[pic] | COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES |

[pic] | KUMMISSJONI TAL-KOMUNITAJIET EWROPEJ |

Brussels, 26.3.2009

Brussel 26.3.2009

COM(2009) 143 final

KUMM(2009) 143 finali

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

KOMUNIKAZZJONI MILL-KUMMISSJONI LILL-KUNSILL U L-PARLAMENT EWROPEW

Communication on nuclear non-proliferation

Komunikazzjoni dwar in-nonproliferazzjoni nukleari

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

KOMUNIKAZZJONI MILL-KUMMISSJONI LILL-KUNSILL U L-PARLAMENT EWROPEW

Communication on nuclear non-proliferation

Komunikazzjoni dwar in-nonproliferazzjoni nukleari

1. INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUZZJONI

The political context in recent years has led the international community to focus attention on the reduction of proliferation risks at the UN, G8 and in other international fora. With the renewed global interest in nuclear energy and the growing number of countries looking into possibilities to engage a civil nuclear energy programme, there is an even clearer need to strengthen international guarantees of non-proliferation.

Il-kuntest politiku f'dawn l-aħħar snin wassal lill-komunità internazzjonali sabiex tiffoka l-attenzjoni fuq it-tnaqqis ta' riskji tal-proliferazzjoni fi ħdan in-NU, tal-G8 u f'fora internazzjonali oħra. Bl-interess globali mġedded fl-enerġija nukleari u l-għadd dejjem jikber ta' pajjiżi li qed jeżaminaw il-possibilitajiet li jħaddmu programm ċivili tal-enerġija nukleari, tkompli toħroġ aktar biċ-ċar il-ħtieġa li jissaħħu l-garanziji internazzjonali ta' nonproliferazzjoni.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[1] sets out the general framework to address the non-proliferation challenge and entrusts the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to play a key role in this area. The UN Security Council acts as authority of last resort to address the cases of major breaches to non-proliferation commitments.

It-Trattat dwar in-Nonproliferazzjoni (TNP)[1] jistabbilixxi l-qafas ġenerali biex tiġi indirizzata l-isfida ta' nonproliferazzjoni u jafda lill-Aġenzija Internazzjonali għall-Enerġija Atomika (IAEA) biex ikollha rwol ewlieni f'dan il-qasam. Il-Kunsill tas-Sigurtà tan-NU jaġixxi bħala l-awtorità tar-rimedju aħħari li tindirizza l-każijiet ta' ksur prinċipali tal-impenji ta' nonproliferazzjoni.

The European Union, the Community and their Member States act, within their respective competences, in multiple ways in this area, comprising actions in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as those founded on the Community Treaties. In this way, the EU can provide a considerable contribution to addressing the non-proliferation challenge also at global level, based on its extensive experience in dealing with nuclear power and the range of instruments at its disposal.

L-Unjoni Ewropea, il-Komunità u l-Istati Membri tagħhom jaġixxu, fil-kompetenzi rispettivi tagħhom, b’bosta modi f'dan il-qasam, inklużi azzjonijiet fil-qafas tal-Politika Komuni Barranija u tas-Sigurtà (CFSP) kif ukoll dawk imsejsa fuq it-Trattati Komunitarji. B'dan il-mod, l-UE tista' tagħti kontribut konsiderevoli fl-indirizzar tal-isfida tan-nonproliferazzjoni f'livell globali wkoll, abbażi tal-esperjenza estensiva tagħha fl-indirizzar tal-enerġija nukleari u l-firxa ta' strumenti għad-dispożizzjoni tagħha.

In its recent Communication on "Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security"[2], the Commission announced that it would address to the Council and the Parliament a specific Communication on the various EU instruments available in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, in particular under the Euratom Treaty.

Fil-Komunikazzjoni riċenti tagħha dwar "Li tindirizza l-isfida internazzjonali tas-sikurezza u s-sigurtà nukleari"[2], il-Kummissjoni ħabbret li hi se tindirizza Komunikazzjoni speċifika lill-Kunsill u l-Parlament dwar l-istrumenti varji tal-UE disponibbli fil-qasam tan-nonproliferazzjoni nukleari, partikolarment dawk li jaqgħu taħt it-Trattat tal-Euratom.

The purpose of this Communication is therefore to set out the global context highlighting the need for strengthened international guarantees of non-proliferation (Section 2), to present the main available EU instruments in this field, in particular those under the Euratom Treaty, (Section 3), and the possible ways these instruments could be used to develop – in close coordination with the IAEA – stronger international guarantees of non-proliferation (Section 4).

L-għan ta' din il-Komunikazzjoni għalhekk hu li jiġi stabbilit il-kuntest ġenerali li jenfasizza l-ħtieġa għall-garanziji internazzjonali msaħħa ta' nonproliferazzjoni (It-Taqsima 2), li jiġu ppreżentati l-istrumenti ewlenin tal-UE disponibbli f'dan il-qasam, partikolarment dawk li jaqgħu taħt it-Trattat tal-Euratom (It-Taqsima 3), u li jiġu stabbiliti l-aħjar modi possibbli kif dawn l-istrumenti jistgħu jintużaw biex jiżviluppaw – b'koordinazzjoni fil-qrib mal-IAEA – garanziji internazzjonali ta' nonproliferazzjoni aktar b'saħħithom (It-Taqsima 4).

2. GLOBAL CONTEXT: THE NEED FOR STRENGTHENED INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF NON-PROLIFERATION

2. KUNTEST GLOBALI: IL-ħTIEġA GħAL GARANZIJI INTERNAZZJONALI MSAħħA TA' NONPROLIFERAZZJONI

Rising energy demand at global level, coupled with concerns on security of supply and the recognition that there is a general need to reduce CO2 emissions in order to mitigate the effects of climate change, prompts a renewed interest in nuclear energy worldwide.

It-talba dejjem akbar għall-enerġija, flimkien mat-tħassib dwar is-sigurtà tal-provvista u l-għarfien li hemm ħtieġa ġenerali li jitnaqqsu l-emissjonijiet tas-CO2 sabiex jittaffew l-effetti tat-tibdil fil-klima jqajmu interess imġedded fl-enerġija nukleari madwar id-dinja.

From the outset it should be stated that the international Non-Proliferation Treaty acknowledges the right of all NPT Parties to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Sa mill-bidu nett, għandu jiġi ddikjarat li t-Trattat tan-Nonproliferazzjoni jagħraf id-dritt tal-Partijiet kollha fit-TNP li jiżviluppaw u jużaw l-enerġija nukleari għal skopijiet paċifiċi.

The proliferation risk from the use of nuclear energy essentially may come from two specific nuclear activities, namely enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. These activities require very complex and costly technologies which can only be economically justified if a market demand exists from a large number of nuclear power plants.

Essenzjalment ir-riskju tal-proliferazzjoni mill-użu ta' enerġija nukleari jista' jkun ġej minn żewġ attivitajiet nukleari speċifiċi, li huma l-arrikkiment tal-uranju u l-ipproċessar mill-ġdid ta' fjuwil nukleari użat. Dawn l-attivitajiet jeħtieġu teknoloġiji kumplessi ħafna u li jiswew ħafna flus, li jistgħu jkunu ġġustifikati ekonomikament biss jekk teżisti talba fis-suq minn għadd kbir ta' impjanti tal-enerġija nukleari.

In the present context of growing interest for nuclear energy, the international community must do everything possible to minimize the risks of nuclear security incidents and/or diversion of either nuclear materials or technology to non-peaceful uses. Therefore, the international community should ensure that conditions continue to be met regarding nuclear non-proliferation, including the norms of the NPT and of the IAEA.

Fil-kuntest attwali tal-interess dejjem akbar għall-enerġija nukleari, il-komunità internazzjonali trid tagħmel dak kollu li hu possibbli biex jitnaqqsu r-riskji ta' inċidenti ta' sigurtà nukleari u/jew ta' devjazzjoni ta' materjali jew ta' teknoloġija nukleari għal użu mhux paċifiku. Għalhekk, il-komunità internazzjonali għandha tiżgura li jibqgħu jiġu sodisfatti l-kundizzjonijiet rigward in-nonproliferazzjoni nukleari, inklużi n-normi tat-TNP u dawk tal-IAEA.

At global level, the key international actor in preventing nuclear proliferation is the IAEA with its safeguards activities deriving from the NPT and the enhanced safeguards regime based on the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, and the right to possess fissile nuclear materials. Recent global actions in this area include an initiative endorsed by the G8 Summit 2008, highlighting the importance of non-proliferation/safeguards, safety and security ("3S") in the development of nuclear energy[3]; the US initiative Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Fuq livell globali, l-operatur internazzjonali ewlieni għall-prevenzjoni tal-proliferazzjoni nukleari huwa l-IAEA bl-attivitajiet ta' salvagwardja tagħha li ġejjin mit-TPN u bir-reġimi mtejba ta' salvagwardji abbażi tal-Ftehimiet ta’ Salvagwardji Komprensivi u Protokolli Addizzjonali, u bid-dritt li tippossjedi materjali fissili nukleari. Azzjonijiet globali reċenti f'dan il-qasam jinkludu inizjattiva approvata uffiċjalment mis-Samit tal-G8 tal-2008, li tenfasizza l-importanza tan-nonproliferazzjoni/is-salvagwardji, is-sikurezza u s-sigurtà ("3S") fl-iżvilupp tal-enerġija nukleari[3]; l-inizjattiva tal-Istati Uniti tas-Sħubija Globali tal-Enerġija Nukleari (GNEP), il-Proġett Internazzjonali dwar ir-Reatturi Nukleari u ċ-Ċikli tal-Fjuwil Innovattivi (INPRO) u l-Inizjattiva Globali Kontra t-Terroriżmu Nukleari.

In addition to the NPT, a United Nations Convention was adopted in 2005 concerning the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism[4]. The Nuclear Suppliers Group also plays a significant role in particular through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports (see also Section 3.2).

Barra mit-TNP, fl-2005 ġiet adottata Konvenzjoni tan-Nazzjonijiet Uniti li tikkonċerna t-trażżin ta' atti ta' terroriżmu nukleari[4]. Il-Grupp tal-Fornituri Nukleari għandu rwol sinifikanti wkoll partikolarment permezz tal-implimentazzjoni tal-Linji Gwidi għal esportazzjonijiet nukleari (ara wkoll it-Taqsima 3.2).

In the EU, several instruments are available to further nuclear non-proliferation objectives (Section 3 below). In addition, the EU has the world technological leadership for uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuels. In this context it is important to highlight that the European markets for enriched uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel are competitive, reliable and transparent.

Fl-UE, hemm bosta strumenti disponibbli biex ikomplu jiżviluppaw l-għanijiet tan-nonproliferazzjoni nukleari (it-Taqsima 3 hawn isfel). Barra minn hekk, l-UE għandha t-tmexxija dinjija tat-teknoloġija għall-arrikkiment tal-uranju u l-ipproċessar mill-ġdid ta' fjuwils użati. F'dan il-kuntest huwa importanti li wieħed jenfasizza li s-swieq Ewropej għall-arrikkiment tal-uranju u l-ipproċessar mill-ġdid ta' fjuwil użat huma kompetittivi, affidabbli u trasparenti.

In its Communication on "An Energy Policy for Europe"[5], the Commission identified the promotion of non-proliferation as one of the key priorities to be pursued by an effective external EU energy policy. The importance of non-proliferation for the use and future development of nuclear energy was reaffirmed in the Communication updating the Nuclear Illustrative Programme[6] in the context of the Second Strategic Energy Review[7]. In this respect, the Commission highlighted the need for strengthening cooperation between Euratom and the IAEA in order to achieve the desired international effect. In this context, a Joint Statement was signed on 7 May 2008 between the Commission and the IAEA[8] to reinforce mutual cooperation on nuclear energy.

Fil-Komunikazzjoni tagħha dwar "Politika tal-Enerġija għall-Ewropa"[5], il-Kummissjoni identifikat il-promozzjoni ta' nonproliferazzjoni bħala waħda mill-prijoritajiet ewlenin li għandhom jiġu segwiti permezz ta' politika tal-UE esterna u effettiva dwar l-Enerġija. L-importanza tan-nonproliferazzjoni għall-użu u l-iżvilupp fil-ġejjieni tal-enerġija nukleari ġiet affermata mill-ġdid fil-Komunikazzjoni li taġġorna l-Programm Illustrativ Nukleari[6] fil-kuntest tat-Tieni Reviżjoni tal-Enerġija Strateġika[7]. F'dan ir-rigward, il-Kummissjoni enfasizzat il-ħtieġa li ssaħħaħ il-kooperazzjoni bejn l-Euratom u l-IAEA sabiex jinkiseb l-effett internazzjonali mixtieq. F'dan il-kuntest, fis-7 ta' Mejju 2008 ġiet iffirmata Stqarrija Konġunta bejn il-Kummissjoni u l-IAEA[8] biex tissaħħaħ il-kooperazzjoni reċiproka dwar l-enerġija nukleari.

Recently the European Parliament reaffirmed the particular importance of the Euratom Treaty in connection with the commitment of Member States which use nuclear energy to complying with international security and non-proliferation standards[9].

Reċentament il-Parlament Ewropew afferma mill-ġdid l-importanza partikolari tat-Trattat tal-Eurotom b'konnessjoni mal-impenn tal-Istati Membri li jużaw l-enerġija nukleari f'konformità mas-sigurtà internazzjonali u l-istandards ta' nonproliferazzjoni[9].

3. MAIN EU INSTRUMENTS IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION AREA

3. L-ISTRUMENTI EWLENIN FIż-żONA TA' NONPROLIFERAZZJONI

To further its nuclear non-proliferation objectives, the EU has several instruments available, mainly in the CFSP framework, the EC and the Euratom Treaty.

Biex tkompli tiżviluppa l-għanijiet ta' nonproliferazzjoni nukleari, l-UE għandha bosta strumenti disponibbli, l-aktar fil-qafas tal-CSFP, il-KE u t-Trattat tal-Euratom.

In the context of the CFSP, non-proliferation is a key policy objective, in particular since 2003 when the EU adopted a European Security Strategy[10] followed by the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)[11]. The report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy approved in December 2008[12], together with the New Lines for Action in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction endorsed by the Council (GAERC) on 8–9 December 2008[13], confirmed that WMD threats have further increased and remain a high concern on the EU political agenda. It is clear that the Commission will play an important role in implementing the New Lines for Action through different Community instruments and policies. The EU has also provided its full backing to the UN Security Council Resolution 1540[14], and Council Joint Actions are on-going in support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) actions.

Fil-kuntest tal-CFSP, in-nonproliferazzjoni huwa għan ewlieni politiku partikolarment mill-2003 meta l-UE adottat l-Istrateġija Ewropea dwar is-Sigurtà[10] segwita mill-istrateġija tal-UE kontra l-proliferazzjoni ta' armi ta' qerda tal-massa (WMD)[11]. Ir-rapport approvat f'Diċembru 2008 dwar l-implimentazzjoni tal-Istrateġija Ewropea dwar is-Sigurtà[12], flimkien mal-Linji l-Ġodda għall-Azzjoni fil-ġlieda kontra l-proliferazzjoni ta' armi ta' qerda tal-massa approvati mill-Kunsill (GAERC) bejn it-8 u d-9 ta' Diċembru 2008[13], jikkonfermaw li baqgħu jiżdiedu t-theddidiet ta' WMD u jibqgħu jqajmu tħassib kbir dwar l-aġenda politika tal-UE. Huwa ċar li l-Kummissjoni se jkollha rwol importanti fl-implimentazzjoni tal-Linji l-Ġodda għall-Azzjoni permezz ta' strumenti u politiki Komunitarji differenti. L-UE appoġġat bis-sħiħ ir-Riżoluzzjoni 1540 tal-Kunsill tas-Sigurtà tan-NU[14], u l-Azzjonijiet Konġunti tal-Kunsill ma jifqux fl-appoġġ tagħhom għall-azzjonijiet mill-Aġenzija Internazzjonali għall-Enerġija Atomika (IAEA).

Furthermore, Community instruments, based on the EC Treaty as well as the Euratom Treaty, in particular the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC[15]), the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA[16]) and the Instrument for Stability (IfS[17]) allow for non-proliferation cooperation with third countries. Coherence and synergies among all EU instruments, and particularly with the Instrument for Stability, is essential to support an effective implementation of the WMD strategy.

Barra minn hekk, l-istrumenti Komunitarji, abbażi kemm tat-Trattat tal-KE kif ukoll tat-Trattat tal-Euratom, partikolarment l-Istrument għall-Kooperazzjoni għas-Sikurezza Nukleari (INSC[15]), l-Istrument ta' Assistenza għal Qabel l-Adeżjoni (IPA[16]) u l-Istrument għall-Istabbiltà (IfS[17]) jippermettu kooperazzjoni ta' nonproliferazzjoni ma' pajjiżi terzi. Il-koerenza u s-sinerġiji fost l-istrumenti kollha tal-UE , partikolarment l-Istrument għall-Istabbiltà, huma essenzjali biex isir appoġġ tal-implimentazzjoni effettiva tal-istrateġija WMD.

Through the Instrument for Stability, the Commission supports third countries to develop training and assistance in the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) fields. The focus, so far, has been on the countries of the former Soviet Union. In 2009–2011, EU assistance will be consolidated there while being extended to new regions of concern, including South-East Asia, the Middle East and parts of Africa, in particular in the nuclear and biological fields. The implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1540 will be furthered by supporting the IAEA (nuclear fuel bank initiative), engaging former WMD scientists, tackling nuclear smuggling – including deceptive financial practices – and contributing to a more efficient export control system and border monitoring. Regional CBRN "centres of excellence", relying on JRC expertise, will be instrumental in this context. With around 300 million EUR for the period 2007–2013, the Instrument for Stability is a major instrument on non-proliferation seeking to develop a CBRN safety and security culture throughout the world, together with other EU instruments.

Permezz tal-Istrument għall-Istabbiltà, il-Kummissjoni tappoġġa pajjiżi terzi biex jiżviluppaw it-taħriġ u l-assistenza fl-oqsma tal-Kimika, Bijoloġija, Radjoloġija u Nukleari (CBRN). L-attenzjoni, sa issa, kienet fuq il-pajjiżi tal-ex Unjoni Sovjetika. Bejn l-2009 u l-2011, l-assistenza tal-UE se tkun konsolidata hemmhekk filwaqt li tinfirex għal reġjuni ġodda li jqajmu tħassib, fosthom ix-Xlokk tal-Ażja, il-Lvant Nofsani u partijiet tal-Afrika, partikolarment fl-oqsma nukleari u bijoloġiċi. L-implimentazzjoni tar-Riżoluzzjoni tal-Kunsill ta’ Sigurtà tan-NU 1540 se tkompli tiġi żviluppata billi tiġi appoġġata l-IAEA (l-inizjattiva tal-bank ta' fjuwil nukleari), jiġu involuti xjenzati li qabel kienu ta' WMD, ikun indirizzat il-kutrabandu nukleari - inklużi l-prattiċi finanzjarji qarrieqa - u jingħata kontribut biex tiżdied l-effiċjenza fis-sistema ta' kontroll għall-esportazzjoni u fil-monitoraġġ tal-konfini. Iċ-"ċentri reġjonali ta' eċċellenza" tas-CBRN, abbażi tal-ħila esperta tal-JRC, se jkunu strumentali f'dan il-kuntest. B'madwar EUR 300 miljun għall-perjodu bejn l-2007 u l-2013, l-Istrument għall-Istabbiltà huwa strument ewlieni dwar in-nonproliferazzjoni li jfittex li jiżviluppa kultura tas-CBRN ta' sikurezza u sigurtà madwar id-dinja kollha, flimkien ma' strumenti tal-UE oħra.

As from its origins the main objective of the Euratom Treaty was the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Therefore many provisions of the Treaty cover activities and institutions which contribute to non-proliferation of nuclear materials, including at international level, where the Community may negotiate and enter into agreements with third States and international organizations (Chapter 10 Euratom). The main Euratom related activities linked to the non-proliferation objective are the following:

Sa mill-bidu tiegħu, l-għan ewlieni tat-Trattat tal-Euratom kien l-iżvilupp paċifiku tal-enerġija nukleari. B'hekk ħafna dispożizzjonijiet tat-Trattat ikopru attivitajiet u istituzzjonijiet li jikkontribwixxu għan-nonproliferazzjoni ta' materjali nukleari, inkluż f'livell internazzjonali, meta l-Komunità tista' tinnegozja u tidħol fi ftehimiet ma' Stati terzi u organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali (il-Kapitolu 10 tal-Euratom). L-attivitajiet ewlenin tal-Euratom marbuta mal-għan ta' nonproliferazzjoni huma dawn li-ġejjin:

3.1. Safeguard activities

3.1. Attivitajiet ta' salvagwardja

Euratom Safeguards were established by Chapter 7 of the Euratom Treaty already a decade before the NPT was opened for signature. The Commission has the responsibility to verify that fissile nuclear materials (plutonium, uranium and thorium) are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the Community users, either those in the nuclear industry such as nuclear reactor operators and operators of enrichment and reprocessing plants or those outside the nuclear industry, such as research centres and medical institutes. Nuclear safeguards (inspections and related nuclear material accountancy) form the first line of defence against the diversion of nuclear materials from declared activities to non-peaceful purposes.

Is-Salvagwardji tal-Euratom kienu diġà stabbiliti bil-Kapitolu 7 tat-Trattat tal-Euratom għaxar snin qabel ma t-TNP infetaħ għall-firem. Il-Kummissjoni għandha r-responsabbiltà li tivverifika li l-materjali fissili nukleari (il-plutonju, l-uranju u t-torju) ma jiġux żvijati mill-użi intenzjonati tagħhom kif iddikjarat mill-utenti Komunitarji, jew dawk fl-industrija nukleari bħall-operaturi tar-reatturi nukleari u l-operaturi tal-impjanti ta' arrikkiment u ta' pproċessar mill-ġdid jew dawk barra mill-industrija nukleari, bħaċ-ċentri ta' riċerka u istituti tal-mediċina. Is-salvagwardji nukleari (l-ispezzjonijiet u l-kontabbiltà ta' materjali nukleari relatati) jifformaw l-ewwel linja ta' difiża kontra l-iżvijar ta' materjali nukleari minn attivitajiet dikjarati għal skopijiet mhux paċifiċi.

Since the entry into force of the NPT, the IAEA has been given the role of ensuring that nuclear non-proliferation commitments are met at the global level.

Sa mid-dħul fis-seħħ tat-TNP, l-IAEA kienet ingħatat ir-rwol li tiżgura li l-impenji tan-nonproliferazzjoni nukleari qed jintlaħqu f'livell dinji.

The Euratom safeguards system acts as a collective system of accounting for and control of nuclear material for all the EU Member States[18], for internal purposes and under the safeguards agreements with the IAEA. These basic safeguards agreements have been concluded between Member States of the European Union, Euratom and the IAEA.

Is-sistema ta' salvagwardji tal-Euratom taġixxi bħala sistema kollettiva ta' kontabbiltà u ta' kontroll għall-materjali nukleari għall-Istati Membri tal-UE kollha[18], għall-skopijiet interni u skont il-ftehimiet ta' salvagwardji mal-IAEA. Dawn il-ftehimiet bażiċi ta' salvagwardji ġew konklużi bejn l-Istati Membri u l-Unjoni Ewropea, il-Euratom u l-IAEA.

Inspectors from the IAEA therefore also inspect nuclear facilities in the EU. Both IAEA and Euratom inspectorates work in close co-operation to apply safeguards in the EU. Inspection activities are carried out in full coordination using common equipment. Nonetheless, each inspectorate draws its independent conclusions from inspection activities.

B'hekk spetturi mill-IAEA jispezzjonaw ukoll faċilitajiet nukleari fl-UE. Kemm l-ispettorati tal-IAEA kif ukoll tal-Euratom jaħdmu f'kooperazzjoni mill-qrib sabiex japplikaw is-salvagwardji fl-UE. L-attivitajiet tal-ispezzjoni jitwettqu b'koordinazzjoni sħiħa billi jintuża tagħmir komuni. Madankollu, kull ispettorat jasal għall-konklużjonijiet indipendenti tiegħu mill-attivitajiet tal-ispezzjoni.

The close co-operation with the IAEA extends to the implementation in the Community of the Additional Protocols to the safeguards agreements with the IAEA, which complement the IAEA safeguards system, enabling it to detect, beyond diversion of declared materials, undeclared nuclear activities.

Il-kooperazzjoni mill-qrib mal-IAEA testendi l-implimentazzjoni fil-Komunità tal-Protokolli Addizzjonali għall-ftehimiet ta' salvagwardji mal-IAEA, li jikkumplementaw is-sistema ta' salvagwardji tal-IAEA, u jippermettulha li tiskopri, apparti mill-iżvijar ta' materjali nukleari, attivitajiet nukleari mhux dikjarati.

An Additional Protocol to each of the respective safeguards agreements is in force in all EU Member States. The Commission closely follows the transition of the few remaining new Member States with respect to their adherence to the corresponding trilateral safeguards agreement including the Additional Protocol between Euratom, the IAEA and the non-nuclear-weapon States in the EU and the resulting suspension of their bilateral safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Fl-Istati Membri kollha hemm fis-seħħ Protokoll Addizzjonali għal kull ftehim rispettiv ta' salvagwardji. Il-Kummissjoni ssegwi mill-qrib it-transizzjoni tal-ftit Stati Membri ġodda li fadal rigward l-adeżjoni tagħhom mal-ftehim ta' salvagwardji trilaterali u ekwivalenti inkluż il-Protokoll Addizzjonali bejn l-Euratom, l-IAEA u l-Istati fl-UE li ma għandhomx armi nukleari u, b'riżultat ta' dan, is-sospensjoni tal-ftehimiet ta' salvagwardji bilaterali tagħhom mal-IAEA.

The Commission also supports the transfer of methodologies for safeguards through the implementation of various Community instruments. Since the mid 1990's, the Commission's TACIS and now INSC programmes support in particular the transfer of methodology in nuclear material accounting in the CIS countries, and the Commission is preparing to do the same in other third countries.

Il-Kummissjoni tappoġġa wkoll it-trasferiment tal-metodoloġiji għas-salvagwardji permezz tal-implimentazzjoni ta' strumenti Komunitarji varji. Sa minn nofs is-snin 90, it-TACIS tal-Kummissjoni u issa l-programmi INSC jappoġġaw partikolarment it-trasferiment ta' metodoloġija fil-kontabbiltà ta' materjal nukleari fil-pajjiżi CIS, u l-Kummissjoni qed tipprepara li tagħmel l-istess ħaġa f'pajjiżi terzi oħra.

3.2. Health and safety, physical protection, illicit trafficking and export controls

3.2. Is-saħħa u s-sikurezza, il-protezzjoni fiżika, it-traffikar illeċitu u l-controlli tal-esportazzjoni

On the basis of the health and safety provisions (Chapter 3 Euratom), there is well established legislation on shipments of radioactive substances between Member States[19], on the control High-activity Sealed Radioactive Sources and Orphan Sources[20] and the Shipment Directive[21] complementing it. All these provide for licensing, authorisation and notification procedures which aim to guarantee that radioactive materials are not possessed, used or transported without appropriate regulatory control.

Abbażi tad-dispożizzjonijiet ta' saħħa u ta' sikurezza (il-Kapitolu 3 tal-Euratom), hemm leġiżlazzjoni stabbilita sew dwar konsenji ta' sustanzi radjoattivi bejn Stati Membri[19], dwar il-kontroll ta' Sorsi Radjoattivi ta' Attività Għolja u Siġillati u Għejun Orfni[20], u d-Direttiva ta' Konsenji[21] li tikkomplimentaha. Dawn kollha jipprovdu għall-proċeduri ta' liċensjar, awtorizzar u notifika li għandhom l-għan li jiggarantixxu li materjali radjoattivi ma jkunux possess ta' xi ħadd, jintużaw jew jiġu trasportati mingħajr il-kontroll regolatorju xieraq.

Moreover, Euratom has acceded to the international Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material[22], and negotiated amendments to the Convention regarding matters covered by Community competence. Physical protection extends to the fields of transport of dangerous goods and maritime security, which are relevant for the transport of nuclear or radioactive materials.

Barra minn hekk, Euratom aċċetta l-Konvenzjoni internazzjonali dwar il-Protezzjoni Fiżika ta' Materjali Nukleari[22], u nnegozja emendi għall-Konvenzjoni rigward affarijiet koperti mill-kompetenza Komunitarja. Il-protezzjoni fiżika testendi għall-oqsma tat-trasport ta' 'merkanzija perikoluża u ta' sigurtà marittima, li huma rilevanti għat-trasport ta' materjali nukleari u radjoattivi.

In recent years, the European Commission through the Instrument for Stability supports projects aiming at fighting against illicit trafficking. In this context, the Border Management Working Group permits the coordination with the USA and the IAEA.

F'dawn l-aħħar snin, permezz tal-Istrument għall-Istabbiltà, il-Kummissjoni Ewropeja tappoġġa proġetti bil-għan li jiġġieldu kontra t-traffikar illeċitu. F'dan il-kuntest, il-Grupp ta' Ħidma għall-Ġestjoni tal-Fruntieri jippermetti l-koordinazzjoni mal-Istati Uniti tal-Amerika u mal-IAEA.

The Council Regulation 1334/2000[23], which is directly applicable in Member States, is the Community instrument that enables Member States to implement their commitments to the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Commission also participates in the Nuclear Suppliers Group as an observer and chairs the committee set up by the regulation, which addresses all implementation issues. The Commission regularly makes proposals to update and/or to better align this regulation with our international commitments. In 2006, the Commission proposed a reform of the Community regime of export controls of dual use items in order to strengthen its efficiency, to criminalize the most serious violations and to align it on the provisions of UNSCR 1540 regarding transit and brokering.

Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill 1334/2000[23], li huwa direttament applikabbli fl-Istati Membri, huwa l-istrument Komunitarju li jippermetti lill-Istati Membri li jimplimentaw l-impenji tagħhom lill-Grupp ta' Fornituri Nukleari. Il-Kummissjoni tieħu sehem ukoll fil-Grupp ta' Fornituri Nukleari bħala osservatur u tippresiedi l-Kumitat stabbilit mir-Regolament, li jindirizza l-kwestjonijiet kollha ta' implimentazzjoni. Il-Kummissjoni regolarment tagħmel proposti biex taġġorna u/jew biex tikkonforma aktar dan ir-regolament mal-impenji internazzjonali tagħna. Fl-2006, il-Kummissjoni pproponiet riforma tas-sistema Komunitarja tal-kontrolli tal-esportazzjoni ta' oġġetti b'użu doppju sabiex issaħħaħ l-effiċjenza tagħha, biex tinkrimina l-aktar vjolazzjonijiet serji u biex tikkonformaha mad-dispożizzjonijiet tal-UNSCR 1540 rigward tranżitu u senserija.

Within the broader CBRN context, the Commission is in the process of developing a policy on CBRN security fully taking into account the Council Conclusions of December 2007 on addressing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks. This policy is expected to be put forward in mid-2009. From February 2008 to January 2009, a CBRN Task Force has been working at EU level in order to identify concrete actions which need to be taken in order to strengthen CBRN security in Europe. This Task Force was composed of experts from the Member State authorities, the private sector, Europol, Eurojust and the European institutions.

Fil-kuntest usa' ta' CBRN, il-Kummissjoni qiegħda fil-proċess li tiżviluppa politika dwar is-sigurtà ta' CBRN waqt li tqis bis-sħiħ il-Konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill ta' Diċembru 2007 dwar l-indirizzar tar-riskji kimiċi, bioloġiċi u nukleari. Din il-politika mistennija tkun ippreżentata f'nofs l-2009. Minn Frar 2008 sa Jannar 2009, Task Force għas-CBRN kienet qed taħdem f'livell tal-UE sabiex tidentifika azzjonijiet konkreti li jeħtieġ li jittieħdu sabiex tissaħħaħ is-sigurtà tas-CBRN fl-Ewropa. Din it-Task Force kienet magħmula minn esperti minn awtoritajiet tal-Istati Membri, is-settur provat, Europol, Eurojust u l-istituzzjonijiet Ewropej.

3.3. Euratom Supply Agency

3.3. Aġenzija għall-Provista tal-Euratom

The current contribution of the Euratom Supply Agency[24] to non-proliferation consists mainly of the following:

Il-kontribut attwali tal-Aġenzija għall-Provvista tal-Euratom[24] għan-nonproliferazzjoni jikkonsisti l-aktar minn dawn li ġejjin:

- Authorising the conclusion of supply contracts, when nuclear materials are physically imported into the Community or exported from the Community;

- L-awtorizzazzjoni tal-konklużjoni ta' kuntratti ta' provvista, meta materjali nukleari huma fiżikament importati fil-Komunità jew esportati mill-Komunità;

- Checking that supply contracts are concluded only for peaceful end-uses and that all supply contracts include a safeguards clause;

- Il-verifika li l-kuntratti ta' provvista huma konklużi biss għal użi aħħarin paċifiċi u li l-kuntratti kollha ta' provvista jinkludu klawsola ta' salvagwardja;

- Export authorisation procedures for nuclear materials produced in the Community[25].

- Il-proċeduri ta' awtorizzazzjoni ta' esportazzjoni għall-materjali nukleari magħmula fil-Komunità[25].

Another important point is the possibility to create commercial or security stocks of nuclear materials, in accordance with Article 72 of the Euratom Treaty.

Punt importanti ieħor huwa l-possibiltà li jinħolqu ħażniet kummerċjali jew ta' sigurtà ta' materjali nukleari, skont l-Artikolu 72 tat-Trattat tal-Euratom.

The Community exercises the right of ownership with respect to "all special fissile materials which are produced or imported by a Member State, a person or an undertaking and are subject to the safeguards" (Chapter 8 of the Treaty). With ownership comes also responsibility for safeguards in a broad sense which includes physical protection measures.

Il-Komunità teżerċità d-dritt tal-pussess fir-rigward tal-"materjali kollha fissili prodotti jew importati minn Stat Membru, persuna jew intrapriża u suġġetti għall-kontroll ta’ sigurtà ".(il-Kapitolu 8 tat-Trattat). Mal-pussess tiġi wkoll ir-responsabbiltà għas-salvagwardji fis-sens wiesa' li jinkludi l-miżuri tal-protezzjoni fiżika.

3.4. Research and the Joint Research Centre (JRC)

3.4. Riċerka u Ċentru Konġunt għar-Riċerka (JRC).

The specific provisions on research (Chapter 1 of Euratom) are the basis for all nuclear Community research programmes, among which proliferation resistance can be addressed in the development of innovative reactor concepts. Beyond specific safeguards-related activities, the other areas of the Euratom Research and Training Programme are also open for international cooperation, which can be supportive to the non-proliferation objectives of this Communication.

Id-dispożizzjonijiet speċifiċi dwar riċerka (il-Kapitolu 1 tal-Euratom) huma l-bażi għall-programmi Komunitarji kollha ta' riċerka nukleari, li fihom tkun tista' tiġi indirizzata r-reżistenza ta' proliferazzjoni fl-iżvilupp ta' kunċetti ta' reatturi innovattivi. Lil hinn mill-attivitajiet speċifiċi relatati mas-salvagwardji, l-oqsma l-oħra tal-Programm tal-Euratom għal Riċerka u Taħriġ huma miftuħa għal kooperazzjoni internazzjonali, li tista' tkun ta' appoġġ għall-miri tan-nonproliferazzjoni ta' din il-Komunikazzjoni.

Established by the article 8 of the Euratom Treaty, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has always been a major actor in support to both the Commission and the IAEA. The JRC has been entrusted with the development of methodologies and technologies for the implementation of safeguards, the training of both Commission and IAEA inspectors and the implementation of the European support programme to the IAEA.

Stabbilit bl-Artikolu 8 tat-Trattat tal-Euratom, iċ-Ċentru Konġunt ta' Riċerka (JRC) minn dejjem kien operatur ewlieni fl-appoġġ kemm għall-Kummissjoni kif ukoll għall-IAEA. Il-JRC ġie fdata bl-iżvilupp ta' metodolġiji u teknoloġiji għall-implimentazzjoni ta' salvagwardji, it-taħriġ ta' spetturi kemm mill-Kummissjoni kif ukoll mill-IAEA u l-implimentazzjoni tal-programm ta' appoġġ Ewropew għall-IAEA.

As leading body in the fight against illicit trafficking, the JRC was asked to assist in the transfer of the "acquis communautaire" to new Member States by training their authorities and experts during the enlargement process.

Bħala korp ewlieni fil-ġlieda kontra t-traffikar illeċitu, il-JRC ġie mitlub biex jassisti fit-trasferiment tal-" acquis communautere " lill-Istati Membri ġodda billi jitħarrġu l-awtoritajiet u l-esperti tagħhom matul il-proċess ta' tkabbir.

The establishment of the two on-site laboratories at both European reprocessing facilities in France and the UK and its major contribution to the one in Japan, in collaboration with the IAEA, has conferred to the JRC a recognised competence in the safeguarding of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Furthermore, the JRC has been entrusted with the technical implementation of the TACIS Programme on nuclear security. Starting in 1994, through the TACIS programme, the Commission has also provided a significant support to the Science and Technology Centres in Moscow[26] and Kiev[27] which have the objective to limit the proliferation of sensitive knowledge obtained by scientists in the framework of WMD programmes. Peaceful research activities, to which 70 000 scientists have taken part, have been successfully supported. Continued support to programmes for the redirection of weapons scientists in CIS countries and other regions is being provided by the Instrument for Stability.

L-istabbiliment taż-żewġ laboratorji fuq il-post fiż-żewġ faċilitajiet Ewropej tal-ipproċessar mill-ġdid fi Franza u fir-Renju Unit u l-kontribut tiegħu lill-dak fil-Ġappun, b'kollaborazzjoni mal-IAEA, ta lill-JRC kompetenza rikonoxxuta fis-salvagwardjar tal-faċilitajiet taċ-ċiklu tal-fjuwil nukleari. Barra minn hekk, il-JRC ġie fdat bl-implimentazzjoni teknika tal-Programm TACIS dwar is-sigurtà nukleari. Sa mill-1994, permezz tal-programm TACIS, il-Kummissjoni forniet ukoll appoġġ sinifikanti liċ-Ċentri tax-Xjenza u t-Teknoloġija f'Moska[26] u Kiev[27] li għandhom l-għan li jillimitaw il-proliferazzjoni ta' għarfien sensittiv miksub minn xjenzati fil-qafas tal-programmi WMD. L-attivitajiet ta' riċerka paċifiċi, li għalihom ħadu sehem 70 000 xjenzat, kienu appoġġati b'suċċess. Appoġġ kontinwu għal programmi biex tingħata direzzjoni differenti lix-xjenzati tal-armi fil-pajjiżi tas-CIS u f'reġjuni oħra qed jiġi fornut mill-Strument għall-Istabbiltà.

4. THE POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD

4. IR-ROTTA LI POSSIBILMENT GħANDHA TITTIEħED

The European Union could, within the respective competences, develop the following key actions in the field of non-proliferation:

L-Unjoni Ewropea tista', fi ħdan il-kompetenzi rispettivi, tiżviluppa l-azzjonijiet ewlenin li ġejjin fil-qasam tan-nonproliferazzjoni:

- Strengthening support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its safeguards and the Additional Protocol;

- Issaħħaħ l-appoġġ għat-Trattat tan-Nonproliferazzjoni, għas-salvagwardji tiegħu u għall-Protokoll Addizzjonali;

- Extending cooperation with key nuclear countries through bilateral Euratom agreements, in coordination with measures taken on the basis of the May 2008 Communication[28];

- Testendi l-kooperazzjoni ma' pajjiżi nukleari ewlenin permezz ta' ftehimiet bilaterali tal-Euratom , b'koordinazzjoni ma' miżuri meħuda abbażi tal-Komunikazzjoni ta' Mejju 2008[28];

- Contributing to the development of an international system of guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for countries willing to develop nuclear energy without having their own nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

- Tikkontribwixxi għall-iżvilupp ta' sistema internazzjonali ta' provvista garantita ta' fjuwil nukleari għal pajjiżi li lesti jiżviluppaw enerġija nukleari mingħajr ma jkollhom il-faċilitajiet taċ-ċiklu tal-fjuwil nukleari tagħhom stess.

4.1. Strengthening the support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and nuclear safeguards

4.1. Tisħiħ tal-appoġġ għat-Trattat tan-Nonproliferazzjoni, għas-salvagwardji nukleari

A key priority for non-proliferation is to maintain and intensify the support for the NPT and nuclear safeguards.

Priorità ewlenija għan-nonproliferazzjoni hija li jinżamm u jiġi intensifikat l-appoġġ għas-salvagwardji tan-TNP u dawk nukleari.

The European Union, the Community and their Member States, acting within their respective competences, should, in close cooperation with the IAEA, pursue their efforts to strengthen and promote the credibility of the NPT regime by developing a shared approach towards the risks of proliferation, in particular towards those countries that are either not party to the NPT or are party to it but do not provide sufficient guarantees for its implementation.

L-Unjoni Ewropea, il-Komunità u l-Istati Membri tagħha, waqt li jaġixxu fi ħdan il-kompetenzi rispettivi tagħhom, għandhom, b'kooperazzjoni mill-qrib mal-IAEA, ikomplu bl-isforzi tagħhom biex isaħħu u jħeġġu l-kredibbiltà tas-sistema tat-TNP billi jiżviluppaw approċċ maqsum lejn ir-riskji ta' proliferazzjoni, partikolarment lejn dawk il-pajjiżi li jew mhumiex imsieħba fit-TNP jew li huma msieħba għalih iżda ma jipprovdux biżżejjed garanziji għall-implimentazzjoni tiegħu.

In this context concrete measures should also cover in particular the following areas, making full use of all available instruments in a complementary way:

F'dan il-kuntest, il-miżuri konkreti għandhom ikopru wkoll partikolarment l-oqsma li ġejjin, u jutilizzaw b'mod sħiħ l-istrumenti disponibbli b'mod kumplimentari:

- Reinforcing an international framework for sensitive activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle;

- It-tisħiħ ta' qafas internazzjonali għal attivitajiet sensittivi relatati maċ-ċiklu tal-fjuwil nukleari;

- Contributing to the implementation of the "New lines for action by the European Union in combating the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems", which include provisions with the view to strengthening export controls and reinforcing the capacity to fight illicit trafficking;

- Il-kontribut għall-implimentazzjoni tal-"Linji ġodda ta' azzjoni mill-Unjoni Ewropea fil-ġlieda kontra l-proliferazzjoni ta' WMD u s-sistemi ta' konsenja tagħhom, li jinkludi dispożizzjonijiet bil-għan li jsaħħu l-kontrolli ta' esportazzjoni u titjieb il-kapaċità fil-ġlieda tat-traffikar illeċitu;

- Examining the most appropriate sanctions in case of violation of non proliferation commitments either by third countries or by EU exporters.

- L-eżami tal-aktar sanzjonijiet xierqa f'każ ta' vjolazzjoni tal-impenji ta' nonproliferazzjoni jew minn pajjiżi terzi jew minn esportaturi tal-UE..

The European Union, the Community and their Member States, acting within their respective competences, could facilitate this process and strengthen their support for the NPT in all areas of their competence. Key measures could include:

L-Unjoni Ewropea, il-Komunità u l-Istati Membri tagħhom, waqt li jaġixxu fi ħdan il-kompetenzi rispettivi tagħhom, jistgħu jħaffu l-proċess u jsaħħu l-appoġġ tagħhom għat-TNP fl-oqsma kollha tal-kompetenza tagħhom. Il-miżuri ewlenin jistgħu jinkludu:

- Reinforced cooperation with the IAEA in the field of international safeguards, where the Commission can build on a large number of highly trained Euratom nuclear inspectors with experience of working jointly with the IAEA, and on its experience in applying safeguards on civil nuclear material in nuclear-weapon States.

- Kooperazzjoni msaħħa mal-IAEA fil-qasam tas-salvagwardji internazzjonali, fejn il-Kummissjoni tista' tibni fuq għadd kbir ta' spetturi nukleari tal-Euratom b'livell għoli ta' taħriġ u b'esperjenza ta' ħidma konġunta mal-IAEA, u fuq l-esperjenza tagħha fl-applikazzjoni ta' salvagwardji dwar il-materjal nukleari ċivili fl-Istati li għandhom armi nukleari.

- Full compliance with the enhanced NPT regime should be an objective when closer cooperation is sought between the Community and third countries, in particular for concluding bilateral Euratom cooperation agreements in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Section 4.2). Instruments such as the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) and the Instrument for Stability (IfS) could be mobilised for assisting these countries within their respective domains;

- Konformità sħiħa mas-sistema mtejba tat-TNP għandu jkun l-għan meta qed titfittex kooperazzjoni aktar mill-qrib bejn il-Komunità u l-pajjiżi terzi, partikolarment biex jiġu konklużi l-ftehimiet bilateral tal-korporazzjoni tal-Euratom fil-qasam tal-użi paċifiċi tal-enerġija nukleari (it-Taqsima 4.2). Strumenti bħall-Istrument għall-Kooperazzjoni għas-Sikurezza Nukleari (INSC) u l-Istrument għall-Istabbiltà (IfS) jistgħu jiġu mobilizzati biex jassistu lil dawn il-pajjiżi fi ħdan l-oqsma rispettivi tagħhom;

- Full compliance with the enhanced NPT regime should be an important consideration when establishing multilateral fuel supply guarantees (Section 4.3).

- Konfomità sħiħa mas-sistema mtejba tat-TNP għandha tkun konsiderazzjoni importanti meta qed jiġu stabbiliti garanziji multilaterali ta' provisti ta' fjuwil (It-Taqsima 4.3).

In future, it is expected that due to the increasing number of countries developing or wishing to develop a nuclear power programme, the IAEA will face a considerable challenge that will mobilise all its means. Ways could be sought to enhance the Euratom technical support and assistance to the IAEA in its tasks, while respecting the competencies of both organisations.

Fil-ġejjieni, huwa mistenni li minħabba l-għadd dejjem jikber ta' pajjiżi li qed jiżviluppaw jew jixtiequ li jiżviluppaw programm ta' enerġija nukleari, l-IAEA se taffaċċa sfida konsiderevoli li se timmobilizza il-mezzi kollha tagħha. Jistgħu jitfittxu metodi li jtejbu l-appoġġ u l-assistenza teknika tal-Euratom lill-IAEA f'xogħolha, filwaqt li jinżamm rispett lejn il-kompetenzi taż-żewġ organizzazzjonijiet.

4.2. Extending cooperation with key nuclear countries through bilateral Euratom agreements

4.2. Estensjoni tal-kooperazzjoni ma' pajjiżi nukleari ewlenin permezz ta' ftehimiet bilaterali tal-Euratom

Until now Euratom cooperation agreements in peaceful uses of nuclear energy have been concluded mainly with major suppliers (USA, Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan) or customers (Japan).

Sa issa l-ftehimiet ta' kooperazzjoni tal-Euratom fl-użi paċifiċi tal-enerġija nukleari ġew konklużi l-aktar ma' fornituri ewlenin (l-Istati Uniti, il-Kanada, l-Awstralia, il-Każakastan) jew ma' klienti (il-Ġappun).

The conclusion of a bilateral Euratom cooperation agreement in peaceful uses of nuclear energy should become a priority with all key countries wishing to have significant nuclear trade with the EU Member States and/or EU industry. Taking into account the renewed interest in nuclear energy, the EU could contribute by engaging Euratom agreements with third countries to guaranteeing a high level of nuclear security and to ensure that all countries are committed to purely peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Il-konklużjoni ta' ftehim ta' kooperazzjoni tal-Euratom fl-użi paċifiċi tal-enerġija nukleari għandha ssir prijorità mal-pajjiżi ewlenin kollha li jixtiequ jkollhom kummerċ nukleari sinifikanti mal-Istati Membri tal-UE u/jew l-industrija tal-UE. Meta jitqies l-interess imġedded fl-enerġija nukleari, l-UE tista' tikkontribwixxi billi tħaddem ftehimiet tal-Euratom ma' pajjiżi terzi li jiggarantixxu livell għoli ta' sigurtà nukleari u li jiżguraw li l-pajjiżi kollha huma obbligati għall-użi tal-enerġija nukleari purament paċifiċi.

In the Euratom agreements various conditions are inserted regarding safeguards and the Additional Protocol as well as all relevant international conventions (covering such aspects as nuclear safety, waste management, physical protection). When negotiating and signing Euratom international agreements, the Community will thus seek to obtain the adherence of its partners to all relevant international conventions.

Fil-ftehimiet tal-Euratom hemm imdaħħla kundizzjonijiet varji rigward is-salvagwardji u l-Protokoll Addizzjonali kif ukoll il-konvenzjonijiet internazzjonali relevanti kollha (li jkopru aspetti bħas-sikurezza nukleari, il-ġestjoni tal-iskart, il-protezzjoni fiżika). Fin-negozjati u l-iffirmar tal-ftehimiet internazzjonali tal-Euratom, il-Komunità b'hekk se tfittex li tikseb l-aderenza tal-imsieħba tagħha għal kull konvenzjoni internazzjonali rilevanti.

Likewise, in all new Euratom agreements, or when amending existing agreements, the Community seeks commitments from the other Party that all transfers of materials or equipment covered by the agreement, are done according to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. In this way, conditions could be attached for the retransfer of Community origin products to third countries, thus reducing the risk of diversion of materials or technology to unwanted destinations.

Bl-istess mod, fil-ftehimiet ġodda kollha tal-Euratom, jew meta jsiru emendi ta' ftehimiet eżistenti, il-Komunità se teħtieġ l-impenji mill-Parti l-oħra li t-trasferimenti ta' materjali jew ta' tagħmir kopert bil-ftehim, isiru skont il-linji gwida tal-Grupp tal-Fornituri Nukleari. B'dan il-mod, jistgħu jiġu annessi kundizzjonijiet għat-trasferiment mill-ġdid ta' prodotti ta' oriġini Komunitarja għal pajjiżi terzi, b'hekk jitnaqqas ir-riskju ta' devjazzjoni ta' materjali jew ta' teknoloġija għal destinazzjonijiet mhux mixtieqa.

4.3. Contributing to the development of an international system of guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for countries willing to develop nuclear energy without having their own nuclear fuel cycle facilities

4.3. Kontribut għall-iżvilupp ta' sistema internazzjonali ta' provista garantita ta' fjuwil nukleari għal pajjiżi li lesti jiżviluppaw enerġija nukleari mingħajr ma jkollhom il-faċilitajiet taċ-ċiklu tal-fjuwil nukleari tagħhom stess.

The reduction of the proliferation risk requires a strict control of the nuclear fuel cycle. At the same time, it is important to grant legitimate access to nuclear fuel to countries willing to develop nuclear energy under safe and secure conditions. In this context various proposals, including from Member States, have been made concerning guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for countries that forego having their own nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

It-tnaqqis tar-riskju ta' proliferazzjoni jeħtieġ kontroll strett taċ-ċiklu ta' fjuwil nukleari. Fl-istess ħin, huwa importanti li jingħata aċċess leġittimu għal fjuwil nukleari lill-pajjiżi li huma lesti biex jiżviluppaw enerġija nukleari taħt kundizzjonijiet bla periklu u siguri. F'dan il-kuntest saru proposti varji, inkluż mingħand Stati Membri, rigward provvista garantita ta' fjuwil nukleari għall-pajjiżi li rrinunzjaw li jkollhom il-faċilitajiet taċ-ċiklu tal-fjuwil nukleari tagħhom stess.

The European Union could make a significant contribution to international cooperation in this field, since Europe has the most advanced and secure technologies in the nuclear fuel cycle, especially in uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities which are the most sensitive parts in terms of proliferation risks.

L-Unjoni Ewropea tista' tagħti kontribut sinifikanti għall-kooperazzjoni internazzjonali f'dan il-qasam, peress li l-Ewropa għandha l-aktar teknoloġiji avvanzati u siguri fiċ-ċiklu ta' fjuwil nukleari, speċjalment l-attivitajiet tal-arrikiment u tal-ipproċessar mill-ġdid tal-uranju li huma l-aktar partijiet sensittivi f'termini ta' riskji ta' proliferazzjoni.

In this regard, the Council in its conclusions on 8 December 2008[29] took the decision in principle to support the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank under the control of the IAEA, to which the European Union could contribute up to 25 million EUR, once the conditions and modalities for the bank have been defined and approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA. At the same time, the Council welcomed the readiness of the Commission to contribute to this project through relevant Community instruments. In order to speed up the decision making process, a mandate could be given to the Commission to contribute to the definition of the conditions and modalities for establishing the fuel bank. One of the main advantages of a multilateral approach would be to encourage new market entrants to voluntarily abstain from making complex and costly investments which are disproportionate to their needs, while bringing additional guarantees to fuel supply security.

F'dan ir-rigward, il-Kunsill fil-konklużjonijiet tiegħu fit-8 ta' Diċembru 2008[29] ħa d-deċiżjoni fil-prinċipju biex jappoġġa l-istabbiliment ta' bank ta' fjuwil nukleari taħt il-kontroll tal-IAEA, li għalih L-unjoni Ewropea tista' tikkontribwixxi sa 25 miljun EUR, ladarba il-kundizzjonijiet u l-modalitajiet għall-bank jkunu ġew definiti u approvati mill-Bord tal-Gvernaturi tal-IAEA. Fl-istess ħin, il-Kunsill laqa' r-rieda tal-Kummissjoni li tikkontribwixxi f'dan il-proġett permezz ta' strumenti Komunitarji relevanti. Sabiex jitħaffef il-proċess tat-teħid ta' deċiżjoni, se jingħata mandat lill-Kummissjoni sabiex tikkontribwixxi għad-defenizzjoni tal-kundizzjonijiet u l-modalitajiet għall-istabbiliment tal-bank tal-fjuwil. Wieħed mill-vantaġġi ewlenin ta' approċċ multilaterali ikun li dawk li jidħlu ġodda fis-suq jitħeġġu biex minn jeddhom joqgħodu lura milli jagħmlu investimenti kumplessi u li jqumu l-flus li jkunu sproporzjonati għall-ħtiġijiet tagħhom, waqt li jġibu garanziji addizzjonali għas-sigurtà ta' provvista ta' fjuwil.

In actively contributing to the development of such an initiative, the European Union could make full use of available Euratom[30] and other Community instruments such as the Instrument for Stability and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety and should take into account both the provisions of international agreements, the Euratom Treaty and the good functioning of the European nuclear market.

Filwaqt li tikkontribwixxi għall-iżvilupp ta' inizjattiva bħal din, l-Unjoni Ewropea tista' tagħmel użu sħiħ minn strumenti disponibbli tal-Euratom[30] u minn strumenti Komunitarji oħra bħall-Istrument għall-Istabbiltà u l-Istrument għas-Sikurezza Nukleari u għandha tqis kemm id-dispożizzjonijiet ta' ftehimiet internazzjonali, kemm it-Trattat tal-Euratom kif ukoll it-tħaddim tas-suq nukleari Ewropew.

Since the security of supply for nuclear fuels is essential for guaranteeing non-proliferation, in particular to prevent the spread of sensitive technologies, such as enrichment, the Euratom Supply Agency should become a key actor in this process.

Peress li s-sigurtà tal-provvista għal-fjuwils nukleari hija essenzjali biex tiggarantixxi n-nonproliferazzjoni, partikolarment biex tevita li jinxterdu teknoloġiji sensittivi, bħall-arrikkiment, l-Aġenzija għall-Provvista tal-Euratom għandha ssir operatur ewlieni f'dan il-proċess. [pic][pic][pic]

[1] Opened for signature in July 1968, the Treaty entered into force on 5 March 1970. A total of 189 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States.

[1] Miftuħ għall-firem f'Lulju 1968, it-Trattat daħal fis-seħħ fil-5 ta' Marzu 1970. Total ta' 189 parti ngħaqdu mat-Trattat, inklużi l-ħames Stati li għandhom armi nukleari.

[2] Commission Communication on "Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security", COM (2008) 312 final of 22.5.2008.

[2] Il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar "Li tindirizza l-isfida internazzjonali tas-sikurezza u s-sigurtà nukleari",COM (2008) 312 finali, 22.5.2008.

[3] Report on International Initiative on 3S Based Nuclear Energy Infrastructure, G8 Summit, Hokkaido, Japan, 9.7.2008.

[3] Rapport dwar l-'International Initiative on 3S Based Nuclear Energy Infrastructure', is-Samit tal-G8, Hokkaido, il-Ġappun, 9.7.2008.

[4] Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 April 2005.

[4] Adottata mill-Assemblea Ġenerali tan-NU fit-13 ta' April 2005.

[5] COM (2007) 1 final, 10.1.2007.

[5] COM (2007) 1 finali, 10.1.2007.

[6] COM(2008) 776 final, 13.11.2008.

[6] COM (2008) 776 finali, 13.11.2008.

[7] COM(2008) 781 final, 13.11.2008.

[7] COM (2008) 781 finali, 13.11.2008.

[8] Press release IP/08/719, 7.5.2008.

[8] Stqarrija għall-istampa IP/08/719, 7.5.2008.

[9] European Parliament report on conventional energy sources and energy technology, A6-0348/2007 final, 26.9.2007.

[9] Ir-rapport tal-Parlament Ewropew dwar is-sorsi ta' enerġija u t-teknoloġija tal-enerġija konvenzjonali, A6-0348/2007 finali, 26.9.2007.

[10] "A Secure Europe in a Better World", adopted by the European Council on 12.12.2003.

[10] "Ewropa Sigura f'Dinja Aħjar", adottata mill-Kunsill Ewropew 12.12..2003.

[11] Council document 15708/03, 12.12.2003.

[11] Id-dokument tal-Kunsill 15708/03, 12.12.2003.

[12] Council document S407/08, 11.12.2008.

[12] Id-dokument tal Kunsill S407/08, 11.12.2008.

[13] Council document 17172/08, 17.12.2008.

[13] Id-dokument tal-Kunsill 17172/08, 17.12.2008.

[14] On the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a dopted by the UN Security Council on 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004).

[14] Dwar il-prevenzjoni tal-proliferazzjoni ta' armi ta' qerda tal-massa, adottata mill-Kunsill tas-Sigurtà tan-NU fit-28 ta' April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004).

[15] Council Regulation (EURATOM) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, OJ L 81, 22.3.2007.

[15] Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (EURATOM) Nru 300/2007 tad-19 ta' Frar 2007 li jistabbilixxi Strument għall-Kooperazzjoni dwar is-Sikurezza Nukleari, ĠU L 81, 22.3.2007.

[16] Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, OJ L 210, 31.7.2006.

[16] Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 1085/2006 tas-17 ta' Lulju 2006 li jistabbilixxi Strument għall-Assistenza ta' Qabel l-Adeżjoni, ĠU L 210, 31.7.2006.

[17] Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 November 2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability, OJ L 327, 24.11.2006.

[17] Ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 1717/2006 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tal-15 ta' Novembru 2006 li jistabbilixxi Strument għall-Istabbiltà, ĠU L 327, 24.11.2006.

[18] Including the nuclear material in the civil nuclear fuel cycle of the nuclear-weapon States.

[18] Inkluż il-materjal nukleari fiċ-ċiklu ċivili tal-fjuwil nukleari tal-Istati li għandhom armi nukleari.

[19] Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1493/93, of 8 June 1993, on shipments of radioactive substances between Member States. OJ L 148, 19.6.1993.

[19] Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (Euratom) Nru 1493/93 tat-8 ta' Ġunju 1993 dwar kunsinni ta' sustanzi radjoattivi bejn l-Istati Membri, ĠU L 148, 19.6.1993.

[20] Council Directive 2003/122/Euratom, of 22 December 2003, on the control of high-activity sealed radioactive sources and orphan sources. OJ L 346, 31.12.2003.

[20] Id-Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2003/122/Euratom tat-22 ta' Diċembru 2003 dwar il-kontroll ta' sorsi radjoattivi siġillati ta' attività għolja u sorsi orfni, ĠU L 346, 31.12.2003.

[21] Council Directive 2006/117/Euratom, of 20 November 2006, on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel. OJ L 337, 5.12.2006.

[21] Direttiva tal-Kunsill 2006/117/Euratom tal-20 ta’ Novembru 2006 dwar is-superviżjoni u l-kontroll ta' vjeġġi ta' skart radjuattiv u ta' kombustibbli nukleari eżawrit, ĠU L 337, 5.12.2006.

[22] INFCIRC/274/Rev.1

[22] INFCIRC/274/Rev.1.

[23] Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology.

[23] Ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru. 1334/2000 tat-22 ta' Ġunju 2000 li jistabbilixxi reġim Komunitarju għall-kontroll ta' esportazzjonijiet ta' oġġetti u teknoloġiji b'użu doppju.

[24] Chapter 6 of the Treaty establishes the Supply Agency and provides for its right of option on materials, conclusion of supply contracts by the Agency and for security of supply.

[24] Il-Kapitolu 6 tat-Trattat jistabilixxi l-Aġenzija tal-Provista u jipprovdi għad-dritt tagħha ta' għażla ta' materjali, konklużjoni ta' kuntratti ta' provista mill-Aġenzija u għal sigurtà ta' provista.

[25] In granting its authorisation the Commission takes into account in particular the following criteria: utilisation for non explosive purposes; application of IAEA guarantees; application of physical protection measures; application of specific conditions for a retransfer to another non-nuclear-weapon third State, as well as for subsequent retransfers of this type.

[25] Fl-għotja tal-awtorizzazzjoni tagħha l-Kummissjoni tqis partikolarment il-kriterji li ġejjin: l-utilizzazzjoni għal skopijiet mhux esplussivi; l-applikazzjoni ta' garanziji tal-IAEA; l-applikazzjoni ta' miżuri ta' protezzjoni fiżika; l-applikazzjoni ta' kundizzjonijiet speċifiċi għal trasferiment mill-ġdid għal Stat terz ieħor li ma għandux armi nukleari, kif ukoll għat-trasferiment mill-ġdid sussegwenti ta' dan it-tip.

[26] The International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Moscow deals with the employment and redirection of former weapons scientists from Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It is operated jointly with the beneficiary states and the EU, US, Canada, Japan, Korea and Norway.

[26] Iċ-Ċentru Internazzjonali tax-Xjenzi u t-Teknoloġiji (ISTC) f' Moska jittratta mal-impjieg u d-direzzjoni differenti ta' xjenzati tal-armi ta' qabel mir-Russja, l-Armenja, il-Belarus, il-Ġeorġja, il-Każakastan, il-Kirgiżtan u minn Taġikistan Huwa jitħaddem b'mod konġunt mal-istati benefiċjarji u mal-UE, l-Istati Uniti, il-Ġappun, il-Korea u n-Norveġja.

[27] The Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev deals with the employment and redirection of former weapons scientists from Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Uzbekistan. It is operated jointly with the beneficiary states and the EU, US and Canada.

[27] Iċ-ċentru tax-xjenza u t-Teknoloġija tal-Ukraina (STCU) fi Kiev jitratta mal-impjieg u d-direzzjoni differenti ta' xjenzati tal-armi ta' qabel mill-Ukraina, l-Ażerbajġan, il-Ġeorġja, il-Moldova u l-Użbekistan. Huwa jitħaddem b'mod konġunt mal-istati benefiċjarji u mal-UE, l-Istati Uniti u l-Kanada.

[28] Commission Communication on "Addressing the international challenge of nuclear safety and security", COM (2008) 312 final, 22.5.2008.

[28] Il-Komunikazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni dwar "Li tindirizza l-isfida internazzjonali tas-sikurezza u s-sigurtà nukleari", COM (2008) 312 finali, 22.5.2008.

[29] 2914th General Affairs Council meeting, 8 December 2008.

[29] L-2914-il laqgħa tal-Kunsill tal-Affarijiet Ġenerali, tat-8 ta' Diċembru 2008.

[30] The provisions on joint undertakings (Chapter 5 Euratom) could provide a possible model for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear cycle facility. The participation by third states or international organisations in the financing or management of Joint Undertakings is expressly foreseen, thereby permitting the participation of non-EU parties.

[30] Id-dispożizzjonijiet dwar impriżi konġunti (Kapitolu 5 Euratom) jistgħu jipprovdu mudell possibbli għall-istabbiliment ta' faċilità multilaterali taċ-ċiklu nukleari. Il-parteċipazzjoni minn pajjiżi terzi jew organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali fil-finanzjament jew ġestjoni ta' Impriżi Konġunti hija espressament prevista, b'hekk li jippermetti l-parteċipazzjoni ta' partijiet mhux fl-UE.