Commission Decision

Kommissionens beslutning

of 13 July 2009

af 13. juli 2009

concerning the reform of the method by which the RATP pension scheme is financed (State aid C 42/07 (ex N 428/06)) which France is planning to implement in respect of RATP

om en reform af finansieringen af pensionsordningen for RATP (statsstøtte C 42/07 (ex N 428/06)), som Frankrig påtænker at iværksætte til fordel for RATP

(notified under document C(2009) 5505)

(meddelt under nummer K(2009) 5505)

(only the French text is authentic)

(Kun den franske udgave er autentisk)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2009/945/EC)

(2009/945/EF)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

KOMMISSIONEN FOR DE EUROPÆISKE FÆLLESSKABER HAR —

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 88(2) thereof,

under henvisning til traktaten om oprettelse af Det Europæiske Fællesskab, særlig artikel 88, stk. 2, første afsnit,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,

under henvisning til aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde, særlig artikel 62, stk. 1, litra a),

Having called on interested parties to submit their observations pursuant to the provisions [1] cited above and having regard to their observations,

efter at have opfordret de interesserede parter til at fremsætte deres bemærkninger i overensstemmelse med disse artikler [1] og under hensyntagen til disse bemærkninger, og

Whereas:

ud fra følgende betragtninger:

1. PROCEDURE

1. SAGSFORLØB

(1) By letter of 29 June 2006, France notified the Commission of the reform of the method by which the RATP pension scheme is financed. It provided the Commission with additional information by letters dated 29 September 2006, 15 December 2006 and 4 April 2007.

(1) Den 29. juni 2006 anmeldte Frankrig en reform af finansieringen af pensionsordningen for RATP til Kommissionen. Frankrig sendte Kommissionen supplerende oplysninger ved skrivelser af 29. september 2006, 15. december 2006 og 4. april 2007.

(2) By letter of 10 October 2007, the Commission informed France of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of the measure notified (hereinafter "the decision to initiate the procedure").

(2) Kommissionen gav ved brev af 10. oktober 2007 Frankrig meddelelse om, at den havde besluttet at indlede proceduren efter EF-traktatens artikel 88, stk. 2, med hensyn til den anmeldte foranstaltning (herefter "beslutningen om indledning af proceduren").

(3) The decision to initiate the procedure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 15 January 2008 [2].

(3) Beslutningen om at indlede proceduren blev offentliggjort i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende den 15. januar 2008 [2].

(4) The French authorities sent their observations by letter dated 22 January 2008.

(4) De franske myndigheder fremsatte deres bemærkninger den 22. januar 2008.

(5) On 19 February 2008, the Commission received observations from one interested party. It forwarded those observations to France, giving it the opportunity to comment on them and received France's comments by letter dated 3 April 2008.

(5) Den 19. februar 2008 modtog Kommissionen bemærkninger fra en interesseret part. Den videresendte bemærkningerne til Frankrig med mulighed for at kommentere dem og modtog Frankrigs kommentarer i brev af 3. april 2008.

(6) On 23 April 2008, the French authorities informed the Commission that in the autumn of 2007, the French Government had embarked on the reform of special public-sector pension schemes, and in particular the pension scheme for RATP staff.

(6) Den 23. april 2008 meddelte de franske myndigheder Kommissionen, at den franske regering i efteråret 2007 havde indledt reformen af de særlige pensionsordninger for offentlige virksomheder, navnlig pensionsordningen for medarbejdere hos RATP.

(7) On 6 January 2009, the Commission asked the French authorities for additional information and received a reply from them by letter dated 3 March 2009.

(7) Kommissionen bad den 6. januar 2009 om supplerende oplysninger, og de franske myndigheder svarede pr. brev af 3. marts 2009.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE BENEFICIARY

2. BESKRIVELSE AF MODTAGEREN

(8) The Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (the Paris public transport operator, or "RATP") is a French public enterprise which is wholly owned by the French State. It was established by Law No 48-506 of 21 March 1948 on the reorganisation and coordination of passenger transport in the Paris region [3], its aim being to "operate the public passenger transport networks and lines for which it has been assigned responsibility" [4].

(8) La Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (herefter "RATP") er en offentlig fransk virksomhed, der ejes 100 % af den franske stat. RATP blev oprettet ved lov nr. 48-506 af 21. marts 1948 om omlægning og koordinering af personbefordring i Paris-regionen [3] og har til formål at varetage "driften af de transportnet og -linjer til kollektiv persontransport, det har fået overdraget" [4].

(9) Under this Law, RATP's activities are limited to public transport in the Paris region. Under Article 7 of Law No 48-506 of 21 March 1948, RATP is responsible for operating the public transport networks in the City of Paris and the Department of Seine and the lines in Seine-et-Oise and Seine-et-Marne previously granted or leased to the Compagnie du chemin de fer métropolitain or the Société des transports en commun de la région parisienne. This was confirmed by Order No 59-151 of 7 January 1959.

(9) Loven begrænsede RATP’s virksomhed til kollektiv transport i Paris-regionen. I medfør af artikel 7 i lov nr. 48-506 af 21. marts 1948 har RATP ansvaret for "driften af de kollektive transportnet i byen Paris og departementet Seine samt linjerne i Seine-et-Oise og Seine-et-Marne, som tidligere var blevet overdraget eller bortforpagtet til Compagnie du chemin de fer métropolitain eller til Société des transports en commun de la région parisienne". Denne situation blev atter bekræftet ved ovennævnte bekendtgørelse nr. 59-151 af 7. januar 1959.

(10) However, RATP is able, via its subsidiaries, to provide services outside of the Ile-de-France region [5]. The RATP subsidiaries, which are formed as limited companies, are currently grouped into three main sectors, which employ approximately 2050 people, 170 of whom are seconded by head office:

(10) RATP har imidlertid mulighed for gennem datterselskaber at tilbyde tjenesteydelser uden for Ile-de-France [5]. RATP’s datterselskaber, der er dannet som aktieselskaber, er i dag samlet i tre store poler, der beskæftiger omkring 2050 personer, hvoraf 170 er udstationeret fra moderselskabet:

- The Transport sector, managed by RATP Développement SA, whose turnover in 2005 was EUR 57 million, including EUR 4,7 million abroad and EUR 3,1 million in the French regions (i.e. outside of Ile-de-France).

- transport, der styres af RATP Développement SA, som tegnede sig for en konsolideret omsætning på 57 mio. EUR i regnskabsåret 2005, hvoraf 4,7 mio. EUR var indtjent internationalt og 3,1 mio. EUR i de franske regioner (uden for Ile-de-France)

- The Engineering sector, managed by RATP International SA, whose consolidated turnover in 2005 was EUR 86 million; nearly 80 % of its activity took place abroad, with most of the remaining activity taking place outside Ile-de-France.

- ingeniørarbejde styret af RATP International SA, hvis konsoliderede omsætning beløb sig til 86 mio. EUR i 2005, og hvis virksomhed for næsten 80 % vedkommende ligger internationalt, idet den resterende del hovedsagelig ligger i Frankrig uden for Ile-de-France

- The Space Utilisation sector, essentially comprising subsidiaries responsible for property development (on RATP-managed premises), the promotion of sales outlets in Metro stations and telecommunication activities. The consolidated turnover in 2005 for this sector was EUR 33 million (only in Ile-de-France).

- områdeudnyttelse, der i al væsentlighed samler datterselskaber, som beskæftiger sig med ejendomsudvikling (på områder, der forvaltes af RATP), udnyttelse af handelsområder på metrostationer samt telekommunikationsvirksomhed, og hvis konsoliderede omsætning i 2005 beløb sig til 33 mio. EUR, bortset fra Ile-de-France.

(11) The RATP group employs a total of approximately 46050 people, 44000 of whom are employed by the RATP as staff in posts governed by service regulations, with the remaining 2050 people employed in RATP subsidiaries.

(11) RATP-koncernen beskæftiger i alt ca. 46050 personer, hvoraf 44000 er vedtægtsansatte medarbejdere, og resten, dvs. 2050 personer, arbejder i RATP’s datterselskaber.

(12) The working conditions of staff in posts governed by service regulations are established on a regulatory basis in the RATP staff regulations [6]. However, working conditions for the 2050 people employed by RATP subsidiaries are established on the basis of collective agreements, and therefore the RATP staff regulations do not apply to them.

(12) Arbejdsvilkårene for vedtægtsansatte medarbejdere er fastsat lovgivningsmæssigt i vedtægten for funktionærer i RATP [6]. For de 2050 personer, der er ansat i RATP’s datterselskaber, er arbejdsbetingelserne derimod fastsat i de kollektive overenskomster og er derfor ikke omfattet af RATP’s funktionærvedtægt.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE PUBLIC TRANSPORT MARKET IN THE ILE-DE-FRANCE REGION

3. BESKRIVELSE AF MARKEDET FOR KOLLEKTIV TRANSPORT I ILE-DE-FRANCE

(13) The Ile-de-France public transport market is currently not open to competition. Licences to operate public transport lines have been allocated on the basis of the procedure provided for in Decree No 59-157 of 7 January 1959 on the organisation of passenger transport in the Ile-de-France region [7], which divided the public transport market in Ile-de-France between RATP and many private operators which were present in the region at the time.

(13) Indtil nu har markedet for kollektiv transport i Ile-de-France ikke været åbent for konkurrence. Licenser til at drive offentlige transportlinjer blev tildelt efter proceduren i dekret nr. 59-157 af 7. januar 1959 vedrørende tilrettelæggelse af personbefordringen i regionen Ile-de-France [7], hvorved markedet for kollektiv transport i Ile-de-France var blevet fordelt mellem RATP og det store antal små private operatører, der dengang var til stede i Ile-de-France.

(14) In addition to RATP, approximately 100 companies provide public transport services in Ile-de-France. These companies are SNCF (the French national rail company) and private operators grouped collectively in the "OPTILE" association (approximately 95 companies, including three major bus transport operators: Veolia Transport, Keolis and Transdev).

(14) Ud over RATP leverer omkring et hundrede virksomheder kollektive transportydelser i Ile-de-France. Disse virksomheder er de franske statsbaner SNCF samt private operatører, der er samlet i sammenslutningen OPTILE (ca. 95 virksomheder, heraf tre større bustransportoperatører, Veolia Transport, Keolis og Transdev).

(15) Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 1191/69 and 1107/70 [8] (hereinafter "Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007"), provides for the public transport market to be gradually opened up. In accordance with Article 12 of the Regulation, it will come into force on 3 December 2009.

(15) I henhold til Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007 af 23. oktober 2007 om offentlig personbefordring med jernbane og ad vej og om ophævelse af Rådets forordning (EØF) nr. 1191/69 og (EØF) nr. 1107/70 [8] (herefter "forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007") skal markedet for offentlig transport gradvist åbnes. Den træder i kraft den 3. december 2009 i overensstemmelse med forordningens artikel 12.

4. PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL PENSION SCHEME FOR RATP STAFF BEFORE AND AFTER THE NOTIFIED REFORM

4. YDELSERNE UNDER DEN SÆRLIGE PENSIONSORDNING FOR FUNKTIONÆRER I RATP FØR OG EFTER DEN ANMELDTE REFORM

(16) The RATP pension scheme is provided for in Article 31 of Law No 48-506 of 21 March 1948 (referred to above), and supplemented by Decree No 59-1091 of 23 September 1959 on the RATP statutes [9].

(16) RATP’s pensionsordning er fastsat i artikel 31 i ovennævnte lov nr. 48-506 af 21. marts 1948 og suppleret af dekret nr. 59-1091 af 23. september 1959 om RATP [9].

(17) The pension scheme for RATP staff is a special scheme within the meaning of Articles L 711-1 and R 711-1 of the French Social Security Code, and has specific advantages compared to statutory schemes. It is a regulated scheme, i.e. established by the State on the basis of administrative provisions. In addition, changes to its rules, contributions and benefits, amongst other things, are the subject of regulatory provisions.

(17) Pensionsordningen for medarbejdere hos RATP er i henhold til artikel L 711-1 og R. 711-1 i socialsikringsloven (Code de la sécurité sociale) en særlig ordning med specifikke fordele i forhold til de almindelige ordninger. Der er tale om en lovfæstet ordning, der er fastsat administrativt af staten. Endvidere fastsættes udviklingen af bl.a. parametre, bidrag og ydelser i administrative bestemmelser.

(18) Until 15 January 2008, the main differences between the special pension scheme for RATP staff and statutory schemes concerned how pension entitlements and the payment of pensions were calculated.

(18) I forhold til de almindelige ordninger vedrørte de vigtigste særlige træk ved pensionsordningen for ansatte hos RATP indtil den 15. januar 2008 de nærmere betingelser for beregning af pensionsret og fastsættelse af pension.

(19) In this regard, under statutory pension schemes, the pension amount is calculated on the basis of average salary during a person's whole career or part of it. The pension amount also depends on the period of insurance or on age, with overvaluation or undervaluation being applied if the sums established for these two criteria have not been met or have been exceeded. Consequently, under a general scheme, a pension is calculated on the basis of average salary (including bonuses) over a person's best 25 career years (subject to a maximum annual salary), with a rate of 50 % (full rate) being applied to the salary, if the insured person has contributed for at least 40 years.

(19) I den forbindelse skal pensionsbeløbet i henhold til de almindelige pensionsordninger beregnes på grundlag af gennemsnitslønnen i hele eller dele af karriereforløbet. Det står også i forhold til forsikringsperiode eller alder, idet der anvendes en under- eller overkurs, når de værdier, der fastsættes under hensyntagen til disse to kriterier, ikke opnås eller overskrides. Således beregnes pensionen under den almindelige ordning på grundlag af gennemsnitslønnen (inklusive tillæg) i de 25 bedste erhvervsaktive år (inden for rammerne af et årligt lønloft) med 50 % (fuld sats), såfremt forsikringstageren kan dokumentere mindst 40 års forsikring.

(20) However, under the RATP pension scheme, staff in posts governed by service regulations were entitled, in respect of each year of insurance, to 2 % of basic salary (excluding bonuses) received during the last six months of employment, subject to a limit of 37,5 annual payments. This means that an RATP employee, after 37,5 years of employment, would receive a pension corresponding to 75 % of final salary, excluding bonuses, i.e. approximately 64,5 % of final salary, including bonuses.

(20) Ifølge RATP’s pensionsordning havde de vedtægtsansatte derimod for hvert års forsikring ret til 2 % af den grundløn uden tillæg, de havde fået i de sidste seks erhvervsaktive måneder, dog højst 37,5 pensionsgivende tjenesteår. Som følge heraf modtog en RATP-medarbejder efter 37,5 års arbejde en pension, der svarede til 75 % af sin sidste løn, eksklusive tillæg, dvs. ca. 64,5 % af den sidste løn, inklusive tillæg.

(21) The fundamental principles of the reform established by the Law of 21 August 2003 [10] for almost all French pension schemes were extended to the RATP special pension scheme by Decrees 2008-48 of 15 January 2008 [11], 2008-637 of 30 June 2008 [12] and 2008-1514 of 30 December 2008 [13]. One of the objectives of this reform was to harmonise special schemes operating on the basis of the statutory rules applying to staff employed in the private sector and civil servants. With regard to the RATP special scheme, the period of contribution necessary in order to obtain a full pension, in particular, has progressively increased and reached 40 annuities in 2012, before subsequently being changed by one quarter on 1 July of each year until reaching the duration required under the general scheme and the public sector scheme (the duration of 41 years applicable in 2012 to the general scheme and public sector scheme should therefore be reached in 2016 under the special scheme).

(21) De grundlæggende principper for reformen, der blev iværksat ved loven af 21. august 2003 [10] for næsten samtlige franske grundpensionsordninger, blev udvidet til RATP’s særlige pensionsordning ved dekret 2008-48 af 15. januar 2008 [11], 2008-637 af 30. juni 2008 [12] og 2008-1514 af 30. december 2008 [13]. Et af målene med denne reform er at harmonisere særordningerne efter de almindelige regler for grundordninger for lønmodtagere i den private sektor og embedsmænd. I forbindelse med RATP’s særordning øges navnlig den periode, hvor der skal betales bidrag for at opnå fuld pension, gradvis til 40 pensionsgivende tjenesteår i 2012 og udvikles derefter med et kvartal den 1. juli hvert år, indtil bidragsperioden under den generelle ordning og ordningen for den offentlige sektor er nået (varigheden på 41 år, der i 2012 gælder for den generelle ordning og ordningen for den offentlige sektor, forventes således nået i 2016 for særordningen).

5. FINANCING OF THE PENSION SCHEME FOR RATP STAFF BEFORE AND AFTER THE NOTIFIED REFORM

5. FINANSIERING AF PENSIONSORDNINGEN FOR ANSATTE HOS RATP FØR OG EFTER DEN ANMELDTE REFORM

(22) The pension scheme for RATP staff is a "pay-as-you-go" pension scheme; contributions made by employees in respect of old-age pensions are immediately used to pay the pensions of retired staff [14].

(22) Pensionsordningen for ansatte hos RATP er en løbende finansieret pensionsordning, hvor de bidrag, de erhvervsaktive indbetaler i aldersforsikring, omgående bruges til at udbetale pensionisternes pensioner [14].

(23) Until 31 December 2005, RATP was legally liable for the pension commitments of the special scheme. Under Article 20 of the 1948 Law referred to above, RATP was responsible for ensuring the financial equilibrium of its special pension scheme.

(23) Indtil den 31. december 2005 påhvilede pensionsforpligtelserne ved særordningen juridisk set RATP. I medfør af artikel 20 i ovennævnte lov fra 1948 påhvilede det RATP at sikre den finansielle balance i den særlige pensionsordning.

(24) The RATP pensions department, part of the RATP legal service, was responsible for administering this special pension scheme. The pensions department collected contributions from serving RATP staff and from RATP itself as an employer and paid pensions to beneficiaries of the scheme. The rates of pension contribution (7,85 % of salary and 15,34 % of salary for employees and the employer respectively) were lower than the statutory contribution rate (employee contributions of 12 % and employer contribution of 18 %).

(24) Forvaltningen af denne særlige pensionsordning blev varetaget af RATP’s pensionsafdeling, der var en del af den retlige enhed RATP. Den afdeling opkrævede bidrag fra de erhvervsaktive medarbejdere hos RATP og fra RATP selv som arbejdsgiver og udbetalte pensioner til de ydelsesberettigede under ordningen. Pensionsbidragssatserne (bidragssatserne for lønmodtagerne på 7,85 % og for arbejdsgiveren på 15,34 %) var lavere end de almindelige bidragssatser (lønmodtagerbidrag på 12 % og arbejdsgiverbidrag på 18 %).

(25) For many years, the RATP pension scheme has experienced structural shortcomings due to reasons relating to the demographic imbalance between active staff and pensioners, the advantageous nature of the scheme compared to the general scheme, and, until 31 December 2005, the standardised setting of pension contribution rates. These successive shortcomings of the RATP pension scheme have been rectified by measures taken by the State, which took action on the basis of Article 2 of the Order of 7 January 1959 and the Decree of 7 January 1959 referred to above.

(25) I mange år oparbejdede RATP’s pensionsordning et strukturelt underskud på grund af den demografiske ubalance mellem erhvervsaktive og pensionister, dens specifikke fordele i forhold til den almindelige ordning, og, indtil den 31. december 2005, den lovbestemte fastsættelse af pensionsbidragssatserne. Disse successive underskud på RATP’s pensionsordning blev dækket af staten i henhold til artikel 2 i ovennævnte bekendtgørelse af 7. januar 1959 og ovennævnte dekret af 7. januar 1959.

(26) On 29 June 2006, France provided notification of the reform of the method by which RATP finances its pension scheme. According to the French authorities, the reform is part of the changes made to the institutional arrangements for urban transport in Ile-de-France over the last 10 years and also the preparations for opening urban transport up to competition.

(26) Den 29. juni 2006 anmeldte Frankrig reformen af finansieringen af pensionsordningen for RATP. Ifølge de franske myndigheder indgår denne reform i udviklingen af den institutionelle struktur for bytrafikken i Ile-de-France, der har været i gang i de sidste ti år, og i forberedelserne til åbning af bytrafikken for konkurrence.

(27) The notified reform has two stages.

(27) Den anmeldte reform falder i to etaper.

5.1. CREATION OF THE RATP STAFF PENSION FUND ON 1 JANUARY 2006

5.1. OPRETTELSE AF PENSIONSKASSEN FOR MEDARBEJDERE HOS RATP PR. 1. JANUAR 2006

(28) Article 1 of Decree No 2005-1635 of 26 December 2005 [15] set up, as of 1 January 2006, a pension fund for RATP staff (hereafter the "CRP-RATP").

(28) I medfør af artikel 1 i dekret nr. 2005-1635 af 26. december 2005 [15] oprettedes den 1. januar 2006 en pensionskasse for medarbejdere hos RATP (herefter "CRP-RATP").

(29) The CRP-RATP has the status of a social security body and legal personality, and is legally and financially independent of RATP. In accordance with Article L711-1 of the Social Security Code, it has all the characteristics defined in Article L111-1 of that Code, which states, in particular, that the organisation of social security is to be based on the principle of national solidarity. The CRP-RATP is subject to the Social Security Code rules applicable to all independent pension funds. It is also subject to scrutiny by the relevant State authorities which are represented by commissioners of the Government.

(29) CRP-RATP har status af privatretligt socialsikringsorgan som juridisk person og med retlig og finansiel autonomi i forhold til RATP. I medfør af artikel L711-1 i socialsikringsloven (Code de la sécurité sociale) har CRP-RATP alle de beføjelser, der er fastsat i artikel L111-1 i nævnte lovsamling, hvori det især fremhæves, at udformningen af social sikring bygger på princippet om national solidaritet. Den er underlagt reglerne i socialsikringsloven, der gælder for alle uafhængige pensionskasser. Den er underlagt statslig kontrol, som varetages af regeringskommissærer.

(30) On the date on which it was set up, the CRP-RATP replaced RATP as the only legal debtor for the retirement pensions of staff in posts governed by service regulations.

(30) På datoen for sin oprettelse blev CRP-RATP i stedet for RATP den eneste juridiske debitor i forhold til alderspensioner til vedtægtsansatte funktionærer.

(31) As a result, since 1 January 2006 the RATP has, in full discharge of its liabilities, made contributions to the CRP-RATP which correspond to the contributions of the active members of this special scheme and its contributions as an employer. From that date, these contributions are at the same level as statutory contributions [16]. In addition to these employer pension contributions, the CRP-RATP also receives a payment from the State in order to balance the accounts. This balancing contribution finances both the demographic deficit in the special scheme and also the pension entitlements specific to the scheme. In 2006 and 2007, the State paid balancing subsidies of EUR 390,11 and EUR 414 million.

(31) I den egenskab har CRP-RATP siden den 1. januar 2006 opkrævet et bidrag med frigørende virkning fra RATP svarende til bidragene fra de aktive medlemmer af den særlige ordning og til RATP’s arbejdsgiverbidrag. Disse bidrag er endvidere fra samme dato blevet sat op til det almindelige niveau [16]. Ud over disse pensionsbidrag modtager CRP-RATP en betaling fra staten med det formål at skabe balance i regnskaberne. Dette udligningsbidrag finansierer både det demografiske underskud på den særlige ordning og pensionsrettighederne i henhold til ordningen. I 2006 og 2007 betalte staten udligningstilskud på henholdsvis 390,11 mio. og 414 mio. EUR.

5.2. THE FINANCIAL AFFILIATION OF BASIC ENTITLEMENTS UNDER THE RATP SPECIAL SCHEME TO STATUTORY SCHEMES

5.2. FINANSIEL TILSLUTNING AF BASISRETTIGHEDERNE I RATP’S SÆRORDNING TIL DE ALMINDELIGE ORDNINGER

(32) Article 18 of Decree 2005-1635 of 26 December 2005, as referred to above, makes it possible for the CRP-RATP to financially affiliate some of the RATP special pension scheme entitlements to statutory schemes (CNAV [17] and ARGIC [18]/ARCCO [19]) [20], i.e. a technical transfer of CRP-RATP pension transactions to statutory schemes (receiving schemes) is possible.

(32) I henhold til artikel 18 i ovennævnte dekret nr. 2005-1635 af 26. december 2005 er der mulighed for, at CRP-RATP finansielt tilslutter en del af pensionsrettighederne under særordningen for RATP-ansatte til de almindelige ordninger (CNAV [17] og AGIRC [18]/ARRCO [19]) [20], dvs. teknisk set overfører CRP-RATP’s pensionstransaktioner til de almindelige ordninger (herefter "modtagende ordninger").

(33) The affiliation of some pension rights acquired under the RATP special scheme to statutory schemes is intended to place the mechanism of inter-generational and inter-professional solidarity on a considerably widened demographic basis. On a broader level, it also ensures that the financing of compulsory pension schemes, funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, can continue in the long term.

(33) Tilslutningen af en del af pensionsrettighederne under RATP’s særordning til de almindelige ordninger har til formål at sikre solidaritet mellem generationer og mellem fag på et stærkt udvidet demografisk grundlag og i bredere forstand at sikre en bæredygtig finansiering af de obligatoriske pensionsordninger, som finansieres efter pay-as-you-go-princippet.

Basic rights acquired at the time of affiliation

Erhvervede basisrettigheder på tilslutningsdatoen

(34) In accordance with Article L222-6 of the Social Security Code, a special pension scheme or any other (statutory) pension scheme may be affiliated in respect of some of the benefits provided under special schemes, equivalent to old-age pension benefits provided to employees under the general scheme.

(34) I medfør af artikel L222-6 i socialsikringsloven kan en særlig pensionsordning eller enhver anden pensionsordning tilsluttes de almindelige ordninger, for så vidt angår den del af ydelserne, som udbetales af særordningerne, der svarer til de aldersydelser, der udbetales til lønmodtagere under den almindelige ordning.

(35) Under a pay-as-you-go pension scheme, previous entitlements acquired under another scheme (and therefore on the basis of other criteria) can be transferred to a receiving scheme by calculating these rights acquired on the basis of the rules governing the receiving scheme as if the beneficiaries (pensioners, employees and persons whose names have been removed from the scheme) had spent all of their working life under the receiving scheme.

(35) Inden for rammerne af en løbende finansieret pensionsordning sker en modtagende ordnings overtagelse af rettigheder, der tidligere er erhvervet under en anden ordning (og således efter andre kriterier), ved at beregne disse erhvervede rettigheder på grundlag af reglerne i den modtagende ordning, som om rettighedshaverne (pensionister, erhvervsaktive og slettede) havde gennemført hele deres karriereforløb under den modtagende ordning.

(36) In this particular case, the French authorities calculated the basic rights, i.e. those corresponding to pension benefits calculated in the light of the rules governing the receiving schemes and which would be transferred to the schemes [21]. Only these basic rights thus established in this way may be transferred to the receiving schemes.

(36) I det foreliggende tilfælde har de franske myndigheder beregnet basisrettighederne, dvs. dem, som svarer til pensionsydelser beregnet efter de modtagende ordningers regler, og som disse ordninger skal overtage [21]. Kun disse således definerede basisrettigheder kan overtages af de modtagende ordninger.

(37) Article 222-6 of the Social Security Code also stipulates that affiliation of a special scheme must ensure strict financial neutrality of the transaction for employees covered under the receiving scheme. In other words, under no circumstances may the financial affiliation of a special pension scheme to statutory schemes jeopardise the financial situation of receiving schemes.

(37) Det hedder endvidere i artikel 222-6 i socialsikringsloven, at tilslutningen af en særordning skal overholde princippet om, at transaktionen skal være finansielt neutral for de forsikrede i den modtagende ordning. Med andre ord må en særlig pensionsordnings finansielle tilslutning til almindelige ordninger under ingen omstændigheder forringe den finansielle situation for de modtagende ordninger.

(38) This is the point at which weighing takes place, the purpose of which is to determine what proportion of these previous pension entitlements was actually valid at the time of affiliation, in order to ensure that the principle of financial neutrality referred to above is complied with fully. From a conceptual point of view, weighing compares the ratio of pension costs for the group affiliated and the ratio of pension costs under the receiving scheme [22]. The receiving scheme then determines what proportion should be used for transferring previously reconstituted rights in order to ensure that these ratios would stay the change: on the basis of this rate, pension rights are transferred "for free" by the receiving scheme.

(38) På dette stadium sker der en afvejning for at fastslå, hvilken del af disse tidligere optjente pensionsrettigheder der faktisk valideres ved tilslutningen, således at ovennævnte princip om finansiel neutralitet nøje overholdes. Begrebsmæssigt foretages der en sammenligning mellem den tilsluttede koncerns pensionsudgiftsforhold og den modtagende ordnings pensionsudgiftsforhold [22]. Den modtagende ordning afgør herefter, hvilken overtagelsesandel af de rekonstruerede tidligere optjente rettigheder der sikrer lighed mellem disse udgiftsforhold, hvilket betyder, at den modtagende ordning overtager pensionsrettighederne "gratis" ved den valideringssats.

(39) If the rate of validation of reconstituted acquired entitlements by the receiving scheme is less than 100 %, the scheme may propose that the affiliated scheme validate 100 % of these rights by paying a contribution to maintain entitlements (cash payment).

(39) Hvis den modtagende ordnings valideringssats for de rekonstruerede erhvervede rettigheder er under 100 %, kan denne ordning foreslå den tilsluttede ordning at få disse rettigheder godkendt med 100 % mod betaling af et bidrag til fastholdelse af rettigheder (eller "udligningsbeløb").

(40) The method of calculating cash payments is intended not to change the projected ex-ante situation of the scheme. If the weighing is projected, the amount of the cash payment will be equal to the updated net value of annual entry rights. The annual entry right is that which, in respect of supplementary rights (i.e. over and above the rights transferred free of charge) transferred by the receiving scheme, equalises annually the ratio of costs between the full scheme and the receiving scheme.

(40) Metoden til beregning af udligningsbeløb har til formål ikke på forhånd at ændre den forventede situation for den modtagende ordning. Hvis afvejningen er foreløbig, svarer udligningsbeløbet til nettonutidsværdien af de årlige optagelsesgebyrer. Det årlige optagelsesgebyr er det, der årligt udligner udgiftsforholdene mellem den integrerede ordning og den modtagende ordning for de supplerende rettigheder (dvs. ud over de rettigheder, der overtages gratis), som den modtagende ordning overtager.

(41) If the financial situation of a receiving scheme has structural shortcomings, the method of calculation requires that this underlying imbalance not be exacerbated, and not requiring a projected technical equilibrium on the part of the group transferred.

(41) Hvis den modtagende ordnings finansielle situation er præget af strukturelt underskud, kræver beregningsmetoden, at denne tendentielle ubalance ikke forværres, og ikke, at den nedbringes ved at kræve en foreløbig teknisk ligevægt af den overførte koncern.

(42) In this particular case, the demographic structure of RATP was not as good as that of the average French company affiliated to statutory pension schemes. The full affiliation of basic rights under the special pension scheme for RATP staff to the statutory schemes requires cash payments to be paid to receiving schemes, i.e. exceptional and one-off payments and payments in discharge of their liabilities.

(42) I det foreliggende tilfælde er RATP’s demografiske struktur ikke så god som den demografiske struktur i den franske gennemsnitsvirksomhed, der er tilknyttet de almindelige pensionsordninger, og derfor kræver en fuld tilslutning af basisrettighederne under den særlige pensionsordning for ansatte hos RATP til de almindelige ordninger, at der til de modtagende ordninger betales udligningsbeløb, dvs. ekstraordinære forud fastsatte og frigørende bidrag.

(43) The French authorities have set out the methods by which these cash payments are calculated. They are calculated on the basis of the parameters in force at the time of implementation. These parameters are:

(43) De franske myndigheder har nærmere beskrevet metoderne til beregning af disse udligningsbeløb. Beregningerne vil blive foretaget efter værdierne af de gældende parametre ved iværksættelsen, dvs.:

- the rates of contribution and the bases allowing the provision to be made to the reserves anticipated by the complimentary schemes,

- bidragssatser og beregningsgrundlag, så henlæggelsen til de af tillægsordningerne forventede reserver kan beregnes

- the level of updating and possibly mortality tables, which will vary depending on economic circumstances.

- nutidsværdi og eventuelt dødelighedstavle, der varierer alt efter de økonomiske omstændigheder.

(44) The French authorities estimate at this stage that the cash payments to be made will consist of:

(44) De franske myndigheder anslår på nuværende tidspunkt, at der skal betales følgende udligningsbeløb:

- a cash payment to the Caisse nationale d'assurance vieillesse (CNAV) which manages the general social security scheme of approximately [EUR 400 million to EUR 800 million] [],

- Udligningsbeløbet til Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse (CNAV), der forvalter den generelle socialsikringsordning, ventes at beløbe sig til ca. [mellem 400 og 800] [] mio. EUR.

- cash payments to the additional statutory schemes AGIRC-ARRCO, in the form of a share in the underwriting reserves of these schemes, of approximately [EUR 80 million to EUR 300 million].

- Udligningsbeløbene til de almindelige tillægsordninger, der forvaltes af AGIRC-ARRCO i form af deltagelse i disse ordningers tekniske reserver, ventes at beløbe sig til ca. [mellem 80 og 300] mio. EUR.

(45) The French Government anticipates taking responsibility, on behalf of the CRP-RATP, for payment of these cash payments to statutory schemes in order to ensure that affiliation of the RATP special scheme to these receiving schemes remains financially neutral.

(45) Den franske regering regner med, i stedet for CRP-RATP, at påtage sig at betale disse udligningsbeløb til de almindelige ordninger for således at sikre den finansielle neutralitet ved tilslutningen af RATP’s særlige ordning til disse modtagende ordninger.

Basic rights acquired after affiliation

Erhvervede basisrettigheder efter tilslutningen

(46) Given that these are basic rights acquired after affiliation, RATP and its staff are to pay statutory pension contributions in exchange for the intervention of the general scheme and supplementary schemes.

(46) Vedrørende de basisrettigheder, der erhverves efter tilslutningen, ventes det, at RATP og dets ansatte betaler almindelige pensionsbidrag til gengæld for, at den generelle ordning og tillægsordningerne yder dækning.

6. REASONS BEHIND THE ADOPTION OF THE DECISION TO INITIATE THE PROCEDURE

6. BEGRUNDELSE FOR BESLUTNINGEN OM INDLEDNING AF PROCEDUREN

(47) In its decision to initiate the procedure, the Commission questioned whether the reform notified was compatible with the common market. The Commission mentioned that the purpose of the procedure was to establish whether the reform constituted aid granted to RATP.

(47) I sin beslutning om at indlede proceduren gav Kommissionen udtryk for tvivl om, hvorvidt den anmeldte reform var forenelig med det indre marked. Kommissionen nævnte, at formålet med proceduren var at fastslå, om den anmeldte reform udgjorde en støtte til RATP.

(48) The Commission first discussed the close link between the CRP-RATP being set up and affiliation to statutory schemes, deciding that it was necessary to verify whether or not the affiliation of basic rights constituted State aid in favour of RATP.

(48) For det første satte Kommissionen spørgsmålstegn ved den tætte forbindelse mellem oprettelsen af CRP-RATP og tilslutningen til de almindelige ordninger og fandt det nødvendigt at kontrollere, om tilslutningen af basisrettighederne ikke udgjorde en statsstøtte til RATP.

(49) It then questioned the proposal that the financing by the State of specific entitlements under the RATP pension scheme did not constitute State aid and, where necessary, whether or not the scheme was compatible with the single market.

(49) Dernæst udtrykte Kommissionen tvivl om udsagnet om, at statens finansiering af de specifikke rettigheder under RATP’s pensionsordning ikke udgjorde en statsstøtte og om, at denne i givet fald var forenelig med det indre marked.

(50) Finally, the Commission questioned the need for the reform notified and its proportionality with regard to common interest. With regard to whether or not the reform was necessary, it discussed the actual and effective opening up of the public transport market in the Paris region and the removal of factors in the legal and actual situation of RATP which could hinder effective competition. It also questioned whether the reform notified was proportional, essentially on the grounds that it would also affect special pension commitments with regard to employees recruited after the reform was implemented.

(50) Endelig fremsatte Kommissionen tvivl om, hvorvidt den anmeldte reform var nødvendig, og om den overholdt proportionalitetsprincippet i forhold til almenvellet. Vedrørende den anmeldte reforms nødvendighed satte Kommissionen spørgsmålstegn ved, om markedet for kollektiv transport i Paris-regionen reelt og effektivt bliver åbnet samt om, hvorvidt den fjerner de særlige elementer i RATP’s juridiske og faktuelle forhold, som kan stå i vejen for en effektiv konkurrence. Kommissionen har ligeledes udtrykt tvivl om det rimelige omfang af den anmeldte reform med den begrundelse, at den også vedrører de særlige pensionsforpligtelser for medarbejdere, der ansættes efter reformens iværksættelse.

(51) However, in its decision of 10 October 2007, the Commission concluded that the financing by the State of the RATP pension scheme's shortfall for the period 1995-2005 constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 1(b)(iii) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty [24] (see recital 15 of this Decision).

(51) I sin beslutning af 10. oktober 2007 konkluderede Kommissionen derimod, at statens finansiering af underskuddet på RATP’s pensionsordning i perioden 1995-2005 udgjorde en eksisterende statsstøtte i medfør af artikel 1, litra b), nr. iii), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 af 22. marts 1999 om fastlæggelse af regler for anvendelsen af EF-traktatens artikel 93 [24] (jf. betragtning 0 i nærværende beslutning).

(52) The Commission also considered that Article 87 the EC Treaty did not apply to the CRP-RATP, since RATP was not a company (recital 67 of this Decision).

(52) Kommissionen mente endvidere, at EF-traktatens artikel 87 ikke gjaldt for CRP-RATP, idet der ikke er tale om en virksomhed (betragtning 67 i nævnte beslutning).

(53) Finally, the Commission decided that the guarantee provided by the French State to beneficiaries under the special scheme directly benefited RATP staff, rather than RATP itself. This guarantee could not therefore be considered to provide the company with an economic advantage (recital 70 of this Decision).

(53) Kommissionen fandt endelig, at den garanti, den franske stat havde givet rettighedshaverne under særordningen, var direkte til gavn for RATP’s medarbejdere og ikke for RATP selv, og at den derfor ikke ville kunne betegnes som en økonomisk fordel for en virksomhed (betragtning 70 i den omtalte beslutning).

7. ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES FOLLOWING THE INITIATING OF THE PROCEDURE

7. DE FRANSKE MYNDIGHEDERS ARGUMENTER EFTER INDLEDNINGEN AF PROCEDUREN

Preliminary remark

Indledende bemærkning

(54) In their letter of 22 January 2008, the French authorities recalled that, from their point of view, the reform in question constituted assistance to individuals, as opposed to RATP and therefore could not be regarded as State aid benefiting RATP. Furthermore, although RATP would be the actual beneficiary of the notified reform, the French authorities consider that trade between Member States is not affected by the reform, nor is competition jeopardised, in so far as RATP's activities are restricted to a single market (the urban public transport market in Ile-de-France) which is not yet open to competition and also in so far as the reform has had no impact on the activities of RATP subsidiaries or the markets in which those are active.

(54) De franske myndigheder anfører i deres brev af 22. januar 2008, at den anmeldte reform efter deres mening institutionaliserer en støtte til enkeltpersoner og ikke til virksomheden RATP, og at der derfor ikke kan være tale om statsstøtte til RATP. Selv om RATP faktisk skulle blive begunstiget af den anmeldte reform, mener de franske myndigheder endvidere ikke, at reformen kan påvirke handlen mellem medlemsstater og heller ikke fordreje konkurrencen, eftersom RATP kun opererer på ét marked, nemlig markedet for kollektiv bytransport i Ile-de-France, der endnu ikke er åbent for konkurrence, og hvor reformen ikke har nogen virkninger for RATP’s datterselskabers aktiviteter eller på de markeder, hvor disse opererer.

Affiliation of basic entitlements

Vedrørende tilslutningen af basisrettigheder

(55) According to the French authorities, affiliation of the CRP-RATP to the general scheme does not constitute State aid benefiting RATP, given that the latter has not been advantaged.

(55) De franske myndigheder mener ikke, at CRP-RATP’s tilslutning til den generelle ordning indeholder elementer af statsstøtte til RATP, eftersom der ikke er nogen fordele for RATP.

(56) Firstly, the French authorities believe that, as the Commission itself indicated in point 69 of the decision to initiate the procedure, "the second stage of the reform, i.e. the provision of cash payments and the transfer of the financing of basic rights from the CRP-RATP to CNAV and AGIRC-ARRCO no longer affect RATP's economic situation".

(56) For det første mener de franske myndigheder, som Kommissionen selv har bemærket i betragtning 69 i åbningsbeslutningen, at "anden etape af reformen, dvs. betaling af udligningsbeløb og overførsel af finansieringen af basisrettighederne fra CRP-RATP til CNAV og AGIRC-ARRCO, ikke længere påvirker RATP’s økonomiske situation".

(57) The French authorities also feel that RATP's obligations corresponding to basic rights were not costs that would normally have put a strain on its budget within the meaning of Community case law. In their view, the financial resources of French companies are normally burdened by payments in full discharge of liabilities made to statutory pension funds but not by the obligation to pay pensions for current employees and retired persons, as was the case with RATP, whose head office included a department responsible for pensioners until the time of the notified reform. Consequently, since they are accompanied by payments in full discharge of liabilities at the same level as under statutory arrangements, the affiliation of the CRP-RATP to the general scheme and the provision of cash payments by the State to the general scheme has not meant that RATP avoided paying costs that would normally have placed a burden on its financial resources.

(57) Endvidere finder de franske myndigheder, at RATP’s forpligtelser, der svarede til basisrettighederne, ikke udgjorde omkostninger, som normalt burde have belastet dets budget i henhold til Fællesskabets retspraksis. Ifølge de franske myndigheder belastes franske virksomheders finansielle ressourcer nemlig normalt af frigørende bidrag, der betales til de almindelige pensionskasser, men ikke af en forpligtelse til at udbetale pensioner til erhvervsaktive og pensionerede medarbejdere, som det var tilfældet for RATP, der indtil den anmeldte reform havde pensionsafdelingen i virksomheden. Så når CRP-RATP’s tilslutning til den generelle ordning og statens betaling af udligningsbeløb til den generelle ordning sker samtidig med betalingen af et frigørende bidrag på niveau med det almindelige, medfører det ikke, at RATP undgår at bære de omkostninger, virksomheden normalt skulle have afholdt.

(58) Lastly, according to the French authorities, given that the special scheme was imposed by the State when RATP was set up in 1948, it would not be normal for the company to have to meet the cost of the cash payments paid in exchange for affiliation of the CRP-RATP to the general scheme.

(58) Da særordningen blev indført af staten ved oprettelsen af RATP i 1948, mener de franske myndigheder endelig ikke, at det ville være rimeligt, at virksomheden skulle betale de udligningsbeløb, der skal erlægges til gengæld for CRP-RATP’s tilslutning til den generelle ordning.

Financing of special rights

Vedrørende finansieringen af de specifikke rettigheder

(59) Firstly, the French authorities believe that the case-law according to which costs resulting from collective agreements constitute, by their nature, a cost which normally places a burden on a company's budgets, and that the company has voluntarily accepted this agreement or that it was extended to this company on the basis of regulations or law [25], does not apply in this particular case in so far as the RATP staff pension scheme was not established on the basis of a collective agreement.

(59) For det første mener de franske myndigheder, at den retspraksis for, at omkostninger som følge af en kollektiv overenskomst i sagens natur er en omkostning, som en virksomhed normalt skal afholde af sit budget, hvad enten virksomheden har accepteret overenskomsten frivilligt, eller den er blevet udvidet til den pågældende virksomhed ad lovgivningens vej [25], ikke gælder i det foreliggende tilfælde, eftersom pensionsordningen for ansatte hos RATP ikke udspringer af en kollektiv overenskomst.

(60) Secondly, according to the French authorities, the existence of special rights does not constitute any advantage for RATP. The fact that RATP continues to recruit staff in posts governed by service regulations who enjoy special rights does not prove that the existence of special rights places the organisation at an economic advantage.

(60) For det andet mener de franske myndigheder ikke, at det på nogen måde er en fordel for RATP, at der findes specifikke rettigheder. Den kendsgerning, at RATP fortsat vedtægtsansætter medarbejdere, der begunstiges af specifikke rettigheder, beviser ikke, at det skulle udgøre en økonomisk fordel for RATP, at der findes specifikke rettigheder.

(61) Thirdly, the French authorities maintain that the public financing of special rights constitutes the strict compensation for abnormal expenses borne by RATP. In their view, the conclusion that the financing of special pension rights does not constitute State aid is the result of principles which have emerged from Community case law since the Community was established, the Combus [26] and Enirisorse [27] rulings being merely the most recent examples of this.

(61) For det tredje fastholder de franske myndigheder, at den offentlige finansiering af specifikke rettigheder udgør en nøje kompensation for unormale omkostninger, som RATP bærer. De franske myndigheder anfører, at konklusionen om, at finansieringen af de specifikke pensionsrettigheder ikke er statsstøtte, følger af de principper, der er blevet fastlagt i Fællesskabets retspraksis siden Fællesskabets oprettelse, og hvorpå dommene i Combus-sagen [26] og Enirisorse-sagen [27] kun er de seneste eksempler.

Compatibility of the reform notified with the single market

Vedrørende den anmeldte reforms forenelighed med det indre marked

(62) If the Commission feels that the reform in question contained elements of State aid, the French authorities take the view that the reform is in any case compatible with the common market.

(62) Såfremt Kommissionen vurderer, at den anmeldte reform omfatter statsstøtteelementer, mener de franske myndigheder, at reformen under alle omstændigheder er forenelig med det indre marked.

(63) The French authorities maintain their view that the reform notified complies with the theory of stranded costs and is pro-competitive.

(63) De franske myndigheder fastholder deres synspunkt om, at den anmeldte reform er i overensstemmelse med teorien om strandede omkostninger og er konkurrencefremmende.

(64) The authorities also feel that the new financing of pension rights starting in 2006 is necessary and proportionate in order to ensure competition within the market.

(64) Endvidere mener de franske myndigheder, at den nye finansiering af pensionsrettigheder fra 2006 er nødvendig og rimelig for at opnå konkurrence på markedet.

(65) The French authorities believe the reform notified is necessary in order to prepare for the Ile-de-France urban transport sector opening up to competition, as provided for in Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007. It will prevent distortions of competition between public and private operators and also ensure the permanent removal of the barrier to entry formed by the means of financing pensions within RATP.

(65) De franske myndigheder mener, at den anmeldte reform er nødvendig, eftersom den er en forudsætning for at åbne bytransportsektoren i Ile-de-France for konkurrence, jf. forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007. Den vil gøre det muligt dels at forebygge konkurrenceforvridning mellem offentlige og private operatører og dels definitivt at fjerne barrieren for adgang til markedet, som lå i RATP’s måde at finansiere pensioner på.

(66) As regards the proportionate nature of the reform, in their letter dated 23 April 2008 the French authorities informed the Commission of the reform of the RATP special pension scheme instigated by the French government, a reform which brings the RATP special pension scheme into line with statutory rules.

(66) Vedrørende proportionaliteten i den anmeldte reform har de franske myndigheder ved brev af 23. april 2008 orienteret Kommissionen om reformen af RATP’s særlige pensionsordning, som den franske regering har indledt, og som harmoniserer RATP’s særlige pensionsordning med de almindelige regler.

8. OBSERVATIONS OF INTERESTED PARTIES FOLLOWING THE OPENING OF THE PROCEDURE

8. BEMÆRKNINGER FRA INTERESSEREDE PARTER EFTER INDLEDNING AF PROCEDUREN

(67) In a letter dated 13 February 2008 the RATP branch of the SUD trade union expressed its opposition to the plans notified by the French authorities, stating that the sole objective of the latter was to transform RATP into a large international group driven by the desire to make profit. In its letter the RATP branch of the SUD trade union drew the Commission's attention to the fact that, in its view, the staff of RATP did not have the status of employees under private law subject to the Labour Code.

(67) Ved brev af 13. februar 2008 gjorde fagforbundet SUD de la RATP indsigelse mod det af de franske myndigheder anmeldte projekt, idet det udelukkende havde til formål at omdanne RATP til en stor international koncern med økonomisk vinding for øje. I brevet gjorde SUD de la RATP Kommissionen opmærksom på, at ansatte hos RATP efter dets mening ikke har status af overenskomstansatte, der er omfattet af samlingen af arbejdsretlige regler (code du travail).

(68) The RATP branch of the SUD trade union also claimed that the reform of the RATP retirement scheme should have been developed by a joint committee since the scheme is subject to collective bargaining between the social partners.

(68) SUD de la RATP hævder endvidere, at reformen af RATP’s pensionsordning burde være udarbejdet af en paritetisk blandet kommission, eftersom den indgår i den kollektive forhandling mellem arbejdsmarkedets parter.

9. COMMENTS OF FRANCE ON THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE INTERESTED PARTIES

9. FRANKRIGS KOMMENTARER TIL DE INTERESSEREDE PARTERS BEMÆRKNINGER

(69) With regard to the legal regime applicable to RATP staff, the French authorities state in their letter of 3 April 2008 that the provisions of the labour code are intended to apply to RATP staff in posts governed by service regulations, except if the labour code or case law expressly states that these provisions should not apply to such staff. According to France, the existence of such exceptions is not sufficient to consider RATP staff as being subject to contracts of employment under public law.

(69) Vedrørende den retlige ordning, der gælder for RATP-ansatte, præciserer de franske myndigheder i deres brev af 3. april 2008, at bestemmelserne i samlingen af arbejdsretlige regler skal gælde for RATP’s vedtægtsansatte, medmindre det udtrykkeligt deri hedder eller følger af retspraksis, at disse bestemmelser ikke gælder for disse medarbejdere. Forekomsten af sådanne undtagelser er ifølge Frankrig ikke tilstrækkelig til at afgøre, at medarbejdere hos RATP skulle indgå i et offentligretligt ansættelsesforhold.

(70) France also indicates that Decree No 60-1362 of 19 December 1960, which delegates competence to the RATP joint committee for matters relating to the status of personnel, does not refer to the retirement scheme. According to the French authorities, the RATP pension scheme is not the result of collective bargaining; it was imposed on RATP by the State by means of administrative procedures.

(70) Frankrig anfører desuden, at dekret nr. 60-1362 af 19. december 1960, der giver den paritetiske blandede kommission hos RATP kompetence vedrørende personalevedtægten, ikke indeholder bestemmelser om pensionsordningen. Ifølge de franske myndigheder er RATP’s pensionsordning ikke resultatet af kollektive forhandlinger, men blev administrativt pålagt RATP af staten

10. SCOPE OF THE PRESENT DECISION

10. RÆKKEVIDDEN AF NÆRVÆRENDE BESLUTNING

(71) The present decision relates to the compatibility of the new pension financing scheme with Community regulations on State aid.

(71) I denne beslutning tages der stilling til, om den nye pensionsfinansieringsordning er forenelig med Fællesskabets regler om statsstøtte.

(72) The opening of the procedure on 10 October 2007 and, in particular, the comments of the French authorities have enabled the Commission to clarify the terms of implementation of the reform notified and, subsequently, to identify three measures which may include State aid components.

(72) Indledningen af proceduren af 10. oktober 2007 og navnlig kommentarerne fra de franske myndigheder har givet Kommissionen mulighed for at få klarhed over de nærmere betingelser for iværksættelse af den anmeldte reform og dermed for at identificere tre foranstaltninger, der kan indebære elementer af statsstøtte.

(73) Firstly, on 1 January 2006 the CRP-RATP became the sole legal debtor for the retirement pensions of staff in posts governed by service regulations; prior to then, RATP had been the debtor.

(73) For det første blev CRP-RATP pr. 1. januar 2006 eneste retlige debitor i forhold til alderspensioner for vedtægtsansatte medarbejdere i stedet for RATP.

(74) Secondly, since 1 January 2006, the State has been paying a subsidy to the CRP-RATP in order to balance its accounts. This public subsidy covers the demographic deficit and the additional cost of the RATP special scheme.

(74) For det andet har staten siden 1. januar 2006 udbetalt støtte til CRP-RATP med henblik på udligning af selskabets regnskaber. Denne offentlige støtte dækker det demografiske underskud og meromkostningerne ved RATP’s særordning.

(75) Thirdly, the reform notified provides for the possibility for the CRP-RATP to affiliate the basic pension rights of the special scheme to statutory schemes. The State undertakes to make balancing payments in order to comply with the principle of the strict financial neutrality of the affiliation in place of the CRP-RATP.

(75) For det tredje indebærer den påtænkte reform muligheden for, at CRP-RATP tilslutter basispensionsrettighederne under særordningen til de almindelige ordninger. Staten påtager sig at betale udligningsbeløb i stedet for CRP-RATP, således at princippet om streng finansiel neutralitet overholdes.

11. ASSESSMENT OF THE FIRST MEASURE: CREATION OF THE CRP-RATP

11. VURDERING AF DEN FØRSTE FORANSTALTNING: OPRETTELSE AF CRP-RATP

(76) The Commission observes that, on 1 January 2006, the CRP-RATP became the sole legal debtor for the retirement pensions of staff in posts governed by service regulations; prior to then, RATP had been the debtor. The Commission observes that, simultaneously, the contribution paid by RATP to the CRP-RATP for pensions became a contribution in full discharge of its obligations.

(76) Kommissionen bemærker, at CRP-RATP pr. 1. januar 2006 blev eneste retlige debitor i forhold til alderspensioner for vedtægtsansatte i stedet for RATP. Kommissionen konstaterer, at det pensionsbidrag, RATP samtidig betaler til CRP-RATP, er blevet frigørende.

(77) The Commission notes that, under the system in place before 1 January 2006, RATP was legally liable for the pension commitments under the special scheme. In this respect, the financing system for the special scheme for RATP staff differed from the provisions under statutory law: RATP was the guarantor of the financial equilibrium of the scheme in question; the "employer" contribution paid by RATP to the special scheme did not constitute full discharge of its obligations.

(77) Kommissionen bemærker, at det i henhold til den ordning, der var gældende før den 1. januar 2006, retligt påhvilede RATP at opfylde pensionsforpligtelserne under særordningen. Dermed afveg finansieringen af særordningen for vedtægtsansatte hos RATP fra de almindelige ordninger, idet RATP var garant for den pågældende ordnings finansielle ligevægt, og det "arbejdsgiverbidrag", RATP betalte til særordningen, således ikke var frigørende.

(78) Consequently, the Commission concludes that the main effect of the provisions foreseen by the reform notified has been to transform the "employer" contribution paid by RATP for the pensions of its staff into a contribution discharging it from its obligations, thus relieving it of its historical obligation to ensure the financial equilibrium of the special scheme. In other words, the reform notified has transferred responsibility for the financial equilibrium of the special scheme in question from RATP to the CRP-RATP and, ultimately, the State.

(78) Kommissionen konkluderer som følge heraf, at den vigtigste virkning af bestemmelserne i den anmeldte reform har været at give det "arbejdsgiverbidrag", RATP har betalt til sine ansattes pensioner, frigørende virkning, idet RATP således er blevet frigjort fra den historiske forpligtelse til at sikre særordningens ligevægt. Med andre ord er ansvaret for finansiel ligevægt på den pågældende særordning hos RATP med den anmeldte reform blevet overført til CRP-RATP og i sidste instans til staten.

(79) The Commission further observes that, in the absence of the reform notified, the obligation to ensure the financial equilibrium of the regime which had been incumbent upon RATP would have given rise to the entering of a commitment in respect of the State, which would have been provisioned in the accounts upon the transition to the IFRS standards (International Financial Reporting Standards), applicable at RATP since 30 June 2007 [28].

(79) Kommissionen konstaterer desuden, at RATP’s forpligtelse til at sikre finansiel balance i særordningen uden den anmeldte reform ville have betydet, at RATP skulle have opført en forpligtelse over for staten, som der ville skulle ydes dækning for i regnskabet ved overgangen til IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards), som har været gældende for RATP siden den 30. juni 2007 [28].

(80) The Commission would like to emphasise at this stage that the question raised by the creation of the CRP-RATP is identical to the question which arose in conjunction with the reform of the financing arrangements for the pensions of civil servants working for La Poste [29]. Consequently, the Commission will assess whether the measure under assessment includes State aid components by means of the same procedure as was adopted for the aforementioned decision.

(80) Kommissionen ønsker her at understrege, at det spørgsmål, oprettelsen af CRP-RATP rejser, er identisk med problemstillingen i forbindelse med reformen af finansieringen af pensionerne til tjenestemandsansatte i Postvæsenet (La Poste) [29]. Derfor vil Kommissionen kontrollere, om den omhandlede foranstaltning i den foreliggende sag indebærer elementer af statsstøtte ved at anlægge samme synsvinkel som i ovennævnte beslutning.

11.1. EXISTENCE OF STATE AID

11.1. FOREKOMST AF STATSSTØTTE

(81) Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty provides: "Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market".

(81) Det bestemmes i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, at "bortset fra de i traktaten hjemlede undtagelser er statsstøtte eller støtte, som ydes ved hjælp af statsmidler under enhver tænkelig form, og som fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene ved at begunstige visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner, uforenelig med fællesmarkedet i det omfang, den påvirker samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne."

(82) The classification of a national measure as State aid as provided for in Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty requires the following cumulative conditions to be fulfilled, namely: (1) the measure in question confers a selective economic advantage; (2) that advantage is financed via State resources; (3) that advantage distorts or threatens to distort competition and, lastly, (4) that advantage has an effect on trade between Member States.

(82) For at betegne en national foranstaltning som statsstøtte i henhold til traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, skal følgende kumulative betingelser være opfyldt, dvs. at: 1) den pågældende foranstaltning medfører en selektiv økonomisk fordel, 2) fordelen finansieres ved hjælp af statsmidler, 3) fordelen fordrejer eller truer med at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og endelig, at 4) fordelen påvirker samhandlen mellem medlemsstaterne.

(83) The reasons for considering that the measure in question meets these cumulative conditions and thus constitutes State aid in favour of RATP within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty need to be explained.

(83) I det følgende gennemgås de årsager, der giver grund til at mene, at den pågældende foranstaltning opfylder disse kumulative betingelser og dermed udgør statsstøtte til fordel for RATP i henhold til traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.

11.1.1. EXISTENCE OF A SELECTIVE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE IN FAVOUR OF RATP

11.1.1. TILSTEDEVÆRELSEN AF EN SELEKTIV ØKONOMISK FORDEL FOR RATP

(84) In order to assess whether the measure under assessment incorporates State aid components, it must be established whether this measure confers an economic advantage on RATP by enabling it to avoid having to bear costs which would normally have had to be met out of the undertaking's own financial resources, thereby preventing market forces from having their normal effect [30].

(84) For at vurdere, om den pågældende foranstaltning omfatter statsstøtteelementer, skal det fastslås, om den giver RATP en økonomisk fordel ved at gøre det muligt for virksomheden at undgå omkostninger, der normalt skulle have været afholdt over dens kapital, og om de derved har hindret markedskræfternes frie spil [30].

(85) It that context, it is settled case law that a normal burden is a normal charge inherent in the day-to-day management or usual activities of an enterprise [31]. The Court also held that an aid consists of a mitigation of the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking, taking account of the nature or general scheme of the system of charges in question, whereas a special charge is, on the contrary, an additional charge over and above those normal charges [32].

(85) Ifølge fast retspraksis er en normal omkostning i den forbindelse en omkostning, som en virksomhed normalt skal afholde i forbindelse med den daglige drift eller sine normale aktiviteter [31]. Domstolen vurderede ligeledes, at en støtte består i en lettelse af de byrder, der normalt belaster virksomhedernes budget, idet der tages hensyn til den ordnings karakter eller opbygning, hvori de indgår, hvorimod en særlig byrde består i en meromkostning i forhold til de normale omkostninger [32].

(86) In the light of the case-law of the Court, and in line with past practice [33] the Commission considers that in order to determine whether a charge is "normal" or "special" a reference framework or comparison must be defined, with the objective of identifying companies which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question.

(86) På baggrund af Domstolens retspraksis og i overensstemmelse med dens beslutningspraksis [33] mener Kommissionen, at betegnelsen "normal" eller "særlig" byrde indebærer, at der anvendes en referenceramme eller sammenligningsfaktor for at fastslå, hvilke virksomheder der befinder sig i en tilsvarende retlig og faktisk situation i lyset af den pågældende foranstaltnings målsætning.

(87) In this respect, it has to be recalled that, for application of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the only question to be determined is whether, under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to favour "certain undertakings or the production of certain goods" within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty in comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question.

(87) I den forbindelse skal det understreges, at der ved anvendelsen af traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, udelukkende skal tages stilling til, om en statslig foranstaltning som led i en bestemt retlig ordning kan begunstige "visse virksomheder eller visse produktioner", jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, i forhold til andre virksomheder, der under hensyntagen til det formål, som forfølges med den pågældende foranstaltning, befinder sig i en tilsvarende faktisk og retlig situation.

(88) More precisely, the Court indicates that the choice of the reference framework follows a two-step approach: firstly, the determination of the system of charges which is the object of the measure under assessment and, secondly, determination of the general scheme applicable to the system of charges in question.

(88) Nærmere betegnet anfører Domstolen, at valget af referenceramme følger en totrinsstrategi. Først fastlæggelse af den udgiftsordning, der er berørt af den pågældende foranstaltning og dernæst fastlæggelse af den generelle ordning, som gælder for den omhandlede udgiftsordning.

(89) On the assumption that an appropriate external comparison can be identified, by reference to which the existence of "abnormal" charges could be defined, the measure under assessment would not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. If this is not the case, the measure under assessment would constitute State aid within the meaning of that provision.

(89) Såfremt der kan afdækkes en relevant eksogen sammenligningsfaktor, hvorved det kan fastslås, at der er tale om "unormale" omkostninger, udgør den pågældende foranstaltning ikke statsstøtte, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1. I modsat fald udgør den omhandlede foranstaltning en statsstøtte i henhold til samme bestemmelse.

11.1.1.1. Absence of an external comparison in the present case

11.1.1.1. Ingen eksogen sammenligningsfaktor i det foreliggende tilfælde

(90) Applying this methodology to the case in question, the Commission considers that the system of charges concerned by the measure under assessment comprises social contributions paid by an employer into a mandatory pension scheme for employees.

(90) Efter anvendelse af denne metodik på den foreliggende sag mener Kommissionen, at den af den omhandlede foranstaltning berørte udgiftsordning består af socialsikringsbidrag betalt af en arbejdsgiver inden for rammerne af dennes medarbejderes obligatoriske aldersforsikring.

(91) From a theoretical standpoint the Commission distinguishes between two potential reference frameworks:

(91) Teoretisk set skelner Kommissionen mellem to potentielle referencerammer:

- provisions relating to mandatory old-age pensions insurance applicable to statutory pension schemes, i.e. the social security scheme managed by CNAV and the complementary schemes managed by AGIRC and ARRCO,

- bestemmelserne for obligatorisk aldersforsikring, der gælder for de almindelige pensionsordninger, dvs. socialsikringsordningen, der forvaltes af CNAV, og tillægsordningerne, der forvaltes af AGIRC og ARRCO

- provisions relating to mandatory old-age pensions applicable to other public enterprises.

- bestemmelserne for obligatorisk aldersforsikring, som gælder for andre offentlige virksomheder.

(92) With reference to the first potential basis for comparison, namely statutory pension schemes, the Commission notes that, since 1 January 2006, RATP has been paying a social contribution, the level of which is identical to the social contribution paid by companies affiliated to the pension funds responsible for statutory schemes. The Commission observes however that, at 1 January 2006, the benefits paid to RATP beneficiaries by the special scheme managed by the CRP-RATP are in excess of the benefits paid to employees affiliated to statutory schemes.

(92) Vedrørende den første mulige sammenligningsfaktor, dvs. de almindelige pensionsordninger, bemærker Kommissionen, at RATP siden den 1. januar 2006 har betalt et socialsikringsbidrag på niveau med det socialsikringsbidrag, virksomheder betaler til pensionskasser, som forvalter de almindelige ordninger. Kommissionen bemærker imidlertid, at de ydelser, der pr. 1. januar 2006 er udbetalt til de ydelsesberettigede hos RATP fra den særlige ordning, som forvaltes af CRP-RATP, er højere end de ydelser, der gives til arbejdstagere tilknyttet de almindelige ordninger.

(93) Moreover, the Commission finds that the members of the statutory schemes are employees under private law contracts whereas the conditions of RATP employees are governed by service regulations. In this respect, it should be noted that the status of RATP staff diverges from statutory law in several respects (see footnote 6).

(93) Endvidere konstaterer Kommissionen, at de, der er tilsluttet de almindelige ordninger, er overenskomstansatte, mens medarbejderne hos RATP er vedtægtsansatte. I den forbindelse skal det nævnes, at de RATP-ansattes status på flere måder afviger fra de almindelige regler (jf. fodnote 6).

(94) In the light of the considerations set out above and its practice in previous decisions [34], the Commission considers that the provisions applicable to statutory schemes for mandatory old-age pensions cannot provide a basis for comparison in the analysis conducted by the Commission to determine the existence of an economic advantage within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.

(94) Kommissionen mener på baggrund af ovenstående overvejelser og sin beslutningspraksis [34], at de bestemmelser, der gælder for de almindelige obligatoriske aldersforsikringsordninger ikke kan tjene som sammenligningsfaktor i den analyse, Kommissionen foretager for at fastslå, om der foreligger en økonomisk fordel, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.

(95) With regard to the second possible basis for comparison, namely public enterprises, the Commission has not been able to identify a set of economic operators constituting a homogenous group which could provide a basis for comparison. The situation of RATP in France is therefore very particular from the legal and factual point of view in more that one respect [35].

(95) For så vidt angår den anden mulige sammenligningsfaktor, dvs. de offentlige virksomheder, har Kommissionen ikke kunnet påvise en ensartet gruppe af økonomiske aktører, der kan anvendes som sammenligningsfaktor. RATP er nemlig på mere end én måde i Frankrig i en meget speciel retlig og faktisk situation [35].

(96) In conclusion, the Commission considers that there is no external basis for comparison which could be used to define a "normal" contribution supported by undertakings in a legal and factual situation comparable to that of RATP in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question.

(96) Kommissionen konkluderer, at der ikke findes en eksogen sammenligningsfaktor, som giver mulighed for at fastsætte et "normalt" bidrag for virksomheder, der befinder sig i samme retlige og faktiske situation som RATP med hensyn til den pågældende foranstaltnings mål

(97) The Enirisorse [36] case, cited by France, does not change the Commission's conclusions as to the existence of an advantage in favour of RATP. In this case the Court based its conclusion on a comparison of the contested measure with a "normal situation" which the Court had been able to define; a similar comparable situation does not exist in the present case.

(97) Enirisorse-dommen [36], som Frankrig anfører, ændrer ikke Kommissionens konklusioner om tilstedeværelsen af en fordel for RATP. I den dom bygger Domstolen nemlig sin konklusion på en sammenligning af den omtvistede foranstaltning og en "normal situation", som Domstolen kunne fastslå, men som ikke findes på lignende måde i den foreliggende sag.

(98) In the absence of an appropriate external comparison, the Commission considers that, in order to determine the existence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, the reference framework for assessing the existence of the advantage is the situation of RATP itself prior to the implementation of the measure.

(98) Da der ikke findes nogen relevant eksogen sammenligningsfaktor, mener Kommissionen, at referencerammen for vurdering af, om der er tale om en fordel, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, vil være RATP’s egen situation inden gennemførelsen af foranstaltningen.

11.1.1.2. Existence of an economic advantage

11.1.1.2. Tilstedeværelsen af en økonomisk fordel

(99) As indicated above, under the system in place before 1 January 2006, RATP was legally liable for the pension commitments under the special scheme. In this capacity, RATP was the guarantor of the financial equilibrium of the scheme in question, the "employer" contribution paid by RATP to the special scheme did not constitute full discharge of its obligations.

(99) Som anført ovenfor var RATP inden for rammerne af den ordning, der var gældende før den 1. januar 2006, retligt forpligtet til at opfylde pensionsforpligtelserne under særordningen. Dermed var RATP garant for den pågældende ordnings finansielle ligevægt, idet det "arbejdsgiverbidrag", RATP betalte til særordningen, ikke var frigørende.

(100) The Commission has observed that the main effect of the provisions foreseen by the reform notified is to transform the "employer" contribution paid by RATP for the pensions of its staff into a contribution discharging it from its obligations.

(100) Kommissionen har konstateret, at den vigtigste effekt af bestemmelserne i den anmeldte reform var at give det "arbejdsgiverbidrag", RATP betalte til sine medarbejderes pension, frigørende virkning.

(101) The Commission therefore concludes that the measures under assessment relieve RATP of charges it would otherwise have had to bear under the provisions of the aforementioned 1948 law.

(101) Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at de omhandlede foranstaltninger fritager RATP for udgifter, som selskabet skulle have afholdt i henhold til ovennævnte lov fra 1948.

(102) In the context of an analysis of the normal or abnormal nature of the retirement pension charges for RATP itself, the Commission considers that the obligations a company itself bears under employment legislation or collective agreements with trade unions to provide redundancy benefits and/or early retirement pensions are part of the normal costs of a business which a firm has to meet from its own resources [37].

(102) Med hensyn til en analyse af, om RATP’s pensionsudgifter skal betragtes som normale eller ej, mener Kommissionen, at de forpligtelser, en virksomhed selv har til at betale som fratrædelsesgodtgørelse og/eller førtidspension i henhold til lovgivningen på arbejdsmarkedsområdet eller kollektive overenskomster med fagforeningerne, er en del af de normale driftsomkostninger, en virksomhed skal dække ved hjælp af egne midler [37].

(103) By extension, the Commission considers that the charges incumbent on RATP under the 1948 law are normal charges. Consequently, since the measure under assessment enables RATP to avoid having to bear costs which would normally have had to be met out of the undertaking's own financial resources, the Commission considers that this measure confers an economic advantage within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. This advantage is selective since it concerns a single beneficiary only.

(103) Kommissionen mener på denne baggrund, at RATP’s pensionsudgifter i henhold til 1948-loven er normale omkostninger. Da RATP gennem den pågældende foranstaltning undgår at skulle afholde omkostninger, som selskabet normalt skulle have afholdt over sine egne midler, mener Kommissionen, at foranstaltningen giver selskabet en økonomisk fordel, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1. Fordelen er selektiv, for den vedrører kun RATP.

(104) The Commission has further observed that in the absence of the reform notified the obligation to ensure the financial equilibrium of the special regime which had been incumbent upon RATP would have given rise to the entering of a commitment in respect of the State on the RATP balance sheet, which would have been provisioned in the accounts on the adoption of the IFRS standards (International Financial Reporting Standards), which have been applicable at RATP since 30 June 2007.

(104) Kommissionen konstaterer desuden, at RATP’s forpligtelse til at sikre finansiel ligevægt i særordningen uden den anmeldte reform ville have betydet, at RATP skulle have opført en forpligtelse over for staten, som der skulle være ydet dækning for i regnskabet ved overgangen til IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards), som har været gældende for RATP siden den 30. juni 2007.

(105) This confirms that the creation of the CRP-RATP relieves RATP of charges that it would normally have had to bear.

(105) Dette element bekræfter, at oprettelsen af CRP-RATP begrænser de udgifter, RATP normalt skulle have afholdt.

11.1.1.3. Inapplicability of the Combus ruling to the present case

11.1.1.3. Retspraksis fra Combus-sagen finder ikke anvendelse i den foreliggende sag

(106) The French authorities refer at length to the Combus [38] judgment, in which the Court of First Instance considered as "abnormal" charges the charges resulting from a reform whereby the special status of the staff of an undertaking is transformed into a statutory status, therefore identical to that of its competitors in terms of the management of staff. The Court stated that: "the measure in question had been introduced to replace the privileged and costly status of the officials employed by Combus with the status of employees on a contract basis comparable to that of employees of other bus transport undertakings competing with Combus. The intention was thus to free Combus from a structural disadvantage it had in relation to its private-sector competitors. Article 87(1) EC is aimed merely at prohibiting advantages for certain undertakings and the concept of aid covers only measures which lighten the burdens normally assumed in an undertaking's budget and which are to be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions. […]. Moreover, instead of paying the DKK 100 million directly to the officials employed by Combus, the Danish Government could have obtained the same result by reassigning those officials within the public administration, without paying any particular bonus, which would have enabled Combus to employ immediately employees on a contract basis falling under private law."

(106) De franske myndigheder gør detaljeret rede for Combus-dommen [38], hvori Retten betragtede "unormale" byrder som byrder, der skyldes de ansattes særlige status i en virksomhed, der som følge af en reform befinder sig i samme situation som sine konkurrenter, når det gælder personaleadministration. Retten anfører således, at "formålet med den pågældende foranstaltning var at erstatte den gunstige og bekostelige ordning, som gjaldt for de tjenestemandsansatte, der var beskæftiget af Combus, med overenskomstvilkår svarende til dem, der gjaldt for ansatte i andre busselskaber, som var i konkurrence med Combus. Formålet var altså at frigøre Combus for en strukturel ulempe i forhold til dets private konkurrenter. Artikel 87, stk. 1, EF tilsigter alene at forbyde de fordele, som favoriserer visse virksomheder, idet begrebet støtte kun omfatter indgreb, der letter de byrder, som normalt belaster en virksomheds budget, og som må betragtes som en økonomisk fordel, som den støttemodtagende virksomhed ikke ville have opnået på normale markedsvilkår. […]. I øvrigt ville den danske stat, i stedet for at udbetale beløbet på 100 mio. DKK direkte til de af Combus beskæftigede tjenestemænd, have kunnet opnå samme resultat ved at genplacere de pågældende tjenestemænd andetsteds i den offentlige forvaltning uden særlig godtgørelse, hvorved Combus ville have haft mulighed for straks fra begyndelsen at rekruttere personale på overenskomstvilkår."

(107) As a general principle it must be borne in mind that the Combus ruling has not been confirmed by the Court of Justice. Some of the Court's rulings contradict the theory that compensation for a structural disadvantage exempts a measure from being qualified as aid. In this regard, the Court has constantly held that the existence of aid is to be assessed in relation to the effects and not in relation to the causes or objectives of State intervention [39]. The Court has also held that the concept of aid includes advantages granted by public authorities which, in various forms, reduce the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking [40]. The Court has also clearly stated that the costs linked to remuneration of employees naturally place a burden on the budgets of undertakings, irrespective of whether or not those costs stem from legal obligations or collective agreements [41]. In this context, the Court has considered that the fact that State measures aim to compensate for additional costs cannot constitute grounds for disqualifying them from the definition of aid [42]. In this context, the French authorities cite the application of the principle laid down by the Court of First Instance in the Combus judgment, claiming that the reform notified simply relieves RATP of an "abnormal" charge.

(107) Generelt skal det erindres, at retspraksis i Combus-sagen ikke er blevet stadfæstet af Domstolen, Visse elementer i Domstolens retspraksis strider mod, at kompensationen for en strukturbestemt ulempe skulle udelukke, at der er tale om støtte. Domstolen har således konstant fastslået, at spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt der er tale om støtte, skal vurderes på grundlag af statsindgrebets virkninger og ikke på grundlag af dets årsager eller formål [39]. Domstolen har også fastholdt, at begrebet støtte omfatter fordele, som de offentlige myndigheder giver en virksomhed, og som på forskellig måde letter de byrder, der normalt belaster en virksomheds budget [40]. Domstolen har også klart anført, at virksomhedernes lønomkostninger naturligvis belaster deres budget, uanset om disse omkostninger skyldes lovgivning eller kollektive overenskomster [41]. I den forbindelse mente Domstolen, at det forhold, at statsforanstaltninger tager sigte på at kompensere for meromkostninger, udelukker, at der foreligger støtte [42]. Frankrig påberåber sig dog det princip, som Retten fastlagde i Combus-dommen, og fastslår, at den anmeldte reform blot fritager RATP for en "unormal" byrde.

(108) In this respect, the Commission emphasises that a number of important factual aspects distinguish the Combus case from the present case:

(108) Kommissionen må understrege, at de materielle forhold adskiller Combus-sagen fra den foreliggende, som det fremgår af følgende:

- the compensation payments are paid directly to the civil servants employed by Combus whereas the measure which is the object of the present decision concerns the "employer contributions" of RATP,

- Kompensationen udbetales direkte til de tjenestemænd, der er ansat i Combus, mens foranstaltningen i den foreliggende beslutning vedrører RATP’s "arbejdsgiverbidrag".

- the State measure in question in the Combus case had been introduced to replace the privileged and costly status of the officials employed by Combus with the status of employees on a contract basis comparable to that of employees of other bus transport undertakings competing with Combus. In contrast, the status and rights of RATP staff remain unchanged as a result of the measure under assessment. This status and these rights are different to those of staff employed under private law contracts by undertakings affiliated to statutory pension schemes,

- Den relevante statsforanstaltning i Combus-sagen tog sigte på at erstatte den gunstige og bekostelige ordning, som gjaldt for de tjenestemandsansatte, der var beskæftiget af Combus, med overenskomstvilkår svarende til dem, der gjaldt for ansatte i andre busselskaber, som var i konkurrence med Combus. Derimod ændrer den pågældende foranstaltning ikke de RATP-ansattes status og rettigheder, som er anderledes end dem, der gælder for de overenskomstansatte i virksomheder, som er tilknyttet almindelige pensionsordninger.

- the competitive context in which Combus was operating was different to that in which RATP operates. The public limited company Combus A/S had to manage its transport services on a commercial basis and operate on the market under competitive conditions comparable to those of private bus companies. In this context, following invitations to tender, the public transport management companies transferred responsibility for the provision of bus services to private and public companies. According to the regulations governing invitations to tender, contracts are awarded to "the most economically advantageous bid", irrespective of whether or not the tenderer is a private or public undertaking. RATP, however, operates in a large non-liberalised sector which will only be opened up to competition very gradually by Regulation (EC) No 130/2007; the economic constraints at play in this sector are therefore very different.

- Combus’ konkurrencesituation var anderledes end RATP’s. Aktieselskabet Combus A/S skulle drive transportvirksomhed på kommercielt grundlag og operere på markedet under de samme konkurrencevilkår som de private busselskaber. I denne forbindelse skal det bemærkes, at de offentlige transportselskaber ved en udbudsprocedure overdrager busdriften til private og offentlige virksomheder. Ifølge udbudsreglerne tildeles kontrakten på grundlag af "det økonomisk mest fordelagtige tilbud", uden at der tages hensyn til, om tilbudsgiveren er offentlig eller privat. RATP disponerer derimod over en stor ikke-liberaliseret sektor, som i henhold til forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007 først efterhånden åbnes for konkurrence, og hvor de økonomiske påvirkninger gør sig gældende på anden måde.

(109) The Commission considers that the factual differences between the Combus case and the present case are sufficient to justify a different reasoning in each case.

(109) Kommissionen mener, at de faktuelle forskelle mellem Combus-sagen og den foreliggende sag er tilstrækkelige til at berettige, at de to sager behandles forskelligt.

11.1.2. INVOLVEMENT OF STATE RESOURCES

11.1.2. TILSTEDEVÆRELSE AF STATSMIDLER

(110) The Commission considers that the measure examined involves State resources in favour of RATP in that the ultimate responsibility for the financial equilibrium of the special pension scheme for RATP employees is no longer incumbent upon RATP, but on the State. With effect of the date of implementation of the reform, the State has ensured the financial equilibrium of the CRP-RATP by means of the payment of a balancing subsidy to the social security body which, in the absence of the reform, would have had to be assumed by RATP.

(110) Kommissionen mener, at den undersøgte foranstaltning omfatter statsmidler til fordel for RATP, eftersom ansvaret for at sikre ligevægt i den særlige pensionsordning for ansatte hos RATP i sidste ende ikke længere ligger hos RATP, men hos staten. Fra iværksættelsen af reformen sikrer staten nemlig den finansielle ligevægt for CRP-RATP gennem betaling af et udligningstilskud til socialsikringsinstitutionen, som uden reformen skulle være afholdt af RATP.

(111) Consequently, the Commission considers that the measure constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.

(111) Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at den omhandlede foranstaltning omfatter statsmidler, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.

11.1.3. DISTORTION OF COMPETITION AND ADVERSE EFFECT ON TRADE

11.1.3. KONKURRENCEFORVRIDNING OG PÅVIRKNING AF SAMHANDLEN

(112) As indicated above, RATP, the beneficiary of the measure under assessment, is the parent company of a group of undertakings, the RATP group, which operate in the transport and associated services sectors. All of these operators are active in the Community markets of the above-mentioned sectors.

(112) Som det tidligere er anført, er støttemodtageren RATP moderselskab for en gruppe virksomheder, RATP-koncernen, der opererer i transportsektoren og yder dermed forbundne tjenester. Alle disse operatører driver virksomhed på Fællesskabets markeder for ovennævnte sektorer.

(113) It should be recalled that, in principle, aid which is intended to release an undertaking from costs which it would normally have had to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities distorts the conditions of competition [43]. It has been ruled that any grant of aid to an undertaking exercising its activities in the Community market is liable to cause distortion of competition and affect trade between Member States [44]. Moreover, the Court of Justice considered that a public subsidy granted to an undertaking which provides only local or regional transport services and does not provide any transport services outside its State of origin may nonetheless have an effect on trade between Member States within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. Where a Member State grants a public subsidy to an undertaking, the supply of transport services by that undertaking may for that reason be maintained or increased with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of providing their transport services in the market in that Member State [45].

(113) Det skal i den forbindelse erindres, at driftsstøtte, dvs. støtte, der skal frigøre en virksomhed for omkostninger, som den normalt skulle have båret inden for sin almindelige drift eller sine sædvanlige aktiviteter, i princippet fordrejer konkurrencevilkårene [43]. Det blev nemlig vurderet, at enhver støtte, der ydes til en virksomhed, der opererer på Fællesskabets marked, er egnet til at fordreje konkurrencevilkårene og påvirke samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne [44]. Domstolen har endvidere fastslået, at det på ingen måde er udelukket, at et offentligt tilskud til en virksomhed, som alene leverer lokale eller regionale transportydelser, og som ikke leverer transportydelser uden for sin hjemstat, ikke desto mindre kan have indvirkning på samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne i den forstand, hvori udtrykket er anvendt i traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1. Når en medlemsstat yder et offentligt tilskud til en virksomhed, kan den pågældende virksomheds stilling inden for levering af transportydelser nemlig derved blive opretholdt eller styrket med den konsekvens, at chancerne for de virksomheder, der er etableret i de øvrige medlemsstater, for at levere transportydelser på denne medlemsstats marked herved bliver formindsket [45].

(114) In the present case, the RATP group is in a privileged position both in relation to its domestic competitors [46] and its competitors in other Member States which cannot benefit from the measure under assessment.

(114) I den foreliggende sag har RATP-koncernen en gunstig position i forhold til både sine nationale konkurrenter [46] og sine konkurrenter i andre medlemsstater, der ikke modtager den pågældende støtte.

(115) In this respect, it should be mentioned that Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 provides for the progressive opening up of the markets concerned to competition and the opening up of a given sector to competition implies that State aid to an undertaking belonging to that sector is likely to have an effect on intra-Community trade and distort competition in the market in question.

(115) I den forbindelse skal det nævnes, at forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007 indeholder bestemmelser om gradvis åbning af de berørte markeder for konkurrence, og at en sådan sektors åbning for konkurrence indebærer, at statsstøtte til en virksomhed i denne sektor kan påvirke samhandlen mellem medlemsstaterne og fordreje konkurrencen på det pågældende marked.

(116) Consequently, the Commission considers that the measure in question does affect trade between Member States and distort competition between the relevant operators.

(116) Som følge heraf mener Kommissionen, at den omhandlede foranstaltning påvirker samhandlen mellem medlemsstaterne og fordrejer konkurrencen mellem disse aktører.

11.2. UNLAWFULNESS OF THE AID

11.2. ULOVLIG STØTTE

(117) Pursuant to Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty, Member States must notify any plans to grant or alter aid. They may not put the proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision.

(117) I overensstemmelse med traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3, skal medlemsstaten anmelde enhver påtænkt indførelse eller ændring af støtteforanstaltninger. Den pågældende medlemsstat må ikke gennemføre de påtænkte foranstaltninger, før den nævnte fremgangsmåde har ført til endelig beslutning.

(118) In the present case, the French authorities notified the reform of the method by which RATP finances its pension scheme by means of a letter dated 29 June 2006. In their letter, the French authorities stated that the arrangements did not appear to constitute State aid notifiable to the Commission in advance under Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.

(118) I den foreliggende sag har de franske myndigheder ved brev af 29. juni 2006 anmeldt reformen af finansieringen af RATP’s pensionsordning. I brevet anfører de franske myndigheder, at de ikke mener, at denne ordning er en statsstøtte, der på forhånd skal indberettes til Kommissionen i medfør af traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3.

(119) However, the Commission observes that the State aid under assessment was implemented by France with effect from 1 January 2006, i.e. before the Commission had adopted a final decision. On this basis, the Commission concludes that France has acted unlawfully in implementing the aid in question contrary to Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty.

(119) Kommissionen konstaterer imidlertid, at Frankrig har iværksat den pågældende statsstøtte fra den 1. januar 2006, dvs. før Kommissionen har truffet en endelig beslutning. På grundlag heraf konkluderer Kommissionen, at Frankrig handlede ulovligt, da man gennemførte den pågældende støtte i modstrid med traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3.

11.3. COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID WITH THE COMMON MARKET

11.3. STØTTENS FORENELIGHED MED FÆLLESMARKEDET

(120) In so far as the measure under assessment constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, its compatibility with the common market must be assessed in the light of the exceptions provided for by that Treaty.

(120) Da den omhandlede foranstaltning er statsstøtte i henhold til traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, skal dens eventuelle forenelighed med det fælles marked undersøges på baggrund af undtagelserne i traktaten.

(121) In this respect, the Commission considers that the most appropriate legal basis is Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty, according to which aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities may be considered to be compatible with the common market, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.

(121) Kommissionen mener, at det mest korrekte retsgrundlag er traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), hvori det hedder, at støtte til fremme af udviklingen af visse erhvervsgrene kan være forenelig med fællesmarkedet, når den ikke ændrer samhandelsvilkårene på en måde, der strider mod den fælles interesse.

(122) Given the nature and the effects of the reform, the Commission considers that the compatibility of the aid under assessment must be assessed in relation to the creation of a level playing field in terms of mandatory social contributions between RATP and its current, potential and future competitors on the urban public transport market in the Ile-de-France region.

(122) I betragtning af reformens art og virkninger mener Kommissionen, at vurderingen af, om støtteforanstaltningen er forenelig med fællesmarkedet, skal vurderes under hensyn til etablering af lige vilkår, når det gælder socialsikringsbidrag, mellem RATP og dens nuværende og kommende konkurrenter inden for den kollektive transportsektor i Ile-de-France.

Level of contributions paid by RATP in relation to its competitors under the reformed system

RATP’s bidrag i forhold til konkurrenterne i den reformerede ordning

(123) In order to analyse the effects of the aid and assess the extent of distortion of competition, the Commission must first examine the level of contributions borne by RATP in relation to its competitors under the reformed system. Thereafter, the Commission will examine the situation as it would have been if RATP had not benefitted from the aid in question. Lastly, the positive and negative effects of the aid will be analysed, before assessing overall compatibility with the Treaty.

(123) For at analysere støttens virkninger og vurdere konkurrencefordrejningernes intensitet skal Kommissionen først undersøge RATP’s bidrag i forhold til konkurrenternes på baggrund af den reformerede ordning. Derefter skal Kommissionen påvise, hvad der ville være sket, hvis RATP ikke havde modtaget den pågældende støtte. Endelig undersøges støttens positive og negative virkninger, hvorefter der kan gøres status over situationen som helhed.

(124) Firstly, the Commission notes that, prior to 1 January 2006, the financing of the RATP special pension scheme differed from the financing of statutory pension schemes in two respects: the fact that RATP's contributions did not constitute full discharge of its obligations and the level of the "employer" contribution.

(124) Indledningsvis bemærker Kommissionen, at finansieringen af RATP’s særlige pensionsordning før den 1. januar 2006 adskilte sig fra finansieringen af de almindelige pensionsordninger i to henseender, nemlig med hensyn til bidragenes ikke-frigørende virkning og størrelsen af "arbejdsgiverbidraget".

(125) The Commission considers that the aid under assessment has resolved the first area of divergence between the RATP special scheme and the statutory schemes. Prior to 1 January 2006, the contributions paid by RATP were not in full discharge of its obligations; RATP was responsible under law for ensuring the financial equilibrium of the retirement pension scheme of its staff. The reform notified has introduced the payment of a contribution in full discharge of RATP's obligations, a feature which characterises the contributions paid by employers subject to statutory law to funds which manage pay-as-you-go pension schemes. With regard to the second area of divergence, the Commission observes that the reform notified has resulted in a harmonisation of the level of mandatory old-age pension charges borne by RATP and companies subject to statutory law in the field of retirement benefits.

(125) Kommissionen mener, at den omhandlede støtte gav en løsning på det første element af divergens mellem RATP’s særordning og de almindelige ordninger. Før den 1. januar 2006 betalte RATP nemlig ikke et bidrag med frigørende virkning, men skulle i henhold til loven sikre finansiel ligevægt i pensionsordningen for sine ansatte. Med den anmeldte reform blev der indført betaling af et frigørende bidrag, som er karakteristisk for de bidrag, en privat arbejdsgiver betaler til den kasse, der forvalter en løbende finansieret pensionsordning. Med hensyn til det andet divergerende element konstaterer Kommissionen, at den anmeldte reform har medført en udjævning af udgifterne til obligatorisk aldersforsikring mellem RATP og private virksomheder, der er omfattet af de almindelige regler for pensionsydelser.

The situation without the provision of aid

Scenario uden støtteforanstaltningen

(126) In the absence of the reform notified, RATP would have had to provision pension commitments for its staff in posts governed by service regulations for the financial years after 2006. This provision would have been a direct result of the fact that the "employer" contributions for the retirement pensions of RATP staff were not in full discharge of their obligations.

(126) Uden reformen skulle RATP have afsat bevillinger i regnskabsårene efter 2006 til sine pensionsforpligtelser over for sine vedtægtsansatte. Det skyldes direkte, at "arbejdsgiverbidragene" til pensionerne til RATP’s medarbejdere ikke havde frigørende virkning.

(127) In addition, RATP's contributions to the old-age pension scheme to ensure the financial equilibrium of that scheme would not have been aligned with the level paid by their potential competitors.

(127) For at sikre finansiel ligevægt i pensionsordningen ville RATP’s aldersforsikringsbidrag endvidere ikke være blevet tilpasset efter de potentielle konkurrenters bidrag.

(128) In the absence of the reform notified, RATP would therefore have had to assume an additional annual expense of several hundred million euro in relation to the reformed scheme.

(128) Uden den anmeldte reform ville RATP således have været nødt til at afholde en ekstra årlig udgift på flere hundrede millioner euro i forhold til den reformerede ordning.

(129) As a result, RATP's pension expenses would have put it at a disadvantage in the context of a liberalised market, which would have had a significant impact on its activities.

(129) Pensionsudgifterne ville derfor have været et handicap for RATP på et liberaliseret marked, hvilket ville have påvirket selskabets aktiviteter betydeligt.

Positive effects of the aid

Støttens positive virkninger

(130) It follows from the above that, considering Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 which provides for the progressive opening up of the urban public transport market, the pension scheme applicable to RATP under the 1948 law comprises a number of specific characteristics which, in isolation, give rise to a distortion of competition to the detriment of RATP and the group to which it belongs. The main effect of the aid under assessment is to align the contributions of RATP with those borne by its competitors and by competitors in the RATP group, thus removing the specific distortion of competition affecting RATP and the RATP group.

(130) På baggrund af forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007, der indeholder bestemmelser om en gradvis åbning af markedet for kollektiv bytrafik, følger det af ovenstående, at den gældende pensionsordning hos RATP ifølge 1948-loven frembyder særlige træk, som isoleret betragtet skaber konkurrencefordrejninger til skade for RATP og den koncern, selskabet tilhører. Støttens væsentligste virkning er, at den tilpasser RATP’s bidrag efter konkurrenternes og RATP-koncernens konkurrenters og dermed fjerner de særlige konkurrencefordrejninger, der berører RATP og RATP-koncernen.

(131) Furthermore, the reform will gradually enable RATP to operate as a private investor facing normal commercial constraints. Indeed, this is one of the objectives of the reform in question.

(131) Endvidere har reformen gjort det muligt for RATP gradvist at handle som en privat investor med normale kommercielle problemer. Det er i øvrigt et af reformens formål.

(132) The Commission also considers that the measure under assessment is suited to the Community objective intended. No other mechanism could have addressed this matter in a more effective manner. Public service compensation could certainly have been awarded, but such an approach would not have been suitable or sustainable in the long term given the structural nature of the problem.

(132) Kommissionen mener desuden, at den pågældende foranstaltning står i forhold til det mål i Fællesskabets interesse, som den tager sigte på at nå. Dette mål havde ikke kunnet nås med et mere effektivt middel. Der ville uden tvivl have kunnet opnås en public service-kompensation, men en sådan fremgangsmåde havde hverken været egnet eller holdbar på lang sigt, da problemet er af strukturbestemt art.

(133) As regards the proportionality of measures, the Commission considers that the aid granted has been limited to the strict minimum. Since 1 January 2006, the pension charges paid by RATP have been identical to those paid by companies whose employees are affiliated to statutory schemes.

(133) Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt foranstaltningerne står i forhold til målet, er det Kommissionens opfattelse, at støtten er begrænset til det strengt nødvendige. Siden den 1. januar 2006 har RATP betalt de samme pensionsudgifter som en virksomhed, hvis ansatte er tilknyttet almindelige ordninger.

(134) Lastly, the Commission considers that the measure under assessment serves to ensure the longevity of a retirement pension scheme, the financing of which was no longer viable. The Commission also considers that the reform in progress of the retirement benefits provided by the special scheme [47] constitutes a decisive additional element in this context. Consequently, the Commission considers that these measures are perfectly compatible with the general drive to reform Member States' pension systems advocated by both the Council and the Commission [48].

(134) Endelig mener Kommissionen, at den omhandlede foranstaltning gør det muligt at videreføre en pensionsordning, hvis finansieringsmåde var blevet forældet. Kommissionen mener endvidere, at reformen af pensionsydelserne fra særordningen [47] i den sammenhæng udgør et afgørende supplerende element. Kommissionen mener derfor, at disse foranstaltninger ligger helt inden for de mere generelle rammer for reform af medlemsstaternes pensionsordninger, som både Rådet og Kommissionen bakker op om [48].

Negative effects of the aid

Støttens negative virkninger

(135) In a static analysis, the Commission considers firstly that the distortions of competition in the urban public transport market in the Ile-de-France region resulting from the measure under assessment are by definition and with immediate effect very limited in the sense that, given the history of RATP and its activities, it is evident that the pension commitments under the reform relate to actions historically implemented in a non-liberalised market where the level of competition has been very low to date. Secondly, with regard to the markets on which the RATP group operates in the form of the subsidiaries of the RATP company, the Commission considers that the measure under assessment only has a very marginal impact. Indeed, these markets will only be affected indirectly by the measure under assessment since, in addition to the strict legal, accounting and financial separation between the parent company and its subsidiaries, the reform notified does not concern staff employed by those subsidiaries.

(135) På grundlag af en statisk analyse finder Kommissionen dels, at konkurrencefordrejningerne for det kollektive transportmarked i Ile-de-France som følge af foranstaltningen i sagens natur umiddelbart er meget begrænsede, eftersom det i betragtning af RATP’s baggrund og virksomhed er åbenbart, at de pensionsforpligtelser, der er omfattet af reformen, vedrører aktiviteter, som hidtil er foregået på et ikkeliberaliseret marked, hvor konkurrencen hidtil har været meget lille. Dels mener Kommissionen vedrørende de markeder, hvor RATP-koncernen opererer gennem virksomheden RATP’s datterselskaber, at den omhandlede foranstaltning kun har en meget marginal virkning. Disse markeder vil nemlig kun blive indirekte påvirket af foranstaltningen, idet den anmeldte reform ud over den strenge juridiske, regnskabsmæssige og finansielle adskillelse mellem modervirksomhed og datterselskaber ikke vedrører ansatte i disse datterselskaber.

(136) In a dynamic analysis, doubtlessly more appropriate, considering Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007, the Commission considers that, although the measure under assessment may theoretically enable RATP to maintain a dominant position, the risk is low. This conclusion results from the fact that the measure is limited to bringing the contributions paid by RATP into line with those paid by its competitors and from the fact that, following the reform of the special pension scheme in 2008, the RATP pension scheme does not create any form of incentive in the company's favour.

(136) På grundlag af en dynamisk analyse, der uden tvivl er mere hensigtsmæssig i betragtning af forordning (EF) nr. 1370/2007, mener Kommissionen, at denne risiko er lille, selv om foranstaltningen teoretisk set kunne give RATP mulighed for at opretholde sin dominerende stilling. Denne konklusion skyldes, at foranstaltningen begrænser sig til at tilpasse RATP’s bidrag efter konkurrenternes, og at RATP’s pensionsordning efter reformen af den særlige pensionsordning fra 2008 ikke gør virksomheden specielt tiltrækkende.

General assessment of compatibility

Status over støttens forenelighed med fællesmarkedet

(137) In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that the negative effects of the aid granted to RATP will be moderate. The reform notified is limited to what is strictly necessary for the creation of a level playing field with regard to mandatory old-age pension contributions, puts an end to a distortion of competition which would have put RATP at a disadvantage and, consequently, does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest.

(137) På baggrund af ovenstående konkluderer Kommissionen, at de negative virkninger af støtten til RATP bliver begrænsede. Den anmeldte reform er begrænset til det, der er strengt nødvendigt for at skabe lige konkurrencevilkår med hensyn til de obligatoriske aldersforsikringsbidrag, og fjerner en konkurrencefordrejning, der ville have udgjort et handikap for RATP, og ændrer derfor ikke samhandelsvilkårene på en måde, der strider mod den fælles interesse.

(138) Accordingly, the aid in question is compatible with the common market, subject to the full implementation of the reform of the RATP special pension scheme to bring the scheme into line with the statutory regulations governing the basic schemes for private sector employees and civil servants.

(138) Som følge heraf er støtten forenelig med fællesmarkedet på betingelse af, at reformen af RATP’s særlige pensionsordning, der har til formål at harmonisere denne ordning efter de almindelige regler for basisordningerne for lønmodtagere i den private sektor og tjenestemænd, gennemføres fuldt ud.

(139) The Commission considers that the above conclusion is not called into question by the solution reached in its Decision 2005/145/EC in the EDF case [49].

(139) Kommissionen mener ikke, at ovenstående konklusion anfægtes af løsningen i sin beslutning 2005/145/EF i EDF-sagen [49].

(140) In this respect, it has to be recalled that, in that decision, the Commission authorised State aid relieving the companies of a given sector of specific pension obligations which were in excess of those resulting from the general pension scheme and which had been defined during the monopoly period. In that case, the Commission also took the view that the partial mitigation of the costs arising from the mechanism for financing the specific pension rights acquired before the date of the reform constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty that could be declared compatible with the common market. The Commission considered in its compatibility assessment that the situation of EDF was not dissimilar in nature to that of stranded costs in the energy field. It involved aid aimed at facilitating the transition to a competitive energy sector. The Commission considered that it was appropriate to consider the aid granted to EDF as compensation for stranded costs [50] and stated that it would adopt this approach in its analyses of similar cases.

(140) Her skal det anføres, at Kommissionen i den beslutning godkendte statsstøtte, der frigjorde virksomheder i en bestemt sektor for særlige pensionsforpligtelser, som oversteg forpligtelserne i henhold til den almindelige pensionsordning, og som var blevet fastsat i en monopolperiode. Ved den lejlighed mente Kommissionen, at den delvise reduktion af udgifterne i forbindelse med finansieringsordningen vedrørende de særlige pensionsrettigheder, der var erhvervet før reformen, skulle betragtes som statsstøtte, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. l, men at den kunne erklæres forenelig med fællesmarkedet. Kommissionen fastslog i sin analyse af støttens forenelighed, at EDF’s situation ikke adskilte sig særlig meget fra "strandede omkostninger" på energiområdet. Der var nemlig tale om støtte, som skulle lette overgangen til en konkurrenceudsat energisektor. Kommissionen fandt det hensigtsmæssigt at sidestille støtten til EDF med kompensation for strandede omkostninger [50] og meddelte, at den ville følge samme fremgangsmåde i sin undersøgelse af tilsvarende sager.

(141) In the light of the above, the Commission considers that, in the present case, the State aid relieves RATP of pension obligations which were in excess of those arising from the statutory pension scheme and which had been defined before the market was liberalised. In parallel, the Commission adds that the reform of the special pension schemes implemented at RATP since the beginning of 2008 aligns the special scheme of RATP staff with the statutory regulations governing the basic schemes for private sector employees and civil servants.

(141) På baggrund af ovenstående mener Kommissionen, at statsstøtten i den foreliggende sag frigør RATP for pensionsforpligtelser, som oversteg forpligtelserne i henhold til den almindelige pensionsordning, og som var blevet fastsat, før markedet blev liberaliseret. Samtidig tilføjer Kommissionen, at reformen af de særlige pensionsordninger, der blev iværksat hos RATP fra begyndelsen af 2008, tilpasser særordningen for ansatte hos RATP efter de almindelige regler for basisordninger for ansatte i den private sektor og tjenestemænd.

11.4. CONCLUSION

11.4. KONKLUSION

(142) In conclusion, the Commission considers that the measure under assessment constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty. This aid is illegal but compatible with the common market according to Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.

(142) Kommissionen konkluderer derfor, at den omhandlede foranstaltning skal betragtes som statsstøtte, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1. Statsstøtten er ulovlig, men forenelig med fællesmarkedet i henhold til artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c).

12. ASSESSMENT OF THE SECOND AND THIRD MEASURES

12. VURDERING AF DEN ANDEN OG TREDJE FORANSTALTNING

(143) As indicated above, with effect from 1 January 2006, the reform notified provides for the payment by the State of a subsidy to the CRP-RATP to enable it to balance its accounts.

(143) Som tidligere anført skal staten i henhold til den anmeldte reform fra 1. januar 2006 betale CRP-RATP et tilskud med det formål at skabe balance i regnskaberne.

(144) In addition, the reform notified provides for the possibility for the CRP-RATP to affiliate the basic pension rights of the special scheme to statutory schemes. In order to respect the general principle of financial neutrality, such affiliation provides for cash payments to the receiving schemes to be borne by the State in place of the CRP-RATP.

(144) Desuden indebærer den anmeldte reform muligheden for, at CRP-RATP tilslutter basispensionsrettighederne under særordningen til de almindelige ordninger. Med henblik på at overholde princippet om finansiel neutralitet forudsætter denne tilslutning, at der betales udligningsbeløb til de modtagende ordninger; disse udligningsbeløb påtager staten sig at betale i stedet for CRP-RATP.

(145) It must be established whether these measures constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.

(145) Det drejer sig om at fastslå, om disse foranstaltninger udgør statsstøtte, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.

(146) In this respect, it has to be recalled that Article 87 of the EC Treaty applies only to undertakings within the meaning of Community competition law. The Court has consistently held that, where the area of social protection is based on solidarity, it does not constitute an economic activity within the meaning of the Treaty (see paragraph 67 of the decision to initiate the procedure of 10 October 2007) [51].

(146) I den henseende skal det erindres, at traktatens artikel 87 kun gælder for virksomheder i EU’s konkurrencelovgivnings forstand. I medfør af Domstolens faste praksis udgør social beskyttelse, når den bygger på solidaritetsprincippet, ikke en økonomisk virksomhed i traktatens forstand (jf. betragtning 67 i beslutningen om indledning af proceduren af 10. oktober 2007) [51].

(147) In the light of this case law, the Commission considers that neither the CRP-RATP nor the pension funds serving current and retired RATP employees, i.e. CNAV and AGIRC-ARRCO, are undertakings within the meaning of Community competition law for the following reasons.

(147) På baggrund af denne retspraksis mener Kommissionen, at hverken CRP-RATP eller de pensionskasser, der modtager erhvervsaktive og pensionerede medarbejdere fra RATP, dvs. CNAV og AGIRC-ARRCO, er virksomheder i EU’s konkurrencelovgivnings forstand. Det er der følgende årsager til.

(148) In the present case, the Commission observes firstly that RATP staff are subject to mandatory social protection including an independent old-age pension scheme which pursues a social objective. It is intended to provide cover for all the persons to whom it applies against the risks of old age, regardless of their financial status and their state of health at the time of affiliation.

(148) I den foreliggende sag bemærker Kommissionen først, at RATP-ansatte er omfattet af en obligatorisk social beskyttelse, der inkluderer en uafhængig aldersforsikringsordning med et socialt sigte. Den har nemlig til formål at forsikre alle, der indgår heri, mod risikoen alderdom uafhængigt af deres formueforhold og helbredstilstand på tilmeldingstidspunktet.

(149) The Commission further considers that this scheme embodies the principle of solidarity in as much as the contributions paid by active workers finance the pensions of retired workers.

(149) Kommissionen mener endvidere, at denne ordning overholder solidaritetsprincippet, idet de bidrag, der betales af arbejdstagere i beskæftigelse, finansierer pensionerne til arbejdstagere på pension.

(150) The Commission also notes that the management of the scheme in question is entrusted under law to the CRP-RATP, the operation of which is subject to State supervision. In this capacity, it collects the contributions receivable from RATP employees and from RATP itself and is responsible for the calculation and payment of pensions. The Commission observes that, in accordance with Article L711-1 of the Social Security Code, the CRP-RATP has all the characteristics defined in Article L 111-1 of the said Code, which states, in particular, that the organisation of social security is to be founded on the basis of national solidarity.

(150) Kommissionen bemærker herudover, at forvaltningen af den pågældende ordning ved lov blev overdraget til CRP-RATP, hvis virke er underlagt statslig kontrol. Derfor opkræver det bidrag fra de ansatte hos RATP og fra RATP og udbetaler pensioner. Kommissionen bemærker, at CRP-RATP i medfør af artikel L711-1 i socialsikringsloven har alle de beføjelser, der er fastsat i artikel L111-1 i nævnte lovsamling, hvori det især fremhæves, at udformningen af social sikring bygger på princippet om national solidaritet.

(151) The Commission observes finally that, in the execution of its remit, the CRP-RATP applies the law and cannot influence the amount of the contributions, the use of assets or the fixing of the level of benefits. The benefits paid are statutory benefits which bear no relation to the amount of the contributions.

(151) Kommissionen konstaterer endelig, at CRP-RATP i varetagelsen af sin opgave følger loven og ikke har mulighed for at påvirke bidragsbeløbet, anvendelsen af midlerne eller fastlæggelsen af ydelsernes størrelse. De udbetalte ydelser er fastlagt i lovgivningen og er uafhængige af det beløb, der er betalt i bidrag.

(152) In so far as the CRP-RATP does not constitute an undertaking within the meaning of Community competition law, the Commission considers that the payment by the State of a balancing subsidy to the CRP-RATP and the funding by the State of cash payments in place of the CRP-RATP do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty,

(152) Eftersom CRP-RATP ikke er en virksomhed i EU’s konkurrencelovgivnings forstand, mener Kommissionen, at statens betaling af et udligningstilskud til CRP-RATP og statens finansiering af udligningsbeløb i stedet for CRP-RATP ikke er statsstøtte, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1 —

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

VEDTAGET FØLGENDE BESLUTNING:

Article 1

Artikel 1

The creation of the pension fund for RATP staff (CRP-RATP) constitutes State aid in accordance with Article 87(1) of the Treaty, granted illegally by France contrary to Article 88(3) of the Treaty.

Oprettelsen af pensionskassen for medarbejdere hos RATP (CRP-RATP) udgør statsstøtte efter traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1, som Frankrig ulovligt har ydet i modstrid med traktatens artikel 88, stk. 3.

This State aid is compatible with the common market under Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty, subject to the full implementation of the reform of the RATP special pension scheme, the objective of which is to bring the scheme into line with the statutory regulations governing the basic schemes of private sector employees and civil servants.

Denne statsstøtte er forenelig med fællesmarkedet, jf. traktatens artikel 87, stk. 3, litra c), på betingelse af, at reformen af RATP’s særlige pensionsordning, der har til formål at harmonisere denne efter de almindelige regler for basisordningerne for lønmodtagere i den private sektor og for tjenestemænd, gennemføres fuldt ud.

Implementation of the aid is accordingly authorised.

Der gives herved tilladelse til udbetaling af denne støtte.

Article 2

Artikel 2

The payment by the State of a balancing subsidy to the CRP-RATP and the financing by the State of cash payments in place of the CRP-RATP for the affiliation of the basic rights of the special scheme to the statutory schemes do not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.

Statens betaling af et udligningstilskud til CRP-RATP og statens finansiering af udligningsbeløb i stedet for CRP-RATP ved tilslutningen af basisrettighederne under RATP’s særordning til de almindelige ordninger udgør ikke statsstøtte i henhold til EF-traktatens artikel 87, stk. 1.

Article 3

Artikel 3

This Decision is addressed to the French Republic.

Denne beslutning er rettet til Den Franske Republik.

Done at Brussels, 13 July 2009.

Udfærdiget i Bruxelles, den 13. juli 2009.

For the Commission

På Kommissionens vegne

Antonio Tajani

Antonio Tajani

Vice-President

Næstformand

[1] OJ C 9, 15.1.2008, p. 13.

[1] EUT C 9 af 15.1.2008, s. 13.

[2] See footnote 1.

[2] Jf. fodnote 1.

[3] Journal Officiel de la République française, 26 March and 3 April 1948.

[3] Den franske statstidende af 26. marts og 3. april 1948.

[4] Article 2 of the amended Order No 59-151 of 7 January 1959 on the organisation of passenger transport in the Paris region (Journal Officiel de la République française, 10 January 1959), which amended the 1948 Law referred to above.

[4] Artikel 2 i bekendtgørelse nr. 59-151 af 7. januar 1959 med senere ændringer vedrørende tilrettelæggelse af personbefordringen i Paris-regionen (Den franske statstidende af 10. januar 1959), der ændrede ovennævnte lov fra 1948.

[5] This is made possible by legislation, subject to the following conditions: "Outside of Ile-de-France and abroad, RATP may also, via its subsidiaries, construct, develop and operate public networks and transport lines for travellers, subject to competition rules being complied with on a reciprocal basis. These subsidiaries shall have the status of a limited company. Their financial management will be independent within the framework of the objectives of the group: they may not benefit from aid allocated by the State, the Ile-de-France transport syndicate and other public organisations as regards the operation of and investment in transport in the Ile-de-France region".

[5] I henhold til lovgivningen er der opstillet følgende betingelser for denne mulighed: "Uden for Ile-de-France-regionen og i udlandet kan RATP ligeledes, gennem datterselskaber, anlægge, forbedre og drive offentlige transportnet og -linjer til kollektiv personbefordring under gensidig overholdelse af konkurrencereglerne. Disse datterselskaber har status af aktieselskaber. Driften af dem er finansielt uafhængig inden for rammerne af koncernens formål; bl.a. kan de ikke modtage støtte fra staten, Syndicat des transports d’Ile-de-France og de øvrige offentlige myndigheder til drift og investering i transport i regionen Ile-de-France".

[6] The RATP staff regulations define the principles for classifying staff and the provisions relating to certain situations, the main ones being:

[6] I personalevedtægten for RATP defineres principperne for klassificering af de ansatte samt bestemmelsernefor visse forhold, hvoraf de vigtigste er:

- termination of employment, which stipulates the rules to be applied in the event of resignation, redundancy or dismissal,

- udtræden af tjeneste, hvor det præciseres, hvilke regler der gælder i tilfælde af opsigelse, afskedigelseeller fjernelse fra tjenesten

- leave (annual leave, special leave for family reasons, etc.),

- ferier og orlover (årlige ferier, særlige former for orlov af familiemæssige årsager osv.)

- promotion.Prior to the reform of the special pension scheme, the RATP staff regulations also provided (in Article 51 thereof), the conditions for retirement, with reference to the pensions regulation. The pensions regulation was repealed as of 1 July 2008 (Article 52 of French Decree No 2008-637 of 30 June 2008).

- betingelser for forfremmelse.Før reformen af den særlige pensionsordning var der i artikel 51 i RATP’s personalevedtægt ligeledes fastsat betingelser for overgang til alderspension med henvisning til pensionsreglerne. Disse blev ophævet pr. 1. juli 2008 (art. 52 i dekret nr. 2008-637 af 30. juni 2008).

[7] Journal officiel de la République française, 10 January 1959.

[7] Den franske statstidende af 10. januar 1959.

[8] OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, p. 1.

[8] EUT L 315 af 3.12.2007, s. 1.

[9] Journal officiel de la République française, 24 September 1959.

[9] Den franske statstidende af 24. september 1959.

[10] Law No 2003-775 of 21 August 2003 reforming pension schemes.

[10] Lov nr. 2003-775 af 21. august 2003 om reform af pensioner.

[11] Decree No 2008-48 of 15 January 2008 regarding the special pension scheme for RATP staff.

[11] Dekret nr. 2008-48 af 15. januar 2008 om den særlige pensionsordning for medarbejdere hos RATP.

[12] Decree No 2008-637 of 30 June 2008 regulating the pension scheme for RATP staff.

[12] Dekret nr. 2008-637 af 30. juni 2008 om regulering af pensionerne for medarbejdere hos RATP.

[13] Decree No 2008-1514 of 30 December 2008 regarding certain special social security schemes and the pension scheme supplementing Social Security for non-statutory employees of the State and public bodies.

[13] Dekret nr. 2008-1514 af 30. december 2008 vedrørende visse særlige socialsikringsordninger og socialforsikringens tillægspensionsordning for ikke-fastansatte medarbejdere i staten eller hos offentlige myndigheder.

[14] A pay-as-you-go pension scheme is financed on the basis of significant solidarity between generations. Its financial equilibrium is dependent on the ratio between the number of contributors and the number of pensioners. The rates by which revenue and the active employed population increase therefore constitute the two main factors in its development.

[14] Finansieringen af en her og nu-pensionsordning bygger på en høj grad af solidaritet mellem generationerne. Dens finansielle balance afhænger af forholdet mellem antallet af bidragydere og antallet af pensionister. Vækstraterne i indkomster og erhvervsfrekvens udgør derfor de to vigtigste udviklingsfaktorer.

[15] Decree No 2005-1635 of 26 December 2005 regarding the pension fund for RATP staff.

[15] Dekret nr. 2005-1635 af 26. december 2005 om pensionskassen for medarbejdere hos RATP.

[16] Decree No 2005-1638 of 26 December 2005 setting the rates of contributions payable to the pension fund for RATP staff.

[16] Dekret nr. 2005-1638 af 26. december 2005 om fastsættelse af bidragssatser til pensionskassen for medarbejdere hos RATP.

[17] CNAV: Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Vieillesse (National Old-Age Pension Fund).

[17] CNAV: Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse.

[18] AGIRC: Association générale des institutions de retraite des cadres (General association of pension institutions for managers).

[18] AGIRC: Association générale des institutions de retraite des cadres.

[19] ARRCO: Association pour le régime de retraite complémentaire des salariés (Association for the supplementary retirement scheme for salaried employees).

[19] ARRCO: Association pour le régime de retraite complémentaire des salariés.

[20] The financial affiliation maintains the special scheme and its rules. Its objective is remove pension commitments from the budgets of the companies concerned by the transaction. Unlike inclusion, under affiliation there is no direct link with statutory schemes and the companies, employees and pensioners from the affiliated group. A "screen" structure set up between the companies and the employees from the affiliated sector on the one hand and the statutory schemes on the other makes it possible to ensure that the affiliation process only regulates global financial flows, based on "virtual" transactions. These are virtual, in so far as staff have no legal or administrative connection with the receiving scheme’s institutions and also in so far as the regulation of the special scheme continues to be the only one used for establishing their pension entitlements and revaluing paid pensions.

[20] Ved en finansiel tilslutning bevares særordningen og reglerne herfor. Målet er at trække pensionsforpligtelserne ud af de berørte virksomheders balance. I modsætning til en integration udelukker en tilslutning enhver direkte forbindelse mellem de almindelige ordninger og virksomheder, ansatte og pensionister i den tilsluttede koncern. Ved at sætte vandtætte skotter mellem virksomheder og ansatte i den tilsluttede sektor på den ene side og de almindelige ordninger på den anden medfører tilslutningen kun globale pengestrømme på grundlag af "virtuelle" transaktioner. Virtuelle, fordi medarbejderne hverken har direkte juridiske eller administrative forbindelser med institutionerne under den modtagende ordning, og fordi særordningens regler fortsat er de eneste, der gælder for dem, når deres pensionsrettigheder skal fastsættes, og pensionsudbetalingerne reguleres.

[21] The entitlements specific to the special scheme or "special" entitlements correspond to no more than the difference between the pension entitlements acquired under the RATP special scheme and the portion and corresponding to the benefits provided by statutory provisions or basic rights. The "special" entitlements to the RATP special scheme therefore correspond to the pension rights which are greater than the rights usually provided on a statutory basis. The entitlements specific to the special scheme, or which also will have to be gradually removed in accordance with the reform of special pension schemes (see recital 21 of this Decision) will continue to be the responsibility of the CRP-RATP.

[21] Egne rettigheder ifølge særordningen eller "specifikke" rettigheder svarer i opbygning til forskellen mellem de pensionsrettigheder, der er erhvervet i henhold til RATP’s særordning, og den del, der svarer til de ydelser, som udbetales af den almindelige ordning, eller basisrettigheder. De "specifikke" rettigheder under RATP’s særordning svarer således til de pensionsrettigheder, der går ud over de rettigheder, som normalt følger af de almindelige ordninger. Egne rettigheder under særordningen, som i øvrigt gradvist vil forsvinde i forbindelse med reformen af de særlige pensionsordninger (jf. pkt. 0 i denne beslutning), påhviler fortsat CRP-RATP.

[22] The difference between the cost ratio under the two schemes depends on differences in the level and structure of pay (which has an impact on pension costs) and also demographic differences (for example, a basis of contribution which is proportionally more limited will have an impact on the amount of contributions).

[22] Udsvingene mellem to ordningers udgiftsforhold afhænger dels af forskellene i lønniveau og -struktur (som påvirker pensionsudgifterne) dels af de demografiske forskelle (f.eks. et proportionalt mindre bidragydergrundlag, der påvirker bidragsbeløbet).

[] This information is confidential.

[] Oplysninger, der er omfattet af tavshedspligt.

[24] OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

[24] EFT L 83 af 27.3.1999, s. 1.

[25] Court of Justice judgment in Case C-251/97 France v Commission [1999] ECR I-6639.

[25] Domstolens dom af 5.10.1999 i sag C-251/97, Frankrig mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1999 I, s. 6639, præmis 40.

[26] Court of First Instance judgment in Case T-157/01, Danske Busvognmaend v Commission [2004] ECR II-917.

[26] Førsteinstansrettens dom af 16.3.2004 i sag T-157/01, Danske Busvognmænd mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2004 II, s. 917.

[27] Court of Justice judgment in Case C-237/04, Enirisorse SpA v SotaCRP-RATPbo SpA [2006] ECR I-2843.

[27] Domstolens dom af 23.3.2006 i sag C-237/04, Enirisorse SpA mod Sotacarbo SpA, Sml. 2006 I, s. 2843.

[28] According to the information report presented by Mr Bertrand Auban, Senator, on behalf of the French national committee for finance, budgetary monitoring and economic accounts on 9 July 2008, these pension commitments are assessed at EUR 21 billion.

[28] Ifølge informationsrapport af senator Bertrand Auban for finans-, budgetkontrol- og nationalregnskabsudvalget den 9. juli 2008 anslås disse pensionsforpligtelser til 21 mia. EUR.

[29] Commission Decision 2008/204/EC of 10 October 2007 on the State aid implemented by France in connection with the reform of the arrangements for financing the retirement pensions of civil servants working for La Poste (OJ L 63, 7.3.2008, p. 16).

[29] Kommissionens beslutning 2008/204/EF af 10. oktober 2007 om Frankrigs statsstøtte til en reform af finansieringen af pensionerne til tjenestemandsansatte i Postvæsenet (La Poste) (EUT L 63 af 7.3.2008, s. 16).

[30] Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR I-307, paragraph 41.

[30] Dom af 14.2.1990 i sag C-301/87, Frankrig mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1990 I, s. 307, præmis 41.

[31] See to this effect Case T-55/99 Spain v Commission [2000] ECR II-3207, paragraph 82.

[31] Jf. i den sammenhæng Førsteinstansrettens dom af 20.9.2000 i sag T-55/99, Spanien mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2000 II, s. 3207, præmis 82.

[32] Case C-390/98, H.J. Banks & Co Ltd v The Coal Authority and Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] ECR I-6117, paragraph 33.

[32] Domstolens dom af 20.9.2001 i sag C-390/98, H.J. Banks & Co. Ltd mod The Coal Authority et Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Sml. 2001 I, s. 6117, præmis 33.

[33] See in this context Decision 2008/204/EC mentioned above and the Commission Decision of 10 October 2007 regarding the reform of the financing arrangements for retirement pensions in the banking sector in Greece (OJ C 308, 19.12.2007, p. 9).

[33] Jf. i den sammenhæng ovennævnte beslutning 2008/204/EF og Kommissionens beslutning af 10. oktober 2007 om reformen af finansieringen af pensioner i banksektoren i Grækenland (EUT C 308 af 19.12.2007, s. 9).

[34] See in this context the decisions referred to in the footnote 6.

[34] Jf. i den sammenhæng beslutningerne, der er nævnt i fodnote 32.

[35] See in particular parts 2 and 3 of this decision.

[35] Jf. navnlig denne beslutnings afsnit 2 og 3.

[36] Case C-34/01 Enirisorse SpA v Ministero delle Finanze [2003] ECR I-14243.

[36] Domstolens dom af 27.11.2003 i sag C-34/01, Enirisorse SpA mod Ministero delle Finanze, Sml. 2003 I, s. 14243.

[37] See paragraph 63 of the Community guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty (OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2).

[37] Jf. punkt 63 i Fællesskabets rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte til redning og omstrukturering af kriseramte virksomheder (EUT C 244 af 1.10.2004, s. 2).

[38] Case T-157/01, Danske Busvognmænd v Commission, ECR II-917.

[38] Dom af 16.3.2004 i sag T-157/01, Danske Busvognmænd mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2004II, s. 917.

[39] Case 173/73 Italy v Commission [1974] ECR 709, paragraph 13; Case 310/85 Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901, paragraph 8; Case C-241/94 France v Commission ECR I-4551, paragraph 20.

[39] Domstolens dom af 2.7.1974 i sag 173/73, Italien mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1974, s. 709, præmis 13, Domstolens dom af 24.2.1987 i sag C-310-85 Deufil mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1987, s. 901, præmis 8, Domstolens dom af 26.9.1996 i sag C-241/94 Frankrig mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1996 I, s. 4551, præmis 20.

[40] C-387/92 Banco Exterior [1994] ECR I-877, paragraph 13; aforementioned judgment in Case C-241/94, paragraph 34.

[40] Domstolens dom af 15.3.1994 i sag C-387/92, Banco Exterior, Sml. 1994 I, s. 877, præmis 13, ovennævnte dom i sag C-241/94, præmis 34.

[41] Case C-5/01 Belgium v Commission [2002] ECR I-1191, paragraph 39.

[41] Domstolens dom af 12.12.2002 i sag C-5/01, Belgien mod Kommissionen, Sml.2002 I, s. 1191, præmis39.

[42] Case 30/59 Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority [1961] ECR 3, paragraphs 29 and 30; aforementioned judgment in Case C-173/73, paragraphs 12 and 13; aforementioned judgment in Case C-241/94, paragraphs 29 and 35; Case C-251/97 France v Commission [1999] ECR I-6639, paragraphs 40, 46 and 47.

[42] Domstolens dom af 23.2.1961 i sag 30/59, Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg mod Haute Autorité, Sml.1961, s. 3, præmis 29 og 30, ovennævnte dom i sag C-173/73, præmis 12 og 13, ovennævnte dom i sag C-241/94, præmis 29 og 35, Domstolens dom af 5.10.1999 i sag C-251/97, Frankrig mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1999 I, s. 6639, præmis 40, 46 og 47.

[43] See Case C-156/98 Germany v Commission [2000] ECR I-6857, paragraph 30, and the case law cited therein.

[43] Jf. dom af 19.9.2000 i sag C-156/98, Tyskland mod Kommissionen, Sml. 2000 I, s. 6857, præmis 30, og den anførte retspraksis.

[44] See, for example, Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission ECR 2671, paragraphs 11 and 12; and Case T-214/95 Vlaams Gewest v Commission [1998] ECR II-717, paragraphs 48-50.

[44] Jf. bl.a. Domstolens dom af 17.9.1980 i sag C-730/79, Philip Morris mod Kommissionen, Sml. s. 2671, præmis 11 og 12 samt Førsteinstansrettens dom af 30.4.1998 i sag T-214/95, Vlaams Gewest mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1998 II, s. 717, præmis 48-50.

[45] Case T-222/04 Alitalia v Commission [2009], paragraph 45.

[45] Førsteinstansrettens dom af 11.6.2009 i sag T-222/04, Italien mod Kommissionen, præmis 45.

[46] It is not necessary for the recipient undertaking itself to take part in intra-Community trade. Where a Member State grants aid to an undertaking, domestic production may for that reason be maintained or increased with the result that undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of entering the market in that Member State. Moreover, the strengthening of an undertaking which, until then, did not take part in intra-Community trade may enable it to enter the market of another Member State (see to this effect, in particular, Case C-310/99 Italy v Commission [2002] ECR I-2289, paragraph 84).

[46] NB: Det er ikke nødvendigt, at den støttemodtagende virksomhed selv deltager i samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne. Når en medlemsstat yder støtte til en virksomhed, kan den indenlandske produktion derved blive opretholdt eller forøget med den konsekvens, at chancerne for de virksomheder, der er etableret i de øvrige medlemsstater, for at eksportere deres produkter til denne medlemsstats marked herved bliver formindsket. Desuden kan en styrkelse af en virksomhed, der indtil dette tidspunkt ikke havde taget del i samhandelen mellem medlemsstaterne, bringe den i en position, der ville give den mulighed for at etablere sig på en anden medlemsstats marked (jf. herom bl.a. dom af 7. marts 2002 i sag C-310/99 Italien mod Kommissionen, Sml. 1999 I, s. 2289, præmis 84).

[47] See recital 21 of the present decision.

[47] Jf. pkt. 0 i denne beslutning.

[48] See to this effect the joint Council and Commission report on adequate and sustainable pensions (CS/7165/03), 18 March 2003.

[48] Jf. i den sammenhæng den fælles rapport fra Kommissionen og Rådet om tilstrækkelige og bæredygtige pensioner (CS/7165/03) af 18. marts 2003.

[49] OJ L 49, 22.2.2005, p. 9.

[49] EUT L 49 af 22.2.2005, s. 9.

[50] Commission communication relating to the methodology for analysing State aid linked to stranded costs, (Commission letter SG (2001) D/290869 of 6.8.2001).

[50] Kommissionens meddelelse om analysemetoden for statsstøtte i forbindelse med strandede omkostninger (brev fra Kommissionen SG (2001) D/290869 af 6.8.2001).

[51] The Court ruled as follows in Joined Cases C-159 and C-160/91, Poucet and Pistre: "Sickness funds, and the organizations involved in the management of the public social security system, fulfil an exclusively social function. That activity is based on the principle of national solidarity and is entirely non-profit-making. The benefits paid are statutory benefits bearing no relation to the amount of the contributions. Accordingly, that activity is not an economic activity and, therefore, the organisations to which it is entrusted are not undertakings within the meaning of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty."

[51] Således fastslog Domstolen i de forenede sager C-159 og C-160/91, Poucet og Pistre: "Sygekasserne eller de organer, der medvirker ved administrationen af den offentlige socialsikring, har en rent social funktion. Denne virksomhed bygger på princippet om national solidaritet og drives ikke med vinding for øje. De udbetalte ydelser er fastlagt i lovgivningen og er uafhængige af det beløb, der er betalt i bidrag. Denne virksomhed er således ikke af økonomisk karakter, og de organer, der udfører den, er ikke virksomheder i henhold til traktatens artikel 81 og 82".

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