Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on "The implications of the sovereign debt crisis for EU governance" (own-initiative opinion)

Opinjoni tal-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew dwar "L-implikazzjonijiet tal-kriżi tad-dejn sovran għall-governanza tal-UE" (opinjoni fuq inizjattiva proprja)

2011/C 51/03

2011/C 51/03

Rapporteur: Mr SMYTH

Relatur: is-Sur SMYTH

On 29 April 2010 the European Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 29(2) of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on

Nhar id- 29 ta' April 2010, il-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew, b’konformità mal-Artikolu 29(2) tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura tiegħu, iddeċieda li jħejji opinjoni fuq inizjattiva proprja dwar

The implications of the sovereign debt crisis for EU governance.

L-implikazzjonijiet tal-kriżi tad-dejn sovran għall-governanza tal-UE.

The Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 7 September 2010.

Is-Sezzjoni Speċjalizzata għall-Unjoni Ekonomika u Monetarja u l-Koeżjoni Ekonomika u Soċjali inkarigata sabiex tipprepara l-ħidma tal-Kumitat dwar is-suġġett, adottat l-opinjoni tagħha nhar is- 7 ta' Settembru 2010.

In view of the renewal of the Committee's term of office, the Plenary Assembly has decided to vote on this opinion at its October plenary session and has appointed Mr SMYTH as rapporteur-general under Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure.

Minħabba t-tiġdid tal-mandat tal-Kumitat, l-Assemblea Plenarja ddeċidet li tivvota dwar din l-opinjoni matul is-sessjoni plenarja tagħha f’Ottubru u ħatar lis-Sur SMYTH bħala r-relatur ġenerali skont l-Artikolu 20 tar-Regoli ta' Proċedura.

At its 466th plenary session, held on 21 October 2010, the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 120 votes to seven with five abstentions.

Matul l-466 sessjoni plenarja tiegħu li saret fil- 21 ta' Ottubru 2010, il-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew adotta din l-Opinjoni b’120 vot favur, 7 voti kontra u 5 astensjonijiet.

1. Conclusions and recommendations

1. Konklużjonijiet u rakkomandazzjonijiet

1.1 The sovereign debt crisis - triggered by financial and fiscal crises - threatens the very existence of EMU and requires effective financial, economic and political responses. It has highlighted the inadequacies of the Stability and Growth Pact as a mechanism for ensuring fiscal responsibility in member states.

1.1 Il-kriżi tad-dejn sovran – li għandha l-għeruq tagħha fi kriżijiet finanzjarji u fiskali – qed thedded l-eżistenza proprja tal-EMU u tesiġi azzjonijiet finanzjarji, ekonomiċi u politiċi effettivi. Il-kriżi xeħtet dawl fuq in-nuqqasijiet tal-Patt ta' Stabbilità u Tkabbir bħala mekkaniżmu għall-iżgurar tar-responsabbiltà fiskali fl-Istati Membri.

1.2 The EESC supports the actions taken to date by the Council and ECOFIN to support member states in financial distress via the European Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This is an interim solution but it may form the basis of a more permanent procedure and framework for conditional financial support through the establishment of a genuine European Monetary Fund. The case could also be considered for setting up a European sovereign debt agency that issues Eurobonds.

1.2 Il-KESE jappoġġja l-azzjonijiet li ttieħdu s’issa mill-Kunsill u mill-ECOFIN biex jappoġġjaw lill-Istati Membri li għandhom problemi finanzjarji permezz tal-Mekkaniżmu Ewropew ta' Stabbilizzazzjoni (EFSM) u l-Faċilità Ewropea ta' Stabbiltà Finanzjarja (EFSF). Din hija soluzzjoni interim iżda tista’ ssawwar il-bażi ta' proċedura u qafas aktar permanenti għal appoġġ finanzjarju kondizzjonali permezz tal-ħolqien ta' fond monetarju verament Ewropew. Tista tiġi studjata wkoll il-possibbiltà li titwaqqaf aġenzija Ewropea li tiġġestixxi d-dejn sovran billi toħroġ bonds Ewropej.

1.3 The EESC recommends that in order to avoid jeopardising the aims of the European Economic Recovery programme, debt reduction programmes should be set up in the euro area to ensure the area’s economic and monetary stability. This should be done in a way that is compatible with the economic recovery and the employment objectives set out in the Commission’s Communication "Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth", which have been seriously compromised by the crisis.

1.3 Il-KESE jixtieq li sabiex ma jkunux fil-periklu l-għanijiet tal-programm Ewropew ta' Rkupru Ekonomiku, jiġu stabbiliti pjani għat-tnaqqis tad-dejn sovran fiż-żona tal-euro bil-għan li tiġi ggarantita l-istabbilità ekonomika u monetarja taż-żona, b’konformità mal-qagħda ekonomika u mal-għanijiet ta' rkupru ekonomiku u ma' dawk fil-qasam tax-xogħol stipulate fil-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea: "Ewropa 2020 – Strateġija għal tkabbir intelliġenti, sostenibbli u inklużiv", li ġew ipperikolati serjament mill-kriżi.

1.4 There are many lessons to be learned from the debt crisis for future EU governance. The initial proposals from the working group on economic policy in terms of surveillance and sanctions represent moves in the right direction. The EESC nevertheless believes that sanctions have to balanced with greater European solidarity in the management of sovereign debt but the EESC notes that as yet there is no formal mechanism for dealing with a sovereign debt default. This remains a structural weakness in the architecture of EMU that must be addressed by policymakers. The sanctions, however, should be both political and economic, to avoid further exacerbating the debt of the countries concerned.

1.4 Hemm ħafna lezzjonijiet li wieħed għandu x’jitgħallem mill-kriżi tad-dejn għall-governanza futura tal-UE. Il-proposti inizjali mill-grupp ta' ħidma dwar il-politika ekonomika f’termini ta' sorveljanza u sanzjonijiet jirrappreżentaw passi fid-direzzjoni t-tajba. Madankollu, il-KESE jaħseb li s-sanzjonijiet għandhom jiġu bbilanċjati b’solidarjetà Ewropea akbar fil-ġestjoni tad-dejn sovran. Il-KESE jinnota li s’issa m’hemmx mekkaniżmu formali għall-indirizzar ta' każijiet ta' nuqqas ta' ħlas ta' dejn sovran. Dan għadu nuqqas strutturali fl-arkitettura tal-EMU u għandu jiġi indirizzat minn dawk li jfasslu l-politika. Madankollu jkun aħjar jekk is-sanzjonijiet ikunu ta' natura politika kif ukoll ekonomika sabiex jiġi evitat li jkompli jiggrava d-dejn tal-pajjiżi kkonċernati.

1.5 Much of the blame for the sovereign debt crisis can be laid at the door of irresponsible fiscal policies pursued by some EU Member States. Some of the blame can be attributed to imprudent bank lending which fuelled construction and asset bubbles and some to the imprudent behaviour of credit rating agencies. The huge taxpayer-funded bail-outs of banks in some Member States and the subsequent fragility of the global financial system was also an important contributory factor to the crisis. For the future there must be effective reforms of global banking that prevents a recurrence of such behaviour.

1.5 Ħafna mit-tort tal-kriżi ta' dejn sovran tista’ tiġi attribwita lill-politiki fiskali irresponsabbli li segwew xi Stati Membri tal-UE. Parti oħra mit-tort tista’ tiġi attribwita lis-self imprudenti tal-banek li wassal għall-bżieżaq tal-kostruzzjoni u tal-assi u parti oħra lill-imġieba mhux prudenti tal-aġenziji tal-valutazzjoni tal-kreditu. Is-salvataġġ tal-banek iffinanzjat mit-taxxi tal-pubbliku f’xi Stati Membri u l-fraġilità sussegwenti tas-sistema finanzjarja globali kienu wkoll fatturi importanti li kkontribwixxew għall-kriżi. Għall-futur, jeħtieġ li jkun hemm riformi effettivi tas-sistema bankarja globali li jimpedixxu r-rikorrenza ta' tali mġiba.

1.6 The EESC hopes that the strengthening of European economic governance, to be launched in January 2011 with the European Semester, bringing closer economic policy co-ordination among the Member States [1], will aim to safeguard European jobs which are seriously threatened by the crisis.

1.6 Il-KESE jittama li t-tisħiħ tal-governanza ekonomika Ewropea, li ser jitnieda f’Jannar 2011 flimkien mas-Semestru Ewropew, u li se ġġib koordinazzjoni iktar mill-qrib tal-politiki ekonomiċi tal-Istati Membri [1], ikollu l-għan li jħares l-impjiegi fl-Ewropa, li huma mhedda serjament mill-kriżi.

1.7 The Committee believes, however, that economic policy coordination alone is not enough – at least for the euro area countries; rather, a genuine common economic policy is needed, as well as coordination of budgetary policy, at least in the first phase.

1.7 Il-Kumitat jemmen madanakollu li l-koordinazzjoni tal-politika ekonomika biss mhijiex biżżejjed, għall-anqas għall-pajjiżi fiż-żona tal-ewro; minflok, iktar hemm bżonn ta' politika ekonomika komuni vera u proprja kif ukoll koordinazzjoni tal-politika baġitarja, għall-anqas fl-ewwel fażi.

2. Background to the crisis - fiscal policies underpinning Economic and Monetary Union

2. Sfond għall-kriżi – politiki fiskali li jservu ta' bażi għall-Unjoni Ekonomika u Monetarja

2.1 Fiscal discipline is one of the key elements of macroeconomic stability and this is particularly true in a monetary union, such as the euro area, which is made up of sovereign states that retain responsibility for their fiscal policies. In the euro area national monetary and exchange rate policies to respond to country-specific shocks are no longer available. Fiscal policies are therefore all-powerful but they can adjust better to such shocks if they start from a sound position.

2.1 Id-dixxiplina fiskali hija wieħed mill-elementi ewlenin ta' stabbilità makroekonomika u dan huwa minnu b’mod partikulari f’unjoni monetarja, bħaż-żona tal-euro, li hija magħmula minn stati sovrani li huma responsabbli għall-politiki fiskali tagħhom. Fiż-żona tal-euro m’għadhomx disponibbli l-politiki nazzjonali monetarji u tar-rati tal-kambju biex jirreaġixxu għal xokkijiet speċifiċi skont il-pajjiż. Għaldaqstant il-politiki fiskali għandhom is-setgħa kollha iżda jistgħu jaġġustaw ruħhom aħjar għal xokkijiet bħal dawn jekk jibdew minn pożizzjoni soda.

2.2 Several mechanisms and arrangements were put in place to ensure sound fiscal policies and to limit the risks to price stability. These arrangements are enshrined in the Articles 121, 123, 124, 125 and 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and comprise the Stability and Growth Pact (based on Articles 121 and 126), the excessive deficit procedure (Article 126), the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123), the prohibition of privileged access to financial institutions (Article 124) and a no-bail-out-clause (Article 125).

2.2 Twaqqfu bosta mekkaniżmi u arranġamenti sabiex jiġu żgurati politiki fiskali sodi u sabiex jiġu limitati r-riskji għall-istabbilità tal-prezzijiet. Dawn l-arranġamenti huma mħaddna fl-Artikoli 121, 123, 124, 125 u 126 tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea u fihom il-Patt ta' Stabbilità u Tkabbir (imsejjes fuq l-Artikoli 121 u 126), il-proċedura tad-defiċit eċċessiv (Artikolu 126), il-projbizzjoni tal-finanzjament monetarju (Artikolu 123), il-projbizzjoni tal-aċċess ipprivileġġat għal istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji (Artikolu 124) u klawsola dwar meta ma jingħatax salvataġġ finanzjarju (no-bail-out-clause) (Artikolu 125).

2.3 The basic rule of budgetary policy enshrined in the Treaty is that Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. The basis of compliance with this is that Member States should observe an annual general government deficit limit of 3 % of GDP and keep gross national debt in relation to GDP at or below a limit of 60 %.

2.3 Ir-regola bażika tal-politika baġitarja mħaddna fit-Trattat hija li l-Istati Membri għandhom jevitaw defiċits eċċessivi min-naħa tal-gvern. Il-bażi ta' konformità ma' din ir-regola hija li l-Istati Membri għandhom josservaw limitu annwali tad-defiċit ġenerali tal-gvern ta' 3 % tal-PDG u d-dejn nazzjonali gross f’relazzjoni mal-PDG għandu jinżamm fuq limitu ta' 60 % jew inqas.

2.4 In exceptional circumstances a temporary excess of the deficit over the limit can be exempt from being considered excessive provided that it remains close to that limit. The decision as to whether a Member State is in a situation of excessive deficit lies with the ECOFIN Council, acting upon a recommendation from the European Commission. If the Council decides that a Member State is in a situation of excessive deficit, the excessive deficit procedure provides for the necessary steps to be taken. These could ultimately lead to imposing sanctions on the country concerned.

2.4 F’ċirkostanzi eċċezzjonali eċċess temporanju tad-defiċit ’il fuq mil-limitu jista’ ma jiġix meqjus eċċessiv sakemm jibqa’ qrib ta' dak il-limitu. Id-deċiżjoni jekk Stat Membru huwiex f’qagħda ta' defiċit eċċessiv jew le hija r-responsabbiltà tal-Kunsill tal-ECOFIN, li jieħu azzjoni fuq rakkomandazzjoni mill-Kummissjoni Ewropea. Jekk il-Kunsill jiddeċiedi li Stat Membru huwa f’sitwazzjoni ta' defiċit eċċessiv, il-proċedura tad-defiċit eċċessiv tipprovdi li jittieħdu l-passi neċessarji. Fl-aħħar mill-aħħar dawn jistgħu jwasslu għal sanzjonijiet imposti fuq il-pajjiż ikkonċernat.

2.5 The rationale for the Stability and Growth Pact is to ensure that sound budgetary policies are adopted on a permanent basis. The Pact lays down the obligation for Member States to adhere to the medium term objectives for their budgetary positions of "close to balance or in surplus", as defined under country-specific considerations. Adjusting to such positions is supposed to allow Member States to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations without breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value for the government deficit. In reality, the concept behind and the operation of the Stability and Growth Pact have been very far apart. As the European Central Bank (ECB) recently commented:

2.5 Il-ħsieb wara l-Patt ta' Stabbilità u Tkabbir huwa li jiġi żgurat li jiġu adottati fuq bażi permanenti politiki baġitarji sodi. Il-Patt jistipola l-obbligu għall-Istati Membri li jirrispettaw l-objettivi fuq perijodu ta' żmien medju għall-pożizzjonijiet baġitarji tagħhom, jiġifieri li jkunu "qrib il-bilanċ jew f’eċċess tal-bilanċ", kif definiti skont kriterji minn pajjiż għal pajjiż. L-aġġustament għal dawn il-pożizzjonijiet għandu jippermetti lill-Istati Membri jiffaċċjaw il-bidliet ċikliċi normali mingħajr ma jaqbżu l-valur ta' referenza ta' 3 % tal-PDG għad-defiċit tal-gvern. Fil-verità, il-kunċett wara l-Patt ta' Stabbilità u Tkabbir u t-tħaddim tiegħu huma ’l bogħod ħafna minn xulxin. Kif ikkummenta reċentement il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew (BĊE):

"However, the compliance of individual Member States with the budgetary norms of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact has been uneven. Breaches of the 3 % of GDP reference value for the government deficit have been repeated and persistent in some countries, leading to the conclusion that at least in these cases the implementation of the Pact has lacked sufficient rigour and political will. To varying degrees across countries, deviations from fiscal plans have been caused by over-optimistic growth forecasts, ex post data revisions, larger than expected revenue fluctuations and persistent expenditure slippages." (Ten years of the Stability and Growth Pact, ECB Monthly Bulletin article, October 2008.)

"Madankollu, il-konformità tal-Istati Membri individwali man-normi baġitarji tat-Trattat ta' Maastricht u l-Patt ta' Stabbilità u ta' Tkabbir mhijiex konsistenti. Il-valur ta' referenza ta' 3 % tal-PDG għad-defiċit tal-gvern ma ġiex rispettat kemm-il darba u b’mod persistenti f’xi pajjiżi, u dan wassal għall-konklużjoni li tal-inqas f’dawn il-każi l-implimentazzjoni tal-Patt ma kinitx rigoruża biżżejjed u nieqsa mir-rieda politika. Fuq livelli li jvarjaw minn pajjiż għal ieħor, devjazzjonijiet mill-pjani fiskali ġew ikkawżati minn tbassir ta' tkabbir wisq ottimista, reviżjonijiet tad-data ex post, bidliet fid-dħul ikbar milli kien mistenni u diverġenzi negattivi fl-infiq persistenti." (Għaxar snin tal-Patt ta' Stabbilità u ta' Tkabbir, artiklu fil-Bullettin ta' kull xahar tal-BĊE, Ottubru 2008).

2.6 The apparent breakdown in compliance with the fiscal rules underpinning EMU pre-dates the current global financial crisis but it could be argued that the risks of sovereign debt default within the monetary union represent a second phase of the crisis. After a decade or more of easy credit growth which led to housing and construction bubbles, the subsequent economic implosions in some Member States has left them with spiralling debt problems. It is somewhat ironic that the governments of Greece, Spain and Portugal did not have to undertake taxpayer funded rescues of their banking systems during the banking crisis but their sovereign debt difficulties now threaten to de-stabilise banks right across the EU. This illustrates the point that taxpayer-funded bail-outs of banks were not the main cause of the increase in public debt.

2.6 It-tnaqqis apparenti fil-konformità mar-regoli fiskali li fuqhom hija msejsa l-EMU jmur lura għal qabel il-kriżi finanzjarja globali attwali, iżda wieħed jista’ jressaq l-argument li l-perikli ta' nuqqas ta' ħlas tad-dejn sovran fi ħdan l-unjoni monetarja jirrappreżentaw it-tieni stadju tal-kriżi. Wara għaxar snin jew iktar ta' żjieda fil-kreditu faċli li wasslet għall-bżieżaq tad-djar u tal-kostruzzjoni, l-implożjonijiet ekonomiċi sussegwenti f’xi Stati Membri ħallewhom bi problemi dejjem jikbru ta' dejn. Huwa pjuttost ironiku li l-gvernijiet tal-Greċja, ta' Spanja u tal-Portugall ma kellhomx iwettqu azzjonijiet ta' salvataġġ iffinanzjati mit-taxxi tal-poplu tas-sistemi bankarji tagħhom matul il-kriżi bankarja, iżda d-diffikultajiet tad-dejn sovran tagħhom issa jheddu li jiddistabbilixxu lill-banek madwar l-UE. Dan juri biċ-ċar li s-salvataġġ iffinanzjat mit-taxxi tal-banek ma kienx il-kawża ewlenija taż-żjieda fid-dejn pubbliku.

2.7 During the banking crisis it was often claimed that some banks were "too big to be allowed to fail"; now there is talk of Member States, struggling with mounting public debt, being "too important to be allowed to default". Just as there was a painful acceptance by taxpayers of the need to bail out delinquent banks now, in turn, a potentially even more painful adjustment in public finances of some Member States is being demanded by international bond markets. The uncertainty which the sovereign debt default issue has created has also begun to undermine the euro itself and has prompted fears that it could engulf a number of euro Member States.

2.7 Waqt il-kriżi bankarja ta' sikwit saret l-istqarrija li wħud mill-banek kienu "kbar wisq biex ifallu"; issa qed isir diskors dwar Stati Membri, li qed jiġġieldu biex iżommu mad-dejn pubbliku li qed jikber, u li huma "importanti wisq biex jitħallew ma jħallsux id-dejn". Bl-istess mod kif kull min iħallas it-taxxa kellu jaċċetta l-bżonn li l-banek delinkwenti jiġu salvati bi flushom, issa qed jintalab mis-swieq tal-bonds internazzjonali aġġustament li jista’ jkun iktar diffiċli fil-finanzi pubbliċi ta' xi Stati Membri. In-nuqqas ta' ċertezza li l-kwistjoni tan-nuqqas ta' ħlas tad-dejn sovran ħolqot issa bdiet iddgħajjef l-euro wkoll, u dan qed iġib il-biża’ li jista’ jiddomina għadd ta' Stati Membri fiż-żona tal-euro.

2.8 The sovereign debt crisis is a crisis of confidence for the EU in general and the euro zone in particular. It requires a political as well as a financial solution. It has brought into question the adequacy, or otherwise, of the fiscal arrangements outlined above to ensure the stability of the single currency. It could be argued with some justification that the Stability and Growth Pact has failed and that Europe now needs to create a new fiscal and monetary framework that could cope more effectively with seriously adverse economic outcomes or even the failure of a Member State. If this is correct, then what might such a framework look like?

2.8 Il-kriżi tad-dejn sovran hija kriżi ta' kunfidenza għall-UE inġenerali u għaż-żona tal-euro b’mod partikulari. Tesiġi soluzzjoni politika kif ukoll finanzjarja. Ħarġet fid-dieher il-kwistjoni tal-adegwatezza, jew le, tal-arranġamenti fiskali msemmija hawn fuq għall-iżgurar tal-istabbilità tal-munita unika. Wieħed jista’ jargumenta u jkun iġġustifikat li l-Patt ta' Stabbilità u ta' Tkabbir falla u li l-Ewropa issa trid toħloq qafas fiskali u monetarju ġdid li jista’ jlaħħaq b’mod iktar effettiv ma' sitwazzjonijiet ekonomiċi mill-iktar negattivi jew anke l-falliment ta' Stat Membru. Jekk dan huwa minnu, dan il-qafas x’forma jieħu?

3. Alternative Fiscal and Monetary Frameworks

3. Oqfsa fiskali u monetarji alternattivi

3.1 There have been a number of developments at both the policy theory and policy implementation levels in recent months. One interesting proposal that has been put forward to address the sovereign debt crisis and the issue of sovereign default is the creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF) [2]. The idea behind this proposal is the argument that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is not experienced in dealing with the threat of a sovereign debt default in a member of a monetary union and that the EU would have much stronger enforcement mechanisms if an EMF were in operation.

3.1 Saru għadd ta' żviluppi kemm fil-livell ta' teorija politika u tal-implimentazzjoni tal-politika f’dawn l-aħħar xhur. Waħda mill-iktar proposti interessanti li tressqet biex tindirizza l-kriżi tad-dejn sovran u l-kwistjoni tan-nuqqas ta' ħlas ta' dan id-dejn hija l-ħolqien ta' Fond Monetarju Ewropew (FME) [2]. L-idea wara din il-proposta hija l-argument li l-Fond Monetarju Internazzjonali (IMF) mhuwiex lest jindirizza t-theddida ta' nuqqas ta' ħlas tad-dejn sovran f’membru ta' unjoni monetarja u li l-UE jkollha mekkaniżmi ta' infurzar iktar b’saħħithom jekk ikun qed jitħaddem FME.

3.2 The notion of a European Monetary Fund should be seen as analogous to the kinds of policy responses to the recent financial meltdown when the objective of policy was to prevent the failure of large financial institutions. As the EU emerges from the banking crisis the policy debate has centred on reforms that would enable the orderly default of financial institutions and the self-financing of rescue funds for larger banks with solvency difficulties. In other words, having stabilised financial systems, European policy makers are now concentrating on ensuring that, in future, financial institutions and not taxpayers do the heavy lifting in times of crisis. Banking reform proposals include higher capital ratios, tighter supervision, capping bankers’ bonuses and the drawing up of "living wills". In terms of EMU, to protect the single currency, the system must also be strengthened to cope with the instability caused by the default or failure of one of its members.

3.2 Il-kunċett ta' Fond Monetarju Ewropew għandu jitqies bħala analogu għat-tipi ta' tweġibiet ta' politika li saru fil-konfront tal-kriżi finanzjarja reċenti fejn l-objettiv tal-politika kien li jiġi evitat il-falliment ta' istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji kbar. Hekk kif l-UE qed toħroġ mill-kriżi bankarja, id-dibattitu dwar il-politika qed ikun imsejjes fuq riformi li jippermettu nuqqas ta' ħlas ikkontrollat min-naħa tal-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u awtofinanzjar tal-fondi ta' salvataġġ għal banek ikbar li qed jiffaċċjaw diffikultajiet ta' likwidità. Fi kliem ieħor, wara li stabbilizzaw is-sistemi finanzjarji, dawk li jfasslu l-politika Ewropea issa qed jikkonċentraw biex jizguraw li fil-ġejjieni l-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji u mhux dawk li jħallsu t-taxxi jerfgħu l-ikbar piż fi żmien ta' kriżi. Il-proposti ta' riforma bankarja jinkludu proporzjoniijet ikbar ta' kapital, kontroll iktar strett, il-limitazzjoni tal-bonuses tal-bankiera u t-tfassil ta' "testmenti waqt il-ħajja (living wills)". F’termini tal-UME, sabiex titħares il-munita unika, is-sistema trid tissaħħaħ biex tlaħħaq mal-instabbilità kkawżata min-nuqqas ta' ħlas tad-dejn jew il-falliment ta' wieħed mill-membri tagħha.

3.3 The proposers of EMF argued that it would be consistent with the notion of enhanced cooperation established in the Treaty and thus may not need an amendment to the Treaty. An EMF, properly constituted, addresses the weaknesses in the EMU architecture caused by the failure of the Stability Pact to date and the apparent lack of credibility of the no bail out clause.

3.3 Dawk li qed jipproponu l-FME ressqu l-argument li dan il-fond ikun konsistenti mal-idea ta' kooperazzjoni msaħħa stabbilita fit-Trattat u b’hekk ma jkunx hemm bżonn ta' emenda għat-Trattat. FME li jitfassal b’mod tajjeb jindirizza n-nuqqasijiet fl-arkitettura tal-UME kkawżati mill-falliment tal-Patt ta' Stabbilità sal-lum u n-nuqqas apparenti ta' kredibilità tal-klawsola dwar meta ma jingħatax salvataġġ finanzjarju.

3.4 How would such a fund be financed? In order to minimise the moral hazard problem now facing Germany and France in co-financing the emergency package for Greece, only those countries in breach of the Maastricht criteria would contribute to the EMF. Their contribution rates would be determined by two rules:

3.4 Fond bħal dan kif jiġi ffinanzjat? Sabiex tiġi minimizzata l-problema ta' periklu morali li issa qed jiffaċċjaw il-Ġermanja u Franza fil-kofinanzjar tal-pakkett ta' emerġenza għall-Greċja, huma biss dawk il-pajjiżi ħatja ta' ksur tal-kriterji ta' Maastricht li jikkontribwixxu għall-FME. Ir-rati tal-kontribuzzjoni tagħhom jiġu determinati minn żewġ regoli:

- 1 % annually of the stock of "excess debt", which is defined as the difference between the actual level of public debt (at the end of the previous year) and the Maastricht limit of 60 % of GDP. For Greece, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 115 %, this would imply a contribution to the EMF equal to 0.55 %.

- 1 % fis-sena tal-istokk ta' "dejn eċċessiv", li huwa definit bħala d-differenza bejn il-livell reali ta' dejn pubbliku (fl-aħħar tas-sena ta' qabel) u l-limitu ta' Maastricht ta' 60 % tal-PDG. Għall-Greċja, bi proporzjon bejn dejn u PDG ta' 115 %, dan jimplika kontribuzzjoni lill-FME ta' 0.55 %.

- 1 % of the excessive deficit, i.e. the amount of the deficit for a given year that exceeds the Maastricht limit of 3 % of GDP. For Greece, the deficit of 13 % of GDP would give rise to a contribution to the EMF equal to 0.10 % of GDP.

- 1 % tal-iżbilanċ eċċessiv, jiġifieri l-ammont tal-iżbilanċ għal sena speċifika li jaqbeż il-limitu ta' Maastricht ta' 3 % tal-PDG. Għall-Greċja, żbilanċ ta' 13 % tal-PDG iwassal għal kontribuzzjoni lill-FME ta' 0,10 % tal-PDG.

For 2009, the total contribution for Greece would have been 0.65 % of GDP - considerably less than the levels of austerity now being demanded.

Għall-2009 l-kontribuzzjoni totali għall-Greċja kienet tkun 0,65 % tal-PDG – konsiderevolment anqas mill-livelli ta' awsterità mitluba bħalissa.

3.5 In addition the EMF would be able to borrow in the markets so that it would have sufficient resources on top of accumulated contributions to meet any requirements. The EMF could intervene to provide financial support by either liquidating part of its holdings or by guaranteeing a sovereign debt issue by a member state. To illustrate, and with the benefit of hindsight, using the suggested funding mechanism, the EMF would have been able to accumulate EUR 120 billion in reserves since the start of EMU. Combined with appropriate levels of market borrowings, this would provide enough to finance the rescue of any of the smaller euro area Member States.

3.5 Barra minn hekk, il-FME ikun jista’ jsellef fis-swieq sabiex ikollu biżżejjed riżorsi barra mill-kontribuzzjonijiet akkumulati sabiex ilaħħaq mar-rekwiżiti kollha. Il-FME jista’ jintervjeni biex jipprovdi appoġġ finanzjarju, jew billi jillikwida parti mill-assi tiegħu jew billi jiggarantixxi d-dejn sovran ta' Stat Membru. Bħala eżempju, u bil-benefiċċju tal-esperjenza, meta nużaw il-mekkaniżmi ta' finanzjar issuġġerit, il-FME kien ikun jista’ jakkumula EUR 120 biljun f’riżervi minn mindu bdiet l-UME. Flimkien ma' livelli adati ta' self mis-swieq, dan għandu jipprovdi biżżejjed fondi biex isalva kull wieħed mill-Istati Membri ż-żgħar fiż-żona tal-euro.

3.6 With respect to enforcement, the EU has a number of options, ranging from cutting off structural funds, withdrawal of new funding guarantees or even cutting the country off from the euro area's money market. These penalties would be used progressively as individually they impose significant economic pressure on Member States that do not implement previously agreed reform programmes.

3.6 Fir-rigward tal-infurzar, l-UE għandha għadd ta' għażliet, mill-qtugħ tal-fondi strutturali, il-ħruġ ta' garanziji ta' finanzjar ġodda, jew anke li l-pajjiż jinqata’ mis-suq tal-flus taż-żona tal-euro. Dawn il-pieni jistgħu jintużaw b’mod progressiv, billi individwalment jimponu pressjoni ekonomika sinifikanti fuq l-Istati Membri li ma jimplimentawx programmi ta' riforma li sar ftehim fuqhom qabel.

3.7 One of the claimed advantages of the proposed EMF is that it could manage an orderly default of a euro area member that does not comply with the terms of a reform programme. In comparison with the uncertainties of debt restructuring on international bond markets, the EMF could offer holders of the sovereign debt of the defaulting member state to exchange this debt at a standard discount against claims on the EMF. In this way the disruption caused by the default would be limited and the losses suffered by financial institutions would also be reduced.

3.7 Wieħed mill-vantaġġi msemmija tal-FME propost huwa li jkun jista’ jiġġestixxi b’mod organizzat in-nuqqas ta' ħlas tad-dejn ta' membru taż-żona tal-euro li ma jikkonformax mal-kundizzjonijiet ta' programm ta' riforma. Meta mqabbel mal-inċertezzi marbuta mar-ristrutturar tad-dejn fis-swieq internazzjonali tal-bonds, il-FME jista’ joffri lid-detenturi tad-dejn sovran tal-Istat Membru f’kontumaċja, li dan id-dejn jinbidillu bi skont standard fi krediti fil-konfront tal-FME. B’dan il-mod, l-inkonvenjenzi kkawżati min-nuqqas ta' ħlas ikunu limitati u t-telf li jsofru l-istituzzjonijiet finanzjarji jitnaqqas ukoll.

3.8 Advocates of an EMF claim that it offers important advantages over simply calling in the IMF. The EMF could preside over an orderly sovereign default that would minimise disruptive spill over effects in bond and other financial markets. Just as with the lessons learned in the banking crisis, policy should now be geared up not just to prevent a future crisis but also to prepare for it. So too with the sovereign debt crisis. When and if the present crisis has passed, Europe must prepare for it to happen again.

3.8 Dawk li jappoġġjaw FME jgħidu li dan joffri vantaġġi importanti aqwa milli jekk sempliċement issir talba ta' intervent għand il-FMI. Il-FME jista’ jippresjedi fuq nuqqas ta' ħlas tad-dejn sovran li jkun organizzat tajjeb biex b’hekk jiġu minimizzati l-effetti sekondarji li jħarbtu s-swieq tal-bonds u s-swieq finanzjarji oħrajn. L-istess bħal-lezzjonijiet li tgħallimna fil-kriżi bankarja, dik il-politika issa għandu jkollha l-għan mhux biss li tiġi evitata kriżi futura iżda wkoll li nħejju għaliha. Bl-istess mod il-kriżi tad-dejn sovran. Meta u jekk il-kriżi attwali tintemm, l-Ewropa trid tlesti ruħha għal meta terġa’ tiġri.

3.9 Another interesting set of ideas centre on the tension between the need for European economic recovery and debt reduction. Research has shown that in the euro zone the fiscal disciplines of the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact have had a dampening effect on economic growth compared with the US and the UK [3]. The irony is that the financial crisis started in the US and there the policy reaction has been an enormous fiscal and monetary counter cyclical boost. Euro area macroeconomic policy has suffered from inertia due to a policy bias towards monetary stability rather than growth. This is understandable in the context of establishing the credibility of the single currency and the ECB but it could now be viewed as potentially hindering economic recovery. Indeed there is a case for arguing that a relaxation of the limits of the Stability and Growth Pact might help to stimulate economic recovery and bring the debt crisis to an end.

3.9 Ideat oħra interessanti jikkonċentraw fuq it-tensjoni bejn il-bżonn ta' rkupru ekonomiku Ewropew u t-tnaqqis tad-dejn. Ir-riċerka turi li fiż-żona tal-euro d-dixxiplina fiskali tal-kriterji ta' Maastricht u l-Patt ta' Stabbilità u ta' Tkabbir xekklu t-tkabbir ekonomiku meta tqabbel mal-Istati Uniti u r-Renju Unit [3]. L-ironija hija li l-kriżi finanzjarja bdiet fl-Istati Uniti u hemmhekk ir-reazzjoni politika kienet spinta kontroċiklika fiskali u monetarja enormi. Il-politika makroekonomika taż-żona tal-euro soffriet minn inerzja minħabba l-preferenza politika lejn stabbilità monetarja minflok tkabbir. Dan jista’ jiftiehem fil-kuntest tal-istabbilixximent tal-kredibilità tal-munita unika u tal-BĊE, iżda issa jista’ jitqies bħala xkiel potenzjali tal-irkupru ekonomiku. Fil-fatt jista’ jitressaq l-argument li jekk jittaffew il-limiti tal-Patt ta' Stabbiltà u Tkabbir jista’ jiġi stimolat l-irkupru ekonomiku u tiġi fi tmiemha l-kriżi tad-dejn.

3.10 It is argued that any policy or institutional response to the sovereign debt crisis should deal with the issues of debt reduction without endangering the aims of the European Economic Recovery Programme. One possible way of achieving this might be to combine a debt reduction process with an expansion of investments to counter the deflationary effects of the debt reduction. This proposal is based on the Delors 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment and has a debt transfer option as its centrepiece. Thus a proportion of each member states’ sovereign debt would be transferred to European Union bonds. The transfer would still oblige the member states to service their shares of their debt now in euro bonds. It would therefore not be a debt write-off nor would it increase the borrowing of member states faced with debt difficulties; rather it would lower the service costs of the portion transferred. Supporters of this proposal argue that it could be accommodated within existing Treaty guidelines. In tandem with the debt transfer, it is also proposed that European Investment Bank (EIB) and national financial institutions borrowing be expanded to finance the European Economic Recovery programme and to mitigate a contraction of employment income and trade resulting from aggressive debt reduction [4].

3.10 Jitressaq l-argument li kull reazzjoni politika jew istituzzjonali għall-kriżi tad-dejn sovran għandha tindirizza l-kwistjonijiet tat-tnaqqis tad-dejn mingħajr ma jiġu pperikolati l-għanijiet tal-Programm Ewropew ta' Rkupru Ekonomiku. Mod wieħed kif dan jista’ jintlaħaq jista’ jkun billi jiġi kkombinat proċess ta' tnaqqis tad-dejn ma' espansjoni tal-investimenti sabiex jinħoloq bilanċ mal-effetti deflazzjonarji tat-tnaqqis tad-dejn. Din il-proposta hija bbażata fuq il-White Paper ta' Delors tal-1993 dwar it-Tkabbir, il-Kompetittività u l-Impjieg u li għandha fiċ-ċentru tagħha l-għażla tat-trasferiment tad-dejn. B’hekk, proporzjon tad-dejn sovran ta' kull Stat Membru jiġi trasferit għall-bonds tal-Unjoni Ewropea. It-trasferiment jibqa’ jobbliga lill-Istati Membri jmantnu s-sehem tad-dejn tagħhom f’bonds tal-euro. Għaldaqstant, id-dejn ma jitħassarx u lanqas jiżdied is-self tal-Istati Membri li jiffaċċjaw diffikultajiet ta' dejn. Dawk li jappoġġjaw din il-proposta jargumentaw li tista’ tiġi akkomodata fi ħdan il-linji gwida attwali tat-Trattat. Flimkien mat-trasferiment tad-dejn, huwa propost ukoll li s-self tal-Bank Ewropew tal-Investiment (BEI) u tal-istituzzjonijiet nazzjonali ta' finanzjament jitwessa’ biex ikun jista’ jiffinanzja l-programm Ewropew ta' Rkupru Ekonomiku u biex jagħmel tajjeb għat-tnaqqis fid-dħul tal-impjegati u fil-kummerċ li jirriżulta minn tnaqqis aggressiv tad-dejn [4].

3.11 The official response to the debt crisis was set out following the Council extraordinary meeting on 9 May 2010. It involves the establishment of a European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, based on Article 122.2 (exceptional occurrences) of the TFEU and an intergovernmental agreement of euro area Member States. The EFSM has 60 billion Euros at its disposal and it operates under conditionalities similar to those of the IMF. In addition a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), referred to subsequently as a European Financial Stabilisation Facility has been established. The SPV will last three years and it will have up to 690 billion Euros to support euro-area Member States facing exceptional financial difficulties. Furthermore the European Central Bank (ECB) has started to intervene in bond markets by purchasing the debt of governments in financial distress.

3.11 Ir-risposta uffiċjali għall-kriżi tad-dejn ġiet stabbilita wara l-laqgħa staordinarja tal-Kunsill tad- 9 ta' Mejju 2010. Din tinvolvi t-twaqqif ta' Mekkaniżmu Finanzjarju Ewropew ta' Stabilizzazzjoni (EFSM), ibbazat fuq l-Artikolu 122.2 (każijiet rari) tat-TFUE u fuq ftehim intergovernattiv tal-Istati Membri fiż-żona tal-euro. L-EFSM għandu EUR 60 biljun għad-dispożizzjoni tiegħu u jopera taħt kundizzjonijiet simili għal dawk tal-FMI. Barra minn hekk, ġie stabbilit Strument bi Skop Speċjali (SPV), li sussegwentement ser jissejjaħ Faċilità Ewropea ta' Stabbiltà Finanzjarja. Dan l-istrument ser jitħaddem għal perijodu ta' tliet snin u ser ikollu sa EUR 690 biljun biex jappoġġja lill-Istati Membri fiż-żona tal-euro li qed jiffaċċjaw diffikultajiet finanzjarji eċċezzjonali. Barra minn hekk, il-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew (BĊE) beda jintervjeni fis-swieq tal-bonds billi jixtri d-dejn tal-gvernijiet li qed jiffaċċjaw problemi finanzjarji.

3.12 There are several important aspects of these new arrangements. First of all they are not a cheap finance option; all interest and loan principal will be repaid by the relevant Member State via the Commission. In this sense the EFSM is not a bail out and is therefore compatible with Article 125. Secondly, the EFSM and EFSF represent credit lines, not budget lines and therefore they stay within the "own resources" decision. Thirdly, the EFSF will operate for a three year period but its effects could extend for several years beyond this if it issues bonds with longer term maturities. Fourthly, it is envisaged that the EFSF will issue bonds that will be guaranteed up to 120 % by all EU Member States; it is intended that these bonds will carry an AAA rating thereby minimising their servicing costs [5]. Finally the EFSM represents tangible evidence that EU solidarity remains the ultimate underpinning of EMU.

3.12 Dawn l-arranġamenti l-ġodda għandhom bosta aspetti importanti. L-ewwel nett mhumiex għażliet finanzjarji rħas: l-interessi kollha u l-prinċipali tas-self ser jitħallsu lura mill-Istati Membri rilevanti permezz tal-Kummissjoni. Għaldaqstant, l-EFSM mhuwiex mekkaniżmu ta' salvataġġ u huwa kompatibbli mal-Artikolu 125. It-tieni nett, l-EFSM u l-EFSF jirrappreżentaw intestaturi ta' kreditu, u mhux intestaturi baġitarji u għaldaqstant jibqgħu fi ħdan id-deċiżjoni dwar ir-"riżorsi proprji". It-tielet nett, l-EFSF ser topera fuq perijodu ta' tliet snin iżda l-effetti tagħha jistgħu jibqgħu jinħassu għal bosta snin aktar jekk toħroġ bonds li jimmaturaw f’term itwal. Ir-raba’ nett, huwa maħsub li l-EFSF toħroġ bonds li ser ikunu ggarantiti sa 120 % mill-Istati Membri kollha tal-UE; huwa maħsub li dawn il-bonds ikollhom klassifikazzjoni AAA u b’hekk jitnaqqsu l-ispejjeż tas-servizz tagħhom [5]. Fl-aħħar, l-EFSM jagħti xhieda tanġibbli li s-solidarjetà tal-UE għadha l-bażi fundamentali tal-EMU.

3.13 The extent to which the EFSM proposals deal effectively with the present debt crisis will become clear in the months ahead and will depend upon the extent to which individual Member States undertake the fiscal adjustments required by the EU and IMF. The EU has reaffirmed its desire to strengthen fiscal discipline and to find a permanent crisis resolution framework. The latter has prompted speculation that the EFSM and EFSF could be made permanent but this might be difficult to achieve as it would require unanimous approval of all Member States. The lack of any substantive proposals that deal with the possibility of a sovereign debt default implies that policymakers will not permit such an eventuality. While this is entirely understandable it does not eliminate the potential for such defaults.

3.13 Il-punt sa fejn il-proposti tal-EFSM jindirizzaw b’mod effettiv il-kriżi tad-dejn attwali ser joħroġ fid-dieher fix-xhur li ġejjin u ser jiddependi minn kemm l-Istati Membri individwali jimplimentaw l-aġġustament fiskali meħtieġa mill-UE u l-FMI. L-UE affermat mill-ġdid ix-xewqa tagħha li ssaħħaħ id-dixxiplina fiskali u li tistabbilixxi qafas permamenti għas-soluzzjoni tal-kriżi. Din tal-aħħar qajmet spekulazzjoni li l-EFSM u l-EFSF jistgħu jsiru permanenti iżda dan jista’ jkun diffiċli biex jinkiseb għax jirrikjedi l-approvazzjoni unanima tal-Istati Membri kollha. In-nuqqas ta' proposti sostantivi li jindirizzaw il-possibbiltà ta' ħlas tad-dejn sovran jimplika li dawk li jfasslu l-politika mhux ser jippermettu tali eventwalità. Għalkemm dan jista’ jiftiehem, ma jeliminax il-potenzjal ta' ħlasijiet bħal dawn.

4. Lessons to be learned

4. Tagħlimiet

4.1 It is becoming clear that the debt crisis could have been avoided if there had been better governance in member states and in the EU and it is imperative that the governance weaknesses of the past are not repeated. To this end the working group on coordinating economic policy has announced a series of measures to strengthen budgetary surveillance consistent with the Stability and Growth Pact. These measures deal with the peer scrutiny of member states’ draft budgets, earlier application of sanctions in respect of the 3 % and 60 % debt thresholds, triggering of the excessive deficit procedure if debt reduction is not sufficiently timely, and greater independence for national statistical offices from the respective national governments.

4.1 Qed isir dejjem iktar ċar li l-kriżi tad-dejn setgħet ġiet evitata li kieku kien hemm governanza aħjar fl-Istati Membri u fl-UE, u b’hekk huwa essenzjali li l-iżbalji ta' governanza fil-passat ma jerġgħux jirrepetu ruħhom. Għal dan il-għan il-grupp ta' ħidma dwar il-koordinazzjoni tal-politiki ekonomiċi ħabbar sensiela ta' miżuri li jsaħħu s-sorveljanza baġitarja b’mod konsistenti mal-Patt ta' Stabbilità u Tkabbir. Dawn il-miżuri jindirizzaw il-kwistjoni ta' skrutinju minn pari tal-abbozzi tal-baġits tal-Istati Membri, applikazzjoni iktar bikrija tas-sanzjonijiet fir-rigward tal-limiti ta' dejn ta' 3 % u 60 %, l-implimentazzjoni tal-proċedura ta' żbilanċ eċċessiv jekk it-tnaqqis tad-dejn ma jsirx f’waqtu, u iktar indipendenza għall-uffiċċji nazzjonali tal-istatistika mill-gvernijiet nazzjonali rispettivi tagħhom.

4.2 The role and behaviour of the main ratings agencies throughout the financial and debt crises have been unsavoury to say the least [6]. A new independent European rating agency has been proposed by Chancellor Merkel that would compete with the existing big three [7]. It has also been suggested that Eurostat should be given the power to issue ratings of member states’ public finances. If such powers had already been in place then Eurostat might have given earlier warnings of the Greek debt crisis [8].

4.2 Ma nkunux qed nesaġeraw meta ngħidu li r-rwol u l-imġiba tal-aġenziji ewlenin tal-klassifikazzjoni matul il-kriżijiet finanzjarji u tad-dejn ma kinux xempju mill-aqwa [6]. Il-Kanċilliera Merkel ipproponiet aġenzija tal-klassifikazzjoni Ewropea ġdida u indipendenti li tista’ tikkompeti mat-tlieta l-kbar [7]. Tressaq ukoll is-suġġeriment li l-Eurostat għandu jingħata s-setgħa li joħroġ klassifiki tal-finanzi pubbliċi tal-Istati Membri. Li kieku dawn is-setgħat kienu diġà fis-seħħ, l-Eurostat kien ikun jista’ javża minn qabel dwar il-kriżi tad-dejn fil-Greċja [8].

4.3 The Commission has been criticised for lack of vigilance and proactivity in the quality assurance of national public finance data. This point relates to wider issues of surveillance, scrutiny and compliance which go to the heart of the failure of the mechanisms in the Stability and Growth Pact. Any longer term solution must address these issues effectively.

4.3 Il-Kummissjoni ġiet ikkritikata għan-nuqqas ta' viġilanza u proattività fl-assigurazzjoni tal-kwalità tad-data nazzjonali tal-finanzi pubbliċi. Dan il-punt jirrelata ma' kwistjonijiet usa’ ta' sorveljanza, skrutinju u konformità li huma fil-qalba tal-falliment tal-mekkaniżmi fil-Patt ta' Stabbilità u Tkabbir. Kull soluzzjoni iktar fit-tul trid tindirizza dawn il-kwistjonijiet b’mod effettiv.

4.4 While there were no taxpayer-funded bail-outs for banks in Greece, Spain and Portugal, the scale of such bail-outs elsewhere in the EU and the US has contributed to an unprecedented level of pressure on sovereign bond markets and has precipitated this crisis. It is essential that effective reforms of global banking are implemented which would prevent the recurrence of such financial, economic and social instability.

4.4 Għalkemm ma kienx hemm salvataġġ iffinanzjat mit-taxxi tal-pubbliku għall-banek fil-Greċja, Spanja u l-Portugall, l-iskala ta' dan it-tip ta' salvataġġ bnadi oħra fl-UE u l-Istati Uniti kkontribwixxiet għal livell ta' pressjoni mingħajr preċedent fuq is-swieq ta' bonds sovrani u wasslet għal din il-kriżi. Huwa essenzjali li jiġu implimentati riformi effettivi tas-sistemi bankarja globali li jimpedixxu r-rikorrenza ta' nuqqas ta' stabbiltà finanzjarja, ekonomika u soċjali bħal din.

Brussels, 21 October 2010.

Brussell, 21 ta’ Ottubru 2010.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee

Il-President tal-Kumitat Ekonomiku u Soċjali Ewropew

Staffan Nilsson

Staffan Nilsson

[1] COM(2010) 367: Enhancing economic policy coordination for stability, growth and jobs – Tools for stronger EU economic governance.

[1] COM(2010) 367. It-tisħiħ tal-koordinazzjoni tal-politika ekonomika għall-istabilità, it-tkabbir u l-impjiegi – Għodda għal governanza ekonomika tal-UE isħaħ.

[2] This proposal is set out in full in D. Gros and T. Mayer, "How to deal with sovereign debt default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund." Policy Brief No 202, Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2010. Many of the arguments in this document are drawn from this insightful paper.

[2] Din il-proposta hija mfissra kollha kemm hi f’D. Gros u T. Mayer, "How to deal with sovereign debt default in Europe: Towards a Euro(pean) Monetary Fund." Policy Brief No: 202, Ċentru għall-Istudji tal-Politika Ewropea, Mejju 2010. Ħafna mill-argumenti f’dan id-dokument huma mislutin minn din il-karta miktuba b’mod intuwittiv.

[3] See Fitoussi, J.P. and F. Saraceno: "Europe: How deep is a Crisis? Policy Responses and Structural Factors Behind Diverging Performances" Journal of Globalisation and Development. Volume 1 Issue 1 Berkeley Electronic Press. 2010.

[3] Ara Fitoussi, J.P. u F. Saraceno: "Europe: How deep is a Crisis? Policy Responses and Structural Factors Behind Diverging Performances" Journal of Globalisation and Development. Volume 1 Issue 1 Berkeley Electronic Press. 2010.

[4] For a full outline of these proposals see Holland, S.: "A European Monetary Fund, Recovery and Cohesion" in Insight, http://www.insightweb.it/web/node/136 (accessed on 10.6.2010).

[4] Għal deskrizzjoni sħiħa ta' dawn il-proposti ara Holland, S.: "A European Monetary Fund, Recovery and Cohesion" in Insight, http://www.insightweb.it/web/node/136 (aċċessat fl- 10/06/2010).

[5] On 21 September each of the main Credit Rating Agencies declared that they would assign AAA ratings to debt issued by the EFSF.

[5] Fil-21 ta' Settmebru kull waħda mill-Aġenziji tal-Klassifikazzjoni tal-Kreditu ewlenin iddikjarat li se talloka klassifikazzjoni AAA għal dejn li ħareġ mill-EFSF.

[6] For a comprehensive discussion of ratings agency shortcomings see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: (SEC) "Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies" http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf (accessed on 10.6.2010).

[6] Għal diskussjoni komprensiva tan-nuqqasijiet tal-aġenziji tal-klassifikazzjoni ara U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: (SEC) "Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies" (Rapport ta' Sinteżi tal-Kwistjonijiet Identifikati fl-Analiżi tal-Persunal tal-Kummissjoni ta' Aġenziji tal-Klassifikazzjoni tal-Kreditu speċifiċi) http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf (aċċessat fl- 10/06/2010).

[7] Irish Times reports that the German Chancellor said that the new agency would "naturally not be politically dependent" but would "act in the spirit of sustainable economics that is not so oriented around the short term". Irish Times from 21 May 2010.

[7] L-Irish Times irrapporta li l-Kanċilliera Ġermaniża qalet li l-aġenzija ġdida naturalment ma tkunx dipendenti politikament iżda taġixxi fl-ispirtu ta' ekonomija sostenibbli li mhijiex orjentata lejn perijodu ta' żmien qasir. Irish Times, 21 ta' Mejju 2010.

[8] During our visit to Eurostat we were informed that Eurostat had repeatedly given earlier warnings of the Greek high deficit and public debt crisis but nobody listened to them.

[8] Tul iż-żjara tagħna fil-Eurostat, konna informati li l-Eurostat kemm-il darba wissa dwar id-defiċit kbir tal-Greċja u l-kriżi ta' dejn pubbliku iżda ħadd ma tah widen.

--------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------