17.10.2016

Official Journal of the European Union

C 383/26

Action brought on 2 September 2016 — Mylène Troszczynski v Parliament

(Case T-626/16)

(2016/C 383/35)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Applicant: Mylène Troszczynski (Noyon, France) (represented by: M. Ceccaldi, lawyer)

Defendant: European Parliament

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

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annul the decision of the Secretary-General of the European Parliament, dated 23 June 2016, taken pursuant to Articles 33, 43, 62, 67 and 68 of Decision 2009/C 159/01 of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 19 May and 9 July 2008‘concerning implementing measures for the Statute for Members of the European Parliament’ as amended, finding a debt on the part of the applicant amounting to EUR 56 554,00 in respect of amounts overpaid in the context of parliamentary assistance and giving reasons for its recovery under Article 68 of the implementing measures [for the Statute for Members] and Articles 78, 79 and 80 of the Financial Regulation;

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annul debit note No 2016-888, undated, informing the applicant that a debt had been found with respect to her by decision of the General Secretary of 23 June 2016 — recovery of sums overpaid in respect of parliamentary assistance — application of Article 68 of the implementing measures for the Statute for Members and Articles 78, 79 and 80 of the Financial Regulation;

—	order the European Parliament to pay all the costs of the proceedings;

—	order the European Parliament to pay Ms Mylène Troszczynski the sum of EUR 50 000 by way of reimbursement of recoverable costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on two pleas in law.

First plea in law, alleging defects affecting the external legality of the contested acts. This plea is divided into three parts.

—	First part, according to which the Bureau of the European Parliament, and not the Secretary General, has competence with respect to financial decisions affecting political parties and, therefore, the Members.

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Second part, according to which the Bureau of the European Parliament does not have the power to decide on its own competence and, therefore, is unable to modify its nature and scope. The Secretary General fails to show that the President of the Bureau of the European Parliament delegated powers to him enabling him to adopt, sign and notify the contested acts concerning the settlement of financial questions affecting a Member.

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Third part, according to which the author of the contested acts failed to give a statement of reasons. Thus, the justification provided does not cover the factual situation set out in those acts and it contains an irreconcilable contradiction between the complaint that the applicant’s assistant actually carries out two functions concurrently and the complaint that the assistant carries out only one function to the exclusion of any other; only the Secretary General refers to that latter situation.

Second plea in law, alleging defects affecting the internal legality of the contested acts. This plea is divided into nine parts.

—	First part, according to which the events complained of in support of the contested acts did not occur.

—	Second part, according to which the adoption of the contested acts infringed the rules and general principles of law applicable to establishing proof and the burden of proof.

—	Third part, according to which the Secretary General’s decision to recover the sum overpaid infringed the principle of proportionality. The amount claimed is furthermore not justified by either detail or a method of calculation.

—	Fourth part, according to which the contested acts prejudice the political rights of the local assistants of MEPs.

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Fifth part, according to which the contested acts are vitiated by misuse of power, in that the Secretary General assumed compulsion powers of a financial nature which he does not possess for the purpose of restricting a Member’s means of acting, whose ideals and the political agenda it is of undeniable public knowledge he does not share.

—	Sixth part, according to which the contested acts are discriminatory and that these presuppose the intention of causing political damage to the applicant; thus there is a fumus persecutionis.

—	Seventh part, according to which the contested acts prejudice the independence of the applicant in her capacity as MEP.

—	Eighth part, according to which the contested acts violate the principle of ‘electa una via’ and raise question of the impartiality of OLAF which only conducts its investigation by seeking evidence against the party concerned where that party is a French MEP from the Front National’s list.

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Ninth part, according to which the contested acts amount to an infringement of the general legal principle that ‘civil proceedings must await the outcome of criminal proceedings’ in that the proceedings for recovery of overpayment ought to be suspended until the outcome of the other proceedings, in particular the French proceedings, and an infringement of the principle non bis in idem.