1.

Is Article 82 of the General Data Protection Regulation (1) to be interpreted as meaning that the right to compensation, including the determination of the amount of that compensation, does not have a punitive character, in particular, that it has no general or specific dissuasive function, but a purely compensatory function and, in some instances, a satisfaction function?

2.a

Is the right to compensation for non-material damage to be determined on the basis that it also has an individual satisfaction function — understood here to mean the private interest of the injured party in seeing the behaviour that caused the damage penalised — or does it have only a compensatory function — understood here to mean the function of compensating for the detrimental effects suffered?

2.b.1.

If it is to be assumed that the right to compensation for non-material damage has both a compensatory and a satisfaction function: is it to be determined on the basis that the compensatory function has structural precedence over the satisfaction function or, at least, that the relationship between the two is that of the rule and the exception? Does that mean that it can have a satisfaction function only when the infringement is deliberate or a result of gross negligence?

2.b.2.

If the right to compensation for non-material damage does not have a satisfaction function: when determining that compensation, is additional weight attributed only to deliberate or grossly negligent data protection infringements deemed to be contributory factors?

3.

Is the compensation for non-material damage to be determined on the basis of a structural order of precedence or, at least, a rule-exception relationship, which attributes less weight to the detrimental effects of a data infringement than to the detrimental and painful effects associated with a physical injury?

4.

Assuming that damage has been sustained, can a national court award only minimal compensation, which may be perceived by the injured party or generally as merely symbolic, in the light of the non-serious nature of the damage?

5.

Are the consequences of the compensation for non-material damage to be assessed on the basis that identity theft within the meaning of recital 75 of the General Data Protection Regulation requires an offender to have actually assumed the identity of the person concerned, that is to say to have somehow impersonated that person, or does the mere fact that offenders have gained possession of data that identify the person concerned constitute such identity theft?