Grounds
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1. This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age and of Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).
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1. It-talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari tikkonċerna l-interpretazzjoni tal-prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età u tad-Direttiva tal-Kunsill, 2000/78/KE, tas-27 ta’ Novembru 2000, li tistabbilixxi qafas ġenerali għall-ugwaljanza fit-trattament fl-impjieg u fix-xogħol (ĠU Edizzjoni Speċjali bil-Malti, Kapitolu 5, Vol. 4, p. 79).
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2. The reference was made in the course of proceedings between Ms Kücükdeveci and her former employer Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (‘Swedex’) concerning the calculation of the notice period applicable to her dismissal.
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2. Din it-talba ġiet ippreżentata fil-kuntest ta’ kawża bejn S. Kücükdeveci u min kien iħaddimha, Swedex GmbH & Co. KG (iktar ’il quddiem “Swedex”), fir-rigward tal-kalkolu tat-terminu ta’ avviż bil-quddiem li għandu japplika għat-tkeċċija tagħha.
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Legal context
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Il-kuntest ġuridiku
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European Union legislation
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Il-leġiżlazzjoni tal-Unjoni
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3. Directive 2000/78 was adopted on the basis of Article 13 EC. Recitals 1, 4 and 25 in the preamble to the directive read as follows:
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3. Id-Direttiva 2000/78 ġiet adottata abbażi tal-Artikolu 13 KE. Il-premessi 1, 4 u 25 ta’ din id-direttiva jipprovdu li ġej:
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‘(1) In accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, the European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to all Member States and it respects fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [signed at Rome on 4 November 1950] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.
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“(1) Skond l-Artikolu 6 tat-Trattat ta’ l-Unjoni Ewropea, l-Unjoni Ewropea hi mibnija fuq il-prinċipji tal-libertà, tad-demokrazija, tar-rispett għad-drittijiet umani u għal-libertajiet fundamentali, u wkoll fuq l-istat tad-dritt, prinċipji li huma komuni għall-Istati Membri kollha u li tirrispetta d-drittijiet fundamentali kif iggarantiti mill-Konvenzjoni Ewropea għall-protezzjoni tad-drittijiet umani u l-libertajiet fundamentali [, iffirmata f’Ruma fl-4 ta’ Novembru 1950,] u kif jirriżultaw mit-traduzzjonijiet kostituzzjonali komuni għall-Istati Membri bħala prinċipji ġenerali tal-liġi Komunitarja.
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…
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[...]
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(4) The right of all persons to equality before the law and protection against discrimination constitutes a universal right recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, to which all Member States are signatories. Convention No 111 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) prohibits discrimination in the field of employment and occupation.
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(4) Id-dritt tal-persuni kollha għall-ugwaljanza quddiem il-liġi u l-protezzjoni minn diskriminazzjoni jikonstitwixxi dritt universali rikonoxxut mid-Dikjarazzjoni Universali tad-Drittijiet Umani, il-Konvenzjoni tal-Ġnus Magħquda dwar l-Elimazzjoni tal-Forom Kollha tad-Diskriminazzjoni Kontra n-Nisa, mill-Patti tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti dwar id-Drittijiet Ċivili u Politiċi u dwar id-Drittijiet Ekonomiċi, Soċjali u Kulturali u mill-Konvenzjoni Ewropea għall-Protezzjoni tad-Drittijiet tal-Bniedem u l-Libertajiet, iffirmata mill-Istati Membri kollha. Il-Konvenzjoni Nru 111 ta’ l-Organizzazzjoni Internazzjonali tax-Xogħol (ILO) tipprojbixxi d-diskriminazzjoni fil-qasam ta’ l-impjieg u tax-xogħol.
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…
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[...]
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(25) The prohibition of age discrimination is an essential part of meeting the aims set out in the Employment Guidelines and encouraging diversity in the workforce. However, differences in treatment in connection with age may be justified under certain circumstances and therefore require specific provisions which may vary in accordance with the situation in Member States. It is therefore essential to distinguish between differences in treatment which are justified, in particular by legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and discrimination which must be prohibited.’
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(25) Il-projbizzjoni tad-diskriminazzjoni marbuta ma’ l-età hija element essenzjali biex jintlaħqu l-miri stabbiliti fil-Linji Gwida ta’ l-Impjieg u biex tiġi inkoraġġita d-diversità fl-impjieg. Madankollu, id-differenzi fit-trattament marbuta ma’ l-età jistgħu jiġu ġġustifikati f’ċerti ċirkostanzi u għalhekk jeħtieġu dispożizzjonijiet speċifiċi li jistgħu jvarjaw skond is-sitwazzjoni fl-Istati Membri. Huwa għalhekk essenzjali li jkun hemm distinzjoni bejn id-differenzi fi trattament li huma ġġustifikati, b’mod partikulari minn politika leġittima ta’ mpjieg, objettivi tas-suq tax-xogħol u taħriġ professjonali, u diskriminazzjoni li għandha tiġi pprojbita.”
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4. According to Article 1 of Directive 2000/78, its purpose is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment.
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4. Skont l-Artikolu 1 tagħha, id-Direttiva 2000/78 għandha l-għan li tistabbilixxi qafas ġenerali sabiex tikkumbatti d-diskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq reliġjon jew twemmin, diżabilità, età jew orjentazzjoni sesswali f’dak li għandu x’jaqsam l‑impjieg u x-xogħol, bil-għan li timplementa l-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali fl‑Istati Membri.
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5. Article 2 of the directive states:
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5. L-Artikolu 2 ta’ din id-direttiva jipprovdi:
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‘1. For the purposes of this Directive, the “principle of equal treatment” shall mean that there shall be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1.
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“1. Għall-iskop ta’ din id-Direttiva, ‘il-prinċipju ta’ ugwaljanza fit-trattament’ għandu jfisser li ma għandux ikun hemm diskriminazzjoni diretta jew indiretta għall-ebda raġuni msemmija fl-Artikolu 1.
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2. For the purposes of paragraph 1:
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2. Għall-iskopijiet tal-paragrafu 1:
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(a) direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1;
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a) għandu jitqies li jkun hemm diskriminazzjoni diretta meta persuna tiġi trattata b’mod inqas favorevoli milli kienet tiġi trattata oħra f’sitwazzjoni simili, għar-raġunijiet imsemmija fl-Artikolu 1;
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…’
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[...]”
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6. Article 3(1) of the directive provides:
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6. L-Artikolu 3(1) ta’ din id-direttiva jispeċifika:
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‘Within the limits of the areas of competence conferred on the Community, this Directive shall apply to all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, including public bodies, in relation to:
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“1. Fil-limiti tal-kompetenzi konferiti lill-Komunità, din id-Direttiva għandha tapplika għall-persuni kollha, kemm fis-settur pubbliku kif ukoll f’dak privat, inklużi korpi pubbliċi, f’dak li jirrigwarda:
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…
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[...]
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(c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay;
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ċ) il-kundizzjonijiet għall-impjieg u tax-xogħol, inklużi sensji u paga;
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…’
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[...]”
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7. Article 6(1) of the directive provides:
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7. L-Artikolu 6(1) tal-istess direttiva jipprovdi:
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‘Notwithstanding Article 2(2), Member States may provide that differences of treatment on grounds of age shall not constitute discrimination, if, within the context of national law, they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
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“Minkejja l-Artikolu 2(2), l-Istati Membri jistgħu jipprovdu li trattament differenti fuq bażi ta’ età ma għandux jikkostitwixxi diskriminazzjoni, jekk, fil-kuntest tal-liġi nazzjonali, hu objettivament u raġonevolment iġġustifikat b’għan leġittimu, inkluża politika leġittima ta’ l-impjieg, tas-suq tax-xogħol u ta’ objettivi ta’ taħriġ professjonali, u jekk il-mezzi biex jintlaħqu dawk l-għanjiet ikunu approprjati [xierqa] u neċessarji.
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Such differences of treatment may include, among others:
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Dan it-trattament differenti jista’ b’mod partikolari jinkludi:
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(a) the setting of special conditions on access to employment and vocational training, employment and occupation, including dismissal and remuneration conditions, for young people, older workers and persons with caring responsibilities in order to promote their vocational integration or ensure their protection;
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a) l-istabbiliment ta’ kondizzjonijiet speċjali għall-aċċess għall-impjieg u t-taħriġ professjonali, l-impjieg u x-xogħol, inkluzi l-kundizzjonijiet ta’ sensji u pagi, għaż-żgħażagħ, ħaddiema ta’ età, u persuni li jkollhom responsabbilitajiet li jieħdu ħsieb persuni oħra sabiex jippromwovu l-integrazzjoni professjonali tagħhom jew jiżguraw il-protezzjoni tagħhom;
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(b) the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional experience or seniority in service for access to employment or to certain advantages linked to employment;
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b) L-iffissar ta’ kondizzjonijiet minimi ta’ età, esperjenza professjonali jew anzjanità f’servizz għall-aċċess ta’ mpjieg jew għal ċerti vantaġġi marbuta ma’ l-impjieg;
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(c) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment which is based on the training requirements of the post in question or the need for a reasonable period of employment before retirement.’
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ċ) l-iffissar ta’ età massima għal reklutaġġ li tkun ibbażata fuq ħtiġiet ta’ formazzjoni tal-post inkwistjoni jew fuq il-ħtieġa ta’ perijodu raġjonevoli ta’ mpjieg qabel l-irtirar.”
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8. In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 18 of the directive, it was to be transposed into the legal systems of the Member States by 2 December 2003 at the latest. The second paragraph of Article 18 provided, however, that:
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8. Skont l-ewwel paragrafu tal-Artikolu 18 tad-Direttiva 2000/78, it-traspożizzjoni tagħha fis-sistema legali tal-Istati Membri għandha ssir sa mhux iktar tard mit-2 ta’ Diċembru 2003. Madankollu, skont it-tieni paragrafu tal-istess artikolu:
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‘In order to take account of particular conditions, Member States may, if necessary, have an additional period of three years from 2 December 2003, that is to say a total of six years, to implement the provisions of this Directive on age and disability discrimination. In that event they shall inform the Commission forthwith …’
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“Sabiex jittieħed kont ta’ kondizzjonijiet partikolari, l-Istati Membri jistgħu, jekk neċessarju, jkollhom perijodu addizzjonali ta’ 3 snin mit-2 ta’ Diċembru 2003, jiġifieri total ta’ 6 snin, biex jimplimentaw id-dispożizzjonijiet ta’ din id-Direttiva dwar diskriminazzjoni fuq bażi ta’ età u ta’ diżabilità. F’dak il-kaz għandhom jinfurmaw lill-Kummissjoni minnufih […]”.
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9. The Federal Republic of Germany made use of that option, so that the provisions of the directive relating to discrimination on grounds of age and disability were to be transposed in that Member State by 2 December 2006 at the latest.
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9. Ir-Repubblika Federali tal-Ġermanja użat din il-possibbiltà, b’mod li t‑traspożizzjoni tad-dispożizzjonijiet ta’ din id-direttiva dwar id-diskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età u fuq id-diżabbiltà kellha ssir sa mhux iktar tard mit-2 ta’ Diċembru 2006 f’dan l-Istat Membru.
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National legislation
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Il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali
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The General Law on equal treatment
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Il-Liġi ġenerali fuq it-trattament ugwali
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10. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 10 of the General Law on equal treatment (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) of 14 August 2006 (BGBl. 2006 I, p. 1897), which transposed Directive 2000/78, provide:
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10. L-Artikoli 1, 2 u 10 tal-Liġi ġenerali fuq it-trattament ugwali (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) tal-14 ta’ Awwissu 2006 (BGBl. 2006 I. p. 1897), li ttrasponiet id-Direttiva 2000/78, jipprovdu:
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‘Paragraph 1 – Object of the Law
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“Artikolu 1 – L-għan tal-liġi
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The object of this law is to prevent or eliminate discrimination on grounds of race, ethnic origin, sex, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
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Din il-liġi għandha l-għan li timpedixxi jew telimina kull diskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq ir-razza jew l-oriġni etnika, is-sess, ir-reliġjon jew it-twemmin, id-diżabbiltà, l-età jew l-identità sesswali.
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Paragraph 2 – Scope
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Artikolu 2 – Kamp ta’ applikazzjoni
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…
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[...]
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(4) For dismissals, the provisions on general and specific protection against dismissal apply exclusively.
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4) It-tkeċċijiet huma rregolati esklużivament mid-dispożizzjonijiet dwar il-protezzjoni ġenerali u partikolari kontra t-tkeċċija.
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…
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[...]
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Paragraph 10 – Permissible different treatment on grounds of age
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Artikolu 10 – Legalità ta’ ċerti trattamenti differenti bbażati fuq l-età
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Paragraph 8 notwithstanding, different treatment on grounds of age is also permissible if it is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim. The means of achieving that aim must be appropriate and necessary. Such differences of treatment may include in particular the following:
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Minkejja l-Artikolu 8, it-trattament differenti marbut mal-età huwa permess meta dan ikun oġġettivament u raġjonevolment iġġustifikat u bbażat fuq għan leġittimu. Il-mezzi biex jintlaħaq dan l-għan għandhom ikunu xierqa u meħtieġa. Dawn id-differenzi fit-trattament jistgħu jinkludu b’mod partikolari:
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1) l-implementazzjoni ta’ kundizzjonijiet speċjali ta’ aċċess għall-impjieg u għat-taħriġ professjonali, ta’ impjieg u ta’ xogħol, inklużi l-kundizzjonijiet tal-ħlas u tkeċċija, għaż-żgħażagħ, ħaddiema anzjani u dawk li għandhom lil min jieħdu ħsieb, bil-għan li titħeġġeġ l-integrazzjoni professjonali tagħhom jew li tiġi żgurata l-protezzjoni tagħhom;
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1. the setting of special conditions on access to employment and vocational training, employment and occupation, including conditions of remuneration and termination of employment relationships, for young people, older workers and persons with caring responsibilities in order to promote their vocational integration or ensure their protection,
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[...]”
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…’
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Il-leġiżlazzjoni fuq it-terminu tal-avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg
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Legislation on the notice period for dismissal
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11. L-Artikolu 622 tal-Kodiċi Ċivili Ġermaniż (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, iktar ’il quddiem il-”BGB”) jipprovdi:
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11. Paragraph 622 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ‘the BGB’) provides:
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“1) Ir-relazzjoni ta’ impjieg ta’ ħaddiem jew ta’ impjegat (bil-paga) tista’ tiġi tterminata b’avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg ta’ erba’ ġimgħat mill‑15 tax-xahar jew mill-aħħar tax-xahar.
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‘(1) Notice may be given to terminate the employment relationship of an employee with a notice period of four weeks to the 15th or to the end of a calendar month.
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2) F’każ ta’ tkeċċija min-naħa ta’ min iħaddem, it-terminu għall-avviż tat‑temm ta’ impjieg huwa dan li ġej:
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(2) For termination by the employer, the notice period, if the employment relationship in the business or undertaking
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– xahar żmien b’effett mill-aħħar tax-xahar meta r-relazzjoni ta’ impjieg fl‑istabbiliment jew fl-impriża tkun damet sentejn;
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1. has lasted for two years, is one month to the end of a calendar month,
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– xahrejn żmien b’effett mill-aħħar tax-xahar meta tkun damet 5 snin;
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2. has lasted five years, is two months to the end of a calendar month,
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– 3 xhur żmien b’effett mill-aħħar tax-xahar meta tkun damet 8 snin;
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3. has lasted eight years, is three months to the end of a calendar month,
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– 4 xhur żmien b’effett mill-aħħar tax-xahar meta tkun damet 10 snin;
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4. has lasted 10 years, is four months to the end of a calendar month,
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– 5 xhur żmien b’effett mill-aħħar tax-xahar meta tkun damet 12‑il sena;
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5. has lasted 12 years, is five months to the end of a calendar month,
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– 6 xhur żmien b’effett mill-aħħar tax-xahar meta tkun damet 15‑il sena;
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6. has lasted 15 years, is six months to the end of a calendar month,
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– 7 xhur żmien b’effett mill-aħħar tax-xahar meta tkun damet 20 sena.
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7. has lasted 20 years, is seven months to the end of a calendar month.
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Il-perijodi ta’ impjieg maħduma mill-impjegat qabel ma jkun laħaq l-età ta’ 25 sena ma għandhomx jittieħdu inkunsiderazzjoni fil-kalkolu taż-żmien ta’ impjieg.”
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In calculating the length of employment, periods prior to the completion of the employee’s 25th year of age are not taken into account.’
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Il-kawża prinċipali u d-domandi preliminari
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The main proceedings and the order for reference
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12. S. Kücükdeveci twieldet fit-12 ta’ Frar 1978. Sa mill-4 ta’ Ġunju 1996, jiġifieri sa minn meta kellha 18-il sena, hija kienet impjegata minn Swedex.
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12. Ms Kücükdeveci was born on 12 February 1978. She was employed from 4 June 1996, in other words from the age of 18, by Swedex.
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13. Permezz ta’ ittra tad-19 ta’ Diċembru 2006, Swedex keċċiet lil din l-impjegata b’effett mill-31 ta’ Jannar 2007, fid-dawl tal-avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg meħtieġ bil-liġi. Min iħaddimha kkalkola t-terminu ta’ avviż bħallikieku l-impjegata kellha anzjanità ta’ 3 snin meta effettivament kienet ilha taħdem magħha għal 10 snin.
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13. Swedex dismissed her by letter of 19 December 2006 with effect, taking account of the statutory notice period, from 31 January 2007. The employer calculated the notice period as if the employee had three years’ length of service, although she had been in its employment for 10 years.
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14. S. Kücükdeveci kkontestat it-tkeċċija tagħha quddiem l-Arbeitsgericht Mönchengladbach. Hija sostniet quddiem din il-qorti li t-terminu tal-avviż tat‑temm ta’ impjieg imissu kien ta’ erba’ xhur mill-31 ta’ Diċembru 2007, u dan skont il-punt 4 tal-ewwel subparagrafu tal-Artikolu 622(2) tal-BGB. Dan it‑terminu jikkorrispondi għal anzjanità ta’ għaxar snin. Għaldaqstant il-kawża prinċipali tikkonċerna kwistjoni bejn żewġ individwi, jiġifieri, minn naħa, S. Kücükdeveci u, min-naħa l-oħra, Swedex.
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14. Ms Kücükdeveci contested her dismissal before the Arbeitsgericht Mönchengladbach (Labour Court, Mönchengladbach). She argued before that court that her period of notice should have been four months from 31 December 2006, that is, to 30 April 2007, pursuant to point 4 of the second sentence of Paragraph 622(2) of the BGB. That period corresponded to 10 years’ service. The dispute in the main proceedings is thus between two individuals, Ms Kücükdeveci on the one hand and Swedex on the other.
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15. Skont S. Kücükdeveci, sa fejn it-tieni subparagrafu tal-Artikolu 622(2) tal-BGB jipprovdi li l-perijodi ta’ impjieg maħduma qabel l-età ta’ 25 sena ma jittiħdux inkunsiderazzjoni għall-kalkolu tat-terminu tal-avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg, dan jikkostitwixxi diskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età li tmur kontra d-dritt tal-Unjoni, u l-applikazzjoni tiegħu għandha tiġi eskluża.
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15. According to Ms Kücükdeveci, in so far as it provides that periods of employment completed before the age of 25 are not to be taken into account in calculating the notice period, the second sentence of Paragraph 622(2) of the BGB is a measure which discriminates on grounds of age, contrary to European Union law, and must be disapplied.
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16. Il-Landesarbeitsgericht Düsseldorf, li kienet qed tiddeċiedi fuq l-appell, ikkonstatat li t-terminu għat-traspożizzjoni tad-Direttiva 2000/78 kien iddekorra meta seħħet it-tkeċċija. Din il-qorti qieset ukoll li l-Artikolu 622 tal-BGB jinkludi trattament differenti direttament marbut mal-età, li filwaqt li n-natura antikostituzzjonali tiegħu ma tikkonvinċihiex, min-naħa l-oħra, il-konformità tiegħu mad-dritt tal-Unjoni hija diskutibbli. F’dan ir-rigward, hija tistaqsi jekk l‑eżistenza eventwali ta’ diskriminazzjoni direttament marbuta mal-età għandhiex tiġi evalwata fir-rigward tad-dritt primarju tal-Unjoni, bħal ma tidher li qed tissuġġerixxi s-sentenza tat-22 ta’ Novembru 2005 Mangold (C‑144/04, Ġabra p. I‑9981), jew inkella fir-rigward tad-Direttiva 2000/78. Filwaqt li tenfasizza li d‑dispożizzjoni nazzjonali inkwistjoni hija ċara u jekk ikun il-każ, ma tistax tiġi interpretata f’sens konformi ma’ din id-direttiva, hija tistaqsi wkoll jekk, sabiex din id-dispożizzjoni tkun tista’ titħalla mingħajr ma’ tiġi applikata fi kwistjoni bejn persuni privati, sabiex tiżgura l-protezzjoni tal-aspettattivi leġittimi tal‑individwi, hija għandhiex tressaq rinviju għal deċiżjoni preliminari quddiem il‑Qorti tal-Ġustizzja sabiex din tikkonferma l-inkompatibbiltà ta’ din id‑dispożizzjoni mad-dritt tal-Unjoni.
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16. The Landesarbeitsgericht Düsseldorf (Higher Labour Court, Düsseldorf), hearing the case on appeal, found that the period for transposing Directive 2000/78 had expired by the date of the dismissal. That court also considered that Paragraph 622 of the BGB contains a difference of treatment directly linked to age, and, while it is not convinced that it is unconstitutional, it regards its compatibility with European Union law as doubtful. It is not sure in this respect whether the possible existence of direct discrimination on grounds of age must be assessed by reference to primary European Union law, as the judgment in Case C‑144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I‑9981 appears to suggest, or by reference to Directive 2000/78. Noting that the national provision at issue is clear and could not be interpreted, if that were necessary, in a manner compatible with the directive, the court is also uncertain whether, to be able to disapply that provision in a dispute between private individuals, it must first, in order to ensure the protection of the legitimate expectations of persons subject to the law, make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling so that the Court can confirm that the provision is incompatible with European Union law.
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17. Huma f’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi li l-Landesarbeitsgericht Düsseldorf iddeċidiet li tissospendi l-proċeduri quddiemha u li tagħmel id-domandi preliminari li ġejjin lill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja:
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17. In those circumstances, the Landesarbeitsgericht Düsseldorf decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
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“1) a) Liġi nazzjonali li tistabbilixxi li t-terminu ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg li għandu jiġi rrispettat minn min iħaddem jiżdied b’mod progressiv skont it-tul tas-servizz, iżda li ma tiħux inkunsiderazzjoni l‑perijodi ta’ impjieg li l-impjegat ikun ħadem qabel ma laħaq l-età ta’ 25 sena, tikser il-projbizzjoni ta’ diskriminazzjoni abbażi tal-età stabbilita mid-dritt Komunitarju, b’mod partikolari d-dritt Komunitarju primarju jew id-Direttiva 2000/78 [...]?
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‘(1) (a) Does a national provision under which the periods of notice to be observed by employers are extended incrementally as the length of employment increases, but the employee’s periods of employment b efore the age of 25 are disregarded, infringe the Community law prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age, in particular primary Community law or Directive 2000/78 …?
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b) Jista’ jiġi ġġustifikat il-fatt li min iħaddem għandu jirrispetta biss terminu ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg bażiku f’każ ta’ tkeċċija ta’ impjegati żgħażagħ minħabba li dan għandu interess ekonomiku fit‑tmexxija tal-persunal flessibbli - fejn termini itwal ta’ avviż tat‑temm ta’ impjieg jistgħu jkunu ta’ ħsara għal dan l-interess ekonomiku - u li l-impjegati żgħażagħ jiġu mċaħħda mill-protezzjoni tal-istabbiltà tax-xogħol u mill-possibbiltà li jużaw id-dispożizzjonijiet (li jagħtu lill-impjegati iktar anzjani termini ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg itwal), pereżempju għaliex, fir-rigward tal-età tagħhom u/jew tal-fatt li għandhom inqas obbligi soċjali, familjari u privati, jista’ b’mod raġjonevoli jkun meħtieġ minnhom flessibbiltà u mobbiltà professjonali u personali ikbar?
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(b) Can the fact that employers are required to observe only a basic period of notice when terminating the employment of younger employees be justified on the grounds that employers are recognised as having an operational interest in flexibility as regards staffing – an interest which would be adversely affected by longer periods of notice – and that younger employees are not recognised as having the protection available to older employees (by means of longer notice periods) with respect to their employment status or arrangements, for example because, having regard to their age and/or their lesser social, family and private obligations, they are assumed to have greater occupational and personal flexibility and mobility?
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2) Fil-każ ta’ risposta fil-pożittiv għad-domanda 1 a) u ta’ risposta fin-negattiv għad-domanda 1 b):
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(2) If Question 1(a) is answered in the affirmative and Question 1(b) is answered in the negative:
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Il-qorti ta’ Stat Membru li jkollha quddiemha kwistjoni bejn persuni privati għandha tinjora liġi manifestament kuntrarja għad-dritt Komunitarju jew għandha tieħu inkunsiderazzjoni l-fiduċja li l-individwi għandhom fl‑applikazzjoni tal-liġijiet nazzjonali fis-seħħ fis-sens li n-nuqqas ta’ applikazzjoni sseħħ biss wara deċiżjoni tal-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fuq il-liġi inkwistjoni jew fuq liġi essenzjalment simili?”
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In legal proceedings between private individuals, must a court of a Member State disapply a statutory provision which is explicitly contrary to Community law, or is the legitimate expectation of persons subject to the law – that national laws which are in force will be applied – to be taken into account so that a provision becomes inapplicable only after the Court of Justice has ruled on the disputed provision or a substantially similar provision?’
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Fuq id-domandi preliminari
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The questions referred for a preliminary ruling
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Fuq l-ewwel domanda
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Question 1
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18. Permezz tal-ewwel domanda tagħha, il-qorti tar-rinviju tistaqsi, essenzjalment, jekk leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali bħal dik inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali, li tipprovdi li l-perijodi ta’ xogħol imwettqa mill-impjegat qabel ma jikseb l-età ta’ 25 sena ma jittiħdux inkunsiderazzjoni għall-kalkolu ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg, tikkostitwixxix trattament differenti bbażat fuq l-età li hu pprojbit mid-dritt tal‑Unjoni, b’mod partikolari mid-dritt primarju jew mid-Direttiva 2000/78. Hija tistaqsi, b’mod partikolari, fuq il-punt dwar jekk it-tali leġiżlazzjoni hiex iġġustifikata mill-fatt li jkun utli li jiġi osservat biss terminu wieħed ta’ avviż ta’ temm ta’ impjieg fil-każ ta’ tkeċċija ta’ ħaddiema żgħażagħ, minn naħa, sabiex min iħaddem ikun f’pożizzjoni li jamministra l-persunal tiegħu bi flessibbiltà, li ma jkunx possibbli li kieku t-termini għal avviż ta’ temm ta’ impjieg kienu itwal, u, min-naħa l-oħra, peress li huwa raġjonevoli li tkun meħtieġa mobbiltà personali u professjonali taż-żgħażagħ ikbar minn dik meħtieġa minn persuni ta’ età ikbar.
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18. By its first question, the referring court asks essentially whether national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which periods of employment completed by the employee before reaching the age of 25 are not taken into account in calculating the notice period for dismissal, constitutes a difference of treatment on grounds of age prohibited by European Union law, in particular primary law or Directive 2000/78. It is unsure, in particular, whether such legislation is justified on the ground that only a basic notice period is to be observed in the case of dismissal of younger workers, first, in order to enable employers to manage their personnel flexibly, which would not be possible with longer notice periods, and, second, because it is reasonable to require greater personal and occupational mobility from younger workers than from older ones.
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19. Sabiex tingħata risposta għal din id-domanda, jeħtieġ, hekk kif titlob il-qorti tar‑rinviju, li jiġi ppreċiżat qabel kollox jekk din id-domanda għandhiex tiġi ttrattata fir-rigward tad-dritt primarju tal-Unjoni jew tad-Direttiva 2000/78.
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19. To answer that question, it must first be ascertained, as the referring court suggests, whether the question should be examined by reference to primary European Union law or to Directive 2000/78.
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20. F’dan ir-rigward, għandu jitfakkar, fl-ewwel lok, li l-Kunsill tal-Unjoni Ewropea adotta d-Direttiva 2000/78 abbażi tal-Artikolu 13 KE u fir-rigward tagħha l-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ddeċidiet li din ma tistabbilixxix fiha nnifisha l-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali fil-qasam tal-impjiegi u tax-xogħol, li jsib is-sors tiegħu f’diversi strumenti internazzjonali u fl-użanzi kostituzzjonali komuni għall-Istati Membri, iżda hija sempliċement intiża sabiex fir-rigward ta’ dawn l-istess oqsma tistabbilixxi qafas ġenerali għall-ġlieda kontra d-diskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq raġunijiet differenti, fosthom l-età (ara s-sentenza Mangold, iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 74).
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20. In the first place, that the Council of the European Union adopted Directive 2000/78 on the basis of Article 13 EC, and the Court has held that that directive does not itself lay down the principle of equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation, which derives from various international instruments and from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, but has the sole purpose of laying down, in that field, a general framework for combating discrimination on various grounds including age (see Mangold , paragraph 74).
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21. F’dan il-kuntest, il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja rrikonoxxiet l-eżistenza ta’ prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età li għandu jiġi kkunsidrat bħala prinċipju ġenerali tad-dritt tal-Unjoni (ara, f’dan is-sens, is-sentenza Mangold, iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 75). Id-Direttiva 2000/78 tikkonkretizza dan il-prinċipju (ara, b’analoġija, is-sentenza tat-8 ta’ April 1976, Defrenne, 43/75, Ġabra p. 455, punt 54).
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21. In that context, the Court has acknowledged the existence of a principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age which must be regarded as a general principle of European Union law (see, to that effect, Mangold , paragraph 75). Directive 2000/78 gives specific expression to that principle (see, by analogy, Case 43/75 Defrenne [1976] ECR 455, paragraph 54).
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22. Għandu jiġi osservat ukoll li l-Artikolu 6(1) TUE jipprovdi li l-Karta tad-Drittijiet Fundamentali tal-Unjoni Ewropea għandha l-istess valur ġuridiku tat-Trattati. Skont l-Artikolu 21(1) ta’ din il-Karta, “[k]ull diskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq [...] l-età [...] għandha tkun projbita”.
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22. It should also be noted that Article 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is to have the same legal value as the Treaties. Under Article 21(1) of the charter, ‘[a]ny discrimination based on … age … shall be prohibited’.
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23. Barra minn hekk, sabiex il-prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età japplika f’każ bħal dak tal-kawża prinċipali, jeħtieġ li dan jinsab fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tad-dritt tal-Unjoni.
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23. For the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age to apply in a case such as that at issue in the main proceedings, that case must fall within the scope of European Union law.
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24. F’dan ir-rigward, u b’differenza mill-kawża li tat lok għas-sentenza tat-23 ta’ Settembru 2008, Bartsch (C‑427/06, Ġabra p. I‑7245), l-imġiba allegatament diskriminatorja adottata, f’din il-kawża prinċipali, abbażi tal-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali kkonċernata seħħet wara d-data tal-iskadenza tat-terminu mogħti lill‑Istat Membru kkonċernat għat-traspożizzjoni tad-Direttiva 2000/78, li fir-rigward tar-Repubblika Federali tal-Ġermanja, skada fit-2 ta’ Diċembru 2006.
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24. In contrast to the situation concerned in Case C‑427/06 Bartsch [2008] ECR I‑7245, the allegedly discriminatory conduct adopted in the present case on the basis of the national legislation at issue occurred after the expiry of the period prescribed for the Member State concerned for the transposition of Directive 2000/78, which, for the Federal Republic of Germany, ended on 2 December 2006.
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25. F’din id-data, l-imsemmija direttiva kellha bħala effett li ddaħħal fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tad-dritt tal-Unjoni l-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali fil-kawża prinċipali li tikkunsidra materja rregolata minn din l-istess direttiva, jiġifieri, f’dan il-każ, il‑kundizzjonijiet ta’ tkeċċija.
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25. On that date, that directive had the effect of bringing within the scope of European Union law the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, which concerns a matter governed by that directive, in this case the conditions of dismissal.
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26. Fil-fatt, sa fejn dispożizzjoni nazzjonali bħat-tieni subparagrafu tal‑Artikolu 622(2) tal-BGB tipprovdi li, għall-kalkolu tat-terminu tal-avviż tat‑temm ta’ impjieg ma jittiħdux inkunsiderazzjoni l-perijodi ta’ impjieg imwettqa mill-impjegat qabel ma dan ikun kiseb l-età ta’ 25 sena, din ikollha inċidenza fuq il-kundizzjonijiet ta’ tkeċċija tal-impjegati. B’hekk, leġiżlazzjoni ta’ din in-natura għandha tiġi kkunsidrata bħala waħda li tistabbilixxi regoli relatati mal-kundizzjonijiet ta’ tkeċċija.
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26. A national provision such as the second sentence of Paragraph 622(2) of the BGB, in that it provides that, in calculating the notice period, periods of employment completed before the employee reaches the age of 25 are not taken into account, affects the conditions of dismissal of employees. Such a provision must therefore be regarded as laying down rules on the conditions of dismissal.
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27. Minn dawn il-kunsiderazzjonijiet jirriżulta li huwa abbażi tal-prinċipju ġenerali tad-dritt tal-Unjoni li jipprojbixxi kull diskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età, bħal dik stabbilita mid-Direttiva 2000/78, li għandu jiġi kkonstatat jekk id-dritt tal-Unjoni jipprekludix leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali bħal dik fil-kawża prinċipali.
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27. It follows that it is the general principle of European Union law prohibiting all discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression in Directive 2000/78, which must be the basis of the examination of whether European Union law precludes national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings.
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28. Fit-tieni lok, fir-rigward tal-kwistjoni dwar jekk il-leġiżlazzjoni fil-kawża prinċipali tinkludix trattament differenti bbażat fuq l-età, għandu jitfakkar li, skont l-Artikolu 2(1) tad-Direttiva 2000/78, għall-finijiet ta’ din tal-aħħar, “prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali” ifisser in-nuqqas ta’ kull diskriminazzjoni diretta jew indiretta, ibbażata fuq waħda mir-raġunijiet imsemmija fl-Artikolu 1 ta’ din id-direttiva. L‑Artikolu 2(2)(a) ta’ din id-direttiva jispeċifika li, għall-ħtiġijiet tal-applikazzjoni tas-subartikolu 1 tiegħu, diskriminazzjoni diretta tirriżulta ladarba persuna tiġi trattata b’mod inqas favorevoli meta mqabbla ma’ persuna oħra li tinsab f’sitwazzjoni paragunabbli, abbażi ta’ waħda mir-raġunijiet imsemmija fl‑Artikolu 1 tal-istess direttiva (ara s-sentenzi tas-16 ta’ Ottubru 2007, Palacios de la Villa, C‑411/05, Ġabra p. I‑8531, punt 50, u tal-5 ta’ Marzu 2009, Age Concern England, C‑388/07, Ġabra p. I‑9597, punt 33).
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28. In the second place, as regards the question whether the legislation at issue in the main proceedings contains a difference of treatment on grounds of age, it should be recalled that under Article 2(1) of Directive 2000/78, for the purposes of that directive, the ‘principle of equal treatment’ means that there is to be no direct or indirect discrimination whatsoever on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 of the directive. Article 2(2)(a) of the directive states that, for the purposes of Article 2(1), direct discrimination is to be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than another person in a comparable situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1 (see Case C‑411/05 Palacios de la Villa [2007] ECR I‑8531, paragraph 50, and Case C‑388/07 Age Concern England [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 33).
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29. F’dan il-każ, it-tieni subparagrafu tal-Artikolu 622(2) tal-BGB jirriżerva trattament inqas favorevoli lill-persuni li impjegaw rwieħhom ma’ min iħaddimhom qabel ma laħqu l-età ta’ 25 sena. Din il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali għaldaqstant tintroduċi trattament differenti bejn persuni li għandhom l-istess anzjanità skont l-età li kellhom meta daħlu jaħdmu mal-impriża.
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29. In the present case, the second sentence of Paragraph 622(2) of the BGB affords less favourable treatment to employees who entered the employer’s service before the age of 25. That national provision thus introduces a difference of treatment between persons with the same length of service, depending on the age at which they joined the undertaking.
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30. B’hekk, fir-rigward ta’ żewġ impjegati li għandhom 20 sena ta’ anzjanità kull wieħed, dak li impjega ruħu fl-impriża fl-età ta’ 18-il sena jibbenefika minn terminu ta’ avviż ta’ temm ta’ impjieg ta’ ħames xhur filwaqt li dan it-terminu jkun ta’ seba’ xhur għal dak li impjega ruħu fl-età ta’ 25 sena. Barra minn hekk, kif osserva l-Avukat Ġenerali fil-punt 36 tal-konklużjonijiet tiegħu, il‑leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali fil-kawża prinċipali tisfavorixxi, b’mod ġenerali, lill‑ħaddiema żgħażagħ meta mqabbla mal-ħaddiema iktar anzjani, fejn, kif turi s‑sitwazzjoni tar-rikorrenti fil-kawża prinċipali, minkejja l-anzjanità ta’ numru ta’ snin fi ħdan l-impriża, dwan il-ħaddiema żgħażagħ jistgħu jiġu esklużi mill‑benefiċċju taż-żieda progressiva fit-termini ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg skont it-tul tar-relazzjoni tax-xogħol li minnu, min-naħa l-oħra, jistgħu jgawdu ħaddiema iktar anzjani li jkollhom anzjanità paragunabbli.
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30. Thus in the case of two employees each with 20 years’ seniority in service, the one who joined the undertaking at the age of 18 will be entitled to a notice period of five months, whereas the period will be seven months for the one who joined at the age of 25. Moreover, as the Advocate General observes in point 36 of his Opinion, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings disadvantages younger workers generally compared to older ones, in that the former – as the situation of Ms Kücükdeveci shows – may, despite several years’ seniority in service in the undertaking, be excluded from benefiting from the progressive extension of notice periods in the case of dismissal according to the length of the employment relationship, from which older workers of comparable seniority will, by contrast, be able to benefit.
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31. Għaldaqstant il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali inkwistjoni tinkludi trattament differenti bbażat fuq il-kriterju tal-età.
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31. It follows that the national legislation at issue contains a difference of treatment on grounds of age.
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32. Fit-tielet lok, jeħtieġ li jiġi eżaminat jekk dan it-trattament differenti jistax jikkostitwixxi diskriminazzjoni pprojbita mill-prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età stabbilit mid-Direttiva 2000/78.
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32. In the third place, it must be examined whether that difference of treatment is liable to constitute discrimination prohibited by the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age given expression by Directive 2000/78.
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33. F’dan ir-rigward, l-ewwel subparagrafu tal-Artikolu 6(1) tad-Direttiva 2000/78 jipprovdi li trattament differenti bbażat fuq l-età ma jikkostitwixxix diskriminazzjoni ladarba dan ikun oġġettivament u raġonevolment iġġustifikat, fil-kuntest tad-dritt nazzjonali, b’għan leġittimu, b’mod partikolari b’għanijiet leġittimi ta’ politika tal-impjieg, tas-suq tax-xogħol u ta’ għanijiet ta’ taħriġ professjonali, kif ukoll li l-mezzi sabiex jintlaħqu dawn l-għanijiet ikunu xierqa u neċessarji.
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33. The first subparagraph of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78 states that a difference of treatment on grounds of age does not constitute discrimination if, within the context of national law, it is objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.
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34. Kemm mill-informazzjoni pprovduta mill-qorti tar-rinviju kif ukoll mill‑ispjegazzjonijiet mogħtija matul is-seduta mill-Gvern Ġermaniż jirriżulta li l‑Artikolu 622 tal-BGB joriġina minn liġi tal-1926. L-iffissar tal-limitu ta’ 25 sena minn din il-liġi huwa l-frott ta’ kompromess bejn, l-ewwel nett, il-Gvern ta’ dak iż-żmien li kien xtaq żieda uniformi ta’ tliet xhur tat-terminu ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg tal-ħaddiema b’età ta’ iktar minn 40 sena, it-tieni nett, dawk li kienu favur żieda gradwali ta’ dan it-terminu għall-ħaddiema kollha u, it-tielet nett, dawk li kienu favur żieda gradwali tat-tul tal-avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg iżda mingħajr ma jittieħed inkunsiderazzjoni l-perijodu maħdum, fejn din ir-regola kellha bħala għan li teħles parzjalment lil min iħaddem mit-termini ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg twal għall-ħaddiema b’età ta’ inqas minn 25 sena.
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34. According to the information provided by the referring court and the statements made at the hearing by the German Government, Paragraph 622 of the BGB originates in a law of 1926. That that law set the threshold at 25 was the outcome of a compromise between, first, the government of the time, which wanted a uniform extension by three months of the notice period for the dismissal of workers aged over 40, second, the supporters of a progressive extension of that period for all workers, and, third, the supporters of a progressive extension of the notice period without taking the period of employment into account, the purpose of the rule being to give employers partial relief from lengthy periods of notice for workers aged under 25.
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35. Skont il-qorti tar-rinviju, it-tieni subparagrafu tal-Artikolu 622(2) tal-BGB jirrifletti l-evalwazzjoni tal-leġiżlatur li tgħid li l-ħaddiema żgħażagħ ġeneralment jirreaġixxu b’iktar faċilità u b’iktar ħeffa għat-telf ta’ impjieg tagħhom u li min‑naħa tagħhom tista’ tkun meħtieġa flessibbiltà ikbar. Fl-aħħar nett, terminu ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg iqsar għall-ħaddiema żgħażagħ jiffaċilita l-impjieg ta’ dawn tal-aħħar billi tiżdied il-flessibbiltà fl-amministrazzjoni tal-persunal.
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35. The referring court states that the second sentence of Paragraph 622(2) of the BGB reflects the legislature’s assessment that young workers generally react more easily and more rapidly to the loss of their jobs and greater flexibility can be demanded of them. A shorter notice period for younger workers also facilitates their recruitment by increasing the flexibility of personnel management.
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36. Għanijiet bħal dawk imsemmija mill-Gvern Ġermaniż u mill-qorti tar-rinviju jidhru li jirriżultaw minn politika fil-qasam tal-impjiegi u tas-suq tax-xogħol fis‑sens tal-Artikolu 6(1) tad-Direttiva 2000/78.
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36. Objectives of the kind mentioned by the German Government and the referring court clearly belong to employment and labour market policy within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78.
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37. Jeħtieġ li jiġi vverifikat, skont il-kliem innifishom ta’ din id-dispożizzjoni, jekk il‑mezzi implementati sabiex jintlaħaq it-tali għan leġittimu humiex “approprjati [xierqa] u neċessarji”.
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37. It remains to be ascertained, in accordance with the wording of that provision, whether the means of achieving such a legitimate aim are ‘appropriate and necessary’.
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38. F’dan ir-rigward, għandu jitfakkar li l-Istati Membri għandhom setgħa diskrezzjonali wiesgħa fl-għażla tal-miżuri li permezz tagħhom jistgħu jintlaħqu l‑għanijiet tagħhom fil-qasam tal-politika soċjali u tal-impjiegi (ara s-sentenzi ċċitati iktar ’il fuq Mangold, punt 63, u Palacios de la Villa, punt 68).
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38. The Member States enjoy a broad discretion in the choice of the measures capable of achieving their objectives in the field of social and employment policy (see Mangold , paragraph 63, and Palacios de la Villa , paragraph 68).
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39. Il-qorti tar-rinviju tindika li l-għan tal-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali inkwistjoni fil‑kawża prinċipali hija li toffri lil min iħaddem flessibbiltà ikbar fl‑amministrazzjoni tal-persunal billi jitħaffef l-oneru ta’ min iħaddem fir-rigward tat-tkeċċija tal-ħaddiema żgħażagħ, li fir-rigward tagħhom ikun raġonevoli li tkun meħtieġa żieda fil-mobilità personali jew professjonali.
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39. The referring court indicates that the aim of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings is to afford employers greater flexibility in personnel management by alleviating the burden on them in respect of the dismissal of young workers, from whom it is reasonable to expect a greater degree of personal or occupational mobility.
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40. Madankollu, din il-leġiżlazzjoni ma hijiex xierqa sabiex jintlaħaq dan il-għan peress li hija tapplika għall-impjegati kollha li daħlu fl-impriża qabel l-età ta’ 25 sena, tkun liema tkun l-età tagħhom meta jitkeċċew.
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40. However, the legislation is not appropriate for achieving that aim, since it applies to all employees who joined the undertaking before the age of 25, whatever their age at the time of dismissal.
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41. Fir-rigward tal-għan, segwit mil-leġiżlatur meta ġiet adottata l-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali fil-kawża prinċipali u mfakkra mill-Gvern Ġermaniż, li tissaħħaħ il‑protezzjoni tal-ħaddiema skont iż-żmien mgħoddi fl-impriża, jidher li, skont din il-leġiżlazzjoni, iż-żieda tat-terminu ta’ avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg skont l‑anzjanità tal-impjegat hija mtawla għal kull impjegat li daħal fl-impriża qabel l‑età ta’ 25 sena, meta l-persuna kkonċernata kellha anzjanità twila f’din l-impriża meta tkeċċiet. Għaldaqstant din il-leġiżlazzjoni ma tistax tiġi kkunsidrata bħala waħda intiża sabiex jintlaħaq l-għan allegat.
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41. As regards the aim pursued by the legislature at the time of adoption of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, adduced by the German Government, of strengthening the protection of workers according to their length of service in the undertaking, it is clear that, under that legislation, the extension of the notice period for dismissal according to the employee’s seniority in service is delayed for all employees who joined the undertaking before the age of 25, even if the person concerned has a long length of service in the undertaking at the time of dismissal. The legislation cannot therefore be regarded as appropriate for achieving that aim.
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42. Għandu jingħad ukoll li, kif tfakkar il-qorti tar-rinviju, il-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali inkwistjoni fil-kawża prinċipali tolqot lill-impjegati żgħażagħ b’mod li ma huwiex ugwali, fis-sens li tolqot liż-żgħażagħ li jidħlu kmieni fil-ħajja tax-xogħol, jew mingħajr taħriġ professjonali, jew wara taħriġ professjonali qasir, u mhux lil dawk li jibdew jaħdmu iktar tard, wara taħriġ twil.
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42. It should be added that, as the referring court points out, the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings affects young employees unequally, in that it affects young people who enter active life early after little or no vocational training, but not those who start work later after a long period of training.
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43. Minn dawn il-kunsiderazzjonijiet kollha jirriżulta li r-risposta għall-ewwel domanda għandha tkun li d-dritt tal-Unjoni, u b’mod iktar partikolari l-prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età hekk kif inhu stabbilit mid‑Direttiva 2000/78, għandu jiġi interpretat fis-sens li jipprekludi leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali, bħal dik fil-kawża prinċipali, milli tipprovdi li l-perijodi ta’ xogħol imwettqa mill-impjegat qabel ma jilħaq l-età ta’ 25 sena ma jittiħdux inkunsiderazzjoni għall-kalkolu tat-terminu tal-avviż tat-temm ta’ impjieg.
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43. It follows from all the above considerations that the answer to Question 1 is that European Union law, more particularly the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as given expression by Directive 2000/78, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that periods of employment completed by an employee before reaching the age of 25 are not taken into account in calculating the notice period for dismissal.
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Fuq it-tieni domanda
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Question 2
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44. Permezz tat-tieni domanda tagħha, il-qorti tar-rinviju tistaqsi jekk, meta jkollha quddiemha kwistjoni bejn individwi, sabiex tħalli mingħajr applikazzjoni leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali li hija tqis li tmur kontra d-dritt tal-Unjoni, hija għandhiex qabel kollox, sabiex tiżgura l-protezzjoni taċ-ċertezza legali tal-individwi quddiemha, tagħmel rinviju quddiem il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja abbażi tal‑Artikolu 267 TFUE sabiex din tikkonferma l-inkompatibbiltà ta’ din il‑leġiżlazzjoni mad-dritt tal-Unjoni.
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44. By its second question, the referring court asks whether, where it is hearing proceedings between individuals, in order to disapply a national provision which it considers to be contrary to European Union law, it must first, to ensure protection of the legitimate expectations of persons subject to the law, make a reference to the Court under Article 267 TFEU, so that the Court can confirm that the legislation is incompatible with European Union law.
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45. Fl-ewwel lok, fir-rigward tar-rwol tal-qorti nazzjonali meta din ikollha tiddeċiedi kwistjoni bejn individwi li fiha jidher li l-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali kkonċernata hija kontra d-dritt tal-Unjoni, il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ddeċidiet li huma l-qrati nazzjonali li għandhom jiżguraw il-protezzjoni legali fil-konfront tal-inidividwi li tirriżulta mid-dispożizzjonijiet tad-dritt tal-Unjoni kif ukoll li għandhom jiggarantixxu l‑effett sħiħ tagħhom (ara, f’dan is-sens is-sentenzi tal-5 ta’ Ottubru 2004, Pfeiffer et , C‑397/01 sa C‑403/01, Ġabra p. I‑8835, punt 111, kif ukoll tal-15 ta’ April 2008, Impact, C‑268/06, Ġabra p. I‑2483, punt 42).
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45. As regards, first, the role of the national court when called on to give judgment in proceedings between individuals in which it is apparent that the national legislation at issue is contrary to European Union law, the Court has held that it is for the national courts to provide the legal protection which individuals derive from the rules of European Union law and to ensure that those rules are fully effective (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 111, and Case C‑268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraph 42).
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46. F’dan is-sens, fir-rigward ta’ kwistjoni bejn individwi, il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja ddeċidiet li direttiva ma tistax, waħedha, toħloq obbligi fil-konfront ta’ individwu u għaldaqstant ma tistax tiġi invokata bħala tali kontrih (ara, b’mod partikolari, is‑sentenzi tas-26 ta’ Frar 1986, Marshall, 152/84, Ġabra p. 723, punt 48; tal-14 ta’ Lulju 1994, Faccini Dori, C‑91/92, Ġabra p. I‑3325, punt 20, kif ukoll Pfeiffer et , iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 108).
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46. In this respect, where proceedings between individuals are concerned, the Court has consistently held that a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied on as such against an individual (see, inter alia, Case 152/84 Marshall [1986] ECR 723, paragraph 48; Case C‑91/92 Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I‑3325, paragraph 20; and Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 108).
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47. Madankollu, l-obbligu tal-Istati Membri, li jirriżulta minn direttiva, li jilħqu r‑riżultat previst minnha kif ukoll il-kompitu tagħhom, skont l-Artikolu 10 KE, li jadottaw il-miżuri ġenerali jew partikolari kollha sabiex jiżguraw l-eżekuzzjoni ta’ dan l-obbligu jorbot lill-awtoritajiet kollha tal-Istati Membri, inklużi l-awtoritajiet ġudizzjarji fil-kuntest tal-kompetenzi tagħhom (ara, b’mod partikolari, f’dan is‑sens, is-sentenzi tal-10 ta’ April 1984, von Colson u Kamann, 14/83, Ġabra p. 1891, punt 26; tat-13 ta’ Novembru 1990, Marleasing, C‑106/89, Ġabra p. I‑4135, punt 8; Faccini Dori, iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 26; tat-18 ta’ Diċembru 1997, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, C‑129/96, Ġabra p. I‑7411, punt 40; Pfeiffer et , iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 110, kif ukoll tat-23 ta’ April 2009, Angelidaki et , C‑378/07 sa C‑380/07, Ġabra p. I‑3071, punt 106).
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47. However, the Member States’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged by that directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of that obligation are binding on all the authorities of the Member States including, for matters within their jurisdiction, the courts (see, inter alia, to that effect, Case 14/83 von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 1891, paragraph 26; Case C‑106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR I‑4135, paragraph 8; Faccini Dori , paragraph 26; Case C‑129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie [1997] ECR I‑7411, paragraph 40; Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 110; and Joined Cases C‑378/07 to C‑380/07 Angelidaki and Others [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 106).
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48. B’hekk, meta tapplika d-dritt nazzjonali, il-qorti nazzjonali li qed tintalab tinterpretah għandha tagħmel dan, sakemm ikun possibbli, fid-dawl tat-test u tal‑għan ta’ din id-direttiva sabiex jintlaħaq ir-riżultat stabbilit minnha u sabiex b’hekk tikkonforma ruħha mat-tielet paragrafu tal-Artikolu 288 TFUE (ara, f’dan is-sens, is-sentenzi ċċitati iktar ’il fuq von Colson u Kamann, punt 26; Marleasing, punt 8; Faccini Dori, punt 26, kif ukoll Pfeiffer et , punt 113). Ir-rekwiżit ta’ interpretazzjoni konformi tad-dritt nazzjonali huwa inerenti fis-sistema tat-Trattat minħabba li din tippermetti li l-qorti nazzjonali tiżgura, fil-kuntest tal-kompetenzi tagħha, l-effettività sħiħa tad-dritt tal-Unjoni meta tiddeċiedi l-kawża li jkollha quddiemha (ara, f’dan is-sens, is-sentenza Pfeiffer et , iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 114).
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48. It follows that, in applying national law, the national court called on to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in question, in order to achieve the result pursued by the directive and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU (see, to that effect, von Colson and Kamann , paragraph 26; Marleasing , paragraph 8; Faccini Dori , paragraph 26; and Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 113). The requirement for national law to be interpreted in conformity with European Union law is inherent in the system of the Treaty, since it permits the national court, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to ensure the full effectiveness of European Union law when it determines the dispute before it (see, to that effect, Pfeiffer and Others , paragraph 114).
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49. Madankollu, skont il-qorti tar-rinviju, minħabba l-kjarezza u l-preċiżjoni tiegħu, it-tieni subparagrafu tal-Artikolu 622(2) tal-BGB ma huwiex suġġett għal interpretazzjoni konformi m ad-Direttiva 2000/78.
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49. According to the national court, however, because of its clarity and precision, the second sentence of Paragraph 622(2) of the BGB is not open to an interpretation in conformity with Directive 2000/78.
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50. F’dan ir-rigward, minn naħa, għandu jitfakkar, hekk kif intqal fil-punt 20 ta’ din is-sentenza, li d-Direttiva 2000/78 sempliċement tikkonkretizza l-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali fil-qasam tal-impjiegi u tax-xogħol mingħajr ma tistabbilixxih, u, min-naħa l-oħra, li l-prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età huwa prinċipju ġenerali tad-dritt tal-Unjoni peress li jikkostitwixxi applikazzjoni speċifika tal-prinċipju ġenerali ta’ trattament ugwali (ara, f’dan is-sens, is‑sentenza Mangold, iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punti 74 sa 76).
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50. It must be recalled here that, as stated in paragraph 20 above, Directive 2000/78 merely gives expression to, but does not lay down, the principle of equal treatment in employment and occupation, and that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is a general principle of European Union law in that it constitutes a specific application of the general principle of equal treatment (see, to that effect, Mangold , paragraphs 74 to 76).
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51. F’dawn iċ-ċirkustanzi, hija l-qorti nazzjonali li qed tisma’ l-kawża dwar il‑prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età, hekk kif ġie kkonkretizzat permezz tad-Direttiva 2000/78, li fil-kuntest tal-kompetenzi tagħha għandha tiżgura l-protezzjoni ġuridika tal-partijiet li tirriżulta mid-dritt tal-Unjoni u li tiggarantixxi l-effett sħiħ tiegħu billi għall-bżonn ma tapplikax id-dispożizzjonijiet tal-liġi nazzjonali li jmorru kontra dan il-prinċipju (ara, f’dan is-sens, is-sentenza Mangold, iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 77).
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51. In those circumstances, it for the national court, hearing a dispute involving the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age as given expression in Directive 2000/78, to provide, within the limits of its jurisdiction, the legal protection which individuals derive from European Union law and to ensure the full effectiveness of that law, disapplying if need be any provision of national legislation contrary to that principle (see, to that effect, Mangold , paragraph 77).
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52. Fit-tieni lok, fir-rigward tal-obbligu li għandha l-qorti nazzjonali, li quddiemha titressaq kawża bejn individwi, li tressaq rinviju għal deċiżjoni preliminari quddiem il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fir-rigward tal-interpretazzjoni tad-dritt tal-Unjoni qabel ma tippermetti li ma tiġix applikata dispożizzjoni nazzjonali li hija tqis li tmur kontra dan id-dritt, jeħtieġ li jiġi osservat li mid-deċiżjoni tar-rinviju jirriżulta li dan l-aspett tal-kwistjoni huwa mmotivat mill-fatt li, skont id-dritt nazzjonali, il-qorti tar-rinviju ma tistax tippermetti li ma tiġix applikata dispożizzjoni tal-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali li tkun fis-seħħ mingħajr ma din id‑dispożizzjoni tkun ġiet preċedentement iddikjarata antikostituzzjonali mill‑Bundesverfassungsgericht (Qorti Kostituzzjonali Federali).
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52. As regards, second, the obligation of the national court, hearing proceedings between individuals, to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of European Union law before it can disapply a national provision which it considers to be contrary to that law, it is apparent from the order for reference that this aspect of the question has been raised because, under national law, the referring court cannot decline to apply a national provision in force unless that provision has first been declared unconstitutional by the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court).
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53. F’dan ir-rigward, għandu jiġi enfasizzat li l-ħtieġa li jiġi ggarantit l-effett sħiħ tal‑prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età, hekk kif ġie kkonkretizzat permezz tad-Direttiva 2000/78, timplika li, meta l-qorti nazzjonali jkollha quddiemha dispożizzjoni nazzjonali li tidħol fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tad-dritt tal-Unjoni li hija tqis li hija inkompatibbli ma’ dan il-prinċipju u fejn jirriżulta li interpretazzjoni konformi ma’ dan il-prinċipju tkun impossibbli, hija ma għandhiex tippermetti li din id-dispożizzjoni ma tiġix applikata mingħajr ma tkun kostretta jew prekluża milli qabel kollox tressaq talba għal deċiżjoni preliminari quddiem il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja.
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53. The need to ensure the full effectiveness of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression in Directive 2000/78, means that the national court, faced with a national provision falling within the scope of European Union law which it considers to be incompatible with that principle, and which cannot be interpreted in conformity with that principle, must decline to apply that provision, without being either compelled to make or prevented from making a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling before doing so.
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54. Il-possibbiltà għaldaqstant rikonoxxuta lill-qorti nazzjonali permezz tat-tieni paragrafu tal-Artikolu 267 TFUE, li titlob interpretazzjoni preliminari mill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja qabel ma tippermetti li ma tiġix applikata dispożizzjoni nazzjonali li tmur kontra d-dritt tal-Unjoni ma tistax madankollu tinbidel f’obbligu minħabba l‑fatt li d-dritt nazzjonali ma jippermettix li din il-qorti tippermetti li ma tiġix applikata dispożizzjoni nazzjonali li hija tqis li tmur kontra l-Kostituzzjoni mingħajr ma din id-dispożizzjoni tkun ġiet preċedentement iddikjarata antikostituzzjonali mill-Qorti Kostituzzjonali. Fil-fatt, skont il-prinċipju tas‑supremazija tad-dritt tal-Unjoni, li minnu jibbenefika wkoll il-prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età, leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali kuntrarja li tidħol fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tad-dritt tal-Unjoni ma għandhiex tiġi applikata (ara, f’dan is-sens, is-sentenza Mangold, iċċitata iktar ’il fuq, punt 77).
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54. The possibility thus given to the national court by the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU of asking the Court for a preliminary ruling before disapplying the national provision that is contrary to European Union law cannot, however, be transformed into an obligation because national law does not allow that court to disapply a provision it considers to be contrary to the constitution unless the provision has first been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. By reason of the principle of the primacy of European Union law, which extends also to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, contrary national legislation which falls within the scope of European Union law must be disapplied (see, to that effect, Mangold , paragraph 77).
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55. Minn dawn il-kunsiderazzjonijiet jirriżulta li meta titressaq kawża bejn individwi quddiem qorti nazzjonali, hija ma hijiex marbuta iżda għandha l-possibbiltà li tressaq rinviju għal deċiżjoni preliminari quddiem il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar l‑interpretazzjoni tal-prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età hekk kif ġie kkonkretizzat permezz tad-Direttiva 2000/78, qabel ma tippermetti li ma tiġix applikata dispożizzjoni tal-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali li hija tqis li tmur kontra dan il-prinċipju. In-natura diskrezzjonali ta’ dan ir-rinviju hija indipendenti mill‑metodi li għandha l-qorti nazzjonali, fis-sistema legali interna, sabiex tippermetti li ma tiġix applikata dispożizzjoni nazzjonali li hija tqis li tmur kontra l-Kostituzzjoni.
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55. It follows that the national court, hearing proceedings between individuals, is not obliged but is entitled to make a reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression by Directive 2000/78, before disapplying a provision of national law which it considers to be contrary to that principle. The optional nature of such a reference is not affected by the conditions of national law under which a court may disapply a national provision which it considers to be contrary to the constitution.
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56. Fid-dawl ta’ dak li ntqal iktar ’il fuq, ir-risposta għat-tieni domanda għandha tkun li meta titressaq kawża bejn individwi quddiem qorti nazzjonali, hija għandha tiżgura r-rispett tal-prinċipju ta’ nondiskriminazzjoni bbażata fuq l-età, hekk kif ġie kkonkretizzat permezz tad-Direttiva 2000/78, billi jekk ikun meħtieġ tippermetti li ma tiġix applikata kull dispożizzjoni tal-leġiżlazzjoni nazzjonali li tmur kontra d-dritt tal-Unjoni, indipendentement mill-eżerċizzju tal-possibbiltà li hija għandha, fil-każijiet imsemmija fit-tieni paragrafu tal-Artikolu 236 TFUE, li tressaq rinviju għal deċiżjoni preliminari quddiem il-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fir‑rigward tal-interpretazzjoni ta’ dan il-prinċipju.
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56. In the light of the foregoing, the answer to Question 2 is that it is for the national court, hearing proceedings between individuals, to ensure that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression in Directive 2000/78, is complied with, disapplying if need be any contrary provision of national legislation, independently of whether it makes use of its entitlement, in the cases referred to in the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, to ask the Court for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of that principle.
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Fuq l-ispejjeż
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Costs
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57. Peress li l-proċedura għandha, fir-rigward tal-partijiet fil-kawża prinċipali, in‑natura ta’ kwistjoni mqajma quddiem il-qorti tar-rinviju, hija din il-qorti li tiddeċiedi fuq l-ispejjeż. L-ispejjeż sostnuti għas-sottomissjoni tal‑osservazzjonijiet lill-Qorti tal-Ġustizzja, minbarra dawk tal-imsemmija partijiet, ma jistgħux jitħallsu lura.
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57. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.
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