1.

Must Article 10(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive (1) be interpreted as meaning that western norms, values and actual conduct which third-country nationals adopt while staying in the territory of the Member State and participating fully in society for a significant part of the phase of their lives in which they form their identity are to be regarded as a common background that cannot be changed or characteristics that are so fundamental to identity that a person should not be forced to renounce them?

2.

If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, are third-country nationals who, irrespective of the reasons, have adopted comparable western norms and values through actual residence in the Member State during the phase of their lives in which they form their identity to be regarded as ‘members of a particular social group’ within the meaning of Article 10(1)(d) of the Qualification Directive? Is the question of whether there is a ‘particular social group that has a distinct identity in the relevant country’ to be assessed from the perspective of the Member State or must this, read in conjunction with Article 10(2) of the Qualification Directive, be interpreted as meaning that decisive weight is given to the ability of the foreign national to demonstrate that he or she is regarded in the country of origin as belonging to a particular social group or, at any rate, that this is attributed to him or her? Is the requirement that Westernisation can lead to refugee status only if it stems from religious or political motives compatible with Article 10 of the Qualification Directive, read in conjunction with the prohibition on refoulement and the right to asylum?

3.

Is a national legal practice whereby a decision-maker, when assessing an application for international protection, weighs up the best interests of the child without first concretely determining (in each procedure) the best interests of the child compatible with EU law and, in particular, with Article 24(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), read in conjunction with Article 51(1) of the Charter? Is the answer to this question different if the Member State has to assess a request for the grant of residence on ordinary grounds and the best interests of the child must be taken into account in deciding on that request?

4.

Having regard to Article 24(2) of the Charter, in which manner and at what stage of the assessment of an application for international protection must the best interests of the child, and, more specifically, the harm suffered by a minor as a result of his or her long residence in a Member State, be taken into account and weighed up? Is it relevant in that regard whether that actual residence was lawful? Is it relevant, when weighing up the best interests of the child in the above assessment, whether the Member State took a decision on the application for international protection within the time limits laid down in EU law, whether a previously imposed obligation to return was not complied with and whether the Member State did not effect removal after a return decision had been issued, as a result of which the minor’s actual residence in the Member State was able to continue?

5.

Is a national legal practice whereby a distinction is made between initial and subsequent applications for international protection, in the sense that ordinary grounds are disregarded in the case of subsequent applications for international protection, compatible with EU law, having regard to Article 7 of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 24(2) thereof?