20.7.2015

Official Journal of the European Union

C 236/22

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Sächsisches Oberverwaltungsgericht (Germany) lodged on 30 March 2015 — Der Bundesbeauftragte für Asylangelegenheiten v N

(Case C-150/15)

(2015/C 236/31)

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Sächsisches Oberverwaltungsgericht

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Der Bundesbeauftragte für Asylangelegenheiten

Defendant: N

Other party: Federal Republic of Germany

Questions referred

Is Article 9(1)(a) in conjunction with Article 10(1)(b) of Directive 2011/95/EU (1) to be interpreted as follows:

that a severe violation of the freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 10(1) CFREU (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union) and Article 9(1) ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights) and thus an act of persecution under Article 9(1)(a) of the Directive must be assumed when religious acts or expressions of view that are mandated by a doctrine of faith that the applicant actively professes and which form a core element of the doctrine of faith or are based on the religious convictions of the applicant in the sense that they are a pillar of his religious identity, are prohibited by criminal law in the country of origin,

is it required that an applicant who actively declares his belief in a particular doctrine of faith must further prove that core elements mandated as religious acts or as or expressions of view by the doctrine of faith, which represent a prohibited religious activity subject to criminal prosecution in his country of origin, are ‘particularly important’ for the preservation of his religious identity and in this sense are ‘essential’?

Is Article 9(3) in conjunction with Article 2(d) of Directive 2011/95/EU to be interpreted as follows:

that in order to determine a well-founded fear of being persecuted and a real risk of being persecuted or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by one of the actors specified in Article 6 of Directive 2011/95/EU, with regard to religious acts or expressions of view that are mandated by a doctrine of faith that the applicant actively professes and are a core element of the doctrine of faith or are based on the religious convictions of the applicant in the sense that they are a pillar of his religious identity, and are prohibited by criminal law in the country of origin,

it is necessary to evaluate the relationship by comparing the number of members of the applicant’s faith who practice their faith despite the prohibition to the number of actual acts of persecution of these acts of faith in the applicant’s country of origin, including any possible uncertainties or unknowns regarding governmental enforcement practices,

it is sufficient if, in the enforcement of the criminal law in the country of origin, the actual application of the laws threatening prosecution of religious acts or expressions of view that are mandated by a doctrine of faith that the applicant actively professes and which form a core element of the doctrine of faith or are based on the religious convictions of the applicant in the sense that they are a of particular importance for his religious identity can be proved?

Is a provision of national administrative law under which a trial court is bound by the legal judgment of the court of third instance (here: Section 144(6) VwGO (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung) [Administrative Court Procedure Act]) compatible with the principle of the primacy of EU law if the trial court wishes to interpret a standard in EU law differently to the court of third instance but, even after implementation of a preliminary ruling procedure pursuant to Article 267(2) TFEU, is precluded from applying this interpretation of EU law by national law binding the court to the legal analysis of the court of third instance?

(1) Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ L 337, p. 9).