Commission Regulation (EC) No 474/2006

Kommissionens forordning (EF) nr. 474/2006

of 22 March 2006

af 22. marts 2006

establishing the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community referred to in Chapter II of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council

om opstilling af fællesskabslisten over luftfartsselskaber med driftsforbud i Fællesskabet i henhold til kapitel II i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 2111/2005

(Text with EEA relevance)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

KOMMISSIONEN FOR DE EUROPÆISKE FÆLLESSKABER HAR —

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

under henvisning til traktaten om oprettelse af Det Europæiske Fællesskab,

Having regard to Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 of the European Parliament and the Council of 14 December 2005 on the establishment of a Community list of air carriers subject to an operating ban within the Community and on informing air transport passengers of the identity of the operating air carrier, and repealing Article 9 of Directive 2004/36/CE [1], and in particular Article 3 thereof,

under henvisning til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 2111/2005 af 14. december 2005 om opstilling af en fællesskabsliste over luftfartsselskaber med driftsforbud i Fællesskabet og oplysning til passagerer om det transporterende luftfartsselskabs identitet samt ophævelse af artikel 9 i direktiv 2004/36/EF [1], særlig artikel 3, og

Whereas:

ud fra følgende betragtninger:

(1) Chapter II of Regulation (EC) No 2111/2005 (hereinafter referred to as "the basic Regulation") lays down procedures for establishing the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community as well as procedures allowing the Member States, in certain circumstances, to adopt exceptional measures imposing operating bans within their territory.

(1) Kapitel II i forordning (EF) nr. 2111/2005 (i det følgende benævnt "grundforordningen") indeholder procedurer for opstilling af fællesskabslisten over luftfartsselskaber med driftsforbud i Fællesskabet og procedurer, som under visse omstændigheder gør det muligt for medlemsstaterne at vedtage undtagelsesbestemmelser, hvorved der nedlægges driftsforbud på deres område.

(2) In accordance with Article 3(3) of the basic Regulation, each Member State communicated to the Commission the identity of the air carriers that are subject to an operating ban in its territory, together with the reasons which led to the adoption of such bans and any other relevant information.

(2) I henhold til artikel 3, stk. 3, i grundforordningen har hver medlemsstat givet Kommissionen meddelelse om, hvilke luftfartsselskaber der har driftsforbud inden for dens område, ledsaget af årsagerne til vedtagelsen af disse forbud samt alle andre relevante oplysninger.

(3) The Commission informed all air carriers concerned either directly or, when this was not practicable, through the authorities responsible for their regulatory oversight, indicating the essential facts and considerations which would form the basis for a decision to impose them an operating ban within the Community.

(3) Kommissionen har underrettet alle berørte luftfartsselskaber enten direkte eller, hvor dette ikke har været muligt, via de myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med luftfartsselskaberne, med angivelse af de væsentligste kendsgerninger og betragtninger, på grundlag af hvilke der kan træffes afgørelse om at nedlægge driftsforbud for dem i Fællesskabet.

(4) In accordance with Article 7 of the basic Regulation, opportunity was given by the Commission to the air carriers concerned to consult the documents provided by Member States, to submit written comments and to make an oral presentation to the Commission within 10 working days and to the Air Safety Committee [2].

(4) I henhold til artikel 7 i grundforordningen gav Kommissionen de berørte luftfartsselskaber lejlighed til at gennemgå de af medlemsstaterne fremlagte dokumenter, fremsætte skriftlige bemærkninger og give Kommissionen en mundtlig redegørelse inden for 10 arbejdsdage samt at give Udvalget for Luftfartssikkerhed en mundtlig redegørelse [2].

(5) The common criteria for consideration of an operating ban for safety reasons at Community level are set out in the Annex to the basic Regulation.

(5) Bilaget til grundforordningen indeholder fælles kriterier med henblik på indførelse af et driftsforbud på fællesskabsplan af sikkerhedsmæssige grunde.

Air Bangladesh

(6) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Air Bangladesh with regard to a certain aircraft of its fleet. These deficiencies have been identified during ramp inspections performed by Germany under the SAFA programme [3].

(6) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Air Bangladesh, for så vidt angår visse af dette luftfartsselskabs luftfartøjer. Disse mangler er konstateret under rampeinspektioner foretaget af Tyskland i SAFA-programmets regi [3].

(7) Air Bangladesh did not respond adequately and timely to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of Germany regarding the safety aspect of its operation showing a lack of transparency or communication, as demonstrated by its lack of reply to correspondence from this Member State. To date Germany had no opportunity to verify whether the safety deficiencies have been corrected.

(7) Air Bangladesh reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt og rettidigt på en forespørgsel fra den civile tyske luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets drift og udviste mangel på gennemsigtighed eller kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat. Til dato har Tyskland ikke haft mulighed for at efterprøve, om disse sikkerhedsmangler er afhjulpet.

(8) The authorities of Bangladesh with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Air Bangladesh have not exercised an adequate oversight on one specific aircraft used by this carrier in accordance with their obligations under the Chicago Convention.

(8) De myndigheder i Bangladesh, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med Air Bangladesh, førte ikke passende tilsyn med et bestemt luftfartøj, der blev benyttet af dette luftfartsselskab, i overensstemmelse med forpligtelserne i henhold til Chicago-konventionen.

(9) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Air Bangladesh should be submitted to a strict operational restriction and included in Annex B.

(9) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Air Bangladesh bør underlægges en streng driftsmæssig begrænsning og optages i bilag B.

Air Koryo

(10) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Air Koryo. These deficiencies have been identified by France and Germany, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [4].

(10) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Air Koryo. Disse mangler er konstateret af Frankrig og Tyskland under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [4].

(11) Persistent failure by Air Koryo to address deficiencies previously communicated by France was identified during other ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [5].

(11) Vedholdende undladelse fra Air Koryos side af at afhjælpe mangler, som tidligere var meddelt af Frankrig, blev konstateret under andre rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [5].

(12) Substantiated and serious incident-related information communicated by France indicates latent systemic safety deficiencies on the part of Air Koryo.

(12) Veldokumenterede oplysninger fra Frankrig vedrørende alvorlige hændelser tyder på latente systemiske sikkerhedsmangler hos Air Koryo.

(13) Air Koryo demonstrated a lack of ability to address these safety deficiencies.

(13) Air Koryo udviste manglende evne til at træffe foranstaltninger til at afhjælpe disse sikkerhedsmangler.

(14) Air Koryo did not respond adequately and timely to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of France regarding the safety aspect of its operation showing a lack of transparency or communication, as demonstrated by the absence of reply to a request by that Member State.

(14) Air Kyoro reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt og rettidigt på en forespørgsel fra den civile franske luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets drift og udviste mangel på gennemsigtighed eller kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på svar på en forespørgsel fra den pågældende medlemsstat.

(15) The corrective action plan presented by Air Koryo in response to France’s request was not adequate and sufficient to correct the identified serious safety deficiencies.

(15) Den plan for afhjælpende foranstaltninger, som Air Koryo fremlagde som svar på Frankrigs forespørgsel, var ikke hensigtsmæssig og tilstrækkelig til at afhjælpe de konstaterede alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler.

(16) The authorities of the Democratic People Republic of Korea with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Air Koryo have not exercised an adequate oversight on this carrier in accordance with their obligations under the Chicago Convention.

(16) De myndigheder i Den Demokratiske Folkerepublik Korea, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med Air Koryo, førte ikke passende tilsyn med dette luftfartsselskab i overensstemmelse med deres forpligtelser i henhold til Chicago-konventionen.

(17) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Air Koryo does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(17) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Air Kyoro ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

Ariana Afghan Airlines

(18) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of certain aircraft operated by Ariana Afghan Airlines. These deficiencies have been identified by Germany, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [6].

(18) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos visse luftfartøjer, der drives af Ariana Afghan Airlines. Disse mangler er konstateret af Tyskland under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [6].

(19) Ariana Afghan Airlines demonstrated a lack of ability to address these safety deficiencies.

(19) Ariana Afghan Airlines udviste manglende evne til at træffe foranstaltninger til at afhjælpe disse sikkerhedsmangler.

(20) Ariana Afghan Airlines did not respond adequately and timely to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of Germany regarding the safety aspect of its operation showing a lack of communication, as demonstrated by the absence of adequate response to correspondence from this Member State.

(20) Ariana Afghan Airlines reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt og rettidigt på en forespørgsel fra den civile tyske luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets drift og udviste mangel på kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(21) The competent authorities of Afghanistan, where the aircraft used by Ariana Afghan Airlines is registered, have not exercised a fully adequate oversight of the aircraft used by this carrier in accordance with their obligations under the Chicago Convention.

(21) De kompetente myndigheder i Afghanistan, hvor de af Ariana Afghan Airlines benyttede luftfartøjer er registreret, førte ikke fyldestgørende tilsyn med de af dette luftfartsselskab benyttede luftfartøjer i overensstemmelse med deres forpligtelser i henhold til Chicago-konventionen.

(22) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Ariana Afghan does not meet the relevant safety standards for all the aircraft it operates, with the exception of A310 registration number F-GYYY which is registered in France and subject to the oversight of the French authorities.

(22) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Ariana Afghan Airlines ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder for alle de luftfartøjer, som det driver, med undtagelse af A310 registreringsnummer F-GYYY, der er registreret i Frankrig og underlagt de franske myndigheders tilsyn.

BGB Air

(23) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of BGB Air. These deficiencies have been identified by Italy, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [7].

(23) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos BGB Air. Disse mangler er konstateret af Italien under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [7].

(24) BGB Air demonstrated a lack of ability or willingness to address safety deficiencies as demonstrated by the submission of a self-assessment with ICAO Standards on the basis of the Foreign Operator Check List provided by Italy, which was found not to be in conformity with the subsequent findings of SAFA inspections.

(24) BGB Air udviste manglende evne eller vilje til at træffe foranstaltninger til at afhjælpe sikkerhedsmanglerne, som det blev demonstreret, da selskabet fremlagde en selvvurdering i forhold til ICAO-standarder på grundlag af en "Foreign Operator Check List" udarbejdet af Italien, og vurderingen viste sig ikke ikke at være i overensstemmelse med resultaterne af de efterfølgende SAFA-inspektioner.

(25) BGB Air did not respond adequately to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of Italy, regarding the safety aspect of its operation showing a lack of transparency or communication, as demonstrated by the absence of reply to some correspondence sent by this Member State.

(25) BGB Air reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt på en forespørgsel fra Italiens civile luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets drift og udviste mangel på gennemsigtighed eller kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på svar på breve fra Italien.

(26) There is no evidence of the implementation of an adequate corrective action plan presented by BGB Air to correct the serious safety deficiencies in response to the request from Italy.

(26) BGB Air har ikke fremlagt noget bevis for gennemførelse af en passende plan for afhjælpende foranstaltninger vedrørende de alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler som svar på forespørgslen fra Italien.

(27) The authorities of Kazakhstan with responsibility for regulatory oversight of BGB Air did not fully cooperate with the civil aviation authority of Italy when concerns about the safety of the operation of BGB Air certified in that state were raised, as demonstrated by the absence of reply to the correspondence sent by this Member State.

(27) De myndigheder i Kasakhstan, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med BGB Air, samarbejdede ikke fuldt ud med den civile luftfartsmyndighed i Italien, da der opstod betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden i driften af BGB Air, der er certificeret i den pågældende stat, således som det kom til udtryk ved deres mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(28) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that BGB Air does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(28) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at BGB Air ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

Buraq Air

(29) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Buraq Air concerning its cargo operations. These deficiencies have been identified by Sweden and the Netherlands, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [8].

(29) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Buraq Air, for så vidt angår dets lasteoperationer. Disse mangler er konstateret af Sverige og Nederlandene under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [8].

(30) Buraq Air did not respond adequately and timely to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of Germany regarding the safety aspect of its Cargo operations showing a lack of transparency or communication, as demonstrated by a lack of response to correspondence from this Member State.

(30) Buraq Air reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt og rettidigt på en forespørgsel fra den civile tyske luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets lasteoperationer og udviste mangel på gennemsigtighed eller kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(31) The authorities of Libya with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Buraq Air have not exercised an adequate oversight on the Cargo operations of this carrier in accordance with their obligations under the Chicago Convention.

(31) De myndigheder i Libyen, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med Buraq Air, førte ikke tilstrækkeligt tilsyn med dette luftfartsselskabs lasteoperationer i overensstemmelse med deres forpligtelser i henhold til Chicago-konventionen.

(32) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Buraq Air should be subject to strict operational restrictions and included in Annex B.

(32) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Buraq Air bør underlægges strenge driftsmæssige begrænsninger og optages i bilag B.

Air Service Comores

(33) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Air Service Comores. These deficiencies have been identified by a Member State, France, during a ramp inspection performed under the SAFA programme [9].

(33) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Air Service Comores. Disse mangler er konstateret af en medlemsstat, Frankrig, under en rampeinspektion i SAFA-programmets regi [9].

(34) There is no evidence of the implementation of an adequate corrective action plan presented by Air Service Comores to correct the identified serious safety deficiencies in response to the request from France.

(34) Air Service Comores har ikke fremlagt noget bevis for gennemførelse af en passende plan for afhjælpende foranstaltninger vedrørende de alvorlige konstaterede sikkerhedsmangler som svar på forespørgslen fra Frankrig.

(35) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Air Service Comores have shown a lack of ability to address safety deficiencies.

(35) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med Air Service Comores, udviste manglende evne til at træffe foranstaltninger for at afhjælpe sikkerhedsmanglerne.

(36) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Comores did not cooperate in due time with the civil aviation authority of France when concerns about the safety of the operation of a carrier licensed or certified in that state were raised.

(36) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Comorerne, samarbejdede ikke rettidigt med den civile luftfartsmyndighed i Frankrig, da der opstod betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden i driften af et luftfartsselskab, der har fået tildelt licens eller er certificeret i den pågældende stat.

(37) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Air Service Comores does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(37) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Air Service Comores ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

GST Aero Air Company

(38) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of GST Aero Air Company. These deficiencies have been identified by Italy, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [10].

(38) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos GST Aero Air Company. Disse mangler er konstateret af Italien under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [10].

(39) GST Aero Air Company demonstrated a lack of ability or willingness to address safety deficiencies.

(39) GST Aero Air Company udviste manglende evne eller vilje til at træffe foranstaltninger til at afhjælpe sikkerhedsmanglerne.

(40) GST Aero Air Company did not respond adequately and timely to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of Italy regarding the safety aspect of its operation showing a lack of transparency or communication as demonstrated by the absence of reply to the correspondence sent by this Member State.

(40) GST Aero Air Company reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt og rettidigt på en forespørgsel fra den civile italienske luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets drift og udviste mangel på gennemsigtighed eller kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(41) There is no evidence of the implementation of an adequate corrective action plan presented by GST Aero Air Company to correct the serious safety deficiencies in response to Italy’s request.

(41) GST Aero Air Company har ikke fremlagt noget bevis for gennemførelse af en passende plan for afhjælpende foranstaltninger vedrørende de alvorlige konstaterede sikkerhedsmangler som svar på forespørgslen fra Italien.

(42) The authorities of Kazakhstan with responsibility for regulatory oversight of GST Aero Air Company did not fully cooperate with the civil aviation authority of Italy when concerns about the safety of the operation of a carrier licensed or certified in that state were raised, as demonstrated by the limited reply to the correspondence sent by Italy.

(42) De myndigheder i Kasakhstan, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med GST Aero Air Company, samarbejdede ikke fuldt ud med den civile luftfartsmyndighed i Italien, da der opstod betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden i driften af et luftfartsselskab, der har fået tildelt licens eller er certificeret i den pågældende stat, således som det kom til udtryk ved deres begrænsede svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(43) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that GST Aero Air Company does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(43) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at GST Aero Air Company ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

Phoenix Aviation

(44) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Kirghizstan have shown an insufficient ability to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards with regard to Phoenix Aviation. While Phoenix Aviation’s Air Operator’s Certificate was issued by Kyrgyzstan, there is evidence showing s that the airline has its principal place of business in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contrary to the requirements of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention. The US National Transportation Safety Board’s Factual Report [11] into an accident involving Kam Air flight 904, which was operated by Phoenix Aviation, states that Phoenix Aviation has its headquarters in the UAE.

(44) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Kirgisistan, udviste manglende evne til at gennemføre og håndhæve de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder, for så vidt angår Phoenix Aviation. Selv om Phoenix Aviations AOC var udstedt af Kirgisistan, er det bevist, at luftfartsselskabet har sin hovedvirksomhed i De Forenede Arabiske Emirater (UAE), hvilket er i strid med kravene i bilag 6 til Chicago-konventionen. Det fremgår af US National Transportation Safety Board's Factual Report [11] om et havari, som involverede Kam Air-flyvning 904, der blev drevet af Phoenix Aviation, at Phoenix Aviation har sit hovedsæde i UAE.

(45) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Phoenix Aviation does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(45) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Phoenix Aviation ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

Phuket Airlines

(46) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Phuket Airlines. These deficiencies have been identified by Member States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [12].

(46) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Phuket Airlines. Disse mangler er konstateret af medlemsstaterne Det Forenede Kongerige og Nederlandene under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [12].

(47) Phuket Airlines demonstrated a lack of ability to address timely and adequately these safety deficiencies.

(47) Phuket Airlines udviste manglende evne til rettidigt og hensigtsmæssigt at træffe foranstaltninger til at afhjælpe sikkerhedsmanglerne.

(48) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Thailand did not fully cooperate with the civil aviation authority of the Netherlands when concerns about the safety of Phuket Airlines certified in that state were raised as demonstrated by the lack of pertinent responses to the correspondence from this Member State.

(48) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Thailand, samarbejdede ikke fuldt ud med de civile luftfartsmyndigheder i Nederlandene, da der opstod betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden ved Phuket Airlines, der er certificeret i den pågældende stat, således som det kom til udtryk ved deres mangel på relevante svar på brevene fra denne medlemsstat.

(49) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Phuket Airlines does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(49) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Phuket Airlines ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

Reem Air

(50) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Reem Air. These deficiencies have been initially identified by the Netherlands, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [13].

(50) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Reem Air. Disse mangler er indledningsvis konstateret af Nederlandene under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [13].

(51) Persistent failure by Reem Air to address deficiencies was confirmed by the Netherlands, during subsequent ramp inspections on one specific aircraft performed under the SAFA programme [14].

(51) Vedholdende undladelse fra Reem Airs side af at afhjælpe mangler blev bekræftet af Nederlandene under efterfølgende rampeinspektioner af et bestemt luftfartøj i SAFA-programmets regi [14].

(52) Reem Air demonstrated a lack of ability or willingness to address safety deficiencies.

(52) Reem Air udviste manglende evne eller vilje til at træffe foranstaltninger til at afhjælpe sikkerhedsmanglerne.

(53) Reem Air did not respond adequately and timely to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of the Netherlands regarding the safety aspect of its operation showing a lack of transparency or communication as demonstrated by the absence of reply to the correspondence sent by this Member State.

(53) Reem Air reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt og rettidigt på en forespørgsel fra den civile nederlandske luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets drift og udviste mangel på gennemsigtighed eller kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(54) There is no evidence of the implementation of an adequate corrective action plan presented by Reem Air to correct the identified serious safety deficiencies in response to the request from the Netherlands.

(54) Reem Air har ikke fremlagt noget bevis for gennemførelse af en passende plan for afhjælpende foranstaltninger vedrørende de alvorlige konstaterede sikkerhedsmangler som svar på forespørgslen fra Nederlandene.

(55) The authorities of Kirghizstan with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Reem Air have not exercised an adequate oversight on this carrier in accordance with their obligations under the Chicago Convention, as demonstrated by the persistence of serious safety deficiencies. In addition, information provided to the Commission by Reem Air during the hearing granted to this company evidences that, while Reem Air Operator’s Certificate was issued by Kyrgyzstan, this airline has its principal place of business in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), contrary to the requirements of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

(55) De myndigheder i Kirgisistan, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med Reem Air, førte ikke tilstrækkeligt tilsyn med dette luftfartsselskab i overensstemmelse med deres forpligtelser i henhold til Chicago-konventionen, således som det kommer til udtryk i de vedholdende alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler. Desuden fremgik det af de oplysninger, som Reem Air afgav til Kommissionen under den høring, som Kommissionen indrømmede dette selskab, at selv om Reem Airs AOC var udstedt af Kirgisistan, havde dette luftfartsselskab sin hovedvirksomhed i De Forenede Arabiske Emirater (UAE), hvilket er i strid med kravene i bilag 6 til Chicago-konventionen.

(56) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Reem Air does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(56) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Reem Air ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

Silverback Cargo Freighters

(57) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Silverback Cargo Freighters. These deficiencies have been identified by Belgium during a ramp inspection performed under the SAFA programme [15].

(57) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Silverback Cargo Freighters. Disse mangler er konstateret af Belgien under en rampeinspektion i SAFA-programmets regi [15].

(58) Silverback Cargo Freighters which equally assures the maintenance (A&B checks) of its own aircraft, did not respond adequately to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of this Member State regarding the safety aspect of its operation showing a lack of transparency or communication as demonstrated by the lack of pertinent response to requests made by this Member State.

(58) Silverback Cargo Freighters, der også vedligeholder (A- og B-checks) sine egne luftfartøjer, reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt på en forespørgsel fra denne medlemsstats civile luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets drift og udviste mangel på gennemsigtighed eller kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på relevant svar på forespørgsler fra denne medlemsstat.

(59) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Silverback Cargo Freighters does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(59) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Silverback Cargo Freighters ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

Air carriers from the Democratic Republic of Congo

Luftfartsselskaber fra Den Demokratiske Republik Congo

(60) In spite of its efforts, the civil aviation authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC") have persistent difficulties to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards, as demonstrated by the ICAO-USOAP — Audit Summary Report of the Directorate of Civil Aviation of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa, 11- 18 June 2001). In particular, no system for the certification of Air Operators is currently in place.

(60) På trods af den gjorte indsats har de civile luftfartsmyndigheder i Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) vedholdende vanskeligheder ved at gennemføre og håndhæve de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder, således som det er påvist af ICAO-USOAP — Audit Summary Report fra Den Demokratiske Republik Congos direktorat for civil luftfart (Kinshasa, 11.- 18. juni 2001). Navnlig findes der ikke i øjeblikket noget system til certificering af luftfartsselskaber.

(61) The authorities of the DRC with responsibility for regulatory oversight have consequently shown a lack of ability to carry out adequate safety oversight.

(61) De myndigheder i RDC, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn, har derfor udvist manglende evne til at føre tilstrækkeligt sikkerhedstilsyn.

(62) An operating ban is imposed on Central Air Express because of substantiated deficiencies related to international safety standards, and its lack of cooperation with a Member State.

(62) Der er nedlagt driftsforbud for Central Air Express som følge af veldokumenterede mangler med tilknytning til internationale sikkerhedsstandarder og mangel på samarbejde med en medlemsstat.

(63) Belgium [16] and Hewa Bora Airways (HBA) have provided information showing that, in the case of HBA, the deficiencies observed in the past by the Belgian authorities have been significantly corrected with respect to certain aircraft. Belgium has further informed the Commission that it intends to conduct systematic ramp inspections of HBA. In view of this, it is considered that this air carrier should be allowed to continue its current operations.

(63) Belgien [16] og Hewa Bora Airways (HBA) har afgivet oplysninger, som viser, at de mangler, som de belgiske myndigheder tidligere har konstateret vedrørende HBA, i væsentlig grad er afhjulpet for visse luftfartøjers vedkommende. Desuden har Belgien meddelt Kommissionen, at landet agter at foretage systematiske rampeinspektioner af HBA. Der drages den konklusion heraf, at det bør tillades dette luftfartsselskab at fortsætte dets nuværende drift.

(64) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that all air carriers certified in the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) should be included in Annex A with the exception of Hewa Bora Airways (HBA) which should be included in Annex B.

(64) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at samtlige luftfartsselskaber, der er certificeret i Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC), bør optages i bilag A, idet dog Hewa Bora Airways (HBA) bør optages i bilag B.

Air carriers from Equatorial Guinea

Luftfartsselskaber fra Ækvatorialguinea

(65) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Equatorial Guinea did not fully cooperate with the civil aviation authority of the United Kingdom (UK) when concerns about the safety of the operation of carriers licensed or certified in that state were raised. The UK wrote to the Director General of Civil Aviation in Equatorial Guinea on 27 March 2002 [17] seeking clarification on the following points:

(65) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Ækvatorialguinea, samarbejdede ikke fuldt ud med den civile luftfartsmyndighed i Det Forenede Kongerige, da der opstod betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden i driften af luftfartsselskaber, der har fået tildelt licens eller er certificeret i den pågældende stat. Det Forenede Kongerige skrev den 27. marts 2002 [17] til generaldirektøren for civil luftfart i Ækvatorialguinea med anmodning om yderligere oplysninger på følgende punkter:

- a significant increase in the number of aircraft registered in Equatorial Guinea and suggestions that the Aircraft Registration Bureau (ARB) or a similar organisation might be managing the register,

- Den mærkbare forøgelse af antallet af luftfartøjer, der er registreret i Ækvatorialguinea, med forslag om, at registret eventuelt kunne forvaltes af Aircraft Registration Bureau (ARB) eller en lignende organisation.

- the fact that a number of operators holding an Air Operator Certificate (AOC) issued by Equatorial Guinea did not have their principal place of business in Equatorial Guinea.

- Det forhold, at en række operatører med et AOC, der var udstedt af Ækvatorialguinea, ikke havde deres hovedvirksomhed i Ækvatorialguinea.

The letter also advised the Director General of Civil Aviation that the UK would not be in a position to allow further commercial operations to its territory by Equatorial Guinea airlines until the UK authorities were satisfied that these airlines were receiving satisfactory oversight. Equatorial Guinea did not reply to this letter.

I brevet blev det også meddelt generaldirektøren for civil luftfart, at Det Forenede Kongerige ikke ville kunne give luftfartsselskaber i Ækvatorialguinea tilladelse til yderligere forretningsmæssig drift på britisk område, før de britiske myndigheder havde fundet det godtgjort, at der blev ført fyldestgørende tilsyn med disse luftfartsselskaber. Ækvatorialguinea besvarede ikke dette brev.

(66) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Equatorial Guinea have shown an insufficient ability to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards, in particular as demonstrated by audits and related corrective action plans established under ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme. Such a USOAP audit of Equatorial Guinea took place in May 2001 whereby the audit report [18] indicated that the Civil Aviation Authority did not, at the time of the audit, have the ability to provide adequate oversight to its airlines and ensure that they operate in accordance with ICAO standards. These audit findings namely included:

(66) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Ækvatorialguinea, udviste manglende evne til at gennemføre og håndhæve de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder, navnlig i forbindelse med revisioner og dermed forbundne planer for afhjælpende foranstaltninger udarbejdet under ICAO’s verdensomspændende program for kontrol med sikkerheden (USOAP). Der blev i maj 2001 foretaget en sådan USOAP-revision af Ækvatorialguinea, og det blev i revisionsrapporten [18] anført, at den civile luftfartsmyndighed på revisionstidspunktet ikke kunne føre et fyldestgørende tilsyn med landets luftfartsselskaber og sikre, at de drev virksomhed i overensstemmelse med ICAO's standarder. Revisionsresultaterne omfattede bl.a. følgende:

- lack of an organisation capable of undertaking safety oversight activities, in particular a lack of specialised staff in the areas of licensing, aircraft operations or airworthiness,

- mangel på en organisation, som kunne forestå sikkerhedstilsynsaktiviteter, navnlig mangel på specialiseret personale på områderne licensudstedelse, luftfartsoperationer eller luftdygtighed

- inability to identify the number of aircraft on the register or the number of valid certificates of airworthiness issued,

- manglende evne til at fastlægge antallet af luftfartøjer i registret eller antallet af gyldige udstedte luftdygtighedscertifikater

- failure to establish a structured system for the certification and supervision of air operators,

- undladelse af at indføre et struktureret system til certificering og overvågning af luftfartsselskaber

- failure to adopt aeronautical operations regulations,

- undladelse af at fastlægge forskrifter for luftfartsoperationer

- failure to perform surveillance on authorised operators,

- undladelse af at føre tilsyn med godkendte operatører

- failure to implement a system for performing the basic duties of an airworthiness inspection agency.

- undladelse af at indføre et system til udførelse af en luftdygtighedsinspektionsmyndigheds grundlæggende opgaver.

Furthermore the Directorate General of Civil Aviation of Equatorial Guinea has never up to date submitted to ICAO an action plan to address these audit findings [19] and consequently an audit follow up mission has not taken place.

Desuden har Generaldirektoratet for Civil Luftfart i Ækvatorialguinea til dato ikke forelagt ICAO en plan til afhjælpning af de mangler, der blev konstateret som led i denne revision [19], og der er derfor ikke foretaget nogen opfølgende revision.

(67) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Equatorial Guinea have shown an insufficient ability to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards in accordance with their obligations under the Chicago Convention. In fact, some holders of Air Operator Certificate (AOC) issued by Equatorial Guinea do not have their principal place of business in Equatorial Guinea, contrary to the requirements of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention [20].

(67) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Ækvatorialguinea, udviste manglende evne til at gennemføre og håndhæve de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder i overensstemmelse med deres forpligtelser i henhold til Chicago-konventionen. I virkeligheden havde nogle indehavere af AOC udstedt af Ækvatorialguinea ikke deres hovedvirksomhed i Ækvatorialguinea, hvilket er i strid med kravene i bilag 6 til Chicago-konventionen [20].

(68) The authorities of Equatorial Guinea with responsibility for regulatory oversight of the following air carriers have shown a lack of ability to carry out adequate safety oversight on these carriers: Air Consul SA, Avirex Guinée Equatoriale, COAGE — Compagnie Aeree de Guinée Equatorial, Ecuato Guineana de Aviación, Ecuatorial Cargo, GEASA — Guinea Ecuatorial Airlines SA, GETRA — Guinea Ecuatorial de Transportes Aéreos, Jetline Inc., King Transavia Cargo, Prompt Air GE SA, UTAGE — Unión de Transporte Aéreo de Guinea Ecuatorial.

(68) De myndigheder i Ækvatorialguinea, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med følgende luftfartsselskaber, udviste manglende evne til at føre passende sikkerhedstilsyn med følgende luftfartsselskaber: Air Consul SA, Avirex Guinée Equatoriale, COAGE — Compagnie Aeree de Guinée Equatorial, Ecuato Guineana de Aviación, Ecuatorial Cargo, GEASA — Guinea Ecuatorial Airlines SA, GETRA — Guinea Ecuatorial de Transportes Aéreos, Jetline Inc., King Transavia Cargo, Prompt Air GE SA, UTAGE — Union de Transport Aéreo de Guinea Ecuatorial.

(69) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that all air carriers certified in Equatorial Guinea should be subject to an operating ban and included in Annex A.

(69) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at der bør nedlægges driftsforbud for samtlige luftfartsselskaber, der er certificeret i Ækvatorialguinea, og at de bør optages i bilag A.

Air carriers from Liberia

Luftfartsselskaber fra Liberia

(70) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of International Air Services certified in Liberia. These deficiencies have been identified by France, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [21].

(70) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos International Air Services, der er certificeret i Liberia. Disse mangler er konstateret af Frankrig under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [21].

(71) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Liberia did not fully cooperate with the civil aviation authority of the United Kingdom (UK) when informed of serious safety deficiencies identified during a ramp inspection of a Liberian-registered aircraft carried out by the UK civil aviation authority on 5 March 1996 [22]. Concerns about the safety of the operation of carriers licensed or certified in Liberia were promptly raised when on 12 March 1996 the Liberian DCA was advised by the UK civil aviation authority that all requests for permits for Liberian registered aircraft to operate commercial services to the UK would be refused until the Liberian authorities could demonstrate the existence of an effective regulatory system to ensure the airworthiness of aircraft on the Liberian register. No response was ever received from the Liberian authorities. Likewise, the Liberian authorities did not fully cooperate with the civil aviation authority of France by declining to reply when the latter Member State raised concerns about the safety of the operation of a carrier licensed or certified in Liberia.

(71) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Liberia, samarbejdede ikke fuldt ud med den civile luftfartsmyndighed i Det Forenede Kongerige, da de blev underrettet om de alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler, der blev konstateret under en rampeinspektion af et liberiansk registreret luftfartøj foretaget af den civile britiske luftfartsmyndighed den 5. marts 1996 [22]. Der opstod straks betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden i driften af luftfartøjer, der har fået tildelt licens eller er certificeret i Liberia, da den civile britiske luftfartsmyndighed den 12. marts 1996 meddelte det liberianske direktorat for civil luftfart, at alle anmodninger om tilladelser til liberiansk registrerede luftfartøjers forretningsmæssige drift i Det Forenede Kongerige ville blive afvist, indtil de liberianske myndigheder kunne påvise, at der fandtes et effektivt lovpligtigt system til sikring af luftdygtigheden for luftfartøjerne i det liberianske register. Der blev aldrig modtaget noget svar fra de liberianske myndigheder. Tilsvarende samarbejdede de liberianske myndigheder ikke fuldt ud med den civile luftfartsmyndighed i Frankrig, idet de nægtede at svare, da sidstnævnte medlemsstat gav udtryk for betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden i driften af et luftfartsselskab, der har fået tildelt licens eller er certificeret i Liberia.

(72) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Liberia have shown an insufficient ability to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards. The Government of Liberia itself admitted in 1996 [23] that it was unable to maintain regulatory control over Liberian registered aircraft because of the civil conflict. While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in 2003 and the UN and the National Transitional Government of Liberia are slowly putting in place measures to improve security, it is unlikely that the Government’s ability to regulate its register has improved since 1996. ICAO has not yet carried out a USOAP audit of Liberia because of the security situation.

(72) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Liberia, udviste manglende evne til at gennemføre og håndhæve de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder. Liberias regering medgav selv i 1996 [23], at den som følge af de interne uroligheder var ude af stand til at opretholde lovpligtig kontrol med luftfartøjer registreret i Liberia. Selv om den samlede fredsaftale blev undertegnet i 2003, og FN og den nationale overgangsregering i Liberia langsomt er i færd med at træffe foranstaltninger til forbedring af sikkerheden, er det usandsynligt, at regeringens muligheder for at føre landets register er forbedret siden 1996. ICAO har som følge af sikkerhedssituationen endnu ikke foretaget en USOAP-revision af Liberia.

(73) The authorities of Liberia with responsibility for regulatory oversight of the following air carriers have shown a lack of ability to carry out adequate safety oversight on these carriers: International Air Services Inc., Satgur Air Transport Corp., Weasua Air Transport Co. Ltd.

(73) De myndigheder i Liberia, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med følgende luftfartsselskaber, udviste manglende evne til at føre passende sikkerhedstilsyn med følgende luftfartsselskaber: International Air Services Inc., Satgur Air Transport Corp., Weasua Air Transport Co. Ltd.

(74) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that all air carriers certified in Liberia should be subject to an operating ban and included in Annex A.

(74) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at der bør nedlægges driftsforbud for samtlige luftfartsselskaber, der er certificeret i Liberia, og at de bør optages i bilag A.

Air carriers from Sierra Leone

Luftfartsselskaber fra Sierra Leone

(75) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Air Universal Ltd. These deficiencies have been identified by Sweden during a ramp inspection performed under the SAFA programme [24].

(75) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Air Universal Ltd. Disse mangler er konstateret af Sverige under en rampeinspektion i SAFA-programmets regi [24].

(76) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Sierra Leone did not fully cooperate with the civil aviation authority of Sweden when concerns about the safety of the operation of Air Universal Ltd. certified in that state were raised, as demonstrated by the lack of response to the correspondence from this Member State.

(76) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Sierra Leone, samarbejdede ikke fuldt ud med den civile luftfartsmyndighed i Sverige, da der opstod betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden i driften af Air Universal Ltd, der er certificeret i den pågældende stat, således som det kom til udtryk ved deres mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(77) The operating authorisation or technical permission of any carrier under the oversight of Sierra Leone has previously been refused or revoked by the United Kingdom.

(77) Det Forenede Kongerige har tidligere nægtet eller tilbagekaldt driftstilladelse eller teknisk godkendelse for ethvert luftfartsselskab, som Sierra Leone fører tilsyn med.

(78) While the Air Operator’s Certificate of Air Universal Ltd was issued by Sierra Leone, evidence shows that the airline has currently its principal place of business in Jordan, contrary to the requirements of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

(78) Selv om AOC for Air Universal Ltd. var udstedt af Sierra Leone, er det bevist, at luftfartsselskabet i øjeblikket har sin hovedvirksomhed i Jordan, hvilket er i strid med kravene i bilag 6 til Chicago-konventionen.

(79) The authorities of Sierra Leone with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Air Universal Ltd have not exercised an adequate oversight on this carrier in accordance with their obligations under the Chicago Convention.

(79) De myndigheder i Sierra Leone, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med Air Universal Ltd, har ikke ført passende tilsyn med dette luftfartsselskab i overensstemmelse med deres forpligtelser i henhold til Chicago-konventionen.

(80) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that Air Universal Ltd. does not meet the relevant safety standards.

(80) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at Air Universal Ltd ikke opfylder de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder.

(81) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of air carriers certified in Sierra Leone. These deficiencies have been identified by three Member States, the UK, Malta and Sweden, during ramp inspections performed under the SAFA programme [25].

(81) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos luftfartsselskaber, der er certificeret i Sierra Leone. Disse mangler er konstateret af tre medlemsstater, Det Forenede Kongerige, Malta og Sverige, under rampeinspektioner i SAFA-programmets regi [25].

(82) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Sierra Leone did not fully cooperate with the civil aviation authorities of Sweden and of Malta when concerns about the safety of the operation of Air Universal Ltd certified in that state were raised as demonstrated by the lack of response to the correspondence from this Member State.

(82) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Sierra Leone, samarbejdede ikke fuldt ud med de civile luftfartsmyndigheder i Sverige og Malta, da der opstod betænkeligheder ved sikkerheden i driften af Air Universal Ltd, der er certificeret i den pågældende stat, således som det kom til udtryk ved deres mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(83) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Sierra Leone have shown an insufficient ability to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards in accordance with their obligations under the Chicago Convention. Sierra Leone lacks an appropriate system in place to oversee its operators or the aircraft, and does not have the technical capability or resources to undertake such a task. Some holders of Air Operator Certificate (AOC) issued by Sierra Leone did not have their principal place of business in Sierra Leone, contrary to the requirements of Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention.

(83) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Sierra Leone, udviste manglende evne til at gennemføre og håndhæve de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder i overensstemmelse med deres forpligtelser i henhold til Chicago-konventionen. Sierra Leone har ikke noget egnet system til at føre kontrol med landets operatører eller luftfartøjer og har hverken tekniske muligheder eller ressourcer til at påtage sig en sådan opgave. Nogle indehavere af AOC udstedt af Sierra Leone havde ikke deres hovedvirksomhed i Sierra Leone, hvilket er i strid med kravene i bilag 6 til Chicago-konventionen.

(84) The corrective action plan presented by Sierra Leone is considered inappropriate (or insufficient) to correct the identified serious safety deficiencies. The Civil Aviation Authority of Sierra Leone has contracted a private company, International Aviation Surveyors (IAS), to conduct certain oversight activities on its behalf. However, the arrangements entered into between the two parties in a Memorandum of Understanding [26] do not provide an adequate oversight system for aircraft on the Sierra Leone register. In particular:

(84) Den plan for afhjælpende foranstaltninger, som Sierra Leone fremlagde, blev ikke anset for hensigtsmæssig (eller tilstrækkelig) til at afhjælpe de konstaterede alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler. Sierra Leones civile luftfartsmyndighed har indgået kontrakt med et privat selskab, International Aviation Surveyors (IAS), om visse tilsynsaktiviteter på direktoratet for civil luftfarts vegne. De arrangementer, der er indgået mellem de to parter i et aftalememorandum [26], sikrer dog ikke et passende tilsynssystem for luftfartøjerne i Sierra Leones register. Navnlig skal følgende fremhæves:

- The aircraft/airlines covered by the MoU were not based in Sierra Leone and the lAS personnel were based in neither Sierra Leone nor the country in which the airlines were based.

- De luftfartøjer/luftfartsselskaber, der var omfattet af aftalememorandummet, havde ikke hjemsted i Sierra Leone, og IAS's personale havde hverken hjemsted i Sierra Leone eller det land, hvor luftfartsselskaberne havde hjemsted

- IAS did not appear to have any enforcement powers.

- IAS havde øjensynlig ingen håndhævelsesbeføjelser

- IAS assumed responsibility for routine inspections of the airlines concerned but the level of inspection activity was not specified.

- IAS påtog sig ansvaret for de rutinemæssige inspektioner af de pågældende luftfartsselskaber, men inspektionsaktivitetens omfang var ikke fastsat

- The MoU gave lAS a contractual relationship with the airlines concerned.

- ved aftalememorandummet blev der skabt en kontraktuel forbindelse mellem IAS og de pågældende luftfartsselskaber

- The MoU did not appear to adequately address the supervision of flight operations.

- aftalememorandummet sikrede øjensynlig ikke en passende overvågning af flyveoperationerne.

(85) The authorities of Sierra Leone with responsibility for regulatory oversight of the following air carriers have shown a lack of ability to carry out adequate safety oversight on these carriers: Aerolift Co. Ltd, Afrik Air Links, Air Leone Ltd, Air Rum Ltd, Air Salone Ltd, Air Universal Ltd, Destiny Air Services Ltd, First Line Air (SL) Ltd, Heavylift Cargo, Paramount Airlines Ltd, Star Air Ltd, Teebah Airways, West Coast Airways Ltd.

(85) De myndigheder i Sierra Leone, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med følgende luftfartsselskaber, udviste manglende evne til at føre passende sikkerhedstilsyn med disse luftfartsselskaber: Aerolift Co. Ltd, Afrik Air Links, Air Leone Ltd, Air Rum Ltd, Air Salone Ltd, Air Universal Ltd, Destiny Air Services Ltd, First Line Air (SL) Ltd, Heavylift Cargo, Paramount Airlines Ltd, Star Air Ltd, Teebah Airways, West Coast Airways Ltd.

(86) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that all air carriers certified in Sierra Leone should be subject to an operating ban and included in Annex A.

(86) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at der bør nedlægges driftsforbud for samtlige luftfartsselskaber, der er certificeret i Sierra Leone, og at de bør optages i bilag A.

Air carriers from Swaziland

Luftfartsselskaber fra Swaziland

(87) There is verified evidence of serious safety deficiencies on the part of Jet Africa, an air carrier certified in Swaziland. These deficiencies have been identified by the Netherlands during a ramp inspection performed under the SAFA programme [27].

(87) Der er beviser for alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler hos Jet Africa, et luftfartsselskab, der er certificeret i Swaziland. Disse mangler er konstateret af Nederlandene under en rampeinspektion i SAFA-programmets regi [27].

(88) Jet Africa did not respond adequately and timely to an enquiry by the civil aviation authority of the Netherlands regarding the safety aspect of its operation showing a lack of transparency or communication as demonstrated by the absence of reply to the correspondence sent by this Member State.

(88) Jet Africa reagerede ikke hensigtsmæssigt og rettidigt på en forespørgsel fra den civile nederlandske luftfartsmyndighed vedrørende de sikkerhedsmæssige aspekter ved dets drift og udviste mangel på gennemsigtighed eller kommunikation, således som det kom til udtryk ved dets mangel på svar på brevet fra denne medlemsstat.

(89) There is no evidence of a corrective action plan presented by Jet Africa to correct the serious safety deficiencies in response to the Netherlands request.

(89) Jet Africa har ikke fremlagt noget bevis for en plan for afhjælpende foranstaltninger vedrørende de alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler som svar på forespørgslen fra Nederlandene.

(90) The authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Swaziland have shown an insufficient ability to implement and enforce the relevant safety standards, in particular as demonstrated by a USOAP audit which took place in March 1999. The audit report [28] concluded that at the time of the audit, Swaziland was not capable of satisfactorily undertaking safety oversight related responsibilities in respect of its airlines and aircraft register. It also noted that it was not possible to determine the actual number of aircraft on the register as it was not properly maintained. Neither was it possible for the audit team to determine the actual number of personnel licences issued by Swaziland that were still valid, as records were not being maintained. A USOAP audit follow up mission has not taken place because Swaziland has not provided ICAO with information on the progress it has made in implementing the action plan to address the audit findings.

(90) De myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn i Swaziland, udviste manglende evne til at gennemføre og håndhæve de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder, navnlig som påvist ved en USOAP-revision, der fandt sted i marts 1999. I revisionsrapporten [28] blev der draget den konklusion, at Swaziland på det tidspunkt, hvor revisionen fandt sted, ikke var i stand til på tilfredsstillende vis at påtage sig ansvar i form af kontrol med sikkerheden i tilknytning til landets luftfartsselskabs- og luftfartøjsregister. Desuden blev det bemærket, at det ikke var muligt at fastlægge det faktiske antal luftfartøjer i registret, da det ikke blev ajourført behørigt. Fremdeles var det ikke muligt for revisionsholdet at fastlægge det faktiske antal personcertifikater, der var udstedt af Swaziland og stadig var gyldige, fordi registrene ikke blev ajourført. Der er ikke foretaget nogen opfølgende USOAP-revision, fordi Swaziland ikke har givet ICAO oplysning om nogen fremskridt med gennemførelsen af planen for foranstaltninger til afhjælpning af de ved revisionen påviste mangler.

(91) The authorities of Swaziland with responsibility for regulatory oversight of the following air carriers have shown a lack of ability to carry out adequate safety oversight on these carriers: Aero Africa (Pty) Ltd, African International Airways (Pty) Ltd, Airlink Swaziland Ltd, Northeast Airlines (Pty) Ltd, Scan Air Charter Ltd, Swazi Express Airways, Jet Africa.

(91) De myndigheder i Swaziland, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med følgende luftfartsselskaber, udviste manglende evne til at føre passende sikkerhedstilsyn med disse luftfartsselskaber: Aero Africa (Pty) Ltd, African International Airways (Pty) Ltd, Airlink Swaziland Ltd, Northeast Airlines (Pty) Ltd, Scan Air Charter Ltd, Swazi Express Airways, Jet Africa.

(92) Therefore, on the basis of the common criteria, it is assessed that all air carriers certified in Swaziland should be subject to an operating ban and included in Annex A.

(92) Det vurderes derfor på grundlag af de fælles kriterier, at der bør nedlægges driftsforbud for samtlige luftfartsselskaber, der er certificeret i Swaziland, og at de bør optages i bilag A.

General considerations concerning the carriers included in the list

Almindelige betragtninger vedrørende de luftfartsselskaber, der er optaget på listen

(93) Since it would not compromise safety, all air carriers mentioned above can be permitted to exercise traffic rights by using wet-leased aircraft of an air carrier which is not subject to an operating ban, provided that the relevant safety standards are complied with.

(93) Da det ikke vil udgøre en fare for sikkerheden, bør det tillades samtlige ovennævnte luftfartsselskaber at udøve trafikrettigheder ved at benytte wet-leasede luftfartøjer fra et luftfartsselskab, der ikke er omfattet af et driftsforbud, forudsat at de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder er opfyldt.

(94) The Community list has to be updated regularly and as soon as it is required, in order to take into account the evolution of safety in relation to the air carriers concerned and on the basis of further evidence of remedial actions undertaken.

(94) Fællesskabslisten skal ajourføres jævnligt og så snart, det er nødvendigt, for at tage hensyn til den sikkerhedsmæssige udvikling i de berørte luftfartsselskaber, og på grundlag af yderligere beviser for trufne afhjælpende foranstaltninger.

Air carriers not included in the list

Luftfartsselskaber, der ikke optræder på listen

(95) In light of the evidence provided by Tuninter and the authorities of Tunisia with responsibility for its regulatory oversight and further confirmation by Italy, it is considered that there is substantiated evidence that the safety deficiencies observed during two on-site inspections by the Italian authorities have been corrected by this carrier.

(95) Der drages den konklusion af de beviser, der er fremlagt af Tuninter og de tunesiske myndigheder vedrørende det lovpligtige tilsyn dermed, og den yderligere bekræftelse fra Italien, at der foreligger et veldokumenteret bevis for, at de sikkerhedsmangler, der blev konstateret under to inspektioner foretaget af de italienske myndigheder på stedet, er blevet afhjulpet af dette luftfartsselskab.

(96) On the basis of the information provided by Germany, it is considered that there is no longer substantiated evidence of a lack of ability or willingness of the authorities of Tajikistan with responsibility for regulatory oversight of air carriers certified in this State.

(96) Der drages den konklusion af de oplysninger, der er afgivet af Tyskland, at der ikke længere foreligger noget veldokumenteret bevis for manglende evne eller vilje hos de myndigheder i Tadsjikistan, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med luftfartsselskaber, der er certificeret i denne stat.

(97) On the basis of the information provided to Belgium showing that the deficiencies which led to a national ban on I.C.T.T.P.W. and South Airlines have been fully remedied, it is considered that there is no substantiated evidence of persisting serious safety deficiencies on the part of these air carriers.

(97) Der drages den konklusion af de oplysninger, der er afgivet til Belgien, og hvoraf det fremgår, at de mangler, der førte til et nationalt forbud for I.C.T.T.P.W. og South Airlines, er blevet afhjulpet fuldt ud, at der ikke foreligger noget veldokumenteret bevis for fortsatte alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler ved disse luftfartsselskaber.

(98) On the basis of the information provided by Germany showing that the specific aircraft which led to the imposition of a operational restriction on Atlant Soyuz is no more part of its fleet, it is considered that there is no substantiated evidence of persisting serious safety deficiencies on the part of this air carrier.

(98) Der drages den konklusion af de oplysninger, der er afgivet af Tyskland, og hvoraf det fremgår, at det bestemte luftfartøj, der førte til, at der blev fastsat en driftsmæssig begrænsning for Atlant Soyuz, ikke længere indgår i selskabets flåde, at der ikke foreligger noget veldokumenteret bevis for fortsatte alvorlige sikkerhedsmangler ved dette luftfartsselskab.

(99) On the basis of the information available at this stage, it is considered that there is no substantiated evidence of non-corrected serious safety deficiencies on the part of Air Mauritanie. Nevertheless, the ability of the authorities of Mauritania with responsibility for regulatory oversight of this air carrier needs to be further assessed. To this end, an evaluation of the authorities of Mauritania with responsibility for regulatory oversight of this air carrier and the undertakings under its responsibility should be conducted within 2 months by the Commission with the assistance of the authorities of any interested Member States.

(99) Der drages den konklusion af de i øjeblikket foreliggende oplysninger, at der ikke foreligger noget veldokumenteret bevis for ikke-afhjulpne sikkerhedsmangler hos Air Mauritanie. Alligevel bør kompetenceniveauet for de mauretanske myndigheder, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med dette luftfartsselskab, vurderes yderligere. I dette øjemed bør Kommissionen bistået af enhver interesseret medlemsstats myndigheder inden for 2 måneder foretage en evaluering af de myndigheder i Mauretanien, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn med dette luftfartsselskab og de foretagender, der henhører under dets ansvar.

(100) The measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Air Safety Committee,

(100) De i denne forordning fastsatte foranstaltninger er i overensstemmelse med udtalelse fra Udvalget for Luftfartssikkerhed —

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

UDSTEDT FØLGENDE FORORDNING:

Article 1

Artikel 1

Subject matter

Genstand

This Regulation establishes the Community list of air carriers which are subject to an operating ban within the Community referred to in Chapter II of the basic Regulation.

Ved denne forordning opstilles fællesskabslisten over luftfartsselskaber, der er omfattet af et driftsforbud i Fællesskabet som omhandlet i kapitel II i grundforordningen.

Article 2

Artikel 2

Operating bans

Driftsforbud

1. The air carriers listed in Annex A are subject to a ban within the Community for all their operations.

1. De luftfartsselskaber, der er anført i bilag A, er omfattet af et forbud i Fællesskabet, for så vidt angår alle former for drift.

2. The air carriers listed in Annex B are subject to operational restrictions within the Community. The operational restrictions consist of a prohibition on the use of the specific aircraft or specific aircraft types mentioned in Annex B.

2. De luftfartsselskaber, der er anført i bilag B, er omfattet af driftsmæssige begrænsninger i Fællesskabet. De driftsmæssige begrænsninger består af et forbud mod brug af de særlige luftfartøjer eller luftfartøjstyper, der er omhandlet i bilag B.

Article 3

Artikel 3

Enforcement

Håndhævelse

Member States shall inform the Commission of any measures taken under Articles 3(1) of the basic Regulation to enforce, within their territory, the operating bans included in the Community list in respect of the air carriers that are the subject of those bans.

Medlemsstaterne underretter Kommissionen om alle foranstaltninger, der træffes i henhold til artikel 3, stk. 1, i grundforordningen for på deres område at håndhæve de driftsforbud, som er anført på fællesskabslisten vedrørende de luftfartsselskaber, der er omfattet af nævnte forbud.

Article 4

Artikel 4

Entry into force

Ikrafttræden

This Regulation shall enter into force on the first day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Denne forordning træder i kraft dagen efter offentliggørelse i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Denne forordning er bindende i alle enkeltheder og gælder umiddelbart i hver medlemsstat.

Done at Brussels, 22 March 2006.

Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 22. marts 2006.

For the Commission

På Kommissionens vegne

Jacques Barrot

Vice-President

Næstformand

[1] OJ L 344, 27.12.2005, p. 15.

[1] EUT L 344 af 27.12.2005, s. 15.

[2] Established by Article 12 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the harmonization of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil aviation (OJ L 373, 31.12.1991, p. 4).

[2] Nedsat ved artikel 12 i Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 3922/91 af 16. december 1991 om harmonisering af tekniske krav og administrative procedurer inden for civil luftfart (EFT L 373 af 31.12.1991, s. 4).

[3] LBA-D-2005-0003LBA-D-2005-0004LBA-D-2005-0004

[4] DGAC/F 2000-210No ref. for another SAFA inspection performed by Germany.

[4] DGAC/F 2000-210Referencenummer for en anden SAFA-inspektion foretaget af Tyskland.

[5] DGAC/F-2000-895

[6] LBA-D-2004-269LBA-D-2004-341LBA-D-2004-374LBA-D-2004-597

[7] ENAC-IT-2005-237

[8] LFV-S-2004-2004-52CAA-NL-2005-47

[9] DGAC/F-2005-1222

[10] ENAC-IT-2005-170ENAC-IT-2005-370

[11] Factual Aviation Report, USA-National Transportation Safety Board, 2 March 2005, (NTSB ID: DCA05RA033).

[11] Factual Aviation Report, USA-National Transportation Safety Board, 2. marts 2005 (NTSB ID: DCA05RA033).

[12] CAA-UK-2005-40CAA-UK-2005-41CAA-UK-2005-42CAA-UK-2005-46CAA-UK-2005-47CAA-UK-2005-48CAA-NL-2005-49CAA-NL-2005-51CAA-NL-2005-54CAA-NL-2005-55CAA-NL-2005-56

[13] CAA-NL-2005-119CAA-NL-2005-122CAA-NL-2005-128CAA-NL-2005-171CAA-NL-2005-176CAA-NL-2005-177CAA-NL-2005-191CAA-NL-2005-195CAA-NL-2005-196

[14] CAA-NL-2005-230CAA-NL-2005-234CAA-NL-2005-235

[15] BCAA-2005-36

[16] SAFA ramp inspection performed by the Authorities of Belgium on March 11, 2006 in Brussels.

[16] SAFA-rampeinspektion foretaget af de belgiske myndigheder den 11. marts 2006 i Bruxelles.

[17] Correspondence between the UK Department of Transport and DGCA-Equatorial Guinea on the "Aircraft Register of Equatorial Guinea" ( 27 March 2002).

[17] Brevveksling mellem det britiske transportministerium og generaldirektøren for civil luftfart i Ækvatorialguinea vedrørende "Ækvatorialguineas register over luftfartøjer" ( 27. marts 2002).

[18] ICAO-USOAP Summary Report — Audit of the Directorate of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (Malabo, 14- 18 May 2001).

[18] ICAO-USOAP Summary Report — Audit of the Directorate of Civil Aviation of the Republic of Ækvatorialguinea (Malabo, 14.- 18. maj 2001).

[19] ICAO Council working paper C-WP/12471.

[19] ICAO-Rådets arbejdsdokument C-WP/12471.

[20] Correspondence between the UK Department of Transport and ECAC on the "Issue of Aircraft Documentation by Non-Approved Companies" ( 6 August 2003).

[20] Brevveksling mellem det britiske transportministerium og ECAC om "spørgsmål vedrørende ikke-godkendte selskabers luftfartøjsdokumentation" ( 6. august 2003).

[21] DGAC/F-2004 Nos 315, 316

[21] DGAC/F-2004 nr. 315 og 316.

[22] UK-CAA Regulation Group — Aircraft Survey Report, 5 March 1996 (Office code: 223).

[22] UK-CAA Regulation Group — Aircraft Survey Report, 5. marts 1996 (Office code: 223).

[23] Correspondence between the Transport Ministry of Liberia and UK DGCA on the "inability, due to the Liberian Civil conflict, to maintain regulatory control over Liberian registered aircraft", 28 August 1996.

[23] Brevveksling mellem Liberias transportministerium og Det Forenede Kongeriges generaldirektorat for civil luftfart om "det umulige i at føre lovpligtig kontrol med luftfartøjer registreret i Liberia som følge af de interne uroligheder i Liberia", 28. august 1996.

[24] LFV-S-04-0037

[25] CAA-UK-2003-103CAA-UK-2003-111CAA-UK-2003-136CAA-UK-2003-198CAA-MA-2003-4LFV-S-2004-37

[26] Memorandum of Understanding between DCA Sierra Leone and "FAST International Aviation Surveyors on the inspection, surveillance and provision of regulatory services to extra-regional air operators" (IAS/SL DCA MOA 201101).

[26] Aftalememorandum mellem Sierra Leones direktorat for civil luftfart og "FAST International Aviation Surveyors" om inspektion, overvågning og lovpligtige ydelser til luftfartsselskaber fra lande uden for regionen (IAS/SL DCA MOA 201101).

[27] CAA/NL-2004-98

[28] ICAO-USOAP Summary Report — Audit of the Directorate of Civil Aviation of Swaziland, (Mbabane, 9- 12 March 1999).

[28] ICAO-USOAP Summary Report — Audit of the Directorate of Civil Aviation of Swaziland, (Mbabane, 9.- 12. marts 1999).

--------------------------------------------------

ANNEX A

BILAG A

LIST OF AIR CARRIERS OF WHICH ALL OPERATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO A BAN WITHIN THE COMMUNITY [1]

LISTE OVER LUFTFARTSSELSKABER, FOR HVIS VEDKOMMENDE ALLE FORMER FOR DRIFT ER OMFATTET AF FORBUD I FÆLLESSKABET [1]

Name of the legal entity of the air carrier as indicated on its AOC (and its trading name, if different) | Air Operator Certificate (AOC) Number or Operating Licence Number | ICAO airline designation number | State of the Operator |

Luftfartsselskabets juridiske enheds navn som anført på dens AOC (og dens firmanavn, hvis dette er anderledes) | Nummer på Air Operator's Certificate (AOC) eller licens | Luftfartsselskabets ICAO-kode | Operatørens hjemland |

Air Koryo | Unknown | KOR | Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK) |

Air Koryo | Ukendt | KOR | Den Demokratiske Folkerepublik Korea (DPRK) |

Air Service Comores | Unknown | Unknown | Comores |

Air Service Comores | Ukendt | Ukendt | Comorerne |

Ariana Afghan Airlines [2] | 009 | AFG | Afghanistan |

BGB Air | AK-0194-04 | Unknown | Kazakhstan |

BGB Air | AK-0194-04 | Ukendt | Kasakhstan |

GST Aero Air Company | AK 0203-04 | BMK | Kazakhstan |

GST Aero Air Company | AK 0203-04 | BMK | Kasakhstan |

Phoenix Aviation | 02 | PHG | Kyrghizstan |

Phoenix Aviation | 02 | PHG | Kirgisistan |

Phuket Airlines | 07/2544 | VAP | Thailand |

Reem Air | 07 | REK | Kyrghizstan |

Reem Air | 07 | REK | Kirgisistan |

Silverback Cargo Freighters | Unknown | VRB | Rwanda |

Silverback Cargo Freighters | Ukendt | VRB | Rwanda |

All air carriers certified by the authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC), including, | Unknown | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

Alle luftfartsselskaber, som er certificeret af de myndigheder i Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC), der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn, herunder: | Ukendt | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

Africa One | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/017/2005 | CFR | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

Africa One | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/017/2005 | CFR | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

AFRICAN COMPANY AIRLINES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/017/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

AFRICAN COMPANY AIRLINES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/017/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

AIGLE AVIATION | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

AIGLE AVIATION | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

AIR BOYOMA | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

AIR BOYOMA | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

AIR KASAI | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/010/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

AIR KASAI | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/010/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

AIR NAVETTE | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/015/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

AIR NAVETTE | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/015/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

AIR TROPIQUES s.p.r.l. | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/007/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

AIR TROPIQUES s.p.r.l. | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/007/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

ATO — Air Transport Office | Unknown | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

ATO — Air Transport Office | Ukendt | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

BLUE AIRLINES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/038/2005 | BUL | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

BLUE AIRLINES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/038/2005 | BUL | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

BUSINESS AVIATION s.p.r.l. | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/012/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

BUSINESS AVIATION s.p.r.l. | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/012/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

BUTEMBO AIRLINES | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

BUTEMBO AIRLINES | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

CAA — Compagnie Africaine d’Aviation | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/016/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

CAA — Compagnie Africaine d’Aviation | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/016/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

CARGO BULL AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/032/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

CARGO BULL AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/032/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

CENTRAL AIR EXPRESS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/011/2005 | CAX | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

CENTRAL AIR EXPRESS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/011/2005 | CAX | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

CETRACA AVIATION SERVICE | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/037/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

CETRACA AVIATION SERVICE | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/037/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

CHC STELAVIA | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

CHC STELAVIA | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

COMAIR | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

COMAIR | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

COMPAGNIE AFRICAINE D’AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/016/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

COMPAGNIE AFRICAINE D’AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/016/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

C0-ZA AIRWAYS | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

C0-ZA AIRWAYS | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

DAS AIRLINES | Unknown | RKC | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

DAS AIRLINES | Ukendt | RKC | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

DOREN AIRCARGO | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0168/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

DOREN AIRCARGO | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0168/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

ENTERPRISE WORLD AIRWAYS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/031/2005 | EWS | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

ENTERPRISE WORLD AIRWAYS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/031/2005 | EWS | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

FILAIR | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/014/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

FILAIR | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/014/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

FREE AIRLINES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/MNL/CM/014/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

FREE AIRLINES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/MNL/CM/014/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

GALAXY CORPORATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0002/MNL/CM/014/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

GALAXY CORPORATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0002/MNL/CM/014/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

GR AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0403/TW/TK/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

GR AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0403/TW/TK/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

GLOBAL AIRWAYS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/029/2005 | BSP | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

GLOBAL AIRWAYS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/029/2005 | BSP | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

GOMA EXPRESS | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

GOMA EXPRESS | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

GREAT LAKE BUSINESS COMPANY | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

GREAT LAKE BUSINESS COMPANY | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

I.T.A.B. — International Trans Air Business | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0022/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

I.T.A.B. — International Trans Air Business | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0022/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

JETAIR — Jet Aero Services, s.p.r.l. | Unknown | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

JETAIR — Jet Aero Services, s.p.r.l. | Ukendt | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

KINSHASA AIRWAYS, s.p.r.l | Unknown | KNS | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

KINSHASA AIRWAYS, s.p.r.l | Ukendt | KNS | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

KIVU AIR | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

KIVU AIR | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

LAC — Lignes Aériennes Congolaises | Unknown | LCG | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

LAC — Lignes Aériennes Congolaises | Ukendt | LCG | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

MALU AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/013/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

MALU AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/013/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

Malila Airlift | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/008/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

Malila Airlift | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/008/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

MANGO MAT | Ministerial signature | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

MANGO MAT | Ministeriel underskrift | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

RWABIKA "BUSHI EXPRESS" | Unknown | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

RWABIKA "BUSHI EXPRESS" | Ukendt | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

SAFARI LOGISTICS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0760/V/KK//2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

SAFARI LOGISTICS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0760/V/KK//2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

SERVICES AIR | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/034/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

SERVICES AIR | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/034/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

TEMBO AIR SERVICES | 409/CAB/VC-MIN/TC/0405/2006 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

TEMBO AIR SERVICES | 409/CAB/VC-MIN/TC/0405/2006 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

THOM’S AIRWAYS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0033/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

THOM’S AIRWAYS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/0033/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

TMK AIR COMMUTER | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/020/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

TMK AIR COMMUTER | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/020/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

TRACEP | Unknown | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

TRACEP | Ukendt | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

TRANS AIR CARGO SERVICES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/035/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

TRANS AIR CARGO SERVICES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/035/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

TRANSPORTS AERIENNES CONGOLAIS (TRACO) | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/034/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

TRANSPORTS AERIENNES CONGOLAIS (TRACO) | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/034/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

UHURU AIRLINES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/039/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

UHURU AIRLINES | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/039/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

VIRUNGA AIR CHARTER | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/018/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

VIRUNGA AIR CHARTER | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/018/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

WALTAIR AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/036/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

WALTAIR AVIATION | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/036/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

WIMBI DIRI AIRWAYS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/005/2005 | Unknown | Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) |

WIMBI DIRI AIRWAYS | 409/CAB/MIN/TC/005/2005 | Ukendt | Den Demokratiske Republik Congo (RDC) |

All air carriers certified by the authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Equatorial Guinea, including | Unknown | Unknown | Equatorial Guinea |

Alle luftfartsselskaber, som er certificeret af de myndigheder i Ækvatorialguinea, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn, herunder: | Ukendt | Ukendt | Ækvatorialguinea |

Air Consul SA | Unknown | RCS | Equatorial Guinea |

Air Consul SA | Ukendt | RCS | Ækvatorialguinea |

Avirex Guinee Equatoriale | Unknown | AXG | Equatorial Guinea |

Avirex Guinee Equatoriale | Ukendt | AXG | Ækvatorialguinea |

COAGE — Compagnie Aeree de Guinee Equatorial | Unknown | COG | Equatorial Guinea |

COAGE — Compagnie Aeree de Guinee Equatorial | Ukendt | COG | Ækvatorialguinea |

Ecuato Guineana de Aviacion | Unknown | ECV | Equatorial Guinea |

Ecuato Guineana de Aviacion | Ukendt | ECV | Ækvatorialguinea |

Ecuatorial Cargo | Unknown | EQC | Equatorial Guinea |

Ecuatorial Cargo | Ukendt | EQC | Ækvatorialguinea |

GEASA — Guinea Ecuatorial Airlines SA | Unknown | GEA | Equatorial Guinea |

GEASA — Guinea Ecuatorial Airlines SA | Ukendt | GEA | Ækvatorialguinea |

GETRA — Guinea Ecuatorial de Transportes Aereos | Unknown | GET | Equatorial Guinea |

GETRA — Guinea Ecuatorial de Transportes Aereos | Ukendt | GET | Ækvatorialguinea |

Jetline Inc. | Unknown | JLE | Equatorial Guinea |

Jetline Inc. | Ukendt | JLE | Ækvatorialguinea |

KNG Transavia Cargo | Unknown | VCG | Equatorial Guinea |

KNG Transavia Cargo | Ukendt | VCG | Ækvatorialguinea |

Prompt Air GE SA | Unknown | POM | Equatorial Guinea |

Prompt Air GE SA | Ukendt | POM | Ækvatorialguinea |

UTAGE — Union de Transport Aereo de Guinea Ecuatorial | Unknown | UTG | Equatorial Guinea |

UTAGE — Union de Transport Aereo de Guinea Ecuatorial | Ukendt | UTG | Ækvatorialguinea |

All air carriers certified by the authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Liberia, including | Unknown | Unknown | Liberia |

Alle luftfartsselskaber, som er certificeret af de myndigheder i Liberia, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn, herunder: | Ukendt | Ukendt | Liberia |

International Air Services | Unknown | IAX | Liberia |

International Air Services | Ukendt | IAX | Liberia |

SATGUR AIR TRANSPORT, Corp. | Unknown | TGR | Liberia |

SATGUR AIR TRANSPORT, Corp. | Ukendt | TGR | Liberia |

WEASUA AIR TRANSPORT, Co. Ltd | Unknown | WTC | Liberia |

WEASUA AIR TRANSPORT, Co. Ltd | Ukendt | WTC | Liberia |

All air carriers certified by the authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Sierra Leone, including | Unknown | Unknown | Sierra Leone |

Alle luftfartsselskaber, som er certificeret af de myndigheder i Sierra Leone, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn, herunder: | Ukendt | Ukendt | Sierra Leone |

AEROLIFT, Co. Ltd | Unknown | LFT | Sierra Leone |

AEROLIFT, Co. Ltd | Ukendt | LFT | Sierra Leone |

AFRIK AIR LINKS | Unknown | AFK | Sierra Leone |

AFRIK AIR LINKS | Ukendt | AFK | Sierra Leone |

AIR LEONE, Ltd | Unknown | RLL | Sierra Leone |

AIR LEONE, Ltd | Ukendt | RLL | Sierra Leone |

AIR RUM, Ltd | Unknown | RUM | Sierra Leone |

AIR RUM, Ltd | Ukendt | RUM | Sierra Leone |

AIR SALONE, Ltd | Unknown | RNE | Sierra Leone |

AIR SALONE, Ltd | Ukendt | RNE | Sierra Leone |

AIR UNIVERSAL, Ltd | 00007 | UVS | Sierra Leone |

DESTINY AIR SERVICES, Ltd | Unknown | DTY | Sierra Leone |

DESTINY AIR SERVICES, Ltd | Ukendt | DTY | Sierra Leone |

FIRST LINE AIR (SL), Ltd | Unknown | FIR | Sierra Leone |

FIRST LINE AIR (SL), Ltd | Ukendt | FIR | Sierra Leone |

HEAVYLIFT CARGO | Unknown | Unknown | Sierra Leone |

HEAVYLIFT CARGO | Ukendt | Ukendt | Sierra Leone |

PARAMOUNT AIRLINES, Ltd | Unknown | PRR | Sierra Leone |

PARAMOUNT AIRLINES, Ltd | Ukendt | PRR | Sierra Leone |

STAR AIR, Ltd | Unknown | SIM | Sierra Leone |

STAR AIR, Ltd | Ukendt | SIM | Sierra Leone |

TEEBAH AIRWAYS | Unknown | Unknown | Sierra Leone |

TEEBAH AIRWAYS | Ukendt | Ukendt | Sierra Leone |

WEST COAST AIRWAYS Ltd | Unknown | WCA | Sierra Leone |

WEST COAST AIRWAYS Ltd | Ukendt | WCA | Sierra Leone |

All air carriers certified by the authorities with responsibility for regulatory oversight of Swaziland, including | Unknown | Unknown | Swaziland |

Alle luftfartsselskaber, som er certificeret af de myndigheder i Swaziland, der har ansvaret for det lovpligtige tilsyn, herunder: | Ukendt | Ukendt | Swaziland |

AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, (Pty) Ltd | Unknown | AIA | Swaziland |

AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, (Pty) Ltd | Ukendt | AIA | Swaziland |

AIRLINK SWAZILAND, Ltd | Unknown | SZL | Swaziland |

AIRLINK SWAZILAND, Ltd | Ukendt | SZL | Swaziland |

Jet Africa | Unknown | OSW | Swaziland |

Jet Africa | Ukendt | OSW | Swaziland |

NORTHEAST AIRLINES, (Pty) Ltd | Unknown | NEY | Swaziland |

NORTHEAST AIRLINES, (Pty) Ltd | Ukendt | NEY | Swaziland |

SCAN AIR CHARTER, Ltd | Unknown | Unknown | Swaziland |

SCAN AIR CHARTER, Ltd | Ukendt | Ukendt | Swaziland |

SWAZI EXPRESS AIRWAYS | Unknown | SWX | Swaziland |

SWAZI EXPRESS AIRWAYS | Ukendt | SWX | Swaziland |

[1] Air carriers listed in Annex A could be permitted to exercise traffic rights by using wet-leased aircraft of an air carrier which is not subject to an operating ban, provided that the relevant safety standards are complied with.

[1] Luftfartsselskaber, der er opført i bilag A, kan eventuelt få tilladelse til at udøve trafikrettigheder ved at benytte wet-leasede luftfartøjer fra et luftfartsselskab, der ikke er ramt af driftsforbud, hvis de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder opfyldes.

[2] The operating ban on Ariana Afghan Airlines applies to all aircraft operated by this air carrier except the following one: A310 registration number F-GYYY.

[2] Driftsforbuddet for Ariana Afghan Airlines gælder for alle luftfartøjer, der drives af dette luftfartsselskab, med undtagelse af følgende: A310 registreringsnummer F-GYYY.

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ANNEX B

BILAG B

LIST OF AIR CARRIERS OF WHICH OPERATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY [1]

LISTE OVER LUFTFARTSSELSKABER, DER ER OMFATTET AF DRIFTSMÆSSIGE BEGRÆNSNINGER I FÆLLESSKABET [1]

Name of the legal entity of the air carrier as indicated on its AOC (and its trading name, if different) | Air Operator Certificate (AOC) Number | ICAO airline designation number | State of the Operator | Aircraft type | Registration number(s) and, when available, construction serial number(s) | State of registry |

Luftfartsselskabets juridiske enheds navn som anført på dens AOC (og dens firmanavn, hvis dette er anderledes) | Nummer på Air Operator's Certificate (AOC) | Luftfartsselskabets ICAO-kode | Operatørens hjemland | Type luftfartøj | Registreringsnummer eller -numre og serienummer eller -numre, hvis dette/disse er kendt | Registreringsstat |

Air Bangladesh | 17 | BGD | Bangladesh | B747-269B | S2-ADT | Bangladesh |

Buraq Air | 002/01 | BRQ | Libya | IL-76 | UN-76007 (cons. No 0003426765)5a-DNA (cons. No 0023439140)5A-DMQ (cons. No 73479392)UN-76008 (cons. No 0033448404) | Lybia |

Buraq Air | 002/01 | BRQ | Libyen | IL-76 | UN-76007 (serienr. 0003426765)5a-DNA (serienr. 0023439140)5A-DMQ (serienr. 73479392)UN-76008 (serienr. 0033448404) | Libyen |

[1] Air carriers listed in Annex B could be permitted to exercise traffic rights by using wet-leased aircraft of an air carrier which is not subject to an operating ban, provided that the relevant safety standards are complied with.

[1] Luftfartsselskaber, der er opført i bilag B, kan eventuelt få tilladelse til at udøve trafikrettigheder ved at benytte wet-leasede luftfartøjer fra et luftfartsselskab, der ikke er ramt af driftsforbud, hvis de relevante sikkerhedsstandarder opfyldes.

[2] Hewa Bora Airways is only allowed to use the specific aircraft mentioned for its current operations within the European Community.

[2] Hewa Bora Airways må kun bruge det luftfartøj, der er anført for dets nuværende operationer i Det Europæiske Fællesskab.

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