4.6.2018   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 190/5

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set aside the order under appeal and refer the case back to the General Court in order that it may re-examine the case and give a ruling on the merits, subject to appeal;

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alternatively — if the Court finds that the conditions for giving final judgment are satisfied in the present case — set aside the order under appeal and uphold the forms of order sought at first instance in their entirety;

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order the Commission to pay the costs.

(1)

The General Court infringed the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 53 thereof, through misinterpretation of those provisions. In finding that the concepts of ‘force majeure’ and ‘unforeseeable circumstances’ were identical in terms of their meaning, the General Court infringed the principle of the reasonable legislator. Such a reading of those concepts also runs counter to the aim of Article 45 of the Statute, which is intended to compensate for any differences arising as a result of distance (between the place of residence of the parties and the location of the Court). Consequently, the General Court unreasonably failed to take account of the unforeseeable circumstances preventing the appellant from delivering the (original) paper version of the application on time.

(2)

The General Court infringed Article 126 of its Rules of Procedure of 4 March 2015 by misapplying that provision. Despite there being no grounds for doing so, the General Court applied Article 126 of those Rules, unreasonably declaring the appellant’s action manifestly inadmissible. The General Court’s infringement of that provision was the inevitable and obvious result of its infringement of Article 45 of the Statute, read in conjunction with Article 53 thereof.

(3)

The General Court incorrectly found that the appellant had not proved the existence of unforeseeable circumstances as referred to in the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute. The appellant proved the existence of unforeseeable circumstances. It not only submitted more evidence of those circumstances than was necessary but submitted all the evidence available to it in general. As regards ensuring the timely delivery of the parcel containing the application, the appellant exercised all the diligence that could reasonably be required of it. From the moment of sending the parcel, the appellant ceased to have any influence on its delivery process; from that point, any circumstances affecting the date of delivery were wholly outside the appellant’s control.

(4)

The General Court infringed Article 1, Article 6(1) and Article 14 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, by hindering access to the Court and discriminating between the parties on the basis of their place of residence or establishment. The adoption by the General Court of a single extension on account of distance for all the Member States of the European Union has the effect of hindering access to the Court for parties residing or established at a considerable distance from the location of the Court, including in the provinces of their countries, and consequently constitutes discrimination between parties to proceedings depending on their place of residence.