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust framework at the level of the Union for the surveillance of national economic policies.

(4) L-esperjenza miksuba u l-iżbalji li saru matul l-ewwel deċennju tal-funzjonament tal-unjoni ekonomika u monetarja turi ħtieġa għal governanza ekonomika mtejba fl-Unjoni, li għandha tinbena fuq sjieda nazzjonali aktar b’saħħitha tar-regoli u l-linji politiċi maqbula komunement u fuq qafas aktar b’saħħtu ta’ sorveljanza fil-livell tal-Unjoni għas-sorveljanza tal-politika ekonomika nazzjonali.

(5) The common framework for economic governance needs to be enhanced, including improved budgetary surveillance, in line with the high degree of integration between Member States’ economies within the Union, and particularly within the euro area.

(5) Il-qafas komuni għall-governanza ekonomika jeħtieġ li jkun imsaħħaħ, inkluża s-sorveljanza baġitarja mtejba, b’konformità mal-grad għoli ta’ integrazzjoni bejn l-ekonomiji tal-Istati Membri fl-Unjoni, u b’mod partikolari fiż-żona tal-euro.

(6) The improved economic governance framework should rely on several interlinked and coherent policies for sustainable growth and jobs, in particular a Union strategy for growth and jobs, with particular focus on developing and strengthening the internal market, fostering international trade and competitiveness, a European Semester for strengthened coordination of economic and budgetary policies, an effective framework for preventing and correcting excessive government deficits (the SGP), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances, minimum requirements for national budgetary frameworks, and enhanced financial market regulation and supervision, including macroprudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board.

(6) Il-qafas imtejjeb ta’ governanza ekonomika għandu jsejjes ruħu fuq bosta linji politiċi interkonnessi u koerenti għal tkabbir u impjiegi sostenibbli, b’mod partikolari strateġija tal-Unjoni għal tkabbir u impjiegi, b’attenzjoni partikolari fuq l-iżvilupp u t-tisħiħ tas-suq intern, it-trawwim tal-kummerċ internazzjonali u l-kompetittività, Simestru Ewropew għat-tisħiħ tal-koordinazzjoni ta’ linji ta’ politika ekonomika u baġitarja, qafas effikaċi biex jiġu evitati u korretti defiċit eċċessivi tal-gvernijiet (SGP), qafas b’saħħtu biex jiġu evitati u korretti l-iżbilanċi makroekonomiċi, rekwiżiti minimi għall-oqfsa baġitarji nazzjonali, u regolamentazzjoni u superviżjoni msaħħa tas-suq finanzjarju, inkluża s-superviżjoni makroprudenzjali mill-Bord Ewropew dwar ir-Riskju Sistemiku.

(7) Achieving and maintaining a dynamic internal market should be considered an element of the proper and smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union.

(7) Il-kisba u ż-żamma ta’ suq intern dinamiku għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati bħala element tal-funzjonament xieraq u bla problemi tal-unjoni ekonomika u monetarja.

(8) The SGP and the complete economic governance framework should complement and support the Union strategy for growth and jobs. The interlinks between different strands should not provide for exemptions from the provisions of the SGP.

(8) L-SGP u l-qafas komplut tal-governanza ekonomika għandhom jikkompletaw u jappoġġaw l-istrateġija tal-Unjoni għat-tkabbir u l-impjiegi. L-interkonnessjonijiet bejn il-linji differenti m’għandhomx jipprovdu eżenzjonijiet mid-dispożizzjonijiet tal-SGP.

(9) The strengthening of economic governance should include a closer and more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. While recognising that the counterparts of the European Parliament in the framework of this dialogue are the relevant institutions of the Union and their representatives, the competent committee of the European Parliament may offer an opportunity to participate in an exchange of views to a Member State to which the Council has addressed a decision under Article 126(6) TFEU, a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU, a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU or a decision under Article 126(11) TFEU. The Member State’s participation in such an exchange of views is voluntary.

(9) It-tisħiħ tal-governanza ekonomika għandu jinkludi involviment eqreb u aktar f’waqtu tal-Parlament Ewropew u l-parlamenti nazzjonali. Filwaqt li jirrikonoxxi li l-kontrapartijiet tal-Parlament Ewropew fil-qafas ta’ dan id-djalogu huma l-istituzzjonijiet relevanti tal-Unjoni u r-Rappreżentanti tagħhom, il-kumitat kompetenti tal-Parlament Ewropew jista’ joffri opportunità għall-iskambju ta’ opinjonijiet lil Stat Membru li lilu l-Kunsill indirizza deċiżjoni taħt l-Artikolu 126(6) tat-TFUE, rakkomandazzjoni taħt l-Artikolu 126(7) tat-TFUE, avviż taħt l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE jew deċiżjoni taħt l-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE. Il-parteċipazzjoni tal-Istat Membru f’tali skambju ta’ opinjonijiet tkun volontarja.

(10) The Commission should have a stronger role in the enhanced surveillance procedure as regards assessments that are specific to each Member State, monitoring, on-site missions, recommendations and warnings.

(10) Il-Kummissjoni għandu jkollha rwol aktar b’saħħtu fil-proċedura tas-sorveljanza msaħħa fir-rigward tal-evalwazzjonijiet li huma speċifiċi għal kull Stat Membru, il-monitoraġġ, il-missjonijiet ta’ fuq il-post, ir-rakkomandazzjonijiet u t-twissijiet.

(11) The Council and the Commission should, when applying this Regulation, take into account, as appropriate, all relevant factors and the economic and budgetary situation of the Member States concerned.

(11) Il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni, meta japplikaw dan ir-Regolament, għandhom jikkunsidraw, skont il-każ, il-fatturi rilevanti kollha u s-sitwazzjoni ekonomika u baġitarja tal-Istati Membri konċernati.

(12) The rules on budgetary discipline should be strengthened, in particular by giving a more prominent role to the level and evolution of debt and to overall sustainability. The mechanisms to ensure compliance with, and enforcement of, those rules should also be strengthened.

(12) Ir-regoli dwar id-dixxiplina baġitarja għandhom jissaħħu, b’mod partikolari billi jingħata rwol aktar prominenti lil-livell u l-evoluzzjoni tad-dejn u lis-sostenibbiltà ġenerali. Il-mekkaniżmi sabiex jiżguraw konformità ma’ dawn ir-regoli u l-infurzar tagħhom għandhom jissaħħu wkoll.

(13) Implementing the existing excessive deficit procedure on the basis of both the deficit criterion and the debt criterion requires a numerical benchmark, which takes into account the business cycle, against which to assess whether the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is sufficiently diminishing and is approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace.

(13) L-implimentazzjoni tal-proċedura eżistenti ta’ defiċit eċċessiv abbażi kemm tal-kriterju tad-defiċit kif ukoll tal-kriterju tad-dejn teħtieġ valur referenzjali numeriku li jieħu kont taċ-ċiklu kummerċjali, li miegħu ssir il-valutazzjoni dwar jekk il-proporzjon tad-dejn tal-gvern mal-Prodott Domestiku Gross (PDG) huwiex qed jonqos biżżejjed u joqrob il-valur referenzjali b’pass sodisfaċenti.

A transitional period should be introduced in order to allow Member States subject to an excessive deficit procedure at the date of adoption of this Regulation to adapt their policies to the numerical benchmark for debt reduction. This should also apply to Member States which are subject to a Union or International Monetary Fund adjustment programme.

Għandu jiġi introdott perjodu ta’ transizzjoni biex l-Istati Membri li huma soġġetti għal proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv fid-data tal-adozzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament jadattaw il-linji politiċi tagħhom għall-valur referenzjali numeriku għat-tnaqqis tad-dejn. Dan għandu japplika wkoll għall-Istati Membri li huma soġġetti għal programm ta’ aġġustament tal-Unjoni jew tal-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali.

(14) Non-compliance with the numerical benchmark for debt reduction should not be sufficient to establish the existence of an excessive deficit, which should take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the Commission’s report under Article 126(3) TFEU. In particular, the assessment of the effect of the cycle and the composition of the stock-flow adjustment on debt developments may be sufficient to avoid that the existence of an excessive deficit be established on the basis of the debt criterion.

(14) In-nuqqas ta’ konformità mal-valur referenzjali numeriku għat-tnaqqis tad-dejn ma għandux ikun suffiċjenti sabiex jistabbilixxi l-eżistenza ta’ defiċit eċċessiv, li għandu jieħu kont ta’ firxa sħiħa ta’ fatturi rilevanti koperti mir-rapport tal-Kummissjoni taħt l-Artikolu 126(3) tat-TFUE. B’mod partikolari, il-valutazzjoni tal-effett taċ-ċiklu u l-kompożizzjoni tal-aġġustament tal-flussi tal-istokks fir-rigward ta’ żviluppi tad-dejn jistgħu jkunu suffiċjenti biex jevitaw li jiġi determinat defiċit eċċessiv abbażi tal-kriterju tad-dejn.

(15) In establishing the existence of an excessive deficit based on the deficit criterion and the steps leading to it, there is a need to take into account the whole range of relevant factors covered by the Commission’s report under Article 126(3) TFEU if the ratio of government debt to GDP does not exceed the reference value.

(15) Fejn jiġu stabbiliti l-eżistenza ta’ defiċit eċċessiv ibbażat fuq il-kriterju tad-defiċit u l-passi li jwasslu għalih, hemm il-ħtieġa li jittieħed kont tal-firxa kollha tal-fatturi rilevanti koperti mir-rapport tal-Kummissjoni taħt l-Artikolu 126(3) tat-TFUE jekk il-proporzjon tad-dejn tal-gvern mal-PDG ma jaqbiżx il-valur referenzjali.

(16) In taking into account systemic pension reforms among the relevant factors, the central consideration should be whether those reforms enhance the long-term sustainability of the overall pension system, while not increasing the risks to the medium-term budgetary position.

(16) Meta jittieħed kont ta’ riformi sistemiċi tal-pensjonijiet fost il-fatturi rilevanti, il-konsiderazzjoni ċentrali għandha tkun jekk dawk ir-riformi jsaħħux is-sostenibbiltà għall-perjodu twil tas-sistema ġenerali tal-pensjoni, filwaqt li ma jżidux ir-riskji għall-pożizzjoni baġitarja għall-perjodu medju.

(17) The Commission’s report under Article 126(3) TFEU should consider appropriately the quality of the national budgetary framework, as that plays a crucial role in supporting fiscal consolidation and sustainable public finances. That consideration should include the minimum requirements as laid down in Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States [9] and other agreed desirable requirements for fiscal discipline.

(17) Ir-rapport tal-Kummissjoni taħt l-Artikolu 126(3) tat-TFUE għandu jqis b’mod adattat il-kwalità tal-qafas fiskali nazzjonali, minħabba li dan għandu rwol kruċjali fl-appoġġ għall-konsolidazzjoni fiskali u l-finanzi pubbliċi sostenibbli. Din il-konsiderazzjoni għandha tinkludi r-rekwiżiti minimi kif imniżżla fid-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2011/85/UE tat- 8 ta’ Novembru 2011 dwar ir-rekwiżiti għal oqfsa baġitarji tal-Istati Membri [9] u rekwiżiti oħra mixtieqa li fuqhom ikun hemm ftehim għad-dixxiplina fiskali.

(18) In order to support the monitoring of compliance with Council recommendations and notices for the correction of situations of excessive deficit, there is a need that these specify annual budgetary targets consistent with the required fiscal improvement in cyclically adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary measures. In that context, the 0,5 % of GDP annual benchmark should be understood as an annual average.

(18) Sabiex jingħata appoġġ għall-monitoraġġ tal-konformità mar-rakkomandazzjonijiet u l-avviżi tal-Kunsill għall-korrezzjoni ta’ sitwazzjonijiet ta’ defiċit eċċessiv, hemm il-ħtieġa li dawn jispeċifikaw miri baġitarji annwali konsistenti mat-titjib fiskali meħtieġ f’termini aġġustati ċiklikament, netti minn miżuri ta’ darba jew temporanji. F’dan il-kuntest, il-0,5 % tal-valur referenzjali annwali tal-PDG għandu jinftiehem bħala l-medja annwali.

(19) The assessment of effective action will benefit from taking compliance with general government expenditure targets as a reference, in conjunction with the implementation of planned specific revenue measures.

(19) Il-valutazzjoni ta’ azzjoni effettiva se tibbenefika meta l-konformità mal-miri tan-nefqa ġenerali tal-gvern tittieħed bħala referenza flimkien mal-implimentazzjoni ta’ miżuri ta’ dħul speċifiċi ppjanati.

(20) In assessing the case for an extension of the deadline for correcting the excessive deficit, particular consideration should be given to severe economic downturns in the euro area or in the Union as a whole, provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.

(20) Fil-valutazzjoni tal-każ għall-estensjoni tal-iskadenza għall-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv, għandha tingħata konsiderazzjoni partikolari lit-tnaqqis gravi fir-ritmu ekonomiku fiż-żona tal-euro jew fl-Unjoni ġeneralment, bil-kondizzjoni li dan ma jipperikolax is-sostenibbiltà fiskali fil-perjodu medju.

(21) It is appropriate to step up the application of the financial sanctions provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU so that they constitute a real incentive for compliance with the notices under Article 126(9) TFEU.

(21) Huwa xieraq li tiżdied l-applikazzjoni ta’ penali finanzjarji previsti fl-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE sabiex jikkostitwixxu inċentiv reali għall-konformità mal-avviżi taħt l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE.

(22) In order to ensure compliance with the fiscal surveillance framework of the Union for Member States whose currency is the euro, rules-based sanctions should be designed on the basis of Article 136 TFEU, ensuring fair, timely and effective mechanisms for compliance with the SGP.

(22) Sabiex tkun żgurata l-konformità mal-qafas ta’ sorveljanza fiskali tal-Unjoni għall-Istati Membri li l-munita tagħhom hija l-euro, għandhom jitfasslu sanzjonijiet ibbażati fuq l-Artikolu 136 tat-TFUE, biex ikunu żgurati mekkaniżmi ġusti, f’waqthom u effettivi għall-konformità mar-regoli tal-SGP.

(23) Fines referred to in this Regulation shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and should be assigned to stability mechanisms to provide financial assistance, created by Member States whose currency is the euro in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole.

(23) Il-multi msemmija f’dan ir-Regolament għandhom jikkostitwixxu dħul ieħor, kif imsemmi fl-Artikolu 311 tat-TFUE, u għandhom jiġu assenjati lill-mekkaniżmi ta’ stabbiltà biex tingħata għajnuna finanzjarja, maħluqa mill-Istati Membri li l-munita tagħhom hija l-euro sabiex tiġi salvagwardata l-istabbiltà taż-żona tal-euro inġenerali.

(24) References contained in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 should take account of the new Article numbering of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the replacement of Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 [10] by Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 of 25 May 2009 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community [11].

(24) Ir-referenzi li jinsabu fir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1467/97 għandhom jieħdu kont tan-numerazzjoni ġdida tal-Artikoli tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea u tas-sostituzzjoni tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 3605/93 [10] bir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 479/2009 tal- 25 ta’ Mejju 2009 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Protokoll dwar il-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv anness mat-Trattat li jistabbilixxi l-Komunità Ewropea [11].

(25) Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 should therefore be amended accordingly,

(25) Għaldaqstant, ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1467/97 għandu jiġi emendat kif meħtieġ,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

ADOTTA DAN IR-REGOLAMENT:

Article 1

Artikolu 1

Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is hereby amended as follows:

Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1467/97 huwa b’dan emendat kif ġej:

(1) Article 1 is replaced by the following:

(1) L-Artikolu 1 huwa ssostitwit b’dan li ġej:

"Article 1

"Artikolu 1

1. This Regulation lays down the provisions for speeding up and clarifying the excessive deficit procedure. The objective of the excessive deficit procedure is to deter excessive government deficits and, if they occur, to further prompt their correction, where compliance with the budgetary discipline is examined on the basis of the government deficit and government debt criteria.

1. Dan ir-Regolament jistabbilixxi d-dispożizzjonijiet biex titħaffef u tiġi ċċarata l-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv. Dan l-għan tal-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv huwa sabiex jiġu evitati defiċits eċċessivi tal-gvern u, jekk iseħħu, li jinkoraġġixxi aktar il-korrezzjoni tagħhom, meta l-konformità mad-dixxiplina baġitarja tkun eżaminata abbażi tad-defiċit tal-gvern u l-kriterji tad-dejn tal-gvern.

2. For the purposes of this Regulation, "participating Member States" shall mean those Member States whose currency is the euro.";

2. Għall-finijiet ta’ dan ir-Regolament "Stati Membri parteċipanti" għandha tfisser ‘dawk l-Istati Membri li l-munita tagħhom hija l-euro.";

(2) Article 2 is amended as follows:

(2) L-Artikolu 2 jiġi emendat kif ġej:

(a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

(a) fil-paragrafu 1, l-ewwel subparagrafu huwa ssostitwit b’dan li ġej:

"1. The excess of a government deficit over the reference value shall be considered exceptional, in accordance with the second indent of point (a) of Article 126(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), when resulting from an unusual event outside the control of the Member State concerned and with a major impact on the financial position of general government, or when resulting from a severe economic downturn.";

"1. L-eċċess tad-defiċit tal-gvern fuq il-valur referenzjali għandu jitqies bħala eċċezzjonali, b’mod konformi mat-tieni inċiż tal-Artikolu 126(2)(a) tat-TFUE, meta jirriżulta minn avveniment mhux tas-soltu barra mill-kontroll tal-Istat Membru kkonċernat b’impatt maġġuri fuq il-pożizzjoni finanzjarja tal-gvern ġenerali, jew meta jirriżulta minn tnaqqis gravi fir-ritmu ekonomiku.";

(b) the following paragraph is inserted:

(b) għandu jiddaħħal il-paragrafu li ġej:

"1a. When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with point (b) of Article 126(2) TFEU if the differential with respect to the reference value has decreased over the previous three years at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, based on changes over the last three years for which the data is available.

"1a. Meta jaqbeż il-valur referenzjali, il-proporzjon tad-dejn tal-gvern mal-Prodott Domestiku Gross (PDG) għandu jitqies bħala li qiegħed jonqos biżżejjed u joqrob il-valur referenzjali b’pass sodisfaċenti skont il-punt (b) tal-Artikolu 126(2) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea (TFUE) jekk id-differenzjal fir-rigward tal-valur referenzjali tkun naqset matul it-tliet snin preċedenti b’rata medja ta’ wieħed minn kull għoxrin kull sena bħala valur referenzjali, abbażi tal-bidliet matul it-tliet snin li għaddew li għalihom hi disponibbli d-data.

The requirement under the debt criterion shall also be considered to be fulfilled if the budgetary forecasts of the Commission indicate that the required reduction in the differential will occur over the three-year period encompassing the two years following the final year for which the data is available. For a Member State that is subject to an excessive deficit procedure on 8 November 2011 and for a period of three years from the correction of the excessive deficit, the requirement under the debt criterion shall be considered fulfilled if the Member State concerned makes sufficient progress towards compliance as assessed in the opinion adopted by the Council on its stability or convergence programme.

Ir-rekwiżit skont il-kriterju tad-dejn għandu jitqies ukoll sodisfatt jekk it-tbassir baġitarju mill-Kummissjoni jindika li t-tnaqqis meħtieġ fid-differenzjal ser iseħħ matul il-perjodu ta’ tliet snin li jinkorpora s-sentejn ta’ wara l-aħħar sena li għaliha hi disponibbli d-data. Għal Stat Membru li huwa soġġett għal proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv fit- 8 ta’ Novembru 2011 u għal perjodu ta’ tliet snin mill-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv, ir-rekwiżit skont il-kriterju tad-dejn għandu jitqies sodisfatt jekk l-Istat Membru kkonċernat jagħmel progress suffiċjenti lejn il-konformità kif ivvalutata fl-opinjoni adottata mill-Kunsill dwar il-programm ta’ stabbiltà u konverġenza tiegħu.

In implementing the debt ratio adjustment benchmark, account shall be taken of the influence of the cycle on the pace of debt reduction.";

Fl-implimentazzjoni tal-aġġustament tal-valur referenzjali tal-proporzjon tad-dejn, għandha tiġi kkunsidrata l-influwenza taċ-ċiklu fuq il-pass tat-tnaqqis tad-dejn.";

(c) paragraphs 3 to 7 are replaced by the following:

(c) il-paragrafi 3 sa 7 huma ssostitwiti b’dan li ġej:

"3. The Commission, when preparing a report under Article 126(3) TFEU, shall take into account all relevant factors as indicated in that Article, in so far as they significantly affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and debt criteria by the Member State concerned. The report shall reflect, as appropriate:

"3. Meta tħejji rapport taħt l-Artikolu 126(3) tat-TFUE, il-Kummissjoni għandha tqis il-fatturi rilevanti kollha kif indikat f’dak l-Artikolu, sakemm dawn jaffettwaw b’mod sinifikanti l-valutazzjoni tal-konformità mal-kriterji tad-defiċit u tad-dejn mill-Istat Membru kkonċernat. Ir-rapport għandu jirrifletti, kif xieraq:

(a) the developments in the medium-term economic position, in particular potential growth, including the various contributions provided by labour, capital accumulation and total factor productivity, cyclical developments, and the private sector net savings position;

(a) l-iżviluppi fil-pożizzjoni ekonomika għall-perjodu medju, b’mod partikolari, it-tkabbir potenzjali, inklużi l-kontribuzzjonijiet varji pprovduti mix-xogħol, l-akkumulazzjoni ta’ kapital u l-prodottività tal-fatturi totali, l-iżviluppi ċikliċi u l-pożizzjoni tat-tfaddil nett tas-settur privat;

(b) the developments in the medium-term budgetary positions, including, in particular, the record of adjustment towards the medium-term budgetary objective, the level of the primary balance and developments in primary expenditure, both current and capital, the implementation of policies in the context of the prevention and correction of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, the implementation of policies in the context of the common growth strategy of the Union, and the overall quality of public finances, in particular the effectiveness of national budgetary frameworks;

(b) l-iżviluppi fil-pożizzjonijiet baġitarji għall-perjodu medju, inkluż b’mod partikolari r-rekord tal-aġġustament lejn l-għan tal-estimi fuq terminu medju ta’ żmien, il-livell ta’ bilanċ primarju u żviluppi fin-nefqa primarja, kemm kurrenti u kemm kapitali, l-implimentazzjoni ta’ politika fil-kuntest tal-prevenzjoni u l-korrezzjoni ta’ żbilanċi makroekonomiċi eċċessivi, l-implimentazzjoni ta’ linji ta’ politika fil-kuntest tal-istrateġija ta’ tkabbir komuni għall-Unjoni, u l-kwalità ġenerali tal-finanzi pubbliċi, b’mod partikolari, l-effettività ta’ oqfsa baġitarji nazzjonali;

(c) the developments in the medium-term government debt position, its dynamics and sustainability, including, in particular, risk factors including the maturity structure and currency denomination of the debt, stock-flow adjustment and its composition, accumulated reserves and other financial assets, guarantees, in particular those linked to the financial sector, and any implicit liabilities related to ageing and private debt, to the extent that it may represent a contingent implicit liability for the government.

(c) l-iżviluppi fil-pożizzjoni tad-dejn tal-gvern għal terminu medju, id-dinamika u s-sostenibbiltà tagħha (b’mod partikolari, il-fatturi ta’ riskju inklużi l-istruttura tal-maturità u d-denominazzjoni tal-valuta tad-dejn, l-aġġustament tal-flussi tal-istokks u l-kompożizzjoni tiegħu, ir-riżervi akkumulati u assi oħra finanzjarji, il-garanziji, b’mod partikolari dawk marbuta mas-settur finanzjarju; u kwalunkwe responsabbiltà impliċita marbuta max-xjuħija u d-dejn privat sal-punt li jista’ jirrappreżenta responsabbiltà impliċita kontinġenti għall-gvern);

The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union, the debt incurred in the form of bilateral and multilateral support between Member States in the context of safeguarding financial stability, and the debt related to financial stabilisation operations during major financial disturbances.

Il-Kummissjoni għandha tagħti kunsiderazzjoni xierqa u espliċita lil kwalunkwe fattur ieħor li, fl-opinjoni tal-Istat Membru kkonċernat huwa rilevanti sabiex tkun ivvalutata b’mod komprensiv il-konformità mal-kriterji tad-defiċit u d-dejn u li l-Istat Membru ressaq quddiem il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni. F’dak il-kuntest, għandha tingħata konsiderazzjoni partikolari għal: kontribuzzjonijiet finanzjarji għat-trawwim ta’ solidarjetà internazzjonali u għall-kisba tal-miri tal-politika tal-Unjoni; id-dejn li jsir fil-forma ta’ appoġġ bilaterali u multilaterali bejn l-Istati Membri fil-kuntest tas-salvagwardja tal-istabbiltà finanzjarja u d-dejn relatat mal-operazzjonijiet ta’ stabilizzazzjoni finanzjarja waqt tfixkil finanzjarju ewlieni.

4. The Council and the Commission shall make a balanced overall assessment of all the relevant factors, specifically, the extent to which they affect the assessment of compliance with the deficit and/or the debt criteria as aggravating or mitigating factors. When assessing compliance on the basis of the deficit criterion, if the ratio of the government debt to GDP exceeds the reference value, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit provided for in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 126 TFEU only if the double condition of the overarching principle — that, before these relevant factors are taken into account, the general government deficit remains close to the reference value and its excess over the reference value is temporary — is fully met.

4. Il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni għandhom jagħmlu valutazzjoni kumplessiva bbilanċjata tal-fatturi rilevanti kollha, speċifikament il-limitu safejn jaffettwaw il-valutazzjoni tal-konformità mal-kriterji tad-defiċit u/jew tad-dejn bħala fatturi ta’ aggravazzjoni jew ta’ mitigazzjoni. Meta jivvalutaw il-konformità abbażi tal-kriterju tad-defiċit, jekk il-proporzjon tad-dejn tal-gvern għall-PDG jaqbeż il-valur referenzjali, għandu jittieħed kont ta’ dawn il-fatturi fil-passi li jwasslu għad-deċiżjoni rigward l-eżistenza ta’ defiċit eċċessiv kif previst fil-paragrafi 4, 5 u 6 tal-Artikolu 126 tat-TFUE biss jekk il-kundizzjoni doppja tal-prinċipju ġenerali — li, qabel ma jittieħed kont ta’ dawn il-fatturi rilevanti, id-defiċit ġenerali tal-gvern jibqa’ qrib il-valur referenzjali u l-eċċess tiegħu fuq il-valur referenzjali jkun temporanju — tiġi sodisfatta b’mod sħiħ.

However, those factors shall be taken into account in the steps leading to the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit when assessing compliance on the basis of the debt criterion.

Madanakollu, għandu jittieħed kont ta’ dawn il-fatturi fil-passi li jwasslu għad-deċiżjoni dwar l-eżistenza ta’ defiċit eċċessiv meta tiġi vvalutata l-konformità abbażi tal-kriterju tad-dejn.

5. When assessing compliance with the deficit and debt criterion and in the subsequent steps of the excessive deficit procedure, the Council and the Commission shall give due consideration to the implementation of pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar and the net cost of the publicly managed pillar. In particular, consideration shall be given to the features of the overall pension system created by the reform, namely whether it promotes long-term sustainability while not increasing risks for the medium-term budgetary position.

5. Meta jkunu qed jivvalutaw il-konformità mal-kriterji ta’ defiċit u ta’ dejn u fil-passi sussegwenti tal-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni għandhom jagħtu konsiderazzjoni mistħoqqa lill-implimentazzjoni ta’ riformi tal-pensjoni li jintroduċu sistema b’diversi pilastri li tinkludi pilastru obbligatorju ffinanzjat kompletament u l-kost nett tal-pilastru ġestit b’mod pubbliku. B’mod partikolari, għandhom jiġu kkunsidrati l-fatturi tas-sistema ġenerali tal-pensjoni maħluqa mir-riforma, jiġifieri jekk tippromwovix is-sostenibbiltà għall-perjodu twil mingħajr ma żżid ir-riskji għall-pożizzjoni baġitarja għall-perjodu medju.

6. If the Council, acting under Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as specified in Article 3(5) and Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that deadline. However, those relevant factors shall not be taken into account for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126 TFEU.

6. Jekk il-Kunsill, filwaqt li jaġixxi taħt l-Artikolu 126(6) tat-TFUE, jiddeċiedi li jeżisti defiċit eċċessiv fi Stat Membru, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni għandhom, fil-passi proċedurali sussegwenti ta’ dak l-Artikolu tat-TFUE, jikkunsidraw il-fatturi rilevanti msemmija fil-paragrafu 3 ta’ dan l-Artikolu, billi huma jaffettwaw is-sitwazzjoni tal-Istat Membru kkonċernat, inkluż kif speċifikat fl-Artikolu 3(5) u Artikolu 5(2) ta’ dan ir-Regolament, b’mod partikolari fl-iffissar ta’ skadenza għall-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv u eventwalment fl-estensjoni tal-iskadenza. Madanakollu, dawk il-fatturi rilevanti m’għandhomx jiġu kkunsidrati għad-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill skont l-Artikolu 126(12) tat-TFUE dwar it-tħassir ta’ xi wħud mid-deċiżjonijiet tiegħu jew id-deċiżjonijiet kollha skont il-paragrafi 6 sa 9 u l-paragrafu 11 tal-Artikolu 126 TFUE.

7. In the case of Member States where the excess of the deficit over the reference value reflects the implementation of a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar, the Council and the Commission shall also consider the cost of the reform when assessing developments of deficit figures in excessive deficit procedures as long as the deficit does not significantly exceed a level that can be considered close to the reference value, and the debt ratio does not exceed the reference value, provided that overall fiscal sustainability is maintained. The net cost shall be taken into account also for the decision of the Council under Article 126(12) TFEU on the abrogation of some or all of its decisions under paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11 of Article 126 TFEU, if the deficit has declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level that comes close to the reference value.";

7. Fil-każ ta’ Stati Membri fejn l-eċċess tad-defiċit fuq il-valur referenzjali jirrifletti l-implimentazzjoni ta’ riformi tal-pensjonijiet bl-introduzzjoni ta’ sistema b’diversi pilastri li tinkludi pilastru obbligatorju ffinanzjat kompletament, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni għandhom iqisu wkoll l-ispiża tar-riforma meta jivvalutaw l-iżviluppi fiċ-ċifri tad-defiċit fil-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv sakemm id-defiċit ma jeċċedix b’mod sinifikanti livell li jista’ jitqies qrib il-valur referenzjali, u l-proporzjon tad-dejn ma jeċċedix il-valur referenzjali bil-kondizzjoni li tinżamm is-sostenibbiltà fiskali ġenerali. Għandu jittieħed kont tal-kost nett ukoll għad-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill skont l-Artikolu 126(12) tat-TFUE dwar it-tneħħija ta’ wħud mid-deċiżjonijiet tiegħu jew tad-deċiżjonijiet tiegħu kollha taħt il-paragrafi 6 sa 9 u 11 tal-Artikolu 126 TFUE, jekk id-defiċit ikun naqas sostanzjalment u kontinwament u jkun laħaq livell li joqrob il-valur referenzjali.".

(3) the following section is inserted:

(3) Tiddaħħal it-taqsima li ġejja:

"SECTION 1A

"TAQSIMA 1 A

ECONOMIC DIALOGUE

DJALOGU EKONOMIKU

Article 2a

Artikolu 2a

1. In order to enhance the dialogue between the institutions of the Union, in particular the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and to ensure greater transparency and accountability, the competent committee of the European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of the European Council or the President of the Eurogroup, to appear before the committee to discuss Council decisions under Article 126(6) TFEU, Council recommendations under Article 126(7) TFEU, notices under Article 126(9) TFEU, or Council decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU.

1. Bl-iskop li jitjieb id-djalogu bejn l-istituzzjonijiet tal-Unjoni, b’mod partikolari l-Parlament Ewropew, il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni, u bl-iskop li jkunu żgurati aktar trasparenza u responsabbiltà politika, il-kumitat kompetenti tal-Parlament Ewropew jista’ jistieden lill-President tal-Kunsill, lill-Kummissjoni u, fejn ikun xieraq, lill-President tal-Kunsill Ewropew jew lill-President tal-Eurogroup sabiex jidhru quddiem il-kumitat biex jiddiskutu d-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(6) tat-TFUE, ir-rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(7) tat-TFUE, avviżi taħt l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE u deċiżjonijiet tal-Kunsill meħuda skont l-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE.

The Council is, as a rule, expected to follow the recommendations and proposals of the Commission or explain its position publicly.

Il-Kunsill huwa mistenni li, bħala regola, jsegwi r-rakkomandazzjonijiet u l-proposti tal-Kummissjoni jew jispjega l-pożizzjoni tiegħu b’mod pubbliku.

The competent committee of the European Parliament may offer the opportunity to the Member State concerned by such decisions, recommendations or notices to participate in an exchange of views.

Il-kumitat kompetenti tal-Parlament Ewropew jista’ joffri l-opportunità lill-Istat Membru kkonċernat minn dawn id-deċiżjonijiet, rakkomandazzjonijiet jew avviżi sabiex jipparteċipa fi skambju ta’ opinjonijiet

2. The Council and the Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament of the application of this Regulation.";

2. Il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni għandhom jinfurmaw regolarment lill-Parlament Ewropew dwar l-applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament.";

(4) Article 3 is amended as follows:

(4) L-Artikolu 3 jiġi emendat kif ġej:

(a) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

(a) il-paragrafu 2 huwa ssostitwit b’dan li ġej:

"2. Taking fully into account the opinion referred to in paragraph 1, the Commission, if it considers that an excessive deficit exists, shall address an opinion and a proposal to the Council in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 126 TFEU and shall inform the European Parliament thereof.";

"2. B’kont sħiħ meħud tal-opinjoni msemmija fil-paragrafu 1, jekk tqis li jeżisti defiċit eċċessiv, il-Kummissjoni għandha tindirizza opinjoni u proposta lill-Kunsill skont il-paragrafi (5) u (6) tal-Artikolu 126 tat-TFUE u għandha tinforma lill-Parlament Ewropew b’dan.";

(b) in paragraph 3, the reference to "Article 4(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 3605/93" is replaced by a reference to "Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009";

(b) Fil-paragrafu 3, ir-referenza għall-"Artikolu 4(2) u (3) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 3605/93" hija ssostitwita b’referenza għall-"Artikolu 3(2) u (3) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 479/2009".

(c) paragraphs 4 and 5 are replaced by the following:

(c) il-paragrafi 4 u 5 huma ssostitwiti b’dan li ġej:

"4. The Council recommendation made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU shall establish a maximum deadline of six months for effective action to be taken by the Member State concerned. When warranted by the seriousness of the situation, the deadline for effective action may be three months. The Council recommendation shall also establish a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, which shall be completed in the year following its identification unless there are special circumstances. In its recommendation, the Council shall request that the Member State achieve annual budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the recommendation.

"4. Ir-rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kunsill magħmula b’konformità mal-Artikolu 126(7) tat-TFUE għandha tistabbilixxi skadenza massima ta’ sitt xhur għal azzjoni effettiva li trid tittieħed mill-Istat Membru kkonċernat. Meta l-livell ta’ gravità tas-sitwazzjoni jkun jiġġustifikaha, l-iskadenza għal azzjoni effettiva tista’ tkun ta’ tliet xhur. Ir-rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kunsill għandha tistabbilixxi wkoll skadenza għall-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv, li għandha titlesta fis-sena ta’ wara l-identifikazzjoni tiegħu sakemm ma jkunx hemm ċirkostanzi speċjali. Fir-rakkomandazzjoni tiegħu, il-Kunsill għandu jitlob li l-Istat Membru jilħaq miri baġitarji annwali li, abbażi tat-tbassir li huwa l-bażi tar-rakkomandazzjoni, ikunu konsistenti ma’ titjib annwali minimu ta’ mill-inqas 0,5 % tal-PDG bħala valur referenzjali, fil-bilanċ nett tiegħu aġġustat ċiklikament minn miżuri ta’ darba jew temporanji, sabiex tkun żgurata l-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv sal-iskadenza stipulata fir-rakkomandazzjoni.

4a. Within the deadline provided for in paragraph 4, the Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response to the Council’s recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The report shall include the targets for government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side consistent with the Council’s recommendation, as well as information on the measures taken and the nature of those envisaged to achieve the targets. The Member State shall make the report public.

4a. Sal-iskadenza prevista fil-paragrafu 4, l-Istat Membru kkonċernat għandu jirrapporta lill-Kunsill u lill-Kummissjoni dwar l-azzjoni meħuda b’reazzjoni għar-rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kunsill skont l-Artikolu 126(7) tat-TFUE. Ir-rapport għandu jinkludi l-miri għan-nefqa u d-dħul tal-gvern u għall-miżuri diskrezzjonarji fin-naħa tan-nefqa u d-dħul b’mod konsistenti mar-rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kunsill, kif ukoll l-informazzjoni dwar il-miżuri meħuda u n-natura ta’ dawk previsti biex jintlaħqu l-miri. L-Istat Membru għandu jagħmel ir-rapport pubbliku.

5. If effective action has been taken in compliance with a recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of that recommendation, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU. The revised recommendation, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. The Council shall assess the existence of unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances against the economic forecasts in its recommendation. In the case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole, the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised recommendation under Article 126(7) TFEU provided that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.";

5. Jekk tkun ittieħdet azzjoni effettiva b’konformità mar-rakkomandazzjoni taħt l-Artikolu 126(7) tat-TFUE u wara l-adozzjoni ta’ dik ir-rakkomandazzjoni jseħħu avvenimenti ekonomiċi negattivi b’konsegwenzi maġġuri żvantaġġużi għall-finanzi tal-gvern, il-Kunsill jista’ jiddeċiedi, fuq rakkomandazzjoni mingħand il-Kummissjoni, li jadotta rakkomandazzjoni riveduta skont l-Artikolu 126(7) tat-TFUE. L-avviż rivedut, b’kont meħud tal-fatturi rilevanti msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(3) ta’ dan ir-Regolament jista’, b’mod partikolari, jestendi notevolment l-iskadenza għall-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv b’sena bħala regola. Il-Kunsill għandu jivvaluta l-eżistenza ta’ avvenimenti ekonomiċi negattivi mhux mistennija b’konsegwenzi maġġuri żvantaġġużi għall-finanzi tal-gvern kontra t-tbassir ekonomiku fir-rakkomandazzjoni tiegħu. Fil-każ ta’ tnaqqis gravi fir-ritmu ekonomiku fiż-żona tal-euro jew fl-Unjoni ġeneralment, il-Kunsill jista’ wkoll jiddeċiedi, fuq rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni, li jadotta rakkomandazzjoni riveduta taħt l-Artikolu 126(7) tat-TFUE bil-kundizzjoni li dan ma jipperikolax is-sostenibbiltà fiskali għall-perjodu medju.";

(5) in Article 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

(5) Fl-Artikolu 4, il-paragrafi 1 u 2 huma ssostitwiti b’dan li ġej:

"1. Any decision by the Council under Article 126(8) TFEU to make public its recommendations where it is established that no effective action has been taken, shall be taken immediately after the expiry of the deadline set in accordance with Article 3(4) of this Regulation.

"1. Kull deċiżjoni mill-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(8) tat-TFUE sabiex jagħmel pubbliċi r-rakkomandazzjonijiet tiegħu fejn ikun stabbilit li ma ttieħdet l-ebda azzjoni effettiva għandha tittieħed immedjatament wara li jiskadi l-limitu ta’ żmien stabbilit skont l-Artikolu 3(4) ta’ dan ir-Regolament.

2. The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its recommendations made in accordance with Article 126(7) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 3(4a) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as on any other publicly announced decisions by the government of the Member State concerned.

2. Il-Kunsill, meta jikkunsidra jekk itteħditx azzjoni effettiva b’reazzjoni għar-rakkomandazzjonijiet tiegħu magħmula b’konformità mal-Artikolu 126(7) tat-TFUE, għandu jibbaża d-deċiżjoni tiegħu fuq ir-rapport ippreżentat mill-Istat Membru kkonċernat f’konformità mal-Artikolu 3(4a) ta’ dan ir-Regolament u l-implimentazzjoni tiegħu kif ukoll fuq kwalunkwe deċiżjoni oħra mħabbra pubblikament mill-gvern tal-Istat Membru kkonċernat.

Where the Council establishes, in accordance with Article 126(8) TFEU, that the Member State concerned has failed to take effective action, it shall report to the European Council accordingly.";

Meta l-Kunsill jistabbilixxi, skont l-Artikolu 126(8) tat-TFUE, li l-Istat Membru kkonċernat naqas milli jieħu azzjoni effettiva, huwa għandu għaldaqstant jirrapporta lill-Kunsill Ewropew.";

(6) in Article 5, paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

(6) Fl-Artikolu 5, il-paragrafi 1 u 2 huma ssostitwiti b’dan li ġej:

"1. Any Council decision to give notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures for the deficit reduction in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU shall be taken within two months of the Council decision under Article 126(8) TFEU establishing that no effective action has been taken. In the notice, the Council shall request that the Member State achieve annual budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the notice, are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0,5 % of GDP as a benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the notice. The Council shall also indicate measures conducive to the achievement of those targets.

"1. Kull deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill li jingħata avviż lill-Istat Membru parteċipanti kkonċernat biex jieħu miżuri għat-tnaqqis tad-defiċit f’konformità mal-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE għandha tittieħed fi żmien xahrejn mid-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(8) tat-TFUE li tistabbilixxi li ma ttieħdet l-ebda azzjoni effettiva. Fl-avviż, il-Kunsill għandu jitlob li l-Istat Membru jilħaq miri baġitarji annwali li, abbażi tat-tbassir li huwa l-bażi tal-avviż, huma konsistenti ma’ titjib annwali minimu ta’ mill-inqas 0,5 % tal-PDG bħala valur referenzjali, fil-bilanċ nett tiegħu aġġustat ċiklikament minn miżuri ta’ darba jew temporanji, sabiex tkun żgurata l-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv qabel l-iskadenza stipulata fl-avviż. Il-Kunsill għandu wkoll jindika miżuri li jwasslu għall-kisba ta’ dawk il-miri.

1a. Following a Council notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, the Member State concerned shall report to the Council and the Commission on action taken in response thereto. The report shall include the targets for the government expenditure and revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side, as well as information on the actions being taken in response to the specific Council recommendations so as to allow the Council to take, if necessary, a decision in accordance with Article 6(2) of this Regulation. The Member State shall make the report public.

1a. B’segwitu għall-avviż tal-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE, l-Istat Membru kkonċernat għandu jirrapporta lill-Kunsill u lill-Kummissjoni dwar l-azzjoni meħuda b’reazzjoni għalih. Ir-rapport għandu jinkludi l-miri għan-nefqa u d-dħul tal-gvern u għal miżuri diskrezzjonarji fin-naħa tan-nefqa u d-dħul, kif ukoll l-informazzjoni dwar il-miżuri meħuda b’reazzjoni għar-rakkomandazzjonijiet speċifiċi tal-Kunsill sabiex il-Kunsill ikun jista’ jieħu, jekk ikun meħtieġ, deċiżjoni f’konformità mal-Artikolu 6(2) ta’ dan ir-Regolament. L-Istat Membru għandu jagħmel ir-rapport pubbliku.

2. If effective action has been taken in compliance with a notice under Article 126(9) TFEU and unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances occur after the adoption of that notice, the Council may decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU. The revised notice, taking into account the relevant factors referred to in Article 2(3) of this Regulation may, in particular, extend the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit by one year as a rule. The Council shall assess the existence of unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for government finances against the economic forecasts in its notice. In the case of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or in the Union as a whole, the Council may also decide, on a recommendation from the Commission, to adopt a revised notice under Article 126(9) TFEU, on condition that this does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term.";

2. Jekk azzjoni effettiva tkun ittieħdet f’konformità mal-avviż skont l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE u wara l-adozzjoni ta’ dak l-avviż iseħħu avvenimenti ekonomiċi negattivi b’konsegwenzi maġġuri żvantaġġużi għall-finanzi tal-gvern, il-Kunsill jista’ jiddeċiedi, fuq rakkomandazzjoni mingħand il-Kummissjoni, li jadotta avviż rivedut skont l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE. L-avviż rivedut, b’kont meħud tal-fatturi rilevanti msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(3) ta’ dan ir-Regolament, bħala regola, jista’, partikolarment, jestendi l-iskadenza għall-korrezzjoni tad-defiċit eċċessiv b’sena. Il-Kunsill jista’ jivvaluta l-eżistenza ta’ avvenimenti ekonomiċi negattivi b’konsegwenzi maġġuri żvantaġġużi għall-finanzi tal-gvern kontra t-tbassir ekonomiku fl-avviż tiegħu. Fil-każ ta’ tnaqqis gravi fir-ritmu ekonomiku fiż-żona tal-euro jew fl-Unjoni ġeneralment, il-Kunsill jista’ wkoll jiddeċiedi, fuq rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni, li jadotta avviż rivedut skont l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE fuq il-kundizzjoni li dan ma jipperikolax is-sostenibbiltà fiskali għall-perjodu medju.";

(7) Articles 6 to 8 are replaced by the following:

(7) L-Artikoli 6 sa 8 huma ssostitwiti b’dan li ġej:

"Article 6

"Artikolu 6

1. The Council, when considering whether effective action has been taken in response to its notice made in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU, shall base its decision on the report submitted by the Member State concerned in accordance with Article 5(1a) of this Regulation and its implementation, as well as on any other publicly announced decisions by the government of the Member State concerned. The outcome of the surveillance mission carried out by the Commission in accordance with Article 10a of this Regulation shall be taken into account.

1. Meta jikkunsidra jekk ittieħditx azzjoni effettiva b’reazzjoni għall-avviż tiegħu magħmul f’konformità mal-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE, il-Kunsill għandu jibbaża d-deċiżjoni tiegħu fuq ir-rapport imressaq mill-Istat Membru kkonċernat f’konformità mal-Artikolu 5(1a) ta’ dan ir-Regolament u l-implimentazzjoni tiegħu kif ukoll fuq kull deċiżjoni oħra mħabbra pubblikament mill-gvern tal-Istat Membru kkonċernat. Ir-riżultat tal-missjoni ta’ sorveljanza mwettaq mill-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 10a ta’ dan ir-Regolament għandu jiġi kkunsidrat.

2. Where the conditions to apply Article 126(11) TFEU are met, the Council shall impose sanctions in accordance with that Article. Any such decision shall be taken no later than four months after the Council decision under Article 126(9) TFEU giving notice to the participating Member State concerned to take measures.

2. Meta l-kondizzjoniet għall-applikazzjoni tal-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE jiġu sodisfatti, il-Kunsill għandu jimponi sanzjonijiet f’konformità ma’ dak l-Artikolu. Kull deċiżjoni bħal din għandha tittieħed mhux aktar tard minn erba’ xhur wara d-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE li tagħti avviż lill-Istat Membru parteċipanti kkonċernat biex jieħu l-miżuri.

Article 7

Artikolu 7

If a participating Member State fails to act in compliance with the successive acts of the Council in accordance with Article 126(7) and (9) TFEU, the decision of the Council under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions shall be taken as a rule within 16 months of the reporting dates established in Article 3(2) and (3) of Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. Where Article 3(5) or Article 5(2) of this Regulation is applied, the 16-month deadline shall be adjusted accordingly. An expedited procedure shall be used in the case of a deliberately planned deficit which the Council decides is excessive.

Jekk Stat Membru parteċipanti ma jikkonformax mal-atti suċċessivi tal-Kunsill skont l-Artikolu 126(7) u (9) tat-TFUE, id-deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE li jimponi sanzjonijiet għandha tittieħed bħala regola fi żmien sittax-il xahar mid-dati ta’ rapportaġġ stabbiliti fl-Artikolu 3(2) u (3) tar-Regolament (KE) Nru 479/2009. Fejn jiġu applikati l-Artikolu 3(5) jew l-Artikolu 5(2) ta’ dan ir-Regolament, l-iskadenza ta’ sittax-il xahar għandha tiġi għaldaqstant aġġustata. Għandha ttintuża proċedura xierqa fil-każ ta’ defiċit ippjanat deliberatament li l-Kunsill jiddeċiedi li hu eċċessiv.

Article 8

Artikolu 8

Any Council decision under Article 126(11) TFEU to intensify sanctions shall be taken no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009. Any Council decision under Article 126(12) TFEU to abrogate some or all of its decisions shall be taken as soon as possible and in any event no later than two months after the reporting dates pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 479/2009.";

Kull deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE biex jintensifika s-sanzjonijiet għandha tittieħed mhux aktar tard minn xahrejn wara d-dati tar-rappurtar skont ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 479/2009. Kull deċiżjoni tal-Kunsill taħt l-Artikolu 126(12) tat-TFUE biex jitneħħew uħud mid-deċiżjonijiet tiegħu jew id-deċiżjonijiet tiegħu kollha skont l-Artikolu 126(12) tat-TFUE għandha tittieħed malajr kemm jista’ jkun u fi kwalunkwe każ mhux aktar tard minn xahrejn wara d-dati tar-rappurtar skont ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 479/2009.";

(8) in Article 9(3), the reference to "Article 6" is replaced by a reference to "Article 6(2)";

(8) Fl-Artikolu 9(3), ir-referenza għall-"Artikolu 6" hija ssostitwita bir-referenza għall-"Artikolu 6(2)".

(9) Article 10 is amended as follows:

(9) L-Artikolu 10 jiġi emendat kif ġej:

(a) the introductory words of paragraph 1 are replaced by the following:

(a) il-frażi introduttorja tal-paragrafu 1 hija ssostitwita b’dan li ġej:

"1. The Council and the Commission shall regularly monitor the implementation of action taken:";

"1. Il-Kunsill u l-Kummissjoni għandhom jissorveljaw b’mod regolari l-implimentazzjoni tal-azzjoni meħuda.";

(b) in paragraph 3, the reference to "Regulation (EC) No 3605/93" is replaced by a reference to "Regulation (EC) No 479/2009".;

(b) fil-paragrafu 3, ir-referenza għar-"Regolament (KE) Nru 3605/93" hija ssostitwita b’referenza għar-"Regolament (KE) Nru 479/2009";

(10) the following Article is inserted:

(10) Għandu jiddaħħal l-Artikolu li ġej:

"Article 10a

"Artikolu 10a

1. The Commission shall ensure a permanent dialogue with authorities of the Member States in accordance with the objectives of this Regulation. To that end, the Commission shall, in particular, carry out missions for the purpose of the assessment of the actual economic situation in the Member State and the identification of any risks or difficulties in complying with the objectives of this Regulation.

1. Il-Kummissjoni għandha tiżgura djalogu permanenti mal-awtoritajiet tal-Istati Membri skont l-għanijiet ta’ dan ir-Regolament. Għal dan l-għan, Il-Kummissjoni għandha, b’mod partikolari, tagħmel missjonijiet ta’ valutazzjoni dwar is-sitwazzjoni ekonomika attwali fl-Istat Membri u l-identifikazzjoni ta’ kwalunkwe riskju jew diffikultà ta’ konformità mal-għanijiet ta’ dan ir-Regolament.

2. Enhanced surveillance may be undertaken for Member States which are the subject of recommendations and notices issued following a decision pursuant to Article 126(8) TFEU and decisions under Article 126(11) TFEU for the purposes of on-site monitoring. The Member States concerned shall provide all necessary information for the preparation and the conduct of the mission.

2. Tista’ ssir sorveljanza msaħħa għal Stati Membri li jkunu s-suġġett ta’ rakkomandazzjonijiet u avviżi b’segwitu għal deċiżjoni skont l-Artikolu 126(8) tat-TFUE u deċiżjonijiet skont l-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE għall-finijiet ta’ monitoraġġ ta’ fuq il-post. L-Istati Membri konċernati għandhom jipprovdu l-informazzjoni kollha neċessarja għall-preparazzjoni u t-tmexxija tal-missjoni.

3. The Commission may invite representatives of the European Central Bank, if appropriate, to participate in surveillance missions in a Member State whose currency is the euro or which is participating in the Agreement of 16 March 2006 between the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Member States outside the euro area laying down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary Union [] (ERM II).

3. Il-Kummissjoni tista’ tistieden rappreżentanti tal-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew, jekk ikun xieraq, biex jieħdu sehem f’missjonijiet ta’ sorveljanza fi Stat Membru li l-munita tiegħu hija l-euro jew li jipparteċipa fil-Ftehim tas- 16 ta’ Marzu 2006 bejn il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew u l-banek ċentrali nazzjonali tal-Istati Membri barra ż-żona tal-euro li jistabbilixxi l-proċeduri operattivi għal mekkaniżmu tar-rata tal-kambju fit-tielet stadju tal-Unjoni Ekonomika u Monetarja [] (ERM II).

4. The Commission shall report to the Council on the outcome of the mission referred to in paragraph 2 and may decide to make its findings public.

4. Il-Kummissjoni għandha tirrapporta lill-Kunsill dwar ir-riżultat tal-missjoni msemmija fil-paragarafu 2 u tista’ tiddeċiedi li tagħmel il-konklużjonijiet tagħha disponibbli għall-pubbliku.

5. When organising surveillance missions referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission shall transmit its provisional findings to the Member States concerned for comments.;

5. Meta torganizza missjonijiet ta’ sorveljanza msemmijin fil-paragrafu 2, il-Kummissjoni għandha tittrasmetti l-konklużjonijiet proviżorji tagħha lill-Istati Membri konċernati għall-kummenti tagħhom.

(11) Articles 11 and 12 are replaced by the following:

(11) L-Artikoli 11 u 12 huma ssostitwiti b’dan li ġej:

"Article 11

"Artikolu 11

Whenever the Council decides under Article 126(11) TFEU to impose sanctions on a participating Member State, a fine shall, as a rule, be required. The Council may decide to supplement such a fine by the other measures provided for in Article 126(11) TFEU.

Kull meta l-Kunsill jiddeċiedi, taħt l-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE, li jimponi sanzjonijiet fuq Stat Membru parteċipanti, bħala regola għandha tkun meħtieġa multa. Il-Kunsill jista’ jiddeċiedi li jissupplimenta tali multa bil-miżuri l-oħrajn previsti fl-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE.

Article 12

Artikolu 12

1. The amount of the fine shall comprise a fixed component equal to 0,2 % of GDP, and a variable component. The variable component shall amount to one tenth of the absolute value of the difference between the balance as a percentage of GDP in the preceding year and either the reference value for government balance or, if non-compliance with budgetary discipline includes the debt criterion, the government balance as a percentage of GDP that should have been achieved in the same year according to the notice issued under Article 126(9) TFEU.

1. L-ammont tal-multa għandu jikkonsisti minn komponent fiss ugwali għal 0,2 % tal-PDG, u komponent li jvarja. Il-komponent varjabbli għandu jammonta għal wieħed minn għaxra tal-valur assolut tad-differenza bejn il-bilanċ bħala perċentwal tal-PDG fis-sena preċedenti u jew il-valur referenzjali għall-bilanċ tal-gvern, jonkella, jekk in-nuqqas ta’ konformità mad-dixxiplina baġitarja jinkludi l-kriterju tad-dejn, il-bilanċ tal-gvern bħala perċentwal tal-PDG li kellu jinkiseb fl-istess sena skont l-avviż maħruġ skont l-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE.

2. In each year following that in which a fine is imposed, until the decision on the existence of an excessive deficit is abrogated, the Council shall assess whether the participating Member State concerned has taken effective action in response to the Council notice in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU. In this annual assessment the Council shall decide, in accordance with Article 126(11) TFEU, to intensify the sanctions, unless the participating Member State concerned has complied with the Council’s notice. If the Council decides to impose an additional fine, it shall be calculated in the same way as for the variable component of the fine referred to in paragraph 1.

2. Kull sena sussegwenti għal dik li fiha tkun imposta multa, sa meta tiġi revokata d-deċiżjoni dwar l-eżistenza ta’ defiċit eċċessiv, il-Kunsill għandu jivvaluta jekk l-Istat Membru parteċipanti kkonċernat ikunx ħa azzjoni effettiva b’reazzjoni għall-avviż tal-Kunsill f’konformità mal-Artikolu 126(9) tat-TFUE. F’din il-valutazzjoni annwali, il-Kunsill għandu jiddeċiedi, f’konformità mal-Artikolu 126(11) tat-TFUE, li jintensifika s-sanzjonijiet, sakemm l-Istat Membru parteċipanti kkonċernat ma jkunx ikkonforma mal-avviż tal-Kunsill. Jekk il-Kunsill jiddeċiedi li jimponi multa addizzjonali, għandha tkun ikkalkulata bl-istess mod bħal tal-komponent varjabbli tal-multa msemmija fil-paragrafu 1.

3. No single fine referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall exceed 0,5 % of GDP.";

3. L-ebda multa waħdanija msemmija fil-paragrafi 1 u 2 ma għandha taqbeż 0,5 % tal-PDG.";

(12) Article 13 is hereby deleted and the reference to it in Article 15 is replaced by a reference to "Article 12";

(12) L-Artikolu 13 huwa b’dan imħassar u r-referenzi għalih fl-Artikolu 15 huma ssostitwiti b’referenza għall-"Artikolu 12";

(13) Article 16 is replaced by the following:

(13) L-Artikolu 16 huwa ssostitwit b’dan li ġej:

"Article 16

"Artikolu 16

The fines referred to in Article 12 shall constitute other revenue, as referred to in Article 311 TFEU, and shall be assigned to the European Financial Stability Facility. When the participating Member States create another stability mechanism to provide financial assistance in order to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole, the amount of those fines shall be assigned to that mechanism.";

Il-multi msemmija fl-Artikolu 12 għandhom jikkostitwixxu dħul ieħor, kif imsemmi fl-Artikolu 311 tat-TFUE, u għandhom jiġu assenjati għall-Faċilità Ewropea ta’ Stabbiltà Finanzjarja. Meta l-Istati Membri parteċipanti joħolqu mekkaniżmu ta’ stabbiltà ieħor li jipprovdi assistenza finanzjarja sabiex tkun salvagwardjata l-istabbiltà taż-żona tal-euro kollha, l-ammont tal-multi għandu jiġi assenjat lil dak il-mekkaniżmu.";

(14) the following Article is inserted:

(14) Jiddaħħal l-Artikolu li ġej:

"Article 17a

"Artikolu 17a

1. By 14 December 2014 and every five years thereafter, the Commission shall publish a report on the application of this Regulation.

1. Sat- 28 ta’ Diċembru 2014 u kull hames snin wara, il-Kummissjoni għandha tippubblika rapport dwar l-applikazzjoni ta’ dan ir-Regolament.

That report shall evaluate, inter alia:

Dak ir-rapport għandu jivvaluta, inter alia:

(a) the effectiveness of this Regulation;

(a) l-effettività ta’ dan ir-Regolament;

(b) the progress in ensuring closer coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of economic performances of the Member States in accordance with the TFEU.

(b) il-progress li jsir sabiex jiġi żgurat koordinament iktar mill-qrib tal-linji ta’ politika ekonomika u tal-konverġenza kontinwa fl-attività ekonomika tal-Istati Membri skont it-TFUE.

2. Where appropriate, the report referred to in paragraph 1 shall be accompanied by a proposal for amendments to this Regulation.

2. Fejn ikun xieraq, ir-rapport imsemmi fil-paragrau 1 għandu jkun akkumpanjat minn proposta għal emendi għal dan ir-Regolament.

3. The report shall be forwarded to the European Parliament and to the Council.";

3. Ir-rapport għandu jintbagħat lill-Parlament Ewropew u lill-Kunsill.";

(15) throughout Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, all references to "Article 104 of the Treaty" are replaced by references to "Article 126 TFEU";

(15) Fir-Regolament (KE) 1467/97kollu, ir-referenzi kollha għall-"Artikolu 104 tat-Trattat" huma ssostitwiti b’referenzi għall-"Artikolu 126 tat-TFUE";

(16) in point 2 of the Annex, the references in Column I to "Article 4(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93" are replaced by references to "Article 3(2) and (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009".

(16) Fil-punt 2 tal-Anness, ir-referenzi fil-Kolonna I għall-"Artikolu 4(2) u (3) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 3605/93" huma ssostitwiti b’referenzi għall-"Artikolu 3(2) u (3) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 479/2009".

Article 2

Artikolu 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the 20th day following its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Dan ir-Regolament għandu jidħol fis-seħħ fl-għoxrin jum wara dak tal-pubblikazzjoni tiegħu f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Dan ir-Regolament għandu jorbot fl-intier tiegħu u japplika direttament fl-Istati Membri kollha.

Done at Brussels, 8 November 2011.

Magħmul fi Brussell, it- 8 ta’ Novembru 2011.

For the Council

Għall-Kunsill

The President

Il-President

J. Vincent-Rostowski

J. Vincent-Rostowski

[1] European Parliament opinion of 28 September 2011 (not yet published in the Official Journal).

[1] Opinjoni tal-Parlament Ewropew tat- 28 ta’ Settembru 2011 (għadha mhijiex ippubblikata fil-Ġurnal Uffiċjali).

[2] OJ C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.

[2] ĠU C 150, 20.5.2011, p. 1.

[3] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

[3] ĠU L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

[4] OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

[4] ĠU L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6.

[5] OJ C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

[5] ĠU C 236, 2.8.1997, p. 1.

[6] Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1).

[6] Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1055/2005 tas- 27 ta’ Ġunju 2005 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 1466/97 dwar it-tisħiħ tas-sorveljanza ta’ pożizzjonijiet ta’ budget u s-sorveljanza u l-koordinazzjoni ta’ politika ekonomika (ĠU L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 1; MT - ĠU L 352M, 31.12.2008, p. 183).

[7] Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5).

[7] Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1056/2005 tas- 27 ta’ Ġunju 2005 li jemenda r-Regolament (KE) Nru 1467/97 dwar li titħaffef u li tiġi ċċarata l-implimentazzjoni tal-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv (ĠU L 174, 7.7.2005, p. 5; MT - ĠU L 352M, 31.12.2008, p. 187).

[8] See document 7423/3/05 on http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents.aspx?lang=en

[8] Ara d-dokument 7423/05 fuq http://www.consilium.europa.eu/documents.aspx?lang=mt.

[9] See page 41 of this Official Journal

[9] Ara l-paġna 41 ta’ dan il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali.

[10] Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 of 22 November 1993 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community (OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7).

[10] Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 3605/93 tat- 22 ta’ Novembru 1993 dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Protokoll dwar il-proċedura ta’ defiċit eċċessiv anness mat-Trattat li jistabbilixxi l-Komunità Ewropea (ĠU L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7).

[11] OJ L 145, 10.6.2009, p. 1.

[11] ĠU L 145, 10.6.2009, p. 1.

[] OJ C 73, 25.3.2006, p. 21."

[] ĠU C 73, 25.3.2006, p. 21."

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